3 EAST INDIA (TIBET).

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RELATING TO

TIBET

No. III.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No. of Paper.	Document.	Date.	From	To	Subject.	Page.
		1904.				
1	Despatch	April 13	Marquess of Lansdowne.	Sir C. Scott	Conversation with the Russian Ambassador regarding the Mission.	1
2	Telegram	April 28	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Report on situation by Colonel Younghusband.	1
3	Ditto	April 29	Ditto	Ditto	Congratulations from the Dharm Raja of Bhutan on the success at Guru.	2
4	Ditto	April 29	Ditto	Ditto	Communication of Colonel Younghusband's despatch to the Dalai Lama.	3
5	Ditto	May 5	Ditto	Ditto	Occupation of sangars by Tibetans on far side of Karo La.	3
6	Ditto	May 6	Ditto	Ditto	Attack on Mission Camp at Gyangtse.	3
7	Ditto	May 6	Ditto	Ditto	Proposed ultimatum to the Tibetans.	3
8	Ditto	May 7	Ditto	Ditto	Attack on Mission at Gyangtse ...	4
9	Ditto	May 7	Ditto	Ditto	Reply of Dalai Lama to Colonel Younghusband's despatch.	4
10	Ditto	May 8	Ditto	Ditto	Engagement near Karo La	4
11	Ditto	May 9	Ditto	Ditto		5
12	Ditto	May 9	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Enquiry as to cost of Mission and estimated force required for proposed advance to Lhasa.	6
13	Ditto	May 12	Ditto	Ditto	Advance to Lhasa authorised in event of failure to open negotiations at Gyangtse.	6
14	Ditto	May 12	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Estimate of reinforcements required for advance to Lhasa.	7
15	Ditto	May 12	Ditto	Ditto	Report on military situation at Gyangtse.	7
16	Ditto	May 12	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Preparations for advance authorised	8
17	Ditto	May 13	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Ammunition used by Tibetans at Karo La. Attitude of Tibetans and Chinese officials.	8
18	Ditto	May 14	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Date of advance to Lhasa: Requests notification of, when fixed.	8
19	Ditto	May 14	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Report on military situation at Gyangtse. Reinforcements ordered to start.	8
20	Ditto	May 14	Ditto	Ditto	Communication to Amban regarding advance: Instructions to Colonel Younghusband in accordance with No. 13.	9
21	Ditto	May 14	Ditto	Ditto	Report on situation. Attitude of representatives of Lhasa monasteries.	9
22	Ditto	May 14	Ditto	Ditto	Estimate of cost of Mission and reinforcements.	10
23	Ditto	May 15	Ditto	Ditto	Report on military situation at Gyangtse.	10

2000 Wt 9194 1/05 D & S 6 18794

No. of Paper.	Document.	Date.	From	To	Subject.	Page.
		1904.				
24	Telegram	May 15	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Sufficient reinforcements to be made available without delay.	10
25	Ditto	May 17	Ditto	Ditto	Enquiry as to opinion of the Commander-in-Chief regarding sufficiency of reinforcements.	10
26	Ditto	May 18	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Additional guns for advance to Lhasa. (*See* No. 14.)	11
27	Ditto	May 18	Ditto	Ditto	Report on situation at Gyangtse. Mission besieged.	11
28	Ditto	May 18	Ditto	Ditto	Details of reinforcements for Mission. Arrangements considered sufficient by Commander-in-Chief.	11
29	Ditto	May 20	Ditto	Ditto	Probable date of advance to Lhasa. Instructions to Colonel Younghusband regarding communication to be made to the Amban and the Dalai Lama.	11
30	Ditto	May 20	Ditto	Ditto	Report on situation at Gyangtse ...	12
31	Ditto	May 20	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Capture of a Tibetan post north of Gyangtse.	12
32	Ditto	May 21	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Approval of proposed communication to the Amban and the Dalai Lama. (*See* No. 29.)	12
33	Ditto	May 23	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Ambuscade of a Dak patrol by Tibetans.	12
34	Ditto	May 23	Ditto	Ditto	Capture of a village in occupation of Tibetans.	13
35	Ditto	May 24	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Notification of date of advance to Lhasa to His Majesty's Minister at Peking.	13
36	Ditto	May 25	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Reinforcement of Mission by a company of native mounted infantry.	13
37	Ditto	May 25	Marquess of Lansdowne.	Sir E. Satow	Notification to Chinese Government of intended advance in the event of negotiations not being opened at Gyangtse.	13
38	Ditto	May 27	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Reinforcements: Approval of action reported in No. 36.	13
39	Ditto	May 27	Ditto	Ditto	Communication to Chinese Government of decision regarding advance of Mission.	14
40	Ditto	May 28	Ditto	Ditto	Request for information as to position of Mission.	14
41	Ditto	May 30	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Capture and occupation of Palla...	14
42	Ditto	May 30	Ditto	Ditto	Report on situation...	14
43	Ditto	June 2	Marquess of Lansdowne.	Sir C. Hardinge	Communication made to the Russian Ambassador as to policy of His Majesty's Government regarding Tibet.	15
44	Ditto	June 4	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Report on situation at Gyangtse ...	15
45	Ditto	June 5	Ditto	Ditto	Additional troops warned for service. (*See* No. 48.)	15
46	Ditto	June 6	Ditto	Ditto	Interview with the Tongsa Penlop. Reported attitude and intentions of the Dalai Lama.	16
47	Ditto	June 7	Ditto	Ditto	Attacks on Mission posts at Palla and Kangma.	16
48	Ditto	June 7	Ditto	Ditto	Consultation between Colonel Younghusband and General Macdonald.	16

No. of Paper.	Document.	Date.	From	To	Subject.	Page
		1904.				
49	Telegram	June 7	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Delivery of ultimatum to Tibetans. Tibetan request for an armistice.	16
50	Ditto	June 7	Ditto	Ditto	Communication made by the Tongsa Penlop to the Dalai Lama. Reported presence of Tibetan delegate at Shigatse.	17
51	Ditto	June 9	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Enquiry regarding ammunition used by troops.	17
52	Ditto	June 9	Ditto	Ditto	Approval of date of advance of Mission. (*See* No. 49.)	17
53	Ditto	June 10	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Report on situation. Condition of wounded officers.	18
54	Ditto	June 14	Ditto	Ditto	Ammunition issued to troops ...	18
55	Despatch	June 14	Marquess of Lansdowne.	Sir C. Hardinge	Conversation with the Russian Ambassador. Denial of existence of any Russo-Tibetan treaty.	18
56	Telegram	June 15	Sir E. Satow	Marquess of Lansdowne.	Notification to Chinese Government as to intended advance on failure of Tibetans to open negotiations.	19
57	Ditto	June 16	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Enquiry regarding movements of Colonel Younghusband and General Macdonald.	19
58	Ditto	June 17	Ditto	Ditto	Enquiry regarding casualties and sickness.	19
59	Ditto	June 19	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Movements of Colonel Younghusband and General Macdonald. (*See* No. 57.)	19
60	Ditto	June 20	Ditto	Ditto	Return of casualties and sickness	20
61	Despatch	June 20	Sir C. Hardinge	Marquess of Lansdowne.	Conversation between the British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh and Count Lamsdorff as to non-existence of any Russian treaty with or about Tibet.	20
62	Telegram	June 24	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Friendly attitude of local people ...	20
63	Ditto	June 24	Ditto	Ditto	Postponement of advance till 30th June in view of reported departure of Tibetan delegates for Gyangtse.	21
64	Ditto	June 24	Ditto	Ditto	Proposed advance of Mission on 30th June.	21
65	Ditto	June 25	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Approval of postponement of advance.	21
66	Ditto	June 26	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Summary of letter from Government of India containing proposals as to the terms of settlement.	22
67	Ditto	June 27	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Terms of Settlement: No suggestion regarding British Resident at Lhasa to be made by Colonel Younghusband.	23
68	Ditto	June 28	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Capture of Niani village from the Tibetans.	23
69	Ditto	June 29	Ditto	Ditto	Capture of Tibetan position on left bank of river Gyangtse.	23
70	Ditto	June 29	Ditto	Ditto	Reinforcement of General Macdonald's force.	23
71	Ditto	June 30	Ditto	Ditto	Grant of armistice at request of Tibetans.	24
72	Ditto	July 2	Ditto	Ditto	Arrival of Tibetan delegates at Gyangtse.	24
73	Ditto	July 3	Ditto	Ditto	Reported anxiety of Tibetan delegates for a settlement.	25

No. of Paper.	Document.	Date.	From	To	Subject.	Page.
		1904.				
74	Telegram	July 4	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Approval of Colonel Younghusband's attitude towards delegates.	25
75	Ditto	July 4	Ditto	Ditto	Interview with the delegates. Demand for evacuation of Gyangtse Jong.	25
76	Ditto	July 4	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Terms of Settlement: No conditions to be named by Colonel Younghusband without sanction of His Majesty's Government (*See* No. 66.)	25
77	Ditto	July 5	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Commencement of operations against Gyangtse Jong.	26
78	Ditto	July 6	Ditto	Ditto	Attitude of Tibetan delegates ...	26
79	Ditto	July 6	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Instructions regarding terms to be named to Tibetans. (*See* No 66.)	26
80	Ditto	July 7	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Capture of Gyangtse Jong... ...	27
81	Ditto	July 7	Ditto	Ditto	Communication to Tibetan delegates regarding advance of Mission in the event of their non-appearance.	27
82	Ditto	July 8	Ditto	Ditto	Capture of Gyangtse Jong: List of further casualties.	28
83	Ditto	July 8	Ditto	Ditto	Report on situation: Attitude of the Bhutanese.	28
84	Ditto	July 9	Ditto	Ditto	Arrival of column at Dongtse ...	28
85	Ditto	July 10	Ditto	Ditto	Decision regarding advance to Lhasa. Instructions to Colonel Younghusband.	28
86	Ditto	July 11	Ditto	Ditto	Reconnaissance to Penan Jong ...	29
87	Ditto	July 11	Ditto	Ditto	Terms of Settlement: Reply of the Government of India to Colonel Younghusband's request for instructions in event of advance being opposed.	29
88	Ditto	July 11	Ditto	Ditto	Terms of Settlement: Desirability of stipulations against cession of Tibetan territory, grant of concessions, assignment of revenues, erection of fortifications. Question of trade mart at Gartok. Settlement of boundary disputes.	30
89	Ditto	July 12	Ditto	Ditto	Gunpowder explosion: Casualties, 1st Battalion Royal Fusiliers.	30
90	Ditto	July 13	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Terms of Settlement: Approval of instructions to Colonel Younghusband reported in No. 87. Pending receipt of orders, no increased demands, save in respect of indemnity, to be made.	31
91	Ditto	July 13	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Terms of Settlement: Request for decision on points raised in No. 87. Construction of communications through Chumbi Valley. Question of demanding right of access to Lhasa for Trade Agent at Gyangtse.	31
92	Ditto	July 13	Ditto	Ditto	Return of column from Dongtse ...	31
93	Ditto	July 14	Ditto	Ditto	Preparations for advance completed.	32
94	Ditto	July 16	Ditto	Ditto	Report on situation. Communication to the Dalai Lama and delegates regarding advance and terms of settlement.	32

No. of Paper.	Document.	Date.	From	To	Subject.	Page.
		1904.				
95	Telegram	July 18	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Communications from the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan delegates regarding negotiations.	32
96	Ditto	July 18	Ditto	Ditto	Arrival of Mission at Ralung. Condition of wounded officers.	33
97	Letter	June 30 (received July 19).	Government of India.	Ditto	Terms of settlement: Views of the Government of India.	33
98	Telegram	July 20	Viceroy	Ditto	Suggested communication to Chinese Government regarding special instructions to the Amban.	40
99	Ditto	July 21	Ditto	Ditto	Engagement with Tibetans at Karo La	40
100	Ditto	July 21	Ditto	Ditto	Gunpowder explosion: Further casualty.	40
101	Ditto	July 21	Marquess of Lansdowne.	Sir E. Satow	Chinese Government to be approached regarding special instructions to Amban.	40
102	Ditto	July 22	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Strength of column proceeding to Lhasa.	40
103	Ditto	July 25	Ditto.	Ditto	Advance of Mission to Yarsig ...	41
104	Ditto	July 25	Ditto	Ditto	Terms of settlement. Proposed embodiment of, in a Convention with Tibet and recognition of same in a separate Agreement with China.	41
105	Ditto	July 25	Ditto	Ditto	Arrival of Mission at Nagartse. Refusal of Tibetan delegates to discuss terms.	41
106	Ditto	July 26	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Terms of settlement. Decision of His Majesty's Government regarding modification of.	42
107	Ditto	July 26	Ditto	Ditto	Approval of proposed embodiment of terms in Anglo-Tibetan Convention. (*See* No. 104.)	43
108	Ditto	July 27	Sir E. Satow	Marquess of Lansdowne.	Instructions sent by Chinese Government to the Amban to assist in settlement.	43
109	Ditto	July 27	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Progress of the Mission	44
110	Ditto	July 29	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Despatch of special instructions from the Chinese Government to the Amban. (*See* No. 108.)	44
111	Ditto	August 1	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Receipt of letter from the Tibetan National Assembly promising negotiations.	44
112	Ditto	August 1	Ditto	Ditto.	Terms of settlement: Proposed conditions regarding right of access to Lhasa for Trade Agent at Gyangtse, and construction of communications in Chumbi Valley.	44
113	Ditto	August 2	Ditto	Ditto	Progress of the Mission. Passage of the Brahmaputra. Death of Major Bretherton.	45
114	Ditto	August 3.	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy.	Terms of settlement. Decision of His Majesty's Government on the question of demanding right of access to Lhasa for Trade Agent at Gyangtse, and construction of communications in the Chumbi Valley.	45
115	Despatch.	August 5.	Ditto	Government of India.	Terms of settlement: Views of His Majesty's Government.	45
116	Telegram.	August 5.	Viceroy.	Secretary of State for India.	Condition of wounded officers ...	48

No. of Paper.	Document.	Date.	From	To	Subject.	Page
		1904.				
117	Telegram.	August 5	Viceroy.	Secretary of State for India.	Progress of the Mission: Crossing of the Brahmaputra.	48
118	Ditto	August 6	Ditto	Ditto	Communications received by Col. Younghusband from the Dalai Lama and Amban.	48
119	Ditto	August 6	Ditto	Ditto	Arrival of Mission at Lhasa. Flight of the Dalai Lama.	49
120	Ditto	August 8	Ditto	Ditto	Arrival of Mission at Lhasa ...	49
121	Ditto	August 11	Ditto	Ditto	Report on situation at Lhasa ...	49
122	Ditto	August 13	Ditto	Ditto	Instructions to Colonel Younghusband regarding supplies and looting.	50
123	Ditto	August 14	Ditto	Ditto	Report on situation at Lhasa. Attitude of Tibetans.	50
124	Letter	July 28 (received August 15)	Government of India.	Ditto	Forwarding correspondence ...	50
125	Telegram	August 15	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Instructions to Colonel Younghusband regarding date of return of force from Lhasa and looting. (*See* No. 122.)	51
126	Ditto	August 17	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Supplies to Mission at Lhasa ...	51
127	Ditto	August 18	Ditto	Ditto	Report on situation at Lhasa. Reply of Tibetans to terms.	51
128	Ditto	August 20	Ditto	Ditto	Reconnaissances to Pemba Gong La and Kichu.	51
129	Ditto	August 20	Ditto	Ditto	Report on situation at Lhasa. Reply of Tibetans to terms.	52
130	Ditto	August 23	Ditto	Ditto	Release of Lachung prisoners. Amban's proposal to denounce Dalai Lama to Chinese Government.	52
131	Ditto	August 25	Ditto	Ditto	Report on situation at Lhasa. Negotiations with the Acting Regent.	53
132	Ditto	August 25	Ditto	Ditto	Amban's proposal to denounce the Dalai Lama to the Chinese Government.	53
133	Ditto	August 26	Ditto	Ditto	Attack on Captains Kelly and Young, I.M.S.	53
134	Ditto	August 27	Ditto	Ditto	Report on situation at Lhasa. Second reply of the Tibetans to terms.	54
135	Ditto	August 28	Sir E. Satow	Marquess of Lansdowne.	Issue of a Chinese Imperial Decree degrading Dalai Lama.	54
136	Ditto	August 28	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Enquiry made at Peking regarding denunciation of the Dalai Lama.	54
137	Ditto	August 29	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Hostages for attack on Medical Officers. Question of Trade Regulations.	55
138	Letter (with an enclosure).	August 11 (received August 29)	Government of India.	Ditto	Draft Convention with Tibet ...	55
139	Telegram	August 30	Viceroy	Ditto	Indemnity: Suggestion of Colonel Younghusband that amount should be reduced in return for trade facilities in Eastern Tibet.	57
140	Ditto	August 31	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Enquiry regarding trade at proposed mart in Eastern Tibet. (*See* No. 139.)	58

No. of Paper.	Document.	Date.	From	To	Subject.	Page.
		1904.				
141	Telegram	Aug. 31	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Indemnity and proposed additional trade facilities in Eastern Tibet: Views of His Majesty's Government.	58
142	Ditto	Sept. 1	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Report on situation at Lhasa ...	58
143	Ditto	Sept. 2	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy.	Approval of Draft Convention ...	58
144	Ditto	Sept. 2	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Proposed trade mart in Eastern Tibet. Reply to No. 140 regarding amount of trade.	59
145	Ditto	Sept. 3	Ditto	Ditto	Gartok: Proposed deputation of Captain Rawling and Lieutenant Bailey to establish trade mart.	59
146	Ditto	Sept. 3	Ditto	Ditto	Report on situation at Lhasa ...	59
147	Ditto	Sept. 5	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Trade mart in Eastern Tibet. Decision of His Majesty's Government.	60
148	Ditto	Sept. 7	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Report on situation at Lhasa. Progress of negotiations.	60
149	Ditto	Sept. 8	Ditto	Ditto	Precedents for deposition of Dalai Lama.	60
150	Ditto	Sept. 10	Colonel Younghusband.	Ditto	Signature of Convention ...	61
151	Ditto	Sept. 12	Viceroy	Ditto		61
152	Ditto	Sept. 13	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Congratulations on the conclusion of the Convention.	62
153	Ditto	Sept. 13	Ditto	Ditto	Provisions of Convention as to indemnity and occupation of the Chumbi Valley: Inconsistency of provisions with instructions of His Majesty's Government as to reduction of indemnity.	62
154	Ditto	Sept. 14	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Indemnity: Proposals of the Government of India for the remission of part of, on ratification of Convention.	62
155	Ditto	Sept. 16	Ditto	Ditto	Indemnity: Colonel Younghusband's opinion regarding amount.	63
156	Ditto	Sept. 16	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Indemnity. Occupation of the Chumbi Valley. Decision of His Majesty's Government.	63
157	Ditto	Sept. 17	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Arrangements for Colonel Younghusband to remain at Lhasa after withdrawal of main force.	64
158	Ditto	Sept. 17	Ditto	Ditto	Release of prisoners and hostages, and remission of fines.	64
159	Ditto	Sept. 17	Ditto	Ditto	Reduction in garrisons of posts and withdrawal of troops from lines of communication.	65
160	Ditto	Sept. 18	Ditto	Ditto	Indemnity: Enquiry regarding amount proposed to be remitted.	65
161	Ditto	Sept. 18	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Sanction to Colonel Younghusband remaining behind at Lhasa to negotiate amendment of Convention.	65
162	Ditto	Sept. 18	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Anglo-Chinese Adhesion Agreement: Despatch of instructions to Amban not to sign.	65
163	Ditto	Sept. 19	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Indemnity: Reduction of, to Rs. 25 lakhs.	66

No. of Paper.	Document.	Date	From	To	Subject.	Page.
164	Telegram	1904. Sept. 23	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Indemnity : Telegram from Colonel Younghusband deprecating alterations, at Lhasa, of terms of settlement.	66
165	Ditto	Sept. 24	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Indemnity : Provisions regarded as contravention of instructions of His Majesty's Government.	67
166	Ditto	Sept. 24	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Colonel Younghusband's visits to Depung and Sera monasteries. Reported intention of Dalai Lama to return to Lhasa after departure of Mission.	67
167	Ditto	Sept, 27	Sir E. Satow	Marquess of Lansdowne.	Anglo-Chinese Adhesion Agreement : Appointment of Commissioner T'ang to proceed to Tibet.	67
168	Ditto	Sept. 30	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Visits and receptions prior to departure of Mission from Lhasa. Councillors' assurances regarding intention to carry out Convention.	68
169	Ditto	Sept. 30	Ditto	Ditto	Indemnity. Occupation of Chumbi Valley. Colonel Younghusband's reply to instructions regarding alteration of provisions of Convention.	68
170	Ditto	October 3	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Indemnity. Ocupation of the Chumbi Valley. Orders as to amendment of Convention on ratification. Views of His Majesty's Government regarding Colonel Younghusband's action.	69
171	Ditto	October 5	Sir E. Satow	Marquess of Lansdowne.	Anglo-Chinese Adhesion Agreement : Appointment of Commissioner T'ang by the Chinese Government.	69
172	Ditto	October 7	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Withdrawal of Mission. Arrival of first Lhasa column at Gyangtse.	70
173	Ditto	October 13	Ditto	Ditto	Withdrawal of Mission. Departure of troops from Gyangtse.	70
174	Ditto	October 14	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Enquiry regarding retention of troops at Gyangtse.	70
175	Ditto	October 21	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Indemnity. Occupation of the Chumbi Valley. Proposals regarding amendment of Convention.	70
176	Ditto	October 21	Ditto	Ditto	Retention of troops at Gyangtse for Trade Agent's escort.	71
177	Ditto	October 21	Ditto	Ditto	Reception of party proceeding to Gartok by the Tashi Lama at Shigatse.	71
178	Ditto	October 23	Ditto	Ditto	Gyangtse Trade Mart arrangements. Friendly attitude of Tibetans.	71
179	Ditto	October 24	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Retention of troops at Gyangtse for Trade Agent's escort. Approval of proposals.	72
180	Ditto	October 26	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Captain O'Connor's interview with the Tashi Lama at Shigatse.	72
181	Ditto	October 30	Ditto	Ditto	Party proceeding to Gartok : Arrival at Poonchaling.	72
182	Letter (with an enclosure).	October 6 (received October 31).	Government of India.	Ditto	Convention : Observations regarding Colonel Younghusband's conduct of the negotiations. Separate Agreement signed on the 7th September giving Trade Agent at Gyangtse right of proceeding to Lhasa.	72

No. of Paper.	Document.	Date.	From	To	Subject.	Page.
		1904.				
183	Telegram.	Nov. 2	Sir E. Satow	Marquess of Lansdowne.	Anglo-Chinese Adhesion Agreement. Enquiry regarding place of negotiation.	76
184	Ditto	Nov. 7	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy	Amendment of Convention. Decision of His Majesty's Government in respect of provisions as to indemnity and occupation of Chumbi Valley. Disallowance of separate Agreement giving Trade Agent at Gyangtse right of access to Lhasa.	77
185	Ditto	Nov. 11	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Ratification of the Convention ...	77
186	Ditto	Nov. 11	Marquess of Lansdowne.	Sir E. Satow	Anglo-Chinese Adhesion Agreement: Selection of Calcutta as place of negotiation.	77
187	Ditto	Nov. 14	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy		77
188	Ditto	Nov. 21	Viceroy	Secretary of State for India.	Anglo-Chinese Adhesion Agreement. Suggested communication to Chinese Government regarding place of negotiation.	78
189	Letter (with an enclosure).	Oct. 27 (received Nov. 21).	Government of India.	Ditto	Convention: Observations on Colonel Younghusband's explanatory memorandum regarding his conduct of the negotiations.	78
190	Telegram	Nov. 25	Marquess of Lansdowne.	Sir E. Satow	Anglo-Chinese Adhesion Agreement. Suggested communication to Chinese Government regarding place of negotiation.	84
191	Ditto	Nov. 26	Sir E. Satow	Marquess of Lansdowne.	Anglo-Chinese Adhesion Agreement. Date of Commissioner T'ang's probable arrival at Calcutta.	84
192	Ditto	Nov. 29	Secretary of State for India.	Viceroy		84
193	Despatch	Dec. 2	Ditto	Government of India.	Review	84
194	Letter (with 3 enclosures).	Nov. 17 (received Dec. 5).	Government of India.	Secretary of State for India.	Convention. Forwarding copy of, as ratified, with declarations regarding reduction of indemnity and the separate Agreement communicated to the Tibetan Government. Colonel Younghusband's final report on the results of the Mission.	86

PART II.

Correspondence received from the Government of India.

Enclosures to Letter from the Government of India, dated 30th June, 1904 (Part I., No. 97).

No. of Paper.	Document.	Date.	From	To	Subject.	Page.
		1904.				
1	Telegram	March 21	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Military arrangements for advance to Gyangtse. Road blasting accident.	95
2	Letter (with an annexure).	March 21	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Letter from the Viceroy to the Amban on his appointment.	95
3	Telegram	March 23	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Military arrangements for advance to Gyangtse.	96
4	Ditto	March 23	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Postponement of advance at request of Captain Parr	96
5	Diary	March 7–13	Ditto	Ditto	Political Diary of the Commission	96
6	Letter (with an annexure).	March 21	Ditto	Ditto	Advance to Gyangtse: Letter to Amban.	97
7	Telegram	March 24	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Advance to Gyangtse: Military movements.	98
8	Ditto	March 25	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Information regarding Tibetan forces. Situation at Lhasa.	98
9	Ditto	March 26	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Advance to Gyangtse: Military movements.	98
10	Letter (with 3 annexures).	March 13	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Negotiations with the Bhutanese Envoy. The Amo-Chu road.	99
11	Diary	March 16-20	Ditto	Ditto	Political Diary of the Commission	100
12	Telegram	March 28	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General.	Arrival of Mission at Tang La ...	101
13	Ditto	March 28	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Reconnaissance towards Guru ...	101
14	Ditto	March 28	Ditto	Ditto	Amban's efforts towards settlement. Tibetan forces.	101
15	Ditto	March 29	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Arrival of Mission at Thuna ...	102
16	Ditto	March 31	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Engagement with Tibetans at Guru	102
17	Ditto	March 31	Ditto	Ditto		102
18	Ditto	March 31	Ditto	Ditto		102
19	Ditto	March 31	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General		103
20	Ditto	April 1	Ditto.	Ditto		104
21	Ditto	April 1	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.		104

No. of Paper.	Document.	Date.*	From	To	Subject.	Page.
22	Telegram	1904. April 3	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Reconnaissance to Hram. Retreat of Tibetan forces.	104
23	Ditto	April 3	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Receipt of letter from Amban. (For text, *see* Enclosure 45.)	104
24	Ditto	April 4	Ditto	Ditto	Arrival of Amban's delegate at Guru.	105
25	Ditto	April 4	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Military movements. Intelligence from Amban's delegate regarding collection of Tibetan forces at Lhasa.	105
26	Ditto	April 6	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	No serious opposition between Kala Tso and Gyangtse anticipated. Friendly attitude of people.	105
27	Ditto	April 6	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Arrival at Kalasanga. Reported presence of Tibetan force at Samunda.	105
28	Ditto	April 6	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Return of villagers to their homes	106
29	Ditto	April 6	Ditto	Ditto	Alleged orders to Tibetans at Guru. (*See* Nos. 16–21.)	106
30	Ditto	April 6	Ditto	Ditto	Arrangements for communication with Mission.	106
31	Ditto	April 7	Ditto	Ditto	Confiscation by Lhasa Government of property of Tibetan Generals killed at Guru.	106
32	Ditto	April 6 (7)	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Engagement with Tibetans at Samunda.	107
33	Ditto	April 5 (8)	Ditto	Ditto	Arrival at Salu. Retreat of Tibetans after engagement at Samunda.	107
34	Letter	April 1	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Engagement with Tibetans at Guru. Detailed report.	107
35	Telegram	April 9 (10)	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Reconnaissance of Tibetan position south of Kangma. Retreat of Tibetans.	109
36	Diary	March 22–27	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Political Diary of the Commission	110
37	Letter (with 2 annexures).	April 12	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Purchase of Tibetan books and MSS. for Government. Rs. 10,000 allotted.	111
38	Telegram	April 11 (13)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Arrival of Mission at Gyangtse ...	112
39	Ditto	April 11 (13)	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Engagement with Tibetans at Jamdam previous to arrival at Gyangtse.	112
40	Ditto	April 12 (14)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Report on situation at Gyangtse. Friendly attitude of people.	113
41	Ditto	April 14	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Congratulations on arrival of Mission at Gyangtse.	113
42	Diary	March 28–April 3	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Political Diary of the Commission	114
43	Telegram	April 14	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Surrender of Gyangtse and occupation of fort.	116
44	Ditto	April 16	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Participation of Gyangtse monks in Guru engagement. Interview with Abbot and monks.	116
45	Letter (with an annexure).	April 7	Ditto	Ditto	Letter dated 27th March, from the Amban. (*See* Enclosure 23.)	117
46	Letter	April 8	Assistant to the Commissioner.	Colonel Younghusband.	Friendly attitude of the Chumbi Valley people, and their satisfaction at defeat of Tibetans at Guru.	118
47	Telegram	April 16 (18)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Non-appearance of delegates. Reported intended flight of Dalai Lama.	118

* In cases where the date of the communication differs from the date of its despatch from the nearest telegraph station the latter date is enclosed within brackets.

No. of Paper.	Document.	Date.*	From	To	Subject.	Page.
		1904.				
48	Telegram	April 16 (20)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Receipt of congratulatory letters from Tongsa Penlop and Timpuk Jongpen on British success at Guru.	119
49	Ditto	April 18 (20)	Ditto	Ditto	Situation at Gyangtse. Status of delegates.	119
50	Ditto	April 20 (21)	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Strength of Gyangtse garrison ...	119
51	Ditto	April 22	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Receipt of letter from Amban promising to arrive at Gyangtse within three weeks. Report on situation. (*See* Enclosure 68.)	119
52	Ditto	April 22 (23)	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Supply arrangements for Gyangtse	120
53	Ditto	April 24	Ditto	Ditto	Gyangtse communication arrangements.	120
54	Ditto	April 22 (24)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Report on situation	121
55	Letter	April 20	Assistant to the Commissioner.	Colonel Younghusband.	Amban's expected departure for Gyangtse: Interview with Colonel Chao.	122
56	Diary	April 4–10	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Political Diary of the Commission	122
57	Telegram	April 25 (27)	Ditto	Ditto	Congratulations from the Dharm Raja of Bhutan on the British success. (*See* Enclosure 88.)	123
58	Letter (with an annexure).	April 16	Ditto	Ditto	Despatch, dated 3rd April, to the Amban regarding engagement at Guru.	124
59	Ditto	April 16	Ditto	Ditto	Despatch, dated 15th April, to the Amban regarding the latter's non-arrival at Gyangtse and participation of monks in Guru engagement.	124
60	Telegram	April 26 (28)	Ditto	Ditto	Receipt of letter from Amban in reply to despatch referred to in above. (*See* Enclosure 74.)	125
61	Ditto	April 29	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Gyangtse communication and supply arrangements. Reported presence of Tibetan forces on the Karo La.	125
62	Ditto	April 25 (27)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Tashi Lama's representations on behalf of Gyangtse monks.	125
63	Ditto	April 23 (30)	Ditto	Ditto	Despatch of letter to Amban expressing disappointment at his non-arrival at Gyangtse. (*See* Enclosure 63.)	126
64	Ditto	April 23 (30)	Ditto	Ditto	Attitude of Shigatse people ...	126
65	Diary	April 11–17	Ditto	Ditto	Political Diary of the Commission	126
66	Telegram	May 1 (3)	Ditto	Ditto	Location of Tibetan force near Karo La. Supplies from Gyangtse monastery.	128
67	Ditto	May 3	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General		128
68	Letter (with 2 annexures).	April 23	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Despatch, dated 17th April, from Amban, and reply thereto, regarding Guru engagement, &c.	128
69	Telegram	May 5	Ditto	Ditto	Attack on Mission at Gyangtse. Advisability of immediate action.	130
70	Ditto	May 6	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Instructions in reply to above, regarding attitude pending consideration of representations.	130
71	Ditto	May 5	Officer Commanding, Gyangtse.	Chief Staff Officer	Attack on Mission at Gyangtse ...	130
72	Ditto	May 2 (5)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Tibetan force at Karo La: Colonel Brander's proposed movement against.	131

* *See* note on previous page.

No. of Paper.	Document.	Date.*	From	To	Subject.	Page.
73	Telegram	1904. May 3 (5)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Reply of Dalai Lama to Colonel Younghusband's despatch. (*See* Enclosure 95.)	131
74	Letter (with an annexure).	April 26	Ditto	Ditto	Letter, dated 23rd April, from the Amban referred to in Enclosure 60.	131
75	Telegram	May 7 (8)	Ditto	Ditto	Engagement near Karo La ...	132
76	Ditto	May 8	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General		132
77	Ditto	May 8	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Instructions regarding General Macdonald's control of operations, &c., during period of active opposition.	133
78	Ditto	May 6 (8)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Opposition of Lhasa Lamas to settlement. Occupation of Gyangtse monastery by Tibetan troops.	133
79	Ditto	May 7 (8)	Ditto	Ditto	Attempted organization of further attack on Mission.	133
80	Ditto	May 6 (9)	Ditto	Ditto	Report on situation at Gyangtse ...	133
81	Ditto	May 8 (9)	Ditto	Ditto	Pursuit of Tibetans after Karo La engagement. Murder of Captain Parr's servants.	134
82	Ditto	May 10	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Military situation at Gyangtse. Information regarding Tibetan forces. Despatch of reinforcements.	134
83	Ditto	May 9 (10)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Situation at Gyangtse. Anticipated arrival of force under Colonel Brander.	134
84	Ditto	May 9 (10)	Ditto	Ditto	Chinese officials' cognizance of intended attack on Mission.	135
85	Ditto	May 9 (10)	Ditto	Ditto	Return of force from Karo La. Friendly attitude of people. Continued opposition of Lamas.	135
86	Ditto	May 10 (11)	Ditto	Ditto	Chinese delegate's cognizance of intended attack. Murder of Captain Parr's and Mission servants.	135
87	Diary	April 18–24	Ditto	Ditto	Political Diary of the Commission	135
88	Letter (with 2 annexures).	April 27	Ditto	Ditto	Letter from the Dharm Raja of Bhutan, referred to in Enclosure 57, and reply thereto.	137
89	Telegram	May 11	General Officer Commanding, Chumbi.	Adjutant-General	Military situation at Gyangtse. Further particulars regarding Karo La engagement.	138
90	Ditto	May 11 (12)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Tibetan reinforcements for Gyangtse.	139
91	Ditto	May 11 (12)	Ditto	Ditto	Representations to Amban from Lhasa monasteries as to power of Dalai Lama to ratify treaty.	139
92	Ditto	May 10	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Presence of Chinese at Karo La engagement. Chinese delegate's cognizance of intended attack.	139
93	Ditto	May 13	Ditto	Ditto	Situation at Gyangtse. Tibetan reinforcements. Military arrangements.	140
94	Ditto	May 13	Ditto	Ditto		140
95	Letter (with an annexure).	May 3	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Amban's letter, dated 29th April, referred to in Enclosure 73. Dalai Lama's reply regarding participation of monks in Guru engagement.	140
96	Telegram	May 13 (14)	Ditto	Ditto	Retreat of Tibetans after Karo La engagement.	141

* *See* note on page xiii.

No. of Paper.	Document.	Date.*	From	To	Subject.	Page.
		1904.				
97	Telegram	May 14 (15)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Reports on situation at Gyangtse. Mission beseiged.	141
98	Ditto	May 15	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General.		141
99	Diary	April 25–1 May	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Political Diary of the Commission	141
100	Telegram	May 15	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General.	Reinforcements for Gyangtse. Reports on situation.	143
101	Ditto	May 12	Ditto	Ditto		143
102	Ditto	May 14	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Communication to be made to Amban regarding advance in event of failure to open negotiations.	143
103	Ditto	May 16	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Report on situation at Gyangtse ...	144
104	Ditto	May 16 (17)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Inability to communicate with Amban as directed in Enclosure 102.	144
105	Ditto	May 16 (17)	Ditto	Ditto	Tibetan reinforcements for Gyangtse	144
106	Ditto	May 17	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Arrival of convoy at Gyangtse. Tibetan reinforcements for Gyangtse.	144
107	Ditto	May 19	Ditto	Ditto	Capture of Tibetan post at Gyangtse	145
108	Ditto	May 8	Commander-in-Chief.	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Control of operations during period of active opposition. Instructions.	145
109	Ditto	May 14	Ditto	Ditto	Advance to Lhasa. Enquiry and reply regarding possible date.	145
110	Ditto	May 15	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Commander-in-Chief.		145
111	Ditto	May 18	Ditto	Government of India.	Report on situation at Gyangtse ...	146
112	Ditto	May 20	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Advance of Mission: Necessity of notification to Dalai Lama and Amban.	146
113	Ditto	May 20	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Government of India.	Gyangtse. Ambuscade of dâk patrol.	146
114	Ditto	May 21	Ditto	Adjutant-General	Non-arrival of Gyangtse mails at Chengra.	146
115	Ditto	May 22	Ditto	Ditto	Capture of village in occupation of Tibetans. Lieutenant Hodgson wounded.	147
116	Ditto	May 22	Ditto	Ditto	Arrival of Gyangtse convoy at Kangma.	147
117	Ditto	May 23	Ditto	Ditto	Reinforcements for Gyangtse: Departure from Kangma.	147
118	Diary	May 2–8	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Political Diary of the Commission	147
119	Telegram	May 21	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Tongsa Penlop's intended visit to Chumbi.	149
120	Ditto	May 26	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Acceptance of Tongsa Penlop's good offices towards settlement.	149
121	Ditto	May 27	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Military movements. Strength of Gyangtse garrison.	150
122	Ditto	May 28	Ditto	Ditto	Military arrangements on line of communications.	150
123	Ditto	May 28 (29)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Amban's inability to obtain transport from Tibetans. Tibetan reinforcements for Gyangtse.	151
124	Ditto	May 27	Ditto	Ditto	Letter from Dalai Lama to Tongsa Penlop. (*See* Enclosure 156.)	151

* *See* note on page xiii.

No. of Paper.	Document.	Date.*	From	To	Subject.	Page.
125	Telegram	1904. May 29	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Arrival of reinforcements for Gyangtse. Engagements at Niani and Palla.	151
126	Diary	May 9–15	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Political Diary of the Commission	152
127	Telegram	June 1	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Reconnaissances towards Gyangtse. Military movements.	153
128	Ditto	June 2	Assistant to the Commissioner.	Government of India.	Arrival of Tongsa Penlop	153
129	Ditto	June 2	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Reconnaissances towards Gyangtse	153
130	Ditto	June 3	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Further attack on Mission at Gyangtse.	154
131	Ditto	June 2 (3)	Ditto	Ditto	Situation at Gyangtse. Number of Tibetan forces.	154
132	Ditto	May 30 (June 3)	Ditto	Ditto	Further attack on Mission at Gyangtse.	154
133	Ditto	June 2 (3)	Ditto	Ditto	Delivery of ultimatum to Tibetans. Tibetan request for an armistice. (*See* Enclosure 154.)	154
134	Ditto	June 3	Assistant to the Commissioner.	Ditto	Interview with the Tongsa Penlop. Reported attitude and intentions of the Tibetans.	155
135	Ditto	June 3	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Report on situation at Gyangtse ...	155
136	Ditto	June 5	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Request for views on general situation.	156
137	Ditto	June 5 (6)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Intelligence regarding strength and movements of Tibetan forces.	156
138	Ditto	June 6	Assistant to the Commissioner.	Ditto	Despatch of letters from Tongsa Penlop to Dalai Lama and Ta Lama. Situation at Gyangtse. Military movements.	156
139	Ditto	June 6	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General.		156
140	Ditto	June 7	Ditto	Ditto	Attack on Kangma post by Tibetans.	157
141	Ditto	June 7	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.		157
142	Ditto	June 7	Ditto	Ditto	Question of the occupation of Lhasa during winter in event of failure of negotiations.	157
143	Ditto	June 8	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant General	Attacks on Mission at Gyangtse. Further casualty, Kangma. Military movements.	158
144	Ditto	June 9	Ditto	Ditto	Situation at Gyangtse. Further casualty. Military movements.	158
145	Diary	May 16–22	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Political Diary of the Commission	158
146	Telegram	June 8	Assistant to the Commissioner.	Colonel Younghusband.	Interview with Tongsa Penlop	159
147	Ditto	June 9	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.		160
148	Ditto	June 10	Ditto	Ditto		160
149	Ditto	June 10	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Demonstration by Tibetans against out-posts at Gyangtse.	160
150	Ditto	June 11	Assistant to the Commissioner.	Government of India.	Rumoured intention of Tibetans to occupy Gubsi. Casualty at Gyangtse. Attack on Palla post. Military movements.	160
151	Ditto	June 11	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General.		161
152	Ditto	June 12	Ditto	Ditto		161

* *See* note on page xiii.

No. of Paper.	Document.	Date.*	From	To	Subject.	Page.
		1904.				
153	Telegram	June 13	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Departure with force from Chumbi	161
154	Letter (with 2 annexures).	June 3	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Letters, dated 1st June, to the Amban and the Dalai Lama, referred to in Enclosure 133, regarding intended advance to Lhasa.	161
155	Telegram	June 14	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Question of the occupation of Lhasa during winter in event of failure of negotiations. Objection to proposals in No. 142.	162
156	Letter (with 2 annexures).	May 28	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Letter from the Tongsa Penlop, referred to in Enclosure 124, and reply thereto.	162
157	Diary	May 24–30	Ditto	Ditto	Political Diary of the Commission	163
158	Telegram	June 13	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Situation at Gyangtse. Military movements.	165
159	Ditto	June 15	Ditto	Ditto	Arrival at Phari. Situation at Gyangtse.	165
160	Ditto	June 16	Ditto	Ditto	Situation at Gyangtse … …	165

Enclosures to Letter from the Government of India, dated 28th July, 1904.
(Part I., No. 124.)

No. of Paper.	Document.	Date.*	From	To	Subject.	Page.
161	Letter	June 13	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Interview with the Tongsa Penlop	166
162	Diary	May 31—June 5	Ditto	Ditto	Political Diary of the Commission	167
163	Telegram	June 21	Ditto	Ditto	Friendly attitude of people on Chumbi-Gyangtse road.	168
164	Ditto	June 18	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Arrival at Tang La. Situation at Gyangtse. Information regarding Tibetan forces.	168
165	Ditto	June 20	Ditto	Ditto	Arrival at Kala Tso. Situation at Gyangtse. Engagements at Bur, &c.	168
166	Letter (with an annexure).	June 13	Resident in Nepal	Government of India.	Letter from the Prime Minister of Nepal to the Dalai Lama.	169
167	Telegram	June 22	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Proclamation to be issued on advance from Gyangtse.	170
168	Ditto	June 23	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.		171
169	Ditto	June 24	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.		171
170	Ditto	June 22	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Arrival at Kangma. Reconnaissances to Niru and Changra.	171
171	Ditto	June 23	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Postponement of advance in view of reported departure of delegates for Gyangtse.	171
172	Ditto	June 24	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.		172
173	Ditto	June 24	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Retirement of Tibetans from Niru. Arrangements for advance.	172
174	Diary	June 6–12	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Political Diary of the Commission	172
175	Telegram	June 24	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Ammunition abandoned by Tibetans at Niru. Situation at Gyangtse.	173
176	Ditto	June 27	Ditto	Ditto	Situation at Gyangtse … …	174

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* *See* note on page xiii.

No. of Paper.	Document.	Date.*	From	To	Subject.	Page.
		1904.				
177	Telegram	June 27	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Arrival at Gyangtse. Engagement at Niani.	174
178	Ditto	June 28	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Despatch of letters to delegates ...	174
179	Ditto	June 29	Ditto	Ditto	Tibetan request for armistice in view of expected arrival of delegates.	175
180	Ditto	June 29	Ditto	Ditto	Grant of armistice at request of Tibetans. (*See* Enclosure 200.)	175
181	Ditto	June 28 (29)	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Capture of villages and Tsechen position in possession of Tibetans on left bank of river Gyangtse.	175
182	Ditto	June 30	Ditto	Ditto	Grant of armistice at request of Tibetans. (*See* Enclosure 200.)	176
183	Ditto	June 30	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Expected arrival of delegate Ta Lama at Gyangtse.	176
184	Ditto	July 1	Ditto	Ditto	Dalai Lama's request for Tongsa Penlop's good offices towards settlement.	176
185	Ditto	July 1	Brigadier General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Military situation at Gyangtse ...	177
186	Ditto	July 2	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Arrival of Tibetan delegate Ta Lama at Gyangtse.	177
187	Ditto	July 2	Ditto	Ditto	Interview with the delegates at Gyangtse.	177
188	Ditto	July 2	Ditto	Ditto	Tongsa Penlop's conference with the delegates.	177
189	Ditto	July 2	Ditto	Ditto	Interview with delegates at Gyangtse. Further details.	178
190	Ditto	July 2	Brigadier-General Macdonald	Adjutant-General	Interview with delegates at Gyangtse.	178
191	Ditto	July 3	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Further interview with delegates at Gyangtse.	178
192	Ditto	July 4	Ditto	Ditto	Desire of delegates to consult Lhasa Government regarding evacuation of Jong.	179
193	Ditto	July 4	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Demand for evacuation of Gyangtse Jong.	179
194	Ditto	July 4	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Approval of Colonel Younghusband's attitude towards delegates.	179
195	Ditto	July 5	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Expiration of armistice	179
196	Ditto	July 6	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Capture of Gyangtse Jong... ...	180
197	Ditto	July 7	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Despatch of communication to delegates after capture of Gyangtse Jong.	180
198	Ditto	July 8	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Approval of action reported above. Advance to Lhasa considered inevitable.	181
199	Diary	June 13–19	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Political Diary of the Commission	181
200	Letter (with an annexure).	June 29	Ditto	Ditto	Armistice. Letter in reply to Tibetan request. (*See* Enclosure 182.)	182
201	Diary	June 20–26	Ditto	Ditto	Political Diary of the Commission	183
202	Telegram	July 7	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Capture of Gyangtse Jong. Further details. Retreat of Tibetan forces.	184
203	Ditto	July 8	Ditto	Ditto	Arrival of column at Dongtse. Casualties, gunpowder explosion.	184

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* *See* note on page xiii.

No. of Paper.	Document.	Date.*	From	To	Subject.	Page.
		1904.				
204	Telegram	July 9	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Decision regarding advance to Lhasa.	184
205	Ditto	July 9	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Communication to Tongsa Penlop of decision regarding advance.	185
206	Ditto	July 9	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Situation at Gyangtse. Arrival of column at Dongtse. Retreat of Tibetan forces.	185
207	Ditto	July 10	Ditto	Ditto	Reconnaissance to Penam Jong ...	185
208	Ditto	July 11	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Date of departure for, and probable arrival at, Lhasa.	185
209	Ditto	July 12	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Return of column from Dongtse ...	186
210	Ditto	July 13	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Issue of Proclamation on advance to Lhasa.	186
211	Ditto	July 13	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.		186
212	Ditto	July 13	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Communications to the Dalai Lama, Amban, and delegates, regarding advance and terms of settlement.	186
213	Diary	June 27–July 3	Ditto	Ditto	Political Diary of the Commission	187
214	Telegram	July 15	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Arrival at Kotang	188
215	Letter	July 9	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Interview with delegates at Gyangtse. Detailed report.	188
216	Telegram	July 15	Ditto	Ditto	Indemnity and period of payment. Enquiry.	191
217	Ditto	July 13	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Completion of preparations for advance. Reported occupation of Karo La by Tibetans.	191
218	Ditto	July 16 (17)	Ditto	Ditto	Arrival at Ralung	192
219	Ditto	July 16 (17)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Communications from the Dalai Lama and delegates to Tongsa Penlop regarding negotiations.	192
220	Ditto	July 18	Ditto	Ditto	Non-arrival of delegates at Zara ...	192
221	Ditto	July 19	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Engagement at Karo La. Retirement of Tibetans.	192
222	Ditto	July 20	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Indemnity and period of payment. Reply to enquiry. (*See* Enclosure No. 216.)	193
223	Diary	July 4—10	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Political Diary of the Commission	193
224	Telegram	July 20 (23)	Ditto	Ditto	Interview with delegates at Nagartse. (*See* Enclosures 237 and 238.)	194
225	Ditto	July 21 (23)	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Arrival at Nagartse. Occupation of the Jong.	194

Enclosures to Letter from the Government of India, dated 6th October, 1904 (No. 182).

No. of Paper.	Document.	Date.*	From	To	Subject.	Page.
226	Telegram	July 23 (26)	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Arrival at Pete Jong. Reconnaissance to Kumbabarji.	195
227	Letter (with an annexure).	July 13	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Letter, dated 12th July, to the Amban, informing him of intended advance to Lhasa.	195
228	Diary	July 11–17	Ditto	Ditto	Political Diary of the Commission	195

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* *See* note on page xiii.

No. of Paper.	Document.	Date.*	From	To	Subject.	Page.
		1904.				
229	Telegram	July 27 (Aug. 1)	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Arrival at Chaksam. Passage of the Brahmaputra. Death of Major Bretherton.	196
230	Ditto	July 26 (Aug. 1)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Receipt of letter from the National Assembly notifying appointment of delegate. (*See* Enclosure 245.)	197
231	Letter (with 4 annexures).	July 16	Ditto	Ditto	Letter from the Tongsa Penlop ...	197
232	Telegram	July 29 (Aug. 4)	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Passage of the Brahmaputra ...	198
233	Letter (with an annexure).	Aug. 5	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Draft Convention	198
234	Telegram	July 15 (17)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Authority to sign Convention ...	200
235	Letter	Aug. 3	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.		200
236	Telegram	July 29 (Aug. 4)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Receipt of letters from the Dalai Lama and Amban at Chaksam. Situation at Lhasa. (*See* Enclosure 252.)	201
237	Letter	July 20	Ditto	Ditto	Interviews with delegates at Nagartse, referred to in Enclosure 224. Detailed report.	291
238	Ditto	July 21	Ditto	Ditto		202
239	Telegram	Aug. 3 (6)	Ditto	Ditto	Arrival at Lhasa. Flight of Dalai Lama. Visit from Amban. (*See* Enclosure 264.)	205
240	Ditto	Aug. 2 (7)	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Arrival of Mission at Trilung ...	205
241	Ditto	Aug. 4 (6)	Ditto	Ditto	Arrival at Lhasa. Question of supplies.	206
242	Ditto	Aug. 6 (10)	Ditto	Ditto		206
243	Ditto	Aug. 5 (10)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Visit to Amban. Flight of Dalai Lama to Reteng. Unlikelihood of further opposition.	206
244	Ditto	Aug. 5 (10)	Ditto	Ditto	Dorjieff's promise of Russian support to Dalai Lama.	207
245	Letter (with 2 annexures).	July 26	Ditto	Ditto	National Assembly. Letter from, and reply to Dalai Lama, referred to in Enclosure 230.	207
246	Diary	July 18–24	Ditto	Ditto	Political Diary of the Commission	208
247	Telegram	August 12	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Instructions as to requisition of supplies by force, and looting.	209
248.	Ditto	Aug. 9 (13)	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Visit to Amban. Demonstration against Depung monastery.	209
249	Ditto	Aug. 8 (13)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Situation at Lhasa. Action regarding supplies, and residence for Mission. (*See* Enclosure 269.)	210
250	Ditto	August 14	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Approval of action reported in Enclosure 249.	210
251	Ditto	Aug. 12 (16)	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Supplies from monasteries. Removal of camp to site near Lallu Palace.	210
252	Letter (with 2 annexures).	July 27	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Interview with delegates at Chaksam Ferry. Detailed report. Letter from Dalai Lama, and reply thereto, referred to in Enclosure 236.	211
253	Letter	July 29	Ditto	Ditto	Further interview with delegates at Chaksam Ferry. Detailed report.	213
254	Ditto (with 2 annexures).	July 31	Ditto	Ditto	Amban's letter, dated 27th July, and reply thereto.	215

* *See* note on page xiii.

No. of Paper.	Document.	Date.*	From	To	Subject.	Page.
255	Letter	1904. July 31	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Interview with the delegate Ta Lama at Chisul. Detailed report.	216
256	Ditto	August 2	Ditto	Ditto	Interview with delegates at Tolung. Colonel Younghusband's assurances regarding monasteries, &c.	217
257	Diary	July 25–31	Ditto	Ditto	Political Diary of the Commission	218
258	Telegram	August 18	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Instructions as to date of return of force from Lhasa.	218
259	Ditto	Aug. 11 (16)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Flight of Dalai Lama to Nagchuka. Requisition of supplies. Visit to Amban.	219
260	Ditto	Aug. 11 (16)	Ditto	Ditto	Negotiations: Reply of Tibetans to terms.	219
261	Ditto	Aug. 14 (19)	Ditto	Ditto	Negotiations: Reply of Tibetans to terms. Visits from the Amban and the Acting Regent. (*See* Enclosures 289, 290 and 291.)	219
262	Ditto	Aug. 15 (19)	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Reconnaissance to Pemba Jong La and Kichu. Capture of Kham levies.	220
263	Letter (with 2 annexures).	Aug. 8	Resident in Nepal	Government of India.	Correspondence between the Dalai Lama and the Prime Minister of Nepal.	220
264	Letter	Aug. 4	Colonel Younghusband.	Ditto	Interviews with the Amban. Detailed report. (*See* Enclosure 239.)	223
265	Telegram	Aug. 16 (22)	Ditto	Ditto	Release of Lachung prisoners by Tibetans.	224
266	Ditto	Aug. 17 (22)	Ditto	Ditto	Proposed denunciation of Dalai Lama by Amban to Chinese Government. Amban's recognition of Ta Rimpochi as principal in negotiations.	225
267	Ditto	Aug. 17 (22)	Ditto	Ditto	Improvement in situation at Lhasa	225
268	Ditto	Aug. 18 (22)	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Military situation at Lhasa. Reconnaissances and surveys.	225
269	Letter	Aug. 6	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Interview with Shapes. Detailed report. (*See* Enclosure 249.)	226
270	Telegram	Aug. 21 (24)	Ditto	Ditto	Limit of stay of Mission at Lhasa	227
271	Ditto	Aug. 21 (24)	Ditto	Ditto	Terms of Settlement: Amban's suggestions regarding. Request for small indemnity.	227
272	Ditto	Aug. 21 (24)	Ditto	Ditto	Negotiations: Conference with the Acting Regent.	227
273	Ditto	Aug. 21 (24)	Ditto	Ditto	Denunciation of the Dalai Lama by the Amban to the Chinese Government.	227
274	Ditto	Aug. 12	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Prohibition of looting. Purchase of curios. Instructions.	228
275	Ditto	Aug. 25	Ditto	Ditto	Precedents for degradation of the Dalai Lama: Enquiry.	228
276	Ditto	Aug. 19 (25)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Negotiations: Second reply of Tibetans. (*See* Enclosure 318.)	228
277	Ditto	Aug. 24	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Question of compensation to Lachung men released by Tibetans.	228
278	Ditto	Aug. 19 (25)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Negotiations: Receipt from Amban of second reply of Tibetans.	229
279	Ditto	Aug. 20 (25)	Ditto	Ditto	Attack by a Lama on Captains Kelly and Young, I.M.S. (*See* Enclosure 314.)	229

* *See* note on page xiii.

No. of Paper.	Document.	Date.*	From	To	Subject.	Page.
		1904.				
280	Telegram	Aug. 20 (25)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Communication from Dalai Lama to the National Assembly. His departure from Nagchuka.	229
281	Letter	August 9	Ditto	Ditto	Nepalese representative's interview with the Acting Regent regarding terms.	229
282	Diary	August 1–7	Ditto	Ditto	Political Diary of the Commission	230
283	Telegram	Aug. 21 (25)	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Attack on Captains Kelly and Young. (*See* Enclosure 314.)	231
284	Ditto	Aug. 27	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Question of date of return of Mission from Lhasa: Request for reply to Enclosure 258.	232
285	Ditto	Aug. 22 (28)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Attack on Captains Kelly and Young, I.M.S.: Demand for hostages.	232
286	Ditto	Aug. 23 (28)	Ditto	Ditto	Indemnity: Suggested reduction of demand in return for trade facilities in Eastern Tibet, &c.	232
287	Ditto	Aug. 24 (28)	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Visit to Lhasa arsenal. Accident at Chaksam Ferry.	232
288	Ditto	Aug. 23 (28)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Proposals for deputation of party to establish trade mart at Gartok, and for investigation of the route to India down the Brahmaputra.	233
289	Letter	Aug. 12	Ditto	Ditto	Negotiations: Interview with Amban referred to in Enclosure 261. Detailed report.	233
290	Ditto	Aug. 13	Ditto	Ditto	Interview with Shapes referred to in Enclosure 261. Detailed report.	234
291	Ditto	Aug. 14	Ditto	Ditto	Interview with the Acting Regent referred to in Enclosure 261. Detailed report.	235
292	Telegram	Aug. 27 (31)	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Military situation at Lhasa ...	236
293	Letter	Aug. 16	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Release of Lachung prisoners by Tibetans. Detailed report.	236
294	Telegram	Aug. 25 (31)	Ditto	Ditto	Question of the date of return of Mission from Lhasa: Enquiry.	237
295	Ditto	Aug. 26 (31)	Ditto	Ditto	Visits to monasteries and arsenal. Distribution of alms to Lhasa poor.	238
296	Ditto	Sept. 2	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Question of the date of return of Mission from Lhasa. Views of the Government of India.	238
297						238
298	Ditto	Aug. 30 (Sept. 3)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Presence of Mongolians at Reting	239
299	Ditto	Aug. 30 (Sept. 3.)	Ditto	Ditto	Friendly attitude of the Lhasa people.	239
300	Ditto	Aug. 30 (Sept. 3)	Ditto	Ditto	Negotiations: Tibetan verbal assent to terms, except as regards indemnity. (*See also* Enclosure 328.)	239
301	Ditto	Aug. 30 (Sept. 3)	Ditto	Ditto	Dalai Lama. Reported presence of, on Sining road.	240
302	Ditto	Aug. 30 (Sept. 3)	Ditto	Ditto	As to date of return of Mission from Lhasa. General Macdonald's inability to remain later than 15th September.	240
303	Ditto	Aug. 30 (Sept. 3)	Ditto	Ditto	Indemnity: Ability of Tibetans to pay. Suggested extension of period of payment.	240

* *See* note on page xiii.

No. of Paper.	Document.	Date.*	From	To	Subject.	Page.
304	Telegram	1904. Sept. 5	Government of India.	Resident in Nepal.	Nepal—Tibet treaty of 1856. Enquiry as to Tibetan seals and signatures.	240
305	Ditto	Sept. 2 (5)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Negotiations: Cessation of opposition. Ability of Tibetans to pay indemnity. (*See also* Enclosure 341.)	240
306	Ditto	Aug. 30 (Sept. 3)	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Reconnaissance up Kichu valley to Pemba Jong La. Location of force of Kham levies.	241
307	Ditto	Sept. 2 (5)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Precedents for deposition of Dalai Lama.	241
308	Ditto	Sept. 2 (5)	Ditto	Ditto	Indemnity: Proposed lien on Customs dues.	241
309	Ditto	Aug. 31	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Question of date of return of Mission from Lhasa: Desirability of departure not later than 15 September.	242
310	Ditto	Sept. 6	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Date of return of Mission from Lhasa: Precautions to be taken. (*See* No. 296.)	242
311	Ditto	Sept. 6	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Suggested trade mart in Eastern Tibet, &c. Decision of H.M. Government.	242
312	Diary	Aug. 8–14	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Political Diary of the Commission	243
313	Telegram	Sept. 2 (6)	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Reconnaissance up the Kichu Valley.	244
314	Letter	Aug. 18	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Attack on Captains Kelly and Young. Detailed report.	244
315	Telegram	Sept. 4 (9)	Ditto	Ditto	Compensation to Lachung prisoners released by Tibetans.	245
316	Ditto	Sept. 4 (9)	Ditto	Ditto	Acceptance of terms by Regent on behalf of Tibetan Government. Payment of indemnity in annual instalments of one lakh agreed on.	245
317	Letter	Aug. 22	Ditto	Ditto	Negotiations: Interview with the Acting Regent. Detailed report.	245
318	Ditto (with an annexure).	August 19	Ditto	Ditto	Negotiations: Second reply of Tibetans to terms. Interview with Amban referred to in Enclosure 276. Detailed report.	247
319	Letter	August 21	Ditto	Ditto	Proposed denunciation of Dalai Lama by Amban: Detailed report of interview with Amban.	249
320 321	Diary	Aug. 15–28	Ditto	Ditto	Political Diary of the Commission	249 250
322	Telegram	Sept. 14	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Indemnity and occupation of the Chumbi Valley. Inconsistency of provisions of Convention with instructions. As to reduction of indemnity in return for trade facilities.	251
323	Ditto	Sept. 7 (15)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Release of prisoners and hostages, and remission of fines.	252
324	Ditto	Sept. 10 (15)	Ditto	Ditto	Date of return of Mission from Lhasa. Reply to Enclosure 310.	253
325	Ditto	Sept. 10 (15)	Ditto	Ditto	Congratulations from Tongsa Penlop on successful issue of negotiations.	253
326	Ditto	Sept. 16	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Sanction to Colonel Younghusband remaining behind at Lhasa to negotiate amendment of Convention.	253
327	Letter	Sept. 10	Resident in Nepal	Government of India.	Nepal–Tibet Treaty of 1856. Reply to enquiry regarding Tibetan officials signing same.	254

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* *See* note on page xiii.

No. of Paper.	Document.	Date.*	From	To	Subject.	Page.
		1904.				
328	Letter	Aug. 28.	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Negotiations: Interview with Acting Regent and Shapes (*see* Enclosure 300). Tibetan assent to terms except as regards indemnity. Detailed report.	254
329	Telegram	Sep. 11 (15)	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Release of prisoners. Reconnaissance up the Ramtaguyla valley.	256
330	Ditto	Sept. 17	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Amendment of Convention: Decision of H.M. Government regarding reduction of indemnity.	256
331 332	Ditto	Sept. 12 13 (18)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Denunciation of the Dalai Lama. Proclamation by the Amban at Lhasa. Reported departure of Dalai Lama to Mongolia. (*See* Enclosure 362.)	257 257
333	Ditto	Sept. 13 (18)	Ditto	Ditto	Proposed departure of Mission from Lhasa on 23rd September.	257
334	Ditto	Sept. 14 (18)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Anglo-Chinese Adhesion Agreement. Despatch of instructions to Amban not to sign.	258
335	Ditto	Sept. 19	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Secretary of State's sanction to Colonel Younghusband remaining behind at Lhasa to negotiate amendment of Convention.	258
336	Ditto	Sept. 14 (18)	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Arrangements for departure of Mission from Lhasa.	258
337	Ditto	Sept. 16 (18)	Ditto	Ditto	Date of departure fixed for 23rd September.	258
338	Ditto	Sept. 19	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Sanction to Colonel Younghusband remaining behind at Lhasa until the 15th October.	258
339	Letter	Aug. 31	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Negotiations: Interview with Acting Regent and Councillors. Detailed report.	259
340	Ditto	Sept. 1	Ditto	Ditto	Negotiations: Interview with Acting Regent. Detailed report.	260
341	Ditto	Sept. 2	Ditto	Ditto	Negotiations: Interview with Amban, Shapes, and National Assembly (*see* Enclosure 305). Detailed report.	261
342	Telegram	Sept. 18 (21)	Ditto	Ditto	Observations regarding indemnity. Deprecation of amendment of Convention at Lhasa.	262
343	Letter	Sept. 4	Ditto	Ditto	Interview with Acting Regent. Tibetan request for extension of period of payment of indemnity.	263
344	Ditto	Sept. 6	Ditto	Ditto	Convention: Arrangement of details and formalities of signature.	263
345	Telegram	Sept. 20 (22)	Brigadier-General Macdonald	Adjutant-General	Arrangements for withdrawal of Mission from Lhasa.	264
346	Ditto	Sept. 22	Government of India	Colonel Younghusband.	Sanction to despatch of party to Gartok.	264
347	Ditto	Sept. 20 (24)	Colonel Younghusband	Government of India.	Convention: Impossibility of negotiating amendment at Lhasa, having regard to military arrangements for withdrawal of Mission.	265
348	Ditto	Sept. 20 (24)	Ditto	Ditto	Visits to Depung and Sera monasteries.	265
349	Letter	Sept. 9	Ditto	Ditto	Right of Trade Agent at Gyangtse to proceed to Lhasa: Separate Agreement.	265
350	Telegram	Sept. 23 (27)	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Supposed murder of Mission parcel carriers by bandits. Arrangements for withdrawal of Mission.	266

* *See* note on page xiii

No. of Paper.	Document.	Date.*	From	To	Subject.	Page.
		1904.				
351	Telegram	Sept. 21 (27)	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Indemnity: Reasons for not attempting to negotiate amendment of Convention at Lhasa.	266
352	Ditto	Sept. 21 (27)	Ditto	Ditto	Visit to Go-Khang Cathedral ...	267
353	Ditto	Sept. 22 (27)	Ditto	Ditto	Visit from Amban and Tibetan Council previous to departure from Lhasa.	267
354	Ditto	Sept. 24 (27)	Ditto	Ditto	Departure of Mission from Lhasa Farewell visits from Regent and Tibetan Council.	267
355	Ditto	Sept. 24 (27)	Ditto	Ditto	Amendment of Convention: Reply to instructions in Enclosure 338. Reasons for not re-opening negotiations.	268
356	Diary	Aug. 29—Sept. 4	Ditto	Ditto	Political Diary of the Commission	268
357	Telegram	Sept. 28	Ditto	Ditto	Date of probable arrival at Gyangtse.	269
358	Ditto	Sept. 29	Government of India.	Colonel Younghusband.	Approval of proposed return to Simla. (*See* above.)	269
359	Ditto	Sept. 25 (30)	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Arrival of Mission at Trabonang	269
360	Letter (with 2 annexures).	Sept. 8	Colonel Younghusband.	Government of India.	Convention: Detailed report of ceremony of signature. Copy of, as signed.	270
361	Letter	Sept. 8	Ditto	Ditto	Release of prisoners. Compensation for murder of Mission servants.	274
362	Letter (with an annexure).	Sept. 15	Ditto	Ditto	Denunciation of the Dalai Lama: Proclamation by the Amban referred to in Enclosure 331.	274
363	Letter (with an annexure).	Sept. 26	Resident in Nepal	Government of India.	Letter from the Prime Minister of Nepal to the four Kazies at Lhasa.	275
364	Telegram	Sept. 29 (Oct. 3)	Brigadier-General Macdonald.	Adjutant-General	Arrival at Parte ferry. Arrangements for march to Gyangtse.	276
365	Ditto	Oct. 3	Ditto	Ditto	Arrival at Ralung	277

* *See* note on page xiii.

EAST INDIA (TIBET).

FURTHER PAPERS

RELATING TO

TIBET

No. III.

[*In continuation of Cd.* 2054.]

No. 1.

Despatch from the Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. Scott, dated the 13th April, 1904.

In the course of my conversation with the Russian Ambassador this afternoon, his Excellency referred to our Tibetan expedition. The news of our collision with the Tibetans had reached Count Lamsdorff, but did not seem to him to alter the situation. What really mattered, in his opinion, was the results which might follow from Colonel Younghusband's mission. Count Benckendorff asked whether I would authorize him to repeat the statements which I had made to him on a former occasion upon this subject. I replied that I had no objection to his saying that, in my view, nothing had happened to modify the objects with which we had originally determined to send Colonel Younghusband's mission into Tibetan territory.

No. 2.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 28th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Younghusband, telegraphing from Gyangtse, on the 22nd April, reports as follows:—

"A collapse of the Lhasa authorities, rather than further determined resistance, seems to be indicated by present circumstances. In the first place, there is the statement of the Amban that the Dalai Lama is now aroused to a sense of our power; in addition to this there are the several statements made by the Chinese official who brought the despatch from the Amban, viz., that

Tibetan officers are begging the Amban to intercede; that our appearance is not resented by the common people, even at Lhasa; and, further, that there are few troops between this place and Lhasa. Further indications of the present impotence of the Lhasa authorities are afforded by the fact that they were unable, after many months, to raise more than some 5,000 men between Thuna and Gyangtse to oppose us; and by the fact that our presence has been quietly accepted by people here, even including the monks. The game is thus entirely in our own hands. Amban is displaying his usual dilatoriness in the present crisis, and he will, no doubt, show still more while the negotiations are in progress, by trying to delay us through the season best fitted for military movements. Even now, owing to the imprisonment of all the four Councillors, the Amban will be unaccompanied by Tibetan of sufficient authority and position. Against such tactics Government will doubtless be on their guard; the best way to meet them, in my opinion, is that, at the earliest moment by which military preparations can be completed, the mission should be moved straight to Lhasa, and that negotiations should take place at the capital instead of at the half-way house. This would be the most effectual and the only permanent way of clinching matters, besides being the cheapest and quickest. By carrying Amban with me I could probably manage this advance without further fighting, or, at any rate, without a serious collision. Our prestige is now at its height; Nepal and Bhutan are with us; the people are not against us; the soldiers do not want to fight; the Lamas are stunned. By a decisive move now a permanent settlement would be procured, which would be agreeable to the mass of the Tibetan people, which the monks would probably accept, shrugging their shoulders, and which would prevent the Lhasa Lamas from ever again usurping monopoly of power to the detriment of British interests and to the ruin of their own country. In recommending the matter at this early stage for the consideration of Government, my object is that the present favourable season may be utilised to the full, and that we may not allow the psychological moment for action to pass by without taking advantage of it. Meanwhile I will receive the Amban, and will ascertain what power to effect a thorough settlement he and the Tibetan representative really possess."

We shall probably be able to form a conclusion from the attitude of the Amban and both the Tibetan delegates as to the chance of further opposition being encountered. Until we have ascertained their views it does not seem necessary to come to a decision.

No. 3.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 29th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram received from Younghusband :—

"Gyangtse, 25th April. Dharm Raja of Bhutan has sent a small present and written me a letter, in which, referring to Guru affair, he says: 'On hearing that my friends had won victory, I was greatly rejoiced. Now-a-days, England and Bhutan have established a firm friendship. Although the small officials at Guru would not hear what we had to say, I have thought that the higher officials might do so; I have therefore, written a letter to Dalai Lama, and am in hopes of speedy reply. On its arrival I will at once send a man to you. May there be faith and friendship between the English and the Bhutanese. Please let me know if there is anything you require from the Bhutan Government.'"

No. 4.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 29th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram received from Younghusband :—

"Gyangtse, 26th April. I have received despatch from Amban, in reply to one written after my arrival here ; he says he has sent to Dalai Lama copy of my despatch, asking if he knew and approved of monks fighting against us. Amban also urged him to appoint competent and trustworthy official, suitably empowered, and, at the same time, pressed him to furnish transport, but he had had no reply yet from Dalai Lama. Amban adds delay is due to Dalai Lama having to consult National Assembly, that he has exhausted himself in talking to the Tibetans, and trusts I will see difficult nature of circumstances."

No. 5.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 5th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

I have received report from Colonel Younghusband to the effect that the force of Tibetans mentioned in his telegram of the 22nd April has recently been strengthened and now numbers 1,500, and is in occupation of sangars on the far side of Karola, situated due east of Gyangtse. No further communication from Amban has been received by Colonel Younghusband.

No. 6.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 6th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Seven hundred Tibetans from Shigatse attacked Mission camp at Gyangtse, on 5th instant, at 4.30 a.m. Lhasa General was in command, with clerk of Dalai Lama and representatives of Gaden Lhasa monasteries in attendance. Attack was repulsed after lasting two hours. Enemy's loss, 250 killed and wounded, near post. Our casualties, two wounded. No warning given by Chinese, but patient in our dispensary gave intimation of attack. Post perfectly safe in opinion of Younghusband and Officer Commanding.

No. 7.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 6th May, 1904.

My telegram of to-day. Younghusband reports that the impression he had already formed, that the Lhasa Government are irreconcilable, is confirmed by the attack on Mission. We cannot but fear that this view is correct. We have discussed the situation in Council, and would suggest that some definite limit of time should now be imposed, and that a further advance should at once be made, unless within that time proper representatives of both Chinese and Tibetan Governments, invested with full powers, reach Gyangtse. A month would be required for the necessary military preparations.

No. 8.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 7th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Attack was made on Gyangtse post, 5th May last, by seven hundred Tibetans under General appointed from Lhasa. Attack was repulsed. Our casualties were two sepoys wounded ; enemy's loss, 250 killed and wounded.

No. 9.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 7th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram received from Younghusband :—

"Gyangtse, 3rd May. I have received despatch from Amban, dated 29th April last, saying he sent a translated copy of my despatch of 24th April last to Dalai Lama, and also summoned councillors and representatives of three great monasteries ; urged them to send at once fully empowered delegates ; stated he had decided to leave on 3rd May last, and demanded transport. On 27th, Amban received replies from Dalai Lama and representatives of the three great monasteries, denying that they had known of, or encouraged, monks taking up arms against us, but not mentioning a word about transport or the other matters. Amban is at a loss to understand this, and has written again to Dalai Lama, and on receiving reply will communicate with me ; so my fourth despatch to present Amban has produced no more result than previous three, and I have not slightest hope that proper Tibetan delegate will be sent."

No. 10.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 8th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

MacDonald reports Brander, 6th May last, attacked 2,500 Tibetans strongly entrenched beyond Karola pass. After four hours' stubborn fighting enemy was defeated and retreated. Enemy's loss not yet known ; loss on our side, 32nd Pioneers, Captain Bethune and three men killed, 13 men wounded ; 8th Gurkhas, one man wounded. All quiet at Gyangtse on 6th May.

No 11.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 9th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Two following telegrams have been received from Colonel Younghusband:—

(1.) "Gyangtse, 2nd May. Colonel Brander reports that he is of opinion, for reasons given below, that it is advisable to go out and attack Tibetans at Karola before they can attack our communications, and before the gathering can assume more threatening proportions; he accordingly leaves here to-morrow for that purpose. Following are his reasons:—

(i.) Force located on the Karola threatens our lines of communication by road leading direct from Karola to Kangma, where we have only one company stationed;

(ii.) It is reported that Tibetans are also along road from Karola to Kangma;

(iii.) Lhasa Government is sending round this district collecting troops, which are being assembled at the Karola position;

(iv.) Our reconnoitring party was fired on by these troops, although they had received strict injunctions to the contrary from the chief Chinese officials at Gyangtse.

I have raised no objections on political grounds to proposed movement, because I do not see the least indication of any intention on the part of the Government at Lhasa to send anyone to open negotiations with me, whereas I do see signs that Tibetan Government are recovering from the shock of the first encounter with us; and I believe that we may have trouble hereafter, unless such gatherings are checked before they come to a head. Colonel Brander is confident that he can defeat the Tibetan forces at Karola without difficulty, and that Mission left at Gyangtse will be safe."

(2.) "Brander has been successful in clearing very important gathering at Karola. Effect of this will be of greatest value in checking recent resuscitation of influence of the Lamas. Enemy's forces, consisting of 2,500 men, armed with numerous Lhasa-made and foreign rifles, and headed by many influential Lamas and officials from Lhasa, occupied very strong position, which they held most stubbornly. Our casualties were:—Killed 4, including Captain Bethune, who was previously in command of escort of Mission at Khambajong, and whose loss his country has great cause to regret; wounded 14. Brander has most effectually carried out his object of removing threats to our line of communications; he will return to Gyangtse to-morrow or next day."

First news of this movement was received by Army Headquarters. We at once asked for explanation from Colonel Younghusband; this he had meantime given in his telegram of the 2nd May, quoted above. The movement appears to have been necessary for safety of communications. Following is General Macdonald's account, which I think you will like to have in full:—

"8th May. In telegram dated the 6th May, Brander reports that he attacked Tibetans, who were holding entrenched position beyond Karola, and was met with heavy and well-aimed fire from jingals, matchlocks, and numerous breechloaders; this checked his frontal attack until enemy, who numbered 2,000, were dislodged from sangars by wide flanking movement. Four hours' stubborn fighting took place before enemy were dislodged, and retreated, followed by mounted infantry in pursuit. I regret to report following casualties on our side:—Killed, Captain Bethune and three men 32nd Pioneers; wounded, 13 men 32nd

Pioneers, 1 man 8th Gurkhas. Captain Bethune was killed while gallantly storming a sangar ; he was a most gallant and reliable officer, whom I recently mentioned in despatches, and whose loss I deeply regret. Enemy's loss has not yet been accurately ascertained. Following is believed to have formed Brander's movable column :—Four companies infantry, two 7-pounders, two maxims, 40 mounted infantry. It is reported that a considerable number of men from Kham were among the force that opposed us at Karola ; if this is so, their defeat should produce wholesome effect on Eastern Tibetans. I have received a telegram, dated the 6th May, from Major Murray, 8th Gurkhas, who is in command at Gyangtse, reporting all quiet there."

Government of India join in regretting loss of Captain Bethune. The attack on Mission camp at Gyangtse reported in my telegram of 6th May must have taken place while detachment was away at Karola. We shall consider further what measures are necessary in consequence of the now aggressive hostilities of the Tibetans. In meantime General Macdonald has been instructed by us to take all measures necessary for the safety of Mission and of communications, but not to advance on Lhasa. At present military considerations must preponderate ; but Younghusband will resume control if and when negotiations commence.

No. 12.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 9th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 6th May. Please furnish at earliest possible date information on following points :—

(1.) What has been cost of Mission up to date ?

(2.) As regards proposed advance to Lhasa, what estimate have you formed as to cost, force required, and time which advance is expected to take after expiry of month allowed for preparation ?

No. 13.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 12th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

His Majesty's Government have considered your telegram of the 6th May. They agree that recent events make it inevitable that the Mission must advance to Lhasa unless the Tibetans consent to open negotiations at Gyangtse. They, therefore, authorise you to give notice to the Amban that we shall insist on negotiations at Lhasa itself if no competent Tibetan negotiator appears in conjunction with him at Gyangtse within a month, or such further period as may be found necessary for completing preparations for advance. It is, however, the wish of His Majesty's Government that Your Excellency's Government should clearly understand that it is not their intention to depart in any way from the policy which was laid down in my telegram of the 6th November last to the Viceroy.

No. 14.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 12th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

The present situation is fully known to you. Reports show that large numbers of Tibetan troops are concentrating. There is no reasonable prospect of negotiations being opened at Gyangtse, where our Mission is practically cut off by hostile bands from communication with the surrounding country. Unless it is to be withdrawn or to be kept inactive during the ensuing winter, neither of which alternatives, we assume, will commend itself to His Majesty's Government, the only possible course is to bring pressure to bear by means of a military advance to Lhasa. We therefore have no hesitation in repeating the suggestion we have already made, viz., that a definite time, say one month, should be given to the Tibetans within which to open negotiations in satisfactory form at Gyangtse, and that, in the event of their failing to do so by the date fixed, the advance on Lhasa should at once commence. It is very desirable that our preparations should be begun immediately, and that reinforcements should be sent up before the rains break in the Teesta Valley. The latest possible date for the commencement of the advance would be the 10th July. Deeply as we regret that military operations should have become inevitable, we are convinced that anything short of decisive and early assertion of British power can only result in greater expense and trouble in the near future, as well as in serious loss of prestige throughout Indian Empire.

Following is General Macdonald's estimate of reinforcements which would be required from India :—

Four companies Native Infantry,
Four companies British Infantry,
One mule corps,

with the following guns :—

Two 10-pounders, Royal Artillery,
Two 7-pounders (mule-guns).

As regards the time required, General Macdonald reckons that, if a start was made on the 10th July, he could occupy Lhasa by the end of that month. Estimates of cost will be furnished as soon as possible.

No. 15.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 12th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Following is military situation, Tibet :—

Ruined fort and monastery held by several hundred Tibetans with jingals and breechloaders. Lhasa authorities reported to have collected large forces and to be despatching them to Gyangtse. Force also reported two marches east of Changma. Kalatso is being reinforced to bring strength to four companies and two maxims. Brander returned Gyangtse 9th May last from Karola without opposition ; he reported enemy completely routed in engagement 6th May last.

No. 16.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 12th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

See my telegram of to-day, which was sent before receipt of yours of to-day. You should at once make preparations for advance on scale proposed. I shall be glad to receive estimates of expenditure with the least possible delay.

No. 17.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 13th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Younghusband reports return of Colonel Brander to Gyangtse on the 9th May with column from Karola. Quantity of rifle and revolver ammunition of Russian manufacture was found at Karola, but none of British make. New monk member of the Tibetan Council, who was previously supposed to be on his way to open negotiations with us, was actually, it appears, engaged in collecting troops at Nagartse. Younghusband has been informed by Chinese officials that Chinese guards in attendance on Captain Parr have been beaten by the Tibetans, who have also brutally murdered his two Bhutia servants, hacking their limbs off one by one. They also murdered some servants of the Mission who were spending the night in the town. Chinese officials say that General Ma was aware of intention of Tibetans to attack Mission, and that he could have saved Captain Parr's servants, but that he took no action. All the Chinese officials at Gyangtse, including General Ma, are now practically besieged in their quarters, which they dare not leave. Younghusband considers that recent events point to friendly disposition on the part of the people of Tibet, but inveterate hostility on the part of the Lamas.

No. 18.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 14th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegrams of the 12th May. As soon as you have fixed the period to be allowed before advance is begun, you will no doubt inform me by telegraph.

No. 19.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 14th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Macdonald telegraphs as follows :—

"I have received a report, dated Gyangtse, morning of the 11th May, from Colonel Brander, in which he states that on the 10th May the enemy's position was reconnoitred, and a village which threatened our right at 1,500 yards was destroyed, but that the Jong was found to be now too strongly defended by walls and sangars for assault to be made without strong support of artillery. No further casualties have taken place among our force at Gyangtse, but annoying and accurate fire, with jingals and numerous modern rifles, has been maintained by enemy posted on Jong hill, 1,400 yards away, our 7-pounders being unable to reply effectively. Brander, apparently with a view to attacking the Jong, asks for following reinforcements: two 10-pounders, 2 companies infantry, and 50 mounted infantry. Following are being sent up: one company infantry, 20 mounted infantry, half company sappers. But I am not sending the 10-pounders at present, as they have no common shell; and these guns would be of greater use in the field, should it be found necessary for me to clear communications. As everything now points to a concentrated effort being made by enemy at Gyangtse, and as our communications with the place may soon be interrupted, I would strongly urge that the additional guns, troops, and transport asked for may be sent without delay. Gyangtse post itself should easily hold out with its present garrison."

Orders for the reinforcements to start without delay have been given.

No. 20.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 14th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Following instructions have been sent to Younghusband, to whom we have repeated your telegram of the 12th May:—

"You should give notice without delay to the Amban in accordance with the Secretary of State's directions. The day on which Macdonald says he can advance should be specified, in your communication to the Amban, as the date on which you will decline negotiations at Gyangtse. You will, of course, understand that the orders conveyed in my telegram of the 8th May,* as to the control of military operations, must hold good, pending commencement of negotiations."

No. 21.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 14th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

In telegram dated the 11th May Younghusband reports that 3,000 Tibetans are said to have started from Khambajong en route for Gyangtse. Information has been received by Wilton from Chinese source that representations have been made to the Amban by representatives of three great Lhasa monasteries to the effect that Dalai Lama has no power to ratify treaties without their concurrence; they warned Amban against concluding any treaty by which British would be allowed to proceed beyond Yatung, and declared that, though Amban might negotiate with British, Tibetans would have nothing to do with them.

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* Part II., No. 77, page 133.

No. 22.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 14th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 9th May. Following is estimated total cost of Mission up to the 1st April last:—£300,000 military; £8,500 political. For financial year 1904–05, if Mission can be withdrawn in October, total cost, political and military, including terminal charges, will be about £340,000. The cost of the reinforcements is estimated at £25,000, initial; £3,900 monthly recurring.

No. 23.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 15th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Brander reports, dated Gyangtse, 13th, one sepoy 32nd Pioneers, severely wounded by jingal ball. Tibetans expect reinforcements from Kham to arrive at Gyangtse 14th. More jingals have been mounted in jong, and large gun is expected from Lhasa, which he hopes to capture *en route.* Hostile parties previously reported on Ralung Kangma road are said to have retired over Karo La as the result of fight on 9th. Macdonald is sending him two 10-pounder guns, draft 32nd Pioneers, half company Sappers, and twenty infantry. These should reach Gyangtse on 24th. With these Brander can hold his own, and continue harassment of enemy.

No. 24.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 15th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

General Macdonald's telegram repeated in yours of the 14th May. In view of the facts detailed in these telegrams, I trust care will be taken by the military authorities to make sufficient reinforcements available without delay.

No. 25.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated 17th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Please inform me by telegraph whether Commander-in-Chief is satisfied as to the number of reinforcements which it is proposed to send, on what date they are to start, and on what date they are due to reach Kalatso. Please state also whether sufficient transport is available.

No. 26.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 18th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

See my telegram of the 12th May. Eight additional guns, not four as reported in telegram above quoted, will be sent up in the event of an advance to Lhasa.

No. 27.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 18th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

On the 14th May Younghusband reports that Mission at Gyangtse is perfectly safe, but is besieged by the enemy as far as they dare besiege it. Mission has now been continuously under fire for 10 days, and enemy's guns are increasing in weight and number.

No. 28.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 18th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 17th May. Reinforcements comprising four companies British Infantry, four companies Native Infantry, eight mountain guns, have already started, and are due to arrive on the 8th June at Chumbi, which is ten marches distant from Gyangtse. Kalatso is merely an unimportant intermediate point. Above reinforcements are exactly in accordance with Brigadier-General Macdonald's demands; his demands for transport have also been complied with in full. In addition to the above we have, on the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief, sanctioned movement of half a battalion British Infantry in support to Darjeeling; it is also proposed to send to Chumbi another half battalion of Native Infantry. Arrangements detailed above are considered sufficient by Lord Kitchener.

No. 29.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 20th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

I am informed by General Macdonald that, unless complications arise, he can commence the advance to Lhasa on the 15th June. On the other hand, Colonel Younghusband represents his inability to communicate with the Amban, and says that it is certain that any messenger would be murdered, as were Mr. Parr's servants. We have replied that, in order to comply with formality of giving notice, Younghusband must make every endeavour to secure the despatch of his letter to the Amban; and we have suggested that the letter should be sent to the Commander of the Tibetan forces, enclosed in a covering letter in which the nature of the communication should be explained. In our opinion, the necessary formality would be sufficiently observed by this means. In order, however, that the decision of His Majesty's Government may be fully known to the Tibetans, we have also instructed Colonel Younghusband to write to the Dalai Lama in the same terms as to the Amban.

No. 30.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 20th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Macdonald reports general situation unchanged. Convoy from Kangma arrived safely at Gyangtse on 16th. 1,000 Lhasa troops with two guns shortly expected Gyangtse. Supplies now in Gyangtse sufficient to last present garrison for three months. All quiet on line of communications.

No. 31.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 20th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Building north of Gyangtse post occupied 18th May last by enemy, who opened fire on post morning 19th May. Building breached by Pioneers, and stormed by two companies of 8th Gurkhas. Enemy was defeated with severe loss. Our casualties, three wounded.

No. 32.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 21st May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

I agree to proposals contained in your telegram of the 20th May as to procedure.

No. 33.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 23rd May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

19th May last, Dak patrol, light Mounted Infantry, nearing Gyangtse, ambuscaded by Tibetans ; were extricated by help from post, losing one killed, two wounded. Enemy's loss considerable. Brander was moving 20th May against village concerned.

No. 34.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 23rd May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Colonel Brander moved 21st May last against some villages one and half miles from Gyangtse threatening line of communication. One village made stubborn resistance, but captured. Our casualties, 32nd Pioneers, killed two, native ranks. Wounded, Lieutenant Hodgson, three Sepoys. Hodgson wounded in wrist.

No. 35.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated 24th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Please inform His Majesty's Minister at Peking of the date on which Mission will refuse to negotiate at Gyangtse. I assume from your telegram of the 20th May that date will be the 15th June.

No. 36.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 25th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

In view of casualties, and of the increased activity displayed by the enemy, we have decided to send to Tibet an additional company of Native Mounted Infantry. Mounted troops have proved to be of great value.

No. 37.

From the Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow, dated the 25th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

I request that you will make a communication to the Chinese Government in the sense of the notice which Colonel Younghusband has been instructed to give to the Amban. (See telegram of the 12th May from the Secretary of State to the Viceroy of India and Viceroy's telegram of the 14th May.) You will be informed by Government of India of date on which. Mission will refuse to negotiate at Gyangtse with the Representatives of China and Tibet.

No. 38.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 27th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram, 25th May. No risks should be run as to force, in view of increased activity of the enemy. Your decision to send up an additional company Native Mounted Infantry is approved.

No. 39.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated 27th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

On the 25th May, Foreign Office telegraphed instructions to His Majesty's Minister at Peking that a formal notification, to the same effect as the notice which is to be given by Colonel Younghusband to the Amban, is to be made to the Chinese Government.

No. 40.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated 28th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Please report latest information as to position of Mission.

No. 41.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 30th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Macdonald wires from Chumbi: Convoy from Gyangtse arrived Kangma 29th May unopposed. Despatches from Brander reported convoy and reinforcements arrived at Gyangtse 24th May last, meeting with slight opposition at Niani. On morning of 26th May, Brander attacked Palla village, 1,100 yards from post, which has been occupied by enemy. Enemy made determined resistance. Our casualties: Royal Engineers—killed, Lieutenant Garstin; wounded, Lieutenant Walker, slight. Royal Artillery—wounded, Captain O'Connor, shoulder, severe. 32nd Pioneers—wounded, Lieutenant Mitchell, leg, severe. Native ranks—three men killed and seven wounded. Enemy's loss heavy; 37 prisoners. The occupation of Palla cuts enemy's water supply. 28th May, convoy left Gyangtse for Kangma, under escort. Niani evacuated. Strength of garrison, Gyangtse, four guns, two maxims, and 720 effective rifles. 29th May, no signs of enemy near Kalatso. Mounted Infantry reconnoitring towards Khambajong. Nine companies of infantry between Kangma and Tuna.

No. 42.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 30th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Following is position of Mission in Tibet. Communication with Gyangtse was interrupted from 23rd to 28th May, the regular daily post having been discontinued owing to insecure state of roads between Gyangtse and Kangma. On 28th May several telegrams from Gyangtse were brought down by convoy to Kangma and received by us on the 29th. Our telegram of this day's date contains the information we have received as to the attack upon Palla village on the 26th, and as to strength of the garrison at Gyangtse, which has been practically besieged since the 23rd. Further reinforcements were said to be on their way from Lhasa, but Younghusband reports, on the 29th May, that the capture of Palla village is a great shock to the Tibetans. Younghusband has been told by a Chinese informant that Amban sent an official to explain matters after his failure to secure transport from the Tibetans, but that, owing to disturbed state of the country, messenger was afraid to come. Younghusband and Macdonald have informed Tongsa Penlop that they will be glad to see him, in reply to letter in which he expresses desire to meet them.

No. 43.

Despatch from the Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. Hardinge, dated the 2nd June, 1904.

I addressed to Count Benckendorff to-day in writing a communication to the following effect in regard to Tibet, his Excellency having upon several occasions expressed a hope that our policy towards that country would not be altered by recent events :—

"Your Excellency has inquired, in the course of recent conversation, whether the opposition which has been offered to the British Mission to Tibet has in any way modified the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to that country, as described in their telegram to the Government of India of the 6th November, 1903. His Majesty's Government announced in that telegram that in sanctioning the advance of Colonel Younghusband's Mission to Gyangtse, they were clearly of opinion that this step should not be allowed to lead to the occupation of Tibet, or to permanent intervention in Tibetan affairs. They stated that the advance was to be made for the sole purpose of obtaining satisfaction, and that, as soon as reparation had been obtained, withdrawal would be effected. They added that they were not prepared to establish a permanent Mission in Tibet, and that the question of enforcing trade facilities in that country was to be considered in the light of the decision conveyed in the telegram. I am now able to tell you that His Majesty's Government still adhere to the policy thus described, though it is obvious that their action must to some extent depend upon the conduct of the Tibetans themselves, and that His Majesty's Government cannot undertake that they will not depart in any eventuality from the policy which now commends itself to them. They desire, however, to state in the most emphatic terms that, so long as no other Power endeavours to intervene in the affairs of Tibet, they will not attempt either to annex it, to establish a Protectorate over it, or in any way to control its internal administration."

No. 44.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 4th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Half-hearted night attacks, Gyangtse, 30th May, easily repulsed. Our casualties were nil. Communications clear. Two companies, 1st Battalion Royal Fusiliers, arrived Chumbi. Two 4-pounder guns captured at Palla.

No. 45.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 5th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

19th Punjabis, 33rd Punjabis, two sections No. 27 Mountain Battery, No. 1 Company 1st Sappers and Miners, with requisite transport, field hospital, &c., have been warned for service, in addition to troops already named.

No. 46.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 6th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Walsh has had an interview with the Tongsa Penlop of Bhutan, who has been in correspondence with Dalai Lama, and who stated at the interview that the Dalai Lama had written to him declaring his intention of refusing to negotiate or to receive any communication whatever from the Government of India. The Penlop admitted that the Tibetans were foolish and unreasonable, and ascribed their attitude to the bad advice given by the Kazis (Councillors) who have been dismissed. The Penlop added that strong resistance would be offered to advance of Mission, and that before it reached Lhasa the Dalai Lama and his Government would desert the city.

No. 47.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 7th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Palla attacked on 2nd June last. Attack was repulsed easily, without loss. Kangma post attacked 7th June by strong force of enemy. Attack was repulsed. Our casualties, Native ranks, one killed, five seriously wounded. Enemy lost 116 killed. Post quite secure.

No. 48.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 7th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Younghusband arrived Kangma on the 6th June, on his way to meet Macdonald for a consultation. Our action in warning for service the troops mentioned in my telegram of the 5th June was taken in case, as result of consultation, Younghusband and Macdonald represent necessity for employment of larger force, but we do not at present anticipate this.

No. 49.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 7th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram dated the 12th May. Telegraphic report received from Younghusband states that he wrote on the 1st June to the Amban and the Dalai Lama informing them that we should insist on negotiations being conducted at Lhasa itself, unless by the 25th June the Amban appeared at Gyangtse with competent Tibetan negotiator. These communications, together with open covering letters giving their purport, were despatched by the hands of prisoners to the Tibetan Commander, who returned them next morning with message to the effect that it was not their custom to receive communications from us. Subsequently, however, messenger arrived from Tibetan General to say that Chinese official should be sent in to receive Younghusband's letter, and to ask, in the meanwhile, for an armistice. Younghusband replied that flag of truce would be respected, but that, if Tibetans went on fortifying themselves, we should be obliged to fire on places occupied in the vicinity of the Mission Camp. Contents of Younghusband's communication were doubtless at once reported to Lhasa, and arrangements for prompt attendance of Chinese official made, by Tibetan General, but we have not yet heard of arrival of official as promised. We propose to treat the 1st June as the date of delivery of ultimatum, and unless Amban, accompanied by competent Tibetan delegates, has reached Gyangtse by the 25th June, to authorise advance on that date. Recent despatch from Amban reached Younghusband in five days, so that proposed arrangement allows ample time for arrival of delegates at Gyangtse. If this is approved by you, Captain Parr, local Chinese delegate, will be furnished with copy of Younghusband's message, and Sir E. Satow will be informed.

No. 50.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 7th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Macdonald had an interview at Chumbi, on the 6th June, with Tongsa Penlop of Bhutan, who is writing to-day to Dalai Lama advising him to send properly qualified representatives by the 25th June to Gyangtse, and warning him that unless he does so it will be war. Letter is to be taken to Lhasa by Dug-y-Jongpon and Lama Serk-Hang-Tulku. Tongsa Penlop states that Ta Lama, the Senior Kazi, is at Shigatse, with power to negotiate, and he has sent other officials with letter to him to same effect as letter to Dalai Lama.

No. 51.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 9th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Tibet Mission. Are any troops using Dum-dum bullets ?

No. 52.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 9th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 7th June. The 25th June is approved by His Majesty's Government as the date on which Mission is to be authorised to proceed to Lhasa, if by that date competent negotiator has not been sent by Tibetan Government to Gyangtse with the Amban. Communications to His Majesty's Minister at Peking and to Captain Parr should be made, as proposed.

No. 53.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 10th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Situation Gyangtse, 8th June last, unchanged. Wounded officers: O'Connor convalescent, Mitchell progressing slowly, Hodgson fit for duty. All reinforcements have arrived Chumbi except wing 40th Pathans, 3rd Company Mounted Infantry, and remounts.

No. 54.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 14th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram dated 9th June. No Dum-dum ammunition issued to troops, Tibet. All Dum-dum ammunition in stock issued for practice only under stringent orders. General Macdonald wires that none has been used or is in the possession of force, but worse bullet being used by enemy in breech-loaders.

No. 55.

Despatch from the Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. Hardinge, dated the 14th June, 1904.

(Extract.)

The Russian Ambassador informed me to-day that he had received a telegram from Count Lamsdorff who had observed, with regret, a correspondence recently published in the "Times" on the subject of a pretended Convention between Russia and Tibet. Count Lamsdorff had reminded Count Benckendorff that the views of the Imperial Government on the political situation with regard to Tibet had been clearly defined in the communications which, in pursuance of Count Lamsdorff's instructions, his Excellency had made to me in April of last year. It had been distinctly put on record that there existed between Russia and Tibet no Treaty or Convention of any kind, either direct or through any intermediary. This Count Lamsdorff stated, remains as true to-day as it was at that time. Count Lamsdorff had added that it had given him great satisfaction to note that the British Government, for their part, recognise, in the terms of the Memorandum which I had recently handed to Count Benckendorff, the utility and necessity of maintaining the political *status quo* in that province of the Chinese Empire. Placing full confidence in that communication, Count Lamsdorff saw in it a pledge of the future policy of His Britannic Majesty's Government which would prevent any difficulty of principle arising between the two Governments in those regions. Count Benckendorff said that he was instructed by Count Lamsdorff to communicate to me the substance of this message.

No. 56.

From Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne, dated Peking, the 15th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

With reference to telegram from Viceroy, of 7th June, I yesterday made verbal communication to Vice-Minister, Natung, as instructed in your telegram of 25th May. Receiving it with perfect equanimity, he replied that a telegram had been received from the Amban reporting that no transport to convey him to Gyangtse had been furnished him by the Dalai Lama. According to His Excellency the three Great Monasteries have entire control over the Lama, who, he added, is ignorant and pig-headed. He made no objection to intended advance, and announcement seemed to cause him no surprise.

No. 57.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 16th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Please telegraph at what places Colonel Younghusband and General Macdonald are now respectively. Is it possible that their distance from the main body of the Mission may cause delay in negotiations?

No. 58.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 17th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Please telegraph any available information regarding casualties up to date in connection with Mission and sickness subsequent to your telegram of 24th April.*

No. 59.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 19th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 16th June. Macdonald and Younghusband are both at Phari Jong, on their way to rejoin the main body of the Mission at Gyangtse. O'Connor and Wilton remain at Gyangtse, so that no obstacle was placed in the way of negotiations by Younghusband's temporary absence. On the contrary, a better chance than had hitherto presented itself of getting into direct communication with the Dalai Lama, and of inducing him to send a representative, was afforded by the return of Younghusband to Chumbi, since it was there that his meeting with the Tongsa Penlop of Bhutan took place. After an interview with Younghusband, the Penlop, who had come to tender his friendly offices, wrote to Dalai Lama by special messengers, who will of course arrive at Lhasa before the 25th June, urging him to open negotiations. Tongsa Penlop has been in friendly correspondence with Dalai Lama direct, whereas Younghusband himself had, as you are aware, no certain means of communicating with him.

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* Cd, 2054, p. 12, No. 33.

No. 60.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 20th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram dated 17th June. Following is return of casualties to 10th June last:—

War casualties. Killed:—British officers, 2; Native officer, 1; Native rank and file, 20; followers, 2. Wounded:—British officers, 9; Native officers, 2; Native rank and file, 65.

Deaths other than war casualties:—British officers, 2; men, 1; Native officer, 1; Native warrant officer, 1; Native rank and file, 63; followers, 116.

Invaliding:—British officer, 1; men, 6; Native officer, 1; Native rank and file, 195; followers, 193.

No. 61.

Despatch from Sir C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne, dated St. Petersburgh, the 20th June, 1904.

(Extract.)

In the course of conversation with Count Lamsdorff the day before yesterday I alluded to the question of Tibet. His Excellency expressed himself as satisfied with your Lordship's clear and concise declarations as to British policy in Tibet, and trusted that His Majesty's Government paid no more attention to the reported existence of a Convention between Russia and Tibet. He remembered very well the arrival of the Tibetan Mission at Yalta, and he could assure me that no political questions were discussed; the relations between Russia and Tibet being of a purely religious nature, due solely to the large number of Russian Buriats who regarded the Dalai Lama as their Pope. I remarked that it was not surprising that suspicions should have been raised in India and elsewhere by the dispatch of a Mission to Russia from Tibet, and by the reported presence and influence of M. Dorjieff at Lhasa, but that I felt sure that His Majesty's Government accepted with confidence the official assurances given by Count Benckendorff on the 8th April, 1903, that the Russian Government had concluded no Convention relating to Tibet with Tibet, China, or any other Power, and that the Russian Government had no Agents there, nor any intention of sending an Agent or a Mission to Lhasa.

No. 62.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 24th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Younghusband, who has returned to Gyangtse, reports that he was informed by officers posted on the road that the local people, though afraid of Lhasa officials and monks, are very friendly in their attitude towards us.

No. 63.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State of India, dated the 24th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Younghusband telegraphs, 23rd instant, as follows :—

" Tongsa Penlop informs me that Kallan Lama and Ta Councillor are coming to Gyangtse, and that there has arrived for me from Lhasa a parcel of silk cloth. Penlop also expresses wish to come to see me at Gyangtse. This may indicate anxiety of Tibetans to make terms at last. In the circumstances, I would recommend giving a period of five days' grace, and deferring advance till after the 30th June.

I have telegraphed, in reply, as follows :—

" Advance may certainly be deferred until 30th June, if reliable information has reached you that competent Tibetan negotiators may be expected to arrive at an early date."

No. 64.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 24th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram of to-day's date. As Tibetans have failed to comply with ultimatum, we are strongly of opinion that advance to Lhasa should in any case take place. It would merely encourage dilatory tactics if we were to refrain from advancing, and to attempt negotiations at Gyangtse. With your approval, we propose to instruct Mission to advance, whatever happens, on the 30th June ; and if the Tibetans and Chinese envoys present themselves at all, to invite them to accompany Mission. An immediate reply is requested. The above is the only sure means by which, in our opinion, a speedy settlement would be effected.

No. 65.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 25th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of 24th June. If there is reasonable expectation of early arrival at Gyangtse of Amban, accompanied by competent Tibetan negotiators, His Majesty's Government approve the postponement of the advance of the Mission to Lhasa. We think the advance should not be undertaken, if the envoys come to Gyangtse, unless there is adequate ground for doubting their competency, or the earnestness of Tibetan Government. The envoys should be made to understand clearly that the advance to Lhasa will take place forthwith, if they do not satisfy us as to the good faith of their Government. Your telegram of the 12th May indicates that the latest date for the commencement of the advance to Lhasa is the 10th July.

No. 66.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 26th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

I have to-day sent the following telegram to Colonel Younghusband:—

"We are posting to you copy of a despatch which we are addressing to the Secretary of State, in which we discuss the question of the terms to be proposed to the Tibetans when negotiations begin. As yet, however, we are not in a position to send you final instructions. You will find in the Secretary of State's telegram of the 6th November last a statement of the points on which His Majesty's Government have so far authorised negotiations. You should clearly understand that the demands formulated in the despatch above referred to have not yet been approved by His Majesty's Government, and you should confine yourself, without committing Government to them, to ascertaining how the Tibetan Government is likely to regard them.

The following are the proposals contained in our despatch to the Secretary of State:—

1. On the question of placing a Resident at Lhasa, we explain that, while this step may be necessary, we reserve, pending receipt of the view you may take after you have arrived at Lhasa, our final opinion. It is suggested, failing this, that an agent should be posted at Gyangtse, with right, as occasion may require, of proceeding to Lhasa to discuss matters with the Tibetan Officials or Amban. Reservation of our right to post agent at Lhasa, in the event of the Tibetan Government hereafter abandoning attitude of isolation towards European powers, would be associated with demand for agent at Gyangtse.

2. Formal recognition of exclusive political influence would be required from Tibetans, together with engagements not to enter into relations about Tibet with any foreign power without previous British consent; or, without such consent, to cede any portion of Tibetan territory to any foreign power, or to admit to Tibet any representative of a foreign power.

3. Indemnity would be demanded from Tibetans. In the despatch we have not discussed the amount, but £100,000 for every month from date of attack on Mission at Gyangtse, on 4th May, until one month after signature of Convention, should, we think, be the rate—a guarantee being taken for future payments, and one month's instalment paid down.

4. The occupation of Chumbi for requisite period, as security for fulfilment of treaty and for payment of indemnity, should be required:

5. Without British permission, no arms to be manufactured or imported; and all fortified positions between the frontier and Lhasa, which might impede communications, to be destroyed.

6. The establishment of trade marts at Gyangtse, Shigatse, and at Lhasa, in the event of an agent being posted there; also at Gartok in the west, and in the east at such other places as may hereafter be found suitable.

7. Details to stand over till after discussion with the Tibetans. These would include the settlement of the Garwhal and Sikkim boundaries, terms of customs duties, and trade regulations."

No. 67.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 27th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of 26th June. It should be made quite clear to Younghusband, pending the receipt of your despatch and the issue of instructions by His Majesty's Government, that he should not make to Tibetans any suggestion as to the appointment of a Resident at Lhasa. Other points in your telegram require careful consideration, and Younghusband should be very guarded in reference to them.

No. 68.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 28th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Macdonald arrived Gyangtse 26th June last. Had skirmish 25th June last, one native soldier killed ; but met with strong opposition at Niani 26th June last. Village captured. Our casualties were :—Major Lye, 23rd Sikh Pioneers, severely wounded, hand. Native ranks : four killed, six wounded. Enemy, 800 strong, lost heavily and fled. Several Lhasa rifles and arms captured. Macdonald visited Gyangtse post, found everything satisfactory ; was resuming operations to-day.

No. 69.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 29th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Macdonald 28th June last moved against enemy holding in great force strong position in villages and monastery on left bank of river Gyangtse, to which bank he is transferring camp. Fighting carried on whole day. All enemy's positions captured. Enemy were defeated with severe loss. Our casualties :—Killed : Captain Craster, 46th Punjabis, attached 40th Pathans. Wounded : Captain Bliss and Captain Humphreys, 8th Gurkha Rifles, slightly. Five Native ranks wounded.

No. 70.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 29th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

It has been considered advisable to add 19th Punjabis, two guns 27th Mountain Battery, and necessary transport, warned in the telegram of the 5th June from the Government of India, to Macdonald's force.

No. 71.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 30th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

A telegram was received from Colonel Younghusband, dated the 28th instant, in which he reported that he expected the Tongsa Penlop to arrive at Gyangtse on the 30th; and that he had sent letters to Shape, at Nagartse Jong, and to Ta Lama, who was said to be at Shigatse, telling them that he had been informed by Tongsa Penlop that they wished to proceed to Gyangtse, with a view to settling matters, but were afraid to do so. Younghusband informed them that they would be treated with respect, and he would guarantee their safety if they had proper credentials enabling them to effect a settlement, but that, as Mission was about to move on to Lhasa, they must come at once. We have to-day received a telegram from Younghusband stating that Tibetans had seized and taken to Jong the messenger whom he sent with these letters, and that the Tibetan leader, after reading his communications, summoned a council and this morning despatched a messenger, under flag of truce, requesting armistice till Ta Lama and Shape could arrive to negotiate. Former is at Penam, half way to Shigatse; latter is at Nagartse. Both are said to have been given power to treat by Dalai Lama. Younghusband, after consulting with Macdonald, has replied that, in order to enable Ta Lama to reach Gyangtse, armistice will be granted till sunset on 30th June, but that, having regard to the unprovoked attack of the 5th May by the Tibetans on the Mission, and to the fact that they had occupied Jong and fired into our camp ever since, the withdrawal beyond the Karola, Yangla, and Dongtse passes, within a reasonable time, of all armed forces, was demanded by General Macdonald, who was responsible for the safety of the Mission.

No. 72.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 2nd July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Colonel Younghusband was shown, on the 1st instant, by the Tongsa Penlop, a letter from the Dalai Lama saying that he has appointed Shape, Ta Lama, the Grand Secretary, and representatives of the three great monasteries, to carry on negotiations; and asking the Tongsa Penlop, as we are prepared to negotiate by given date, to assist in peaceful settlement, fighting being bad for both animals and men. A present of silk has also arrived in camp as from Dalai Lama. Acceptance of the gift has, however, been refused by Younghusband, unless it is presented officially by the Dalai Lama, or accompanied by a letter. Younghusband also stated that British Government were willing to extend time limit, in spite of the fact that it had passed, if the envoys then on their way could furnish proof of their own readiness and power to negotiate, and of the sincerity of the Tibetan Government. On the afternoon of the 1st July, Ta Lama reached Gyangtse, and Younghusband received him on the following morning, Tongsa Penlop and six representatives of the three Lhasa monasteries being also present. They display no eagerness for settlement, and their only credentials are letters to Tongsa Penlop from Dalai Lama. They were told by Younghusband to come again on the 3rd July, after they had discussed matters with Tongsa Penlop, whom he has requested to explain to them the extremely serious position of affairs, and to impress upon them the necessity, if they wish the advance to Lhasa to be postponed, of furnishing satisfactory assurances as to the good faith of their Government, and the earnestness of their desire for negotiations.

No. 73.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 3rd July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Report has been received from Ugyen Kazi that it is the Tongsa Penlop's belief that there is real anxiety on the part of delegates to come to settlement.

No. 74.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 4th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

I have to-day sent the following telegram to Colonel Younghusband:— Your attitude towards the delegates, and the conditions which, in order to satisfy yourself of their good faith, you have laid down, are fully approved. The Government of India entertain a strong hope that your efforts to initiate regular negotiations will prove successful. They leave it to your discretion to take the necessary measures if the delegates pursue tactics of a purely dilatory nature.

No. 75.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 4th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

The Tibetan representatives presented themselves yesterday an hour and a half after the durbar, but were received at 4 p.m. Apparently no business was transacted, but Colonel Younghusband informed them that if they are seriously desirous to negotiate and so obviate necessity for advance of the force to Lhasa, the Jong must be evacuated by noon on the 5th, that there may be no risk of further attack on Mission.

No. 76.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 4th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

It appears to us that terms suggested in your telegram of 26th June are excessive in certain particulars. As terms may be proposed at any moment to Colonel Younghusband by the Tibetan envoys, it should be clearly explained to him that without our sanction no conditions should be named by him.

No. 77.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 5th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Younghusband reports that to-day he sent two messengers to warn Tibetans that signal gun would be fired at 12 o'clock, and that if fort was not surrendered firing would commence at 12.30. The delegates were warned to leave the fort, and to secure the removal of women and children. General Ma and Tongsa Penlop were also informed. No notice was taken by Tibetans, and at 12.38 firing on the fort commenced.

No. 78.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 6th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

The Tongsa Penlop is stated, in a report dated 4th instant from Colonel Younghusband, to have been asked by delegates for time to consult the Lhasa Government before they evacuated Jong. His advice was that they should comply without delay. They were anxious to get assurance as to the sincerity of our desire for a settlement, and were afraid that we should still insist on advancing to Lhasa. Younghusband explained to the Penlop that a sufficient proof of the Mission being a peaceful one, and not a military expedition, was to be found in the fact that the control of our proceedings was still in his hands.

No. 79.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 6th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Terms to be named to Tibetans by Younghusband should be as follows:—

(1) Neither at Lhasa nor elsewhere is Resident to be demanded.

(2) Tibetans and Chinese to be required to undertake that without the previous consent of the British Government there shall be no cession to any foreign Power of any portion of Tibetan territory, and that no intervention by any foreign Power in the affairs of Tibet shall be permitted.

(3) The production of the two Lachung British subjects, who were taken by the Tibetans, should be asked for by Colonel Younghusband, and, in the event of their having been ill-treated, pecuniary reparation should be demanded. In regard to the question of an indemnity, the sum to be demanded should not exceed an amount which, it is believed, it will be within the power of the Tibetans to pay, by instalments, if necessary, spread over three years. Colonel Younghusband will be guided by circumstances in this matter.

(4) Fortifications to be demolished in all accessible positions between the frontier and the point which the Mission may have reached.

(5) The establishment of a trade mart at Gyangtse, in addition to that at Yatung. The provisions for regulating the new mart to be similar to those existing at Yatung. Free access to the mart at Gyangtse to be ensured for British and Tibetan subjects, and the road between it and the frontier to be kept clear of obstruction. There will be located at Gyangtse, as at Yatung, an Agent of the Tibetan Government who will receive any letters that may be sent to him by the British Agent, and who will be held responsible for the delivery of these letters to the Tibetan authorities, as well as to the Chinese, and for the transmission of their replies.

(6) The Tibetans to be required to rebuild the boundary pillars which have been pulled down on the Sikkim frontier.

(7) The regulations as to trade and the levying of Customs duties to be on the general lines of those attached to the old Convention.

(8) The occupation of the Chumbi Valley will be the security for the indemnity, and for the fulfilment of the conditions in regard to the trade marts to be opened. The occupation will continue till the payment of the indemnity shall have been completed, or the marts opened effectively for the space of three years, whichever is the latest.

In the event of it becoming necessary to advance to Lhasa, the foregoing terms will be subject to alteration. Dilatory tactics on the part of the Tibetans are not to preclude the Mission from advancing.

No. 80.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 7th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Tibetans having refused to evacuate Jong, Macdonald resumed operations at 1 p.m., 5th July, demonstrating only that day. On morning of 6th July a portion of Gyangtse town assaulted and our position made good ; at 4 p.m., 6th July, wall of Jong breached ; Jong assaulted and captured by 6 p.m. Enemy's strength estimated at 5,000, their losses not known yet. Our casualties, full return not yet received. Killed :—32nd Sikh Pioneers, Lieutenant Gurdon ; 8th Gurka Rifles, three men. Wounded :—40th Pathans, Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, Captain Preston ; 8th Gurkha Rifles, Lieutenant Grant ; 23rd Sikh Pioneers, Lieutenant Mitchell ; Royal Fusiliers 1st Battalion, three men ; all slightly. About twenty Native ranks.

No. 81.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 7th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Information has been received from Colonel Younghusband to the effect that on capture of Jong he at once requested the Tongsa Penlop, who had congratulated him on the event, to despatch a messenger to Nagartse to tell the Ta Lama and Shape that he was still prepared to negotiate, but that advance would be made to Lhasa if they delayed coming.

No. 82.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 8th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Macdonald reports following additional casualties on 6th July:—Royal Fusiliers, 1st Battalion, wounded, Lieutenant Bowden Smith; 23rd Sikh Pioneers, Lieutenant Nicolas; 34th Sikh Pioneers, Lieutenant Hunt, attached to 23rd Sikh Pioneers; 8th Gurkha Rifles, Captain Baldwin. Enemy reported to have retreated the night of 6th July towards Shigatse, Yangla, and Karola. Mounted Infantry overtook 400 enemy at Dongtse, inflicting loss. Touch not established with other two parties. Monastery and rest of Gyangtse town occupied 7th July without resistance. Demolition of jong commenced. Enemy's loss on 6th July severer than estimated. Prisoners say total number of enemy fighting on 6th July was 6,000. Macdonald moving to-day with flying column to Dongtse to disperse enemy, also to collect fodder.

No. 83.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 8th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

A telegram has been received from Colonel Younghusband, dated 7th July, in which he states that the Tongsa Penlop is sending messengers after Ta Lama, who has fled. Bhutanese appear highly pleased with the turn of events, and the Tongsa Penlop, who watched fight on the 6th, was very much impressed. The Penlop is writing to Dalai Lama, who is said to be really anxious for settlement, to inform him that Younghusband is still prepared to negotiate.

No. 84.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 9th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Column reached Dongtse yesterday unopposed. All quiet now in vicinity of Gyangtse. Villagers returning.

No. 85.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 10th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

After full deliberation in Council on the 8th July, it was decided that, in consequence of the Tibetans having failed to comply with the conditions precedent to negotiations at Gyangtse, the advance to Lhasa was inevitable and should not be delayed. Our view was that Shape and Ta Lama evidently had neither authority to negotiate nor any intention of doing so; and that to avoid misconception in the future it was essential that our power to advance to Lhasa should be demonstrated. A communication in the above sense was made to Younghusband. Should Tibetan delegates appear after he has started, he is to explain our terms to them, to warn them that a less favourable settlement will be the result of further resistance, and to invite them to accompany the advance of the Mission.

No. 86.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 11th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Mounted Infantry reconnoitred to Penan Jong; found unoccupied; all Tibetans fled to Shigatse or Rong valley; their retirement from Karola and Nagartse also reported, but report has not been confirmed yet.

No. 87.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 11th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram, dated the 9th July, Gyangtse, has been received from Younghusband:—

"I should be enabled to effect settlement more quickly if I had information as to what modifications in the terms now authorised would be made in the following contingencies: (i) if I am met on the march by delegates sent to negotiate, and if latter prevent further opposition being offered; and (ii) in the event of the advance being opposed. Is it possible to furnish me with information on these points?"

I have sent the following reply to Younghusband, and should be glad to know if it has your approval:—

"Following instructions may be acted on pending receipt of a reply from His Majesty's Government, to whom your enquiry has been referred: Should Tibetan delegates meet you, with a view to negotiating, on the march, and should they prevent further opposition, terms specified in the Secretary of State's telegram of the 6th July are to be adhered to. Should the advance be opposed, the character and extent of the opposition must be ascertained before final orders can be given. You are, however, at liberty to make a reservation of the right of His Majesty's Government to establish additional trade marts in Eastern Tibet and at Shigatse and Gartok, and to demand an increase of the amount of the indemnity. These are the only means of enhancing our terms which do not involve a departure from the main principles of settlement desired by His Majesty's Government. If, however, unforeseen circumstances occur which appear to you to necessitate a change of policy, you will, of course, furnish a report of the facts and await instructions. Government of India hope that when you get into touch with the Lhasa authorities you will succeed, without difficulty, in securing the acceptance by them of the terms now proposed."

No. 88.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 11th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

We have received and understood the terms contained in your telegram of the 6th July, which was at once communicated to Colonel Younghusband for his information and guidance. There are certain points of minor importance as to which your telegram above cited is silent, owing possibly to the telegraphic abstract of our despatch not having been explicit enough. These points, which we now suggest for the consideration of His Majesty's Government, are as follows:—

Clause 2.—In drawing up formal convention, the conditions against cession of Tibetan territory should, it is presumed, be amplified in the usual manner; it would also be desirable to secure, by express stipulation:—

(*a*) that no representatives of any other foreign Powers, and no commercial or other Agents of such Powers, should be admitted to Tibet;

(*b*) that no grant of concessions for roads, railways, or telegraphs, or for mining or other rights, should be made without the previous consent of the British Government; and

(*c*) that without such consent no Tibetan revenues, whether in cash or in kind, should be pledged or assigned to any foreign Power, or to the subject of any foreign Power.

These provisions appear to be necessary in order to prevent the intervention of foreign Powers, and they cannot be regarded as constituting interference on our part with the internal administration of Tibet. As regards Clause 4, provision should presumably be inserted prohibiting the erection, at any future time, of fortifications, by which free communication between the frontier and the point reached by the Mission may be impeded. Many of the difficulties experienced in the past will be obviated by the provisions for the transmission of correspondence through British and Tibetan Agents at Gyangtse, and by the establishment of trade mart there under the conditions now applicable to that at Yatung. We trust, however, that, for the reasons given in our despatch, the opening of subordinate mart at Gartok, in Western Tibet, may be agreed to. There is also, we presume, no objection to present opportunity being taken to settle petty boundary cases in Kumaon.

No. 89.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 12th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Following men, 1st Battalion Royal Fusiliers, injured gunpowder explosion 8th July last:—Dangerously, 7139 Private Gillimore and 8776 Private Dare; seriously, 2438 Sergeant Owen, 6487 Private Gee, 5110 Corporal McCarty, 4116 Private Gill, 7306 Private Maloney, 7050 Private Marriage, 7620 Private Phillips.

No. 90.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 13th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegrams, dated the 11th July, regarding Tibet. I shall communicate to you with the least possible delay the views of His Majesty's Government in regard to the modification of the terms laid down in my telegram of the 6th July. In the meantime, pending receipt of the orders of His Majesty's Government, no increased demands, save in respect of the amount of indemnity, are to be made by Younghusband. Subject to this exception, I approve the instructions to Younghusband as given in your telegram in reply to his telegram of the 9th July.

No. 91.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 13th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

To-morrow, the Mission will commence advance to Lhasa. Colonel Younghusband is issuing Proclamation to the effect that our terms will be made more stringent should Mission meet with opposition during the advance. It is presumed that terms will also be made more stringent in the event of Tibetan delegates failing to come in till the last moment before arrival of Mission at Lhasa. We are authorising Younghusband to secure the signature of the Dalai Lama to Convention embodying terms finally approved, and to sign it himself, subject to ratification by His Majesty's Government. I should be glad to be apprised of decision arrived at on the points raised in my telegram of the 11th July, as to the further terms to be demanded in the event of opposition being encountered. We understand that full power is reserved by us to construct suitable communication at any time, of whatever class may be deemed necessary, through the Chumbi valley. Younghusband asks that provision authorising trade agent at Gyangtse to proceed, when necessary, to Lhasa should be included in Convention. This, we suggest, might be made one of the more stringent terms to be exacted should the Mission be opposed.

No. 92.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 13th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Column returned 11th July last from Dongtse. All quiet. Preparations for advance nearing completion.

No. 93.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 14th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Preparations complete. Macdonald marches to Katong to-day.

No. 94.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 16th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Younghusband telegraphs, under date 13th July, as follows :—

"I have informed the Amban by letter that I am advancing to Lhasa, as neither properly empowered Tibetan delegates nor he have come to Gyangtse ; that my purpose is still to negotiate, but that now negotiations can only be conducted in Lhasa. Tongsa Penlop has at my instance written a further letter to Ta Lama, stating that I shall be prepared to carry on negotiations *en route*, in order that settlement may be ready for signature at an early date at Lhasa. The Penlop has also written at my request to the Dalai Lama, giving an outline of the terms to be demanded, and adding that they will be enhanced if we encounter further opposition. Tongsa Penlop is sending a man with me to act as a means of communication with the Tibetans, he himself will rejoin any time I ask him to ; at present he will remain here until he hears from the Tibetans that they still have need of him. A Lama from Lhasa, who has arrived with a letter for the Tongsa Penlop from the Dalai Lama, states that latter is really anxious for a settlement to be effected. In his letter the Dalai Lama says it is a pity that there should be war in a religious country, and asks the Tongsa Penlop to assist the Councillors in their good work. Jongpen, of Gyangtse, whom I had confined in post here when we first heard of hostile gathering, just before the Mission was attacked, has now been released and re-instated ; he will act as intermediary between the Officer Commanding here and the people. People are selling country produce to the soldiers, and a small bazaar has been started. Proclamation will be posted up everywhere to-morrow."

No. 95.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 18th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Telegraphic report from Younghusband, dated the 16th July, states that letters from Dalai Lama, Yutok Shape and Ta Lama have been received by Tongsa Penlop, who has sent them on to him. Dalai Lama in his letter asks Tongsa Penlop to use his influence with English and Tibetans, and say that negotiations for establishing friendship should be begun with all speed as it will then be known which is in the right. The letters from Yutok Shape and Ta Lama were despatched from Nagartse, and were to the effect that they were on the point of setting out for Gyangtse. They came as far as Ralung, but left again on the 14th July without making any communication. Younghusband, before making further diplomatic move, is awaiting definite advances on their part. They are aware what our terms are, and have been advised by Tongsa Penlop not to fight but to effect a settlement. In any case, however, the Mission will not postpone its advance.

No. 96.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 18th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Macdonald arrived Ralung 16th July. Mounted Infantry report Karo-La strongly held, and fresh defences built. Condition of wounded officers:—Lieutenant Bowden Smith, 1st Battalion Royal Fusiliers, Major Lye, 23rd Sikh Pioneers, Lieutenant Mitchell, 32nd Sikh Pioneers, all wounded doing well. Lieutenants Nicolas and Hunt, 23rd Sikh Pioneers, Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell and Captain Preston, 40th Pathans, Captains Baldwin and Bliss, and Lieutenant Grant, 8th Gurkha Rifles, all recovered and on duty. 7139 Private Gillimore, 1st Battalion Royal Fusiliers, died 16th July, effects gunpowder explosion.

No. 97.

Letter from the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 30th June, 1904. (*Received at India Office,* 19*th July,* 1904.)

(Extract.)

We have the honour to address you regarding the conditions of the settlement of our relations with Tibet. Recent events have entirely changed the aspect of the questions to be considered. After a halt at Thuna, on the threshold of Tibet, of over two months, during which Colonel Younghusband's endeavours to open discussion with Tibetan officials met with no more success than his previous efforts at Khamba Jong, the Mission advanced on the 31st March, and on the 11th April arrived at Gyangtse. The move was not effected without opposition, and, despite the endeavours made to avoid bloodshed, the Tibetan forces which essayed to block the progress of the Mission, first at Guru and again in the Jamdan gorge outside Gyangtse, sustained considerable losses. No sooner had the Tibetan forces been routed at Guru, than the countryside resumed its normal aspect, women and children returned to their villages, and supplies were brought in for the use of the Mission and its escort. At Gyangtse itself the experience was the same. A few days after his arrival Colonel Younghusband received a despatch from the Amban, announcing that he would arrive at Gyangtse within the next three weeks, that the Tibetans had agreed to supply him with transport, and that he had insisted on competent and trustworthy Tibetan representatives accompanying him. The Amban added that the Dalai Lama was now aroused to the sense of our power; and the Chinese official who brought the despatch reported that the Tibetans were entreating the Amban to intercede on their behalf, that the common people would not resent our appearance at Lhasa, and that there were but few troops between the town of Gyangtse and the capital. It appeared that at length the situation was improving, and that the Tibetan Government and people had reached a more amenable frame of mind. This belief, however, was soon dispelled. On the 1st May, it was reported that a force of 1,000 to 1,500 Tibetans had been located near the Karo La on the road between Gyangtse and Lhasa; by the time our troops had moved out to remove this menace to our position, the gathering had swelled; and it was only after a stubborn resistance that the Tibetan force was put to flight and their camp captured. In the meanwhile the officials at Gyangtse had taken advantage of the temporary absence of the column despatched to the Karo La, to make an assault upon the Mission and its diminished escort; and the Bhutia servants of Captain Parr, the local Chinese delegate, and some servants of the Mission, who happened to be in the town, were brutally murdered. The attack was repulsed with heavy loss to the assailants. But hostilities had now commenced; and since the early part of May our camp at Gyangtse and our line of communications with that place have been subjected to continuous attacks by the Tibetan forces. The complexion of affairs was thus entirely changed. It became impossible for the Mission to sit indefinitely at Gyangtse, and on the 12th May His Majesty's Government sanctioned the continuance of the advance to Lhasa itself, unless by a fixed date the Amban should have arrived at Gyangtse accompanied by competent Tibetan delegates prepared to negotiate with our officers. This date has now been notified; our ultimatum was delivered to the Tibetan Commander at Gyangtse on the 1st June; and unless by the 25th June the requisite envoys have arrived at Gyangtse, our troops will advance to the capital itself. The time has now arrived for discussing the settlement which it is our object to effect in order that we may be able to communicate instructions as to general principles to our Commission as soon as possible after the arrival of the Mission at Lhasa. The most recent exposition of the views of His Majesty's Government, of which we are in possession is that contained in the memorandum of the 2nd June last handed by Lord Lansdowne to the Russian Ambassador in London. In that document His Lordship explained that His Majesty's Government adhered to the policy stated in your telegram of the 6th November to the Government of India. His Lordship went on to explain that this policy was not inalterable in any eventuality, and that the action of His Majesty's Government was to some extent dependent on the conduct of the Tibetans themselves. He added an emphatic declaration that, so long as no other Power endeavoured to intervene in the affairs of Tibet, no attempt would be made to annex it, to establish a Protectorate over it, or in any way to control its internal administration. With the policy involved in this latter declaration we desire entirely to associate ourselves. But we are unable to disguise the fact that recent developments may make it incumbent upon us to recommend a reconsideration of the opinion previously expressed in your telegram of the 6th November, 1903, in so far as concerns the establishment of a permanent Mission in the country. We do not as yet feel in a position to make our final recommendations, but we think it right, without further delay, to place before His Majesty's Government a statement of the case that may form the basis of further discussion, which it may possibly be necessary to conduct by telegraph, after the arrival of the Mission at Lhasa, and when we are in possession of the fuller knowledge which we hope then to obtain. The arguments against the establishment of a British representative at Lhasa are largely based on the declarations of His Majesty's Government, and on considerations of international policy which it is needless for us to reiterate. Apart from such considerations, we are deeply impressed with the grave responsibilities which the Indian Government must incur by posting a Resident Agent at the Capital of Tibet. We feel it, however, to be our duty to lay before you the reasons which may make it necessary for us reluctantly to assume the burden of the measure. It is evident that, if our objects are not to be frustrated from the outset, the trade arrangements at the marts which we propose to secure must be supervised by a British officer. Clause 1 of the Trade Regulations of 1893 permitted the posting of such an official at the place then selected, and we now regard it as a matter for regret that no use was ever made of this provision. But the need for such an appointment is based also on considerations of a wider nature. It is now more than a year since we received and reported circumstantial rumours of Russian agreements with or about Tibet. The Russian Government declared through their Ambassador that there existed "no Convention about Tibet, either with Tibet itself, or with China, or with any one else, nor had the Russian Government any agents in that country, or any intention of sending agents or missions there." Their policy, it was added, "ne viserait le Tibet en aucun cas." On the strength of these explicit disclaimers, His Majesty's Government announced in May, 1903, that they were unable to approve a suggestion that we should endeavour to arrange for the permanent location of a Political Agent in Tibet. "Such a political outpost," it was explained, "might entail difficulties and responsibilities incommensurate, in the judgment of His Majesty's Government, with any benefits which, in the circumstances now known to exist, could be gained by it. The Foreign Office have recently received assurances that Russia has no intention of developing political interests in Tibet." We do not wish to belittle the practical and immediate value of these disclaimers. His Majesty's Government have already recognised the necessity of asserting the predominance of British influence in Tibet, and in his interview of the 8th April, 1903, Lord Lansdowne clearly apprised Count Benckendorff of our attitude in the matter, and we trust that effect may now be given to the intentions of His Majesty's Government and British influence firmly established in Tibet, a result which will be gladly welcomed not only by the present ruling authorities in Nepal, but also by the Bhutanese, whose executive chief, the Tongsa Penlop, on the arrival of the Mission at Gyangtse, at once conveyed to Colonel Younghusband his congratulations and has since paid a special visit to our Commissioner at Phari Jong, and has expressed his willingness to advance with our troops to Lhasa. How is this influence to be established? It is evident that we must now require something more practical than the nominal concessions acquired by the treaty of 1890 as the fruits of our operations in 1888. The losses sustained by the Tibetans in opposing our advance to Gyangtse, at the Karo La, and in the successive attacks upon our Mission and their lines of communication have been considerable; but our experience of 1888 shows that we cannot trust to our military successes leaving any lasting impression. If on this occasion also, after protracted discussions and costly military operations in Tibetan territory, we retire leaving no visible sign of our authority within their borders, and are content to secure a Convention which like its predecessors may be rendered nugatory by the non-existence of practical guarantees, then we shall only find ourselves, after heavy outlay, in a worse position than before, and the Tibetans will believe more firmly than ever that our failure to gain our ends is due to inability to enforce submission. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the best guarantee for the due observance of the new Convention, and for the adequate protection of our rights as the only European Power limitrophe with Tibet, must be that, in addition to the appointment of officers to watch over our commercial interests at the marts to be established in Tibet, we should demand the acceptance of an accredited British Agent in Tibet. The place at which this agent should reside is one on which opinions can easily differ, and we prefer to leave the question open until we are in possession of the fuller information that we shall acquire after the Mission has reached Lhasa. The arguments in favour of placing him at Lhasa are the following:—Lhasa is the pivot of the religious and political life of Tibet. It is the seat of the Dalai Lama and his council, with whom we have to establish official relations; and it is the focus of the priestly influence which we have to conciliate or overcome. It may be argued that it is undesirable to arouse the resentment of the Tibetans by requiring them to receive a representative of a strange race and a strange religion in the home of their most sacred associations. But after the manner in which for the past 15 years the Tibetans have repudiated their obligations and have derided the patience with which we have submitted to their insults, we believe that, even should such a feeling exist, it may be better to face it than to allow of the misconstruction which would be placed upon the location of an agent at any place outside Lhasa. We see, however, no reason why the presence of a resident agent at Lhasa should be a lasting source of irritation. For more than 80 years we have now had an Agent at Khatmandu, a capital, the isolation of which from foreign intrusion has been guarded hardly less jealously than that of Lhasa itself, and that by a people whose prowess has been proved in our own armies. The hostilities which preceded the first appointment of a British Minister at Peking under the treaty of 1860 were also far more serious than any opposition which has so far been encountered, or, it may be safely asserted, is likely to be met on the way to Lhasa. We see then no reason to anticipate greater risk in placing a Resident at Lhasa than was incurred in sending a British representative to Khatmandu or Peking. Despite the hostility which, under the influence and leadership of the monkish faction, they have displayed against us, we believe that the Tibetan people have no dislike for us as a race, and there is nothing in the tolerant Buddhist creed which counsels hostility to strangers of a different faith or encourages fanaticism. The exclusion of British subjects and Europeans is merely based on a concordat of the present dominant class in Tibet, and is not in any way a religious obligation. The monks are at present opposed to us, fearing the loss of their influence, but we believe that their antipathy is based on suspicion and ignorance, and that, with tact and patience, it may be eradicated; and we are supported in this view by the friendly relations which Colonel Younghusband was able to establish at Khamba Jong with ecclesiastical envoys from the Tashi Lama of Shigatse. It must also always be borne in mind that subjects of all her other neighbours —China, Nepal, and Kashmir—are allowed freely to resort to, and trade in, Tibet, while China and Nepal have official representatives at Lhasa. As at Khatmandu, our Agent would, like the Nepal representative at Lhasa, abstain from all interference with the internal administration of the country, and would confine himself to watching over our trade interests and in guarding against the introduction of foreign influences. His presence, therefore, at Lhasa would be in no sense a contravention of the policy now declared by His Majesty's Government. It is believed that the hesitation of His Majesty's Government to allow the appointment of a representative in Tibet was due partly to the supposed impossibility of keeping open communications with him, and partly to a desire not to accelerate political complications regarding the integrity of China. We believe that the first ground of objection was based upon a misapprehension, and that there is no real difficulty, except on the southern side of the watershed, to such free passage to and from Tibet as may be necessary for the adequate support of a British representative either at Lhasa or Gyangtse; and our recent operations have demonstrated—and the exceptional severity of the past winter makes the proof stronger—that, however great the physical difficulties of communication may be, they are not insuperable even at the worst time of the year. The difficulties on the Indian side of the Himalaya will be obviated by a road through Chumbi which we are now examining. We are unable to share the apprehensions arising from the second cause. No other European Power at present adjoins Tibet or has any interests there, and so far our arrangements have been made with the cordial co-operation of the Chinese officials deputed to meet our Mission, and we understand that they meet with the sympathy, if not with the avowed approval, of the Chinese Government, as, indeed, is clearly evidenced by the attitude of that Government as reported in Sir E. Satow's telegram, dated 15th June, 1904. A further point in regard to which we desire to place you in possession of our present views is the question of retaining the Chumbi valley. It is hardly necessary to explain that this valley lies to the south of the main watershed, and is Indian rather than Tibetan in character. Our Mission has been well received by the people, and the Political Agent whom we have located among them reports that they regard our presence with unmixed satisfaction, and that their only fear is lest we may evacuate the valley and expose them to the vengeance which the Lamas would surely take upon them for having lived on terms of friendliness with us. The occupation of this region was recommended by all the local authorities as far back as 1888, was strongly urged by the Bengal Government in Mr. Cotton's letter, dated 22nd July, 1895, but was deferred owing to Chinese susceptibilities. The contumacious disregard of the Tibetans for their treaty obligations and for the authority of their Suzerain has culminated in armed resistance to the passage of a friendly Mission despatched by us with the full cognizance of that Suzerain and accompanied by Chinese representatives throughout. It appears to us that recent events may make it necessary to take material guarantees. We have referred to a road through the Chumbi valley as desirable in order to secure the position of our representative in Tibet if such a one should be appointed. The route which is projected along the Amo Chu valley will lead into the foot of the Chumbi valley, and it is obviously desirable that it should continue under our control up to the point where it debouches on to the open plateau of Tibet beyond the Tang La. The opening up of such a route into Tibet proper must evidently be the precursor of any real development of trade, and, what is of far greater importance, it provides one of the surest guarantees for the predominance of our influence and the safety of our Agents in the country. It has recently been estimated that, if our forces have all left Tibet by October next, the cost of the expedition will be not less than £648,000. The contingency of such an early withdrawal is remote, and it seems probable that the operations necessary to assert our treaty rights and to exact reparation from the Tibetans will cost us not less than a million sterling, and even this figure may be considerably exceeded. We are, therefore, of opinion that, as a guarantee for the fulfilment of the Convention, and as a security for the payment of the indemnity that we now propose to require, as well as in the interests of the people of the valley themselves, the occupation of the Chumbi valley for such period as may be necessary for the due protection of our treaty rights and international interests will become inevitable. This leads us to the question of an indemnity. Now that it has become necessary to send a regular military expedition to Lhasa, we would submit that we have a good claim to be recouped the expense to which we have been put. It is obvious that the retention of the Chumbi valley will not, from a monetary point of view, be an adequate return for the outlay in which we have been involved, and it will be well to put forward a claim to compensation against the Tibetans. Further, we consider that having regard to the recent attacks upon our Mission at Gyangtse, and as a measure calculated to increase the security of our representative in Tibet, we should follow the precedent of the demands presented by the allied Powers to the Chinese Government after the events of 1900, and should insist on the razing of all fortified positions which might impede the course of free communication between our frontier and Lhasa, and on the prohibition of the importation of arms into Tibet or their manufacture within the country except with our special permission. It remains to discuss what might be done if His Majesty's Government decline to agree to the appointment of a representative at Lhasa. In that case we would urge that a resident Agent should be posted at Gyangtse whose functions would primarily be to supervise and maintain the trading facilities which we must undoubtedly secure, and to which we shall presently allude. Although the duties of such an Agent would be mainly commercial, they would necessarily comprise that of seeing that the Convention or treaty which we shall eventually conclude with the Tibetan Government is observed in all respects. The Agent should, therefore, have the right of proceeding to Lhasa, as occasion may require, to discuss matters with the Chinese Amban or with the high officials of the Dalai Lama. In making the terms of his appointment, we consider that the grounds and conditions of our self-restraint in this matter should be clearly indicated to the Tibetans. It should be explained that His Majesty's Government consent to waive their claim to the appointment of a resident Agent at Lhasa solely out of regard for the Tibetan desire to maintain their freedom from contact with European influence at the political and religious capital of their country; that they are prepared to forego this demand, so long as the Tibetan Government preserves an attitude of isolation from external affairs and avoids all intercourse with other European Powers; but that, in the event of any departure by the Tibetans from this policy in the future, the British Government reserve to themselves the right to require the acceptance of an Agent at the capital itself. We cannot, however, conceal from ourselves that this alternative, the least which can be contemplated, is not calculated, in the same degree, to afford a guarantee of satisfactory results. An Agent at Gyangtse, though possibly in greater personal security, will probably not be in so good a position to know what transpires in political circles at Lhasa. But whether or not a British Agent is established in Tibet, we consider that recent events justify our requiring from the Tibetans and from the Chinese Government a formal recognition of our exclusive political influence in Tibet, and an engagement that they will not admit to Tibet the representative of, that they will cede no portion of Tibetan territory to, and that they will enter into no relations regarding Tibet with, any other foreign Power, without the previous consent of the British Government. We now turn to less contentious matter, namely, that of facilities for trade with Tibet, to secure which was the primary object of the Mission when it was originally despatched on an errand which was then indubitably peaceful in character and intention. It is, of course, necessary to insist on access for purposes of trade to convenient centres in Tibet proper in the place of Yatung, which is beyond all question unsuitable for the object for which it was intended. In Central Tibet our present information leads us to believe that the town of Gyangtse provides the site which is best fitted to our requirements. We trust that His Majesty's Government will authorise us to instruct Colonel Younghusband to arrange for the concession of proper trade facilities at this place. Had the Tibetans agreed to peaceful negotiations, it is probable that, so far as concerns this part of Tibet, we should not have thought it necessary to press for other marts than Gyangtse. In view, however, of recent developments, we think that it may be advisable to insist on the opening up to trade of the neighbouring town of Shigatse, the seat of the Tashi Lama, and also of Lhasa itself, if a British Resident should be posted to the capital. Hitherto the negotiations with Tibet have been conducted through the agency of Bengal officers, and the question of facilitating our traffic with Western Tibet has not been fully considered. British India adjoints Western Tibet in Spiti and Garhwal, and a considerable amount of trade in wool and borax now finds its way across those frontiers as well as down the Hindustan-Tibet road made by Lord Dalhousie in the valley of the Sutlej. The figures for this trade for the past three years are shown on the margin. Already, notwithstanding the difficulties of communication, it amounts to half the total trade with Tibet, and it is capable of considerable development by an extension of the Hindustan-Tibet road to the frontier, a short distance of 25 miles. This, we have ascertained, can be done without much difficulty, and we consider that the present opportunity should be taken of completing the road to the frontier and of opening another market at Gartok or some other convenient place in Western Tibet, which, with its vicinity to Chinese Turkestan, may acquire considerable importance in the future. We are also inclined to think that it may hereafter be advisable to insist on similar facilities in the extreme east of Tibet. This tract is attracting a good deal of attention from explorers. The existence in this locality of a recognised trade mart accessible from India may hereafter, we believe, provide facilities for the purpose of tapping Tibetan trade. For the present, however, we incline to think that it may be advisable to refrain from express mention of any desire for a mart in the extreme east of Tibet, and that it would suffice to stipulate for the right of free passage and of access for commercial purposes to such points as may hereafter be found to afford facilities for Indian traders. It would be useless at the present stage to enter into details of the draft Convention, of the trade regulations, of the terms as to Customs duty,

——	Imports.	Exports.	Total.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
1900-01 ..	8,99,248	3,91,266	12,90,514
1901-02...	10,45,094	4,26,256	14,71,350
1902-03...	10,27,667	3,92,510	14,20,177

These figures do not include the trade *viâ* Ladakh, of which part is Tibetan.

of the arrangements in regard to mining rights and concessions which appear to us to be necessary, and of the boundary settlements on the Sikkim and Garhwal frontiers which stand for decision. These questions must first be discussed by our Commissioner with the representatives of the Tibetan Government, and we shall probably be obliged to consult you by telegraph only, if the Mission is to withdraw from Lhasa without undue delay. All our present plans are being framed with a view to the retirement of the Mission from Lhasa early in October, but Colonel Younghusband is strongly of opinion that nothing can be effected unless the Mission is prepared to remain at Lhasa throughout the winter. His view is that the Tibetans will persist in their obstinacy unless they are made to understand from the very outset that our military forces will occupy Lhasa so long as they refuse to come to terms. We have pointed out to Colonel Younghusband that his proposal is somewhat at variance with the spirit of the policy which His Majesty's Government desire to pursue, and that the military objections to wintering at Lhàsa are well nigh overwhelming. But this is a matter on which we are not prepared to express our opinions until the Mission has reached Lhasa and reported on the situation in that place. There is a serious contingency which we have to contemplate in the probable flight of the Dalai Lama and the officials of the Tibetan Government concerning which we have received much circumstantial information. We are, moreover, very credibly informed that there is a considerable faction in Lhasa who are bitterly opposed to his present policy of insulting the British Empire and consider that he has brought about the ruin of his country by listening to the bad advice of his present counsellors. If these prognostications should prove to be correct, we should hope to be able, with the help or assent of the Chinese authorities, to establish a new Government with whom we could negotiate, and to secure the co-operation of the Chinese Amban in the appointment of a Regent. We trust that we have said enough to prove that the location of a British Agent in Tibet is the best practical guarantee for the fulfilment of the terms which may finally be agreed upon and the only sure means of asserting British influence against the designs of a rival Power. If, however, His Majesty's Government are not prepared to modify their present policy, we fear that it may prove impossible for us to suggest any course of action which would ensure the ultimate success of the Mission, but we observe that, in the Memorandum communicated to the Russian Ambassador, Lord Lansdowne pointed out that, though His Majesty's Government still adhered to their declared policy, it was obvious that their action must to some extent depend upon the conduct of the Tibetans themselves, and that His Majesty's Government could not undertake that they would not depart in any eventuality from the policy which had commended itself to them. It is unnecessary for us to assure you that no efforts will be spared by ourselves and by our Agents in Tibet to give full effect to the views of His Majesty's Government, but we cannot be blind to the fact that the conduct of the Tibetans may render it impossible to carry out in its integrity the policy that has been laid down. It is in view of such a contingency, if, indeed, we are not justified in regarding the contingency as an already accomplished fact, that we have ventured to suggest possible alternatives. We are prepared to await the course of events, and persist in the present plan up to the last possible moment, but we have thought it right to lay our views before His Majesty's Government at the present time in order that they may be in a position to decide upon any new proposals which circumstances may force us to make at short notice. We take the present opportunity to forward, for your information, further correspondence relating to Tibetan affairs.*

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* See Part II, Nos. 1–160.—pp. 95, *et seq.*

No. 98.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 20th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Younghusband reports suggestion of Wilton's that if Chinese Government were requested by His Majesty's Minister at Pekin to send special instructions to the Amban that he is to bring negotiations to speedy conclusion, matters might be expedited.

No. 99.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 21st July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Macdonald forced Karola 18th July last, meeting with slight opposition. Our casualties: One native rank killed, two wounded. Was marching Nagartse 19th July last.

No. 100.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 21st July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Our telegram, dated 12th July last. 7306 Private Maloney, 1st Battalion Royal Fusiliers, died 19th July last, gunpowder explosion.

No. 101.

From the Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow, dated the 21st July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

It is suggested that at this juncture it might hasten matters if you requested the Chinese Government to instruct the Amban specially to bring the negotiations to a speedy conclusion. Proceed accordingly.

No. 102.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 22nd July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Present strength of Column proceeding to Lhasa is as follows:—Mountain Division, No. 7 Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery; 30th Mountain Battery, one section; Maxim Machine Gun Detachment; 1st Battalion Norfolk

Regiment, first and second companies; Mounted Infantry, four companies; 1st Battalion Royal Fusiliers, four companies; 32nd Sikh Pioneers, six companies; 40th Pathans, six companies; 8th Gurkha Rifles, half company; No. 3 Company 1st Sappers and Miners.

No. 103.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 25th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Macdonald marched to Yarsig, 21st July last.

No. 104.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 25th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

We are of opinion that Convention embodying terms should be one between Great Britain and Tibet, and should be signed by Younghusband and the Dalai Lama. Signature of Chinese Amban should, we propose, be obtained to a separate agreement, which, after citing the Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893, should contain provisions recognising validity of the Anglo-Tibetan Agreement. The agreement with Tibet would be the complement of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890. Do you agree?

No. 105.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 25th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

On the 19th Mission arrived without meeting with further opposition at Nagartse. Meeting took place between Younghusband and Yutok Shape, Ta Lama and Grand Councillor, the Tibetan delegates, at which latter protested against advance of Mission to Lhasa on ground that it would give rise to disturbance; they urged, moreover, that there would be no one there. Delegates refused to discuss terms, of general nature of which they had been apprised by Tongsa Penlop. Younghusband reports that the Councillors do not seem even yet to realise the seriousness of the situation, though they were respectful in demeanour. He informed them that we must proceed to Lhasa, but that the character and duration of our stay there was dependent on Tibetans themselves, as we had no wish to remain any longer time than was required for conclusion of settlement.

No. 106.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 26th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

His Majesty's Government, having considered the views expressed in your telegrams of the 11th July, the 13th July, and your letter of 30th June, have approved certain modifications of the terms stated in my telegram of the 6th July. Terms to be named to Tibetans, as modified, will now run as follows:—

(1.) Neither at Lhasa nor elsewhere is Resident to be demanded.

(2.) Tibetans and Chinese to be required to undertake—

(*a*) That, without the previous consent of the British Government, no portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged, or otherwise given for occupation to any foreign Power.

(*b*) That no intervention by any foreign Power in the affairs of Tibet shall be permitted.

(*c*) That, without our previous approval, no representatives or agents of any foreign Power shall be admitted to Tibet; that no grant of concessions for roads, railways, or telegraphs, or for mining or other rights shall be made to any such Power, or to any subject thereof, without the consent of the British Government; but that, if their consent to such concessions be given, the British Government shall be granted similar or equivalent concessions.

(*d*) That without the previous consent of the British Government no Tibetan revenues, whether in cash or in kind, shall be pledged or assigned to any foreign Power, or to any subject of such Power.

(3.) The production of the two Lachung British subjects, who were taken by the Tibetans, should be asked for by Colonel Younghusband, and, in the event of their having been ill-treated, pecuniary reparation should be demanded. In regard to the question of an indemnity, the sum to be demanded should not exceed an amount which, it is believed, will be within the power of the Tibetans to pay, by instalments, if necessary, spread over three years. Colonel Younghusband will be guided by circumstances in this matter.

(4.) Fortifications to be demolished in all accessible positions between the frontier and the point which the Mission may have reached.

(5.) The establishment of trade marts at Gyangtse and Gartok, in addition to that at Yatung. The provisions for regulating the new marts to be similar to those existing at Yatung. Free access to the mart at Gyangtse to be ensured for British and Tibetan subjects, and the road between it and the frontier to be kept clear of obstruction, and in a state of repair suited to the needs of the trade. There will be located at Gyangtse, as at Yatung, an Agent of the Tibetan Government who will receive any letters that may be sent to him by the British Agent, and who will be held responsible for the delivery of these letters to the Tibetan authorities, as well as to the Chinese, and for the transmission of their replies. British Agent will have right of access to Gyangtse, similar to that prescribed in respect of Yatung by the Regulations of 1893.

(5a.) In addition to the establishment of marts at Gyangtse and Gartok the Tibetan Government to be required to undertake to consider the question of establishing fresh marts, if required by the development of trade, and to place no restrictions on trade by routes at present existing.

(6.) Boundary laid down in the Convention of 1890 to be recognised by the Tibetans as the frontier between Sikkim and Tibet, and erection of boundary pillars to be carried out accordingly.

(7.) The regulations as to trade and the levying of Customs duties to be on general lines of those attached to the old Convention. The Tibetans to give undertaking that no dues of any sort other than those which may be provided for in tariff mutually agreed upon shall be levied.

(8.) The occupation of the Chumbi Valley will be the security for the indemnity, and for the fulfilment of the conditions in regard to the trade marts to be opened. The occupation will continue till the payment of the indemnity shall have been completed, or the marts opened effectively for the space of three years, whichever is the latest.

As regards your suggestion that Clause 4 should be amended so as to provide against future erection of fortifications, the proviso in Clause 5 to the effect that the road between Gyangtse and the frontier is to be kept clear of obstruction, seems to meet the point sufficiently. As regards Kumaon boundary cases, these seem to take place within British territory. Would it not be possible to settle the claims of Tibetans by means of local action of our officers when suitable opportunity offers, without including them in present negotiations?

No. 107.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 26th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 25th. Your proposal to embody terms in Anglo-Tibetan Convention, which shall be signed by Younghusband on the one part and the Dalai Lama or his accredited representative on the other, and to secure signature of Amban to a separate agreement, is approved.

No. 108.

From Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne, dated Peking, the 27th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

I saw two Ministers of the Foreign Board on the 25th, and carried out instructions given in your Lordship's telegram of the 21st. I reminded their Excellencies that notice was given on the 14th June that if the Tibetan negotiators did not appear at Gyangtse our Mission would advance to Lhasa. I gave some account of the subsequent events and the final start of the British force for Lhasa. I proceeded to say that His Majesty's Government had information that the Dalai Lama was not averse from opening negotiations, and that they were anxious for the Amban to be instructed to do his best to bring the negotiations to a termination speedily. The Ministers showed me a telegram which had been sent to the Amban a few days ago by Tachienlu, instructing him to use every effort to assist a settlement, and on no account to retire from Lhasa. I offered to send this telegram myself to the Government of India to be forwarded, as this would save time, and I am now doing so.

No. 109.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 27th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Macdonald made short march to Piahte Jong, 22nd July last; was marching to Demalung (not on map) 23rd July last, and hoped to seize passage of river, 24th July last. Khambala found unoccupied and boats observed crossing river.

No. 110.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 29th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

On the 21st July, Foreign Office telegraphed to His Majesty's Minister at Peking instructing him to make representations to the Chinese Government as suggested in your telegram of the 20th July. On the 27th, Sir E. Satow reported that he had obtained from the Chinese Government a telegram containing instructions to the Amban in sense desired, and that this is being sent direct to you for transmission to Amban.

No. 111.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 1st August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Telegraphing on the 26th July from Chaksam ferry, Younghusband reports receipt, through the Dalai Lama's Chamberlain, of letter from National Assembly promising negotiations, and asking that Mission should not proceed to Lhasa. Younghusband replied to the Dalai Lama to the effect that he must go on to Lhasa, but that he will not stay there any longer than is required for conclusion of a settlement, and, that, unless opposition is offered, no injury will be done to religious buildings which are not occupied by soldiers. This reply was accepted for delivery by the Chamberlain, who sent it to Lhasa. On the 27th, a meeting between Younghusband and Ta Lama and the Chamberlain was to take place.

No. 112.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 1st August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 26th July. As regards roads, railways, telegraphs, &c., in the Chumbi Valley, we propose to reserve to ourselves the right to construct such communications, whether before or after evacuation; the Tibetans to be required to afford us facilities in this respect.

Also, having regard to the further opposition offered by the Tibetans during advance of Mission to Lhasa, we would ask that the proposal that our Agent at Gyangtse should have right of proceeding, if and when necessary, to Lhasa (*see* my telegram of the 13th July) may be agreed to by His Majesty's Government, if it be found that this condition would be accepted without serious demur by the Tibetans.

No. 113.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 2nd August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Macdonald reached Kamba Barji 24th July last; secured Chaksam ferry. Enemy observed fleeing towards Lhasa. One company of mounted infantry and seven companies of infantry crossed Brahmaputra at Chaksam 25th July last, using four Berthon, two local boats. River 150 yards wide, heavy volume, strong current. Major G. S. Bretherton, Supply and Transport Corps, two Gurkhas, drowned, boat capsizing, also one mounted infantry sepoy. Crossing progressing 26th July.

No. 114.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 3rd August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 1st August as to terms of settlement with Tibetan Government. His Majesty's Government adhere to their decision that no demand for right of access to Lhasa for our Agent at Gyangtse is to be made. Intention of His Majesty's Government is that Agent's functions are to be essentially commercial; but the additional clause proposed by you would result in his functions being assimilated to those of a Political Resident. This we are anxious to avoid. As regards proposal to reserve right to construct roads, railways, &c., in the Chumbi Valley, even after it has been evacuated, this would be inconsistent with policy as laid down in my telegram of the 6th November, 1903, that withdrawal shall take place as soon as reparation is obtained. If the condition as to the effective opening of trade marts for term of three years has been fulfilled, and the indemnity paid, His Majesty's Government see no reason why complete withdrawal should not be effected.

No. 115.

Despatch from the Secretary of State for India to the Government of India, dated the 5th August, 1904.

Your Excellency was informed in my telegram of the 26th July of the decision taken by His Majesty's Government as to the terms of the settlement to be demanded from the Tibetan Government. That decision was not arrived at until His Majesty's Government had had an opportunity of considering the letter of your Excellency's Government of the 30th June last, which stated at length your views as to the nature of the settlement to be effected.

2. His Majesty's Government have throughout the present difficulty been very reluctant to take any steps which would involve an advance into Tibet or interference with Tibetan affairs. As stated in Lord George Hamilton's despatch of the 27th February, 1903, they had to consider the question not as a local one, concerning India and Tibet alone, but from the wider point of view of the relations of Great Britain to other Powers, both European and Asiatic, and as involving the status of a dependency of the Chinese Empire. Formerly European nations and their interests were in the main far removed from the scope of Indian policy, and the relations of India with the states on her borders rarely involved any European complications. But the effect of Indian policy in relation to Afghanistan, Siam, Tibet or any other dependency of the Chinese Empire is liable to be felt throughout Europe. This immediate responsibility towards Europe which Indian policy nowadays imposes on this country necessarily involves its correlative, and the course of affairs on the Indian frontiers cannot be decided without reference to Imperial exigencies elsewhere.

3. His Majesty's Government have also been consistently averse to any policy in Tibet which would tend to throw on the British Empire an additional burden. The great increase to our responsibilities, however necessary, which recent additions to the Empire have involved, make it obvious that it would be most imprudent to further enlarge them except upon the strongest ground. In military and naval matters the resources of Great Britain and India must be considered together. India has from time to time given effective and ready help in the defence of British interests and British Colonies. On the other hand, it must be remembered that the British Army largely exists in order to defend India, and every new obligation undertaken by India is as much a charge upon the common stock of our heavily burdened resources as if it were placed upon the people of this country.

4. The policy of His Majesty's Government expressed in Lord George Hamilton's despatch of the 27th February was further defined by the telegrams of the 28th May and the 6th November, 1903. The despatch of the 27th February, which was written while communications were still taking place with the Russian Government as to their attitude towards Tibet, laid down the principle that it was indispensable that British influence should be recognised at Lhasa in such a manner as to render it impossible for any other Power to exercise a pressure on the Tibetan Government inconsistent with the interests of British India. But, as recorded in Lord Lansdowne's despatch to Sir C. Scott of the 8th April, 1903, the result of our communications with the Russian Government was that His Majesty's Government received explicit assurances from them that they had no convention about Tibet either with Tibet itself or with China, or with anyone else, and that they had no Agents in Tibet and no intention of sending Agents or Missions there. His Majesty's Government, therefore, having regard to the satisfactory nature of these pledges, which modified the apprehensions that had been felt as to the establishment at Lhasa of foreign influences incompatible with our interests, decided, as stated in the telegram of the 28th May, 1903, that it was unnecessary and undesirable that any demand for the recognition of a Political Agent either at Gyangtse or at Lhasa should be included in the proposals to be made in the negotiations for a settlement with Tibet. We held then, as we hold now, that such a political outpost might entail difficulties and responsibilities incommensurate with any benefits which, in the situation created by the Russian assurances, could be gained by it. The Mission was accordingly authorised to proceed to Khambajong with instructions that the negotiations there should be restricted to questions concerning trade relations, the frontier and grazing rights.

5. The Tibetan Government having refused to negotiate at Khambajong in response to our invitation, it became necessary on 1st October, 1903, to sanction contingently the advance of the Mission to Gyangtse. But the conduct of the Tibetan Government towards the Mission' intolerable as it was when taken in connection with their action in the past, was not such as

to necessitate any alteration of our general policy. It was, therefore, laid down, in the telegram of the 6th November, 1903, that the advance of the Mission was not to lead to permanent intervention in Tibetan affairs in any form; that it should be made for the sole purpose of obtaining satisfaction; that as soon as reparation was obtained a withdrawal should be effected; and that the question of insisting on the fulfilment of our treaty rights of trade in Tibet was to be considered subject to these considerations.

6. The opposition offered by the Tibetans to the progress of the Mission, coupled with their refusal to negotiate at Gyangtse, has necessitated the advance to Lhasa, which it has been our object to avoid, and which we have postponed till no alternative was left to us. But His Majesty's Government adhere to the view that, while our influence must be duly recognised at Lhasa, so as to exclude foreign pressure which would have a disturbing influence on territories adjoining Tibet and British India, it is unnecessary, in view of the present political conditions of Tibet, to insist on the appointment of a permanent political officer as the basis of the settlement to be proposed to the Tibetan Government.

7. It was from this point of view that the terms which Colonel Younghusband was authorised by my telegram of the 6th July to name to the Tibetans were decided on by His Majesty's Government, and the modifications suggested in your telegram of the 11th and 13th July have been considered in the same light. We are satisfied that, so long as the political position of Tibet in relation to foreign Powers remains unaltered, the provisions of Clause 2 as now approved will satisfactorily accomplish our object of excluding undesirable foreign influences from the country. As regards the status of the British Agent who under Clause 5 is to have a similar right of access to Gyangtse as is prescribed in respect of Yatung by the Regulations of 1893, we do not consider it desirable to claim for him the right in certain circumstances of proceeding to Lhasa. The effect of this proposal would be to alter the character of the duties of the Agent, which, it is intended, shall be essentially commercial, and to assimilate them to those of of a Political Resident.

8. As regards the provisions for trade in Clauses 5, 5*a*, and 7, it is not the intention of His Majesty's Government that the Tibetans should be pressed to open marts immediately elsewhere than at Gyangtse and Gartok. The acceptance of the principle by the Tibetan Government should suffice for the present. It may, not unreasonably, be anticipated that the Tibetan people will be led by the prosperity that will result from the establishment of free marts at Gyangtse and Gartok to modify their attitude of exclusiveness in respect of trade in other parts of their territory, and that habits of commercial intercourse will be developed, which would continue after the conditions attached to the occupation of the Chumbi Valley have been fulfilled and our withdrawal completed. Should these conditions unfortunately not be fulfilled, it will be necessary to consider the question of maintaining our hold on the Chumbi Valley.

9. As regards Clause 6, the provision as to the erection of pillars along the frontier defined in the Convention of 1890 should sufficiently impress on the Tibetan Government the hopelessness of attempting to regard the question as an open one, and should prevent any repetition on their part of the infringements of the boundary of which they have been guilty in the past.

10. Similar considerations apply to Clause (4). The destruction of all fortifications commanding the route by which the Mission has advanced, will be a token to the Tibetans of the futility of their efforts to resist us by force.

11. As regards the amount of the indemnity, our ignorance of the resources of the country makes it impossible to speak with any certainty. The question, in the circumstances, must be left to the discretion of Colonel Younghusband. The condition that the amount should be one which it is estimated can be paid in three years, indicates the intention of His Majesty's

Government that the sum to be demanded should constitute an adequate pecuniary penalty, but not be such as to be beyond the powers of the Tibetans, by making a sufficient effort, to discharge within the period named.

12. In conclusion, I desire to express the appreciation of His Majesty's Government of the courage and endurance of the troops attached to the Mission, and of the valuable services of those who have been employed on the lines of communication, both beyond and within the British frontier.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) ST. JOHN BRODRICK.

No. 116.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 5th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

All wounded officers recovered except Major Lye, 23rd Sikh Pioneers, who is progressing favourably.

No. 117.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 5th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Macdonald telegraphed, 29th July last, was continuing crossing river without accident, and expected to complete crossing 31st July.

No. 118.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 6th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Younghusband wired from Chaksam ferry, on 29th July, having had two visits from Ta Lama, and one from Dalai Lama's Grand Chamberlain, who brought letter from Dalai Lama asking Younghusband not to proceed to Lhasa. Chamberlain said he and councillors were ready to negotiate at Chaksam ferry, but our presence in Lhasa would so spoil religion that Dalai Lama might die. Younghusband told delegates that Mission must proceed to Lhasa. He wrote second letter to Dalai Lama expressing hope that latter would appreciate inconvenience to Mission to halt this side of Lhasa now it had left Gyantse. Chinese merchant who arrived Chaksam ferry offered to sell us anything wanted at Lhasa. He saw no Tibetan troops on the way. Sangpo Valley most fertile; wheat, barley, and peas abundant. Despatch from Amban arrived answering Younghusband's from Gyangtse. He said he had communicated purport to Dalai Lama. Bearer said confusion prevailed at Lhasa, everyone shifting responsibility. Dalai Lama in religious seclusion at private monastery 18 miles from Lhasa has ordered monks to attend to religious duties. Supplies abundant at Lhasa, and people would sell readily. Amban anxious for settlement.

No. 119.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 6th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

On 3rd August, at midday, the Mission arrived at Lhasa, no further opposition having been offered. The population was quiet. The Dalai Lama was away at a private monastery some miles off. Younghusband received a visit from the Amban, who expressed himself willing to assist in arriving at a settlement, and made the troops a present of food. He has collected supplies for two days, and promises to collect more. The representative of Nepal sent a deputation to visit Younghusband. He intended to come himself shortly. Tongsa Penlop is with Younghusband. The valley is well cultivated, and two or three miles broad. There is an abundance of supplies.

No. 120.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 8th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Macdonald arrived Lnasa, 3rd August last, without opposition. 3,000 to 5,000 Tibetan troops reported retired eastward. Health of troops satisfactory. Transport in excellent condition.

No. 121.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 11th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram received from Younghusband:—

"Lhasa, 5th August. I yesterday returned Amban's visit, conducted by Amban's body guard, and escorted by one company Mounted Infantry and two companies Royal Fusiliers. Amban expressed sincere intention to induce Tibetans to make speedy settlement. On my return to camp I proceeded through heart of city. Large crowds looked on apathetically. I have received visits from Tongsa Penlop, Nepalese representative, and two Shapes. It appears that Dalai Lama is at Reteng, and has handed over his seal to a regent to carry on business. No further opposition seems likely and, after pressure from Amban, Tongsa Penlop and Nepalese representative, Shapes were distinctly more subdued than before, and they presented me with 280 coolies' loads of tea flour, butter, dried fruits, sugar, and peas, besides Rs. 1,500 for the troops, and 20 yaks and 50 sheep. I have asked both Amban and Shapes to have Tibetan delegates for negotiations definitely appointed. Bazaar has been opened outside camp, and 340 Tibetan, Chinese, Nepalese, and Kashmiri traders brought produce there this morning."

No. 122.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 13th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

We have sent the following telegram dated the 12th August, to Colonel Younghusband:—

As regards the action which should be taken if it becomes necessary to requisition by force for supplies, it is, of course, necessary that you should take what supplies you require, but no destruction of religious property, and nothing in the nature of loot, shall be allowed.

No. 123.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 14th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Telegraphic report from Younghusband, dated the 10th August, states that all is confusion at Lhasa. Yutok Shape is ill, Ta Lama is in disgrace, while of the remaining Shapes one is hostile and the other useless. The Tsong-du (National Assembly) is sitting in permanent Session. The Dalai Lama is three marches off. Neither of these authorities, however, will take any action. Grain has been requisitioned from the Depung Monastery, as, although camp bazaar is well attended, Tibetan authorities refuse to allow villagers to sell us any. General attitude of the Tibetans is not so much hostile as futile, but there is likelihood of some more energetic action being found necessary. Younghusband refrained from occupying the Summer Palace as a residence, on the Tongsa Penlop representing to him that the building was specially sacred.

No. 124.

Letter from the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 28th July, 1904. *(Received at India Office, 15th August,* 1904.*)*

(Extract.)

In continuation of our despatch, dated the 30th June, 1904, we have the honour to forward, for the information of His Majesty's Government, a copy of further correspondence regarding Tibetan affairs.*

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* *See* Part II., Nos. 161–225, pp. 166, *et seq.*

No. 125.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 15th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

The instructions to Colonel Younghusband, as reported in your telegram of the 13th August, are approved by His Majesty's Government. Date on which return of force from Lhasa is to begin should be fixed by military authorities in communication with Younghusband. In no case must anything in the way of looting by the troops be permitted.

No. 126.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 17th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Macdonald reports supplies are coming in more readily last few days.

No. 127.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 18th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Telegraphic report, dated Lhasa, the 11th August, has been received from Younghusband, to the effect that Dalai Lama, accompanied, it is believed, by Dorjieff, is at Nagchuka, eight marches to the north of Lhasa. Mission has transferred its quarters to the best house in the city. Supplies which were requisitioned from Depung monastery are being brought in, and supplies have also been requisitioned from Sera monastery. Younghusband paid visit to the Amban on the 16th August, and impressed upon him responsibility which lies on the Chinese Government to make the Tibetans conclude a settlement. Amban expressed himself as personally most anxious to work with Younghusband, and stated that he had sent a message to the Dalai Lama urging him to come back to Lhasa. Amban has sent Wilton, unofficially, written reply of the Tibetans to our terms. Reply is highly unsatisfactory, all our points being refused by Tibetans, who enter into arguments about boundary and, while offering Rinchengong as trade mart, refuse to agree to other marts being opened in future. They decline to pay any indemnity, saying we ought to pay them an indemnity instead their paying one to us. This document has been returned by Younghusband to the Amban, with an intimation that he could not officially receive so preposterous a reply.

No. 128.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 20th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Macdonald reports mounted infantry reconnoitring towards Pemba Gong La surprised 100 armed enemy, 8 miles from camp; captured 64 without opposition. Larger camp further north visited, 13th August, but enemy had fled northwards. Reconnaissance 11 miles up Kichu, 13th August, showed it clear of armed force. Supplies are coming in satisfactorily.

No. 129.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 20th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Report, dated the 14th August, from Lhasa contains the following news. Amban says that National Assembly's first reply to our terms has been returned by him to the Tibetans, with an intimation that they must be more amenable. It is stated by two Shapes who came to see Younghusband that the Assembly's reply was intended for the Amban only; it was hoped that he would be able to secure more favourable terms. This statement is confirmed by Ti Rimpoche, who presides over Assembly and who now has the Dalai Lama's seal in his keeping. It is reported that Assembly have written to Dalai Lama, who has fled to Nagchukha and possibly beyond, asking him to return to Lhasa; they are said to be angry with him in consequence of his flight. Supplies, both at Lhasa and on line of route, are coming in satisfactorily. The common people are well disposed; only the monks display opposition, and even they are beginning to realise that we have the monasteries at our mercy. It has been made clear to the Tibetans by Younghusband that the terms stated represent the minimum that will be accepted by us.

No. 130.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 23rd August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

News from Lhasa, to the 17th August, is as follows:—

At the instance of the Amban, the two Lachung prisoners have been released by the Shapes in open Durbar. The men were well, and 200 yaks having been seized in retaliation at Giaogong, further compensation was not required. Attitude much more satisfactory of Tibetan Government and people, and supplies freely coming in. The party in favour of settlement is growing in strength, and it is now hoped that even the revision of the trade regulations may be carried out at Lhasa. Ti Rimpoche is making marked overtures to Younghusband, who, in return, is showing him special attention as the principal in negotiations. Amban recognises Ti Rimpoche as principal in the negotiations. Dalai Lama has been summoned to return by the Amban; if summons is not obeyed, Amban proposes to denounce Dalai Lama to the Emperor, effect of which he says will be to reduce him to a private person. Amban would then invite Tashi Lama, of Shigatse, to assume the government in accordance with precedent. Amban has been requested by Younghusband to quote the precedents for this course. Younghusband considers that it will be possible, even should Dalai Lama not return, to negotiate satisfactory Convention in the manner proposed by the Amban, the Convention being sealed also by the heads of the three great monasteries and by the National Assembly.

No. 131.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 25th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Following news from Lhasa up to the 21st August :—

Younghusband met Acting Regent, representative of Nepal, and the Tongsa Penlop, in conference on the 21st August. Acting Regent intimated willingness to accept our terms, though provision as to indemnity presented difficulty ; he hoped lasting friendship between Great Britain and Tibet would be result of settlement. Similar sentiments were expressed by representative of Nepal and by the Tongsa Penlop, who observed that Bhutan, Nepal, and Tibet were allied by religion, and that British were regarded by them as powerful friends. Younghusband also paid a visit to the Amban on the 21st August, and received from him a paper containing suggestions with regard to the Draft Convention. Amban merely asked that consideration should be shown to the Tibetans in the matter of the indemnity ; he raised no objections of importance to any of the clauses and none whatever to the provisions as to trade marts.

No. 132.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 25th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegraphic report, dated Lhasa, the 21st August, received from Younghusband :—

" Telegram purporting to contain denunciation of Dalai Lama has been sent to me by Amban, with the request that it may be forwarded to Peking *viâ* Gyangtse. Amban declares that, if the Emperor of China acts on this telegram, result will be to reduce Dalai Lama to common monk. Tashi Lama, of Shigatse, will then be invited to Lhasa by the Amban, who will recommend him as spiritual head of the Tibetan Church. For transaction of secular business a regent will probably then be appointed. Amban believes Dalai Lama is retiring, not to China, but to the north."

We have telegraphed to Younghusband in reply as follows —

" Please report whether there are precedents for degradation of Dalai Lama by Chinese Emperor, or for the assumption of his place by Tashi Lama.

No. 133.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 26th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Macdonald reports Captains Kelly and A. W. C. Young, Indian Medical Service, attacked 18th August at Camp entrance by a Lama. Kelly wounded slightly in hand, and Young wounded severely in head, sword cuts. Macdonald considers only isolated case of fanaticism. Assailant captured and hanged ; four hostages demanded by Younghusband from monasteries, and fine of Rs. 5,000 inflicted.

No. 134.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 27th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

News from Lhasa up to the 20th August is as follows:—

On the 19th August the Amban paid a visit to Younghusband, and handed him the second reply of the Tibetans to our terms. Clause 9 of the Draft Convention is practically agreed to by the Tibetans; they also agree to destroy all sangared positions, and to pay a small indemnity if boundary is fixed at Giaogong. They stipulate that in the event of our occupying Chumbi Valley we should pay for grass, water, and fuel. They consent to establishment of mart(s) below Phari, but not elsewhere. No British official is to be allowed to proceed into Tibet beyond trade-marts, after Treaty has been concluded. No objection was raised by Amban to form of the Adhesion Agreement. On the 18th August, a monk, wearing chain armour under his monk's robe and armed with sword, ran amuck and wounded Captains Cook-Young and Kelly, Indian Medical Service. Members of Council were summoned by Younghusband, who demanded hostages from each monastery, and from the National Assembly, as well as a fine of Rs. 5,000; he also announced that the man would be hanged. On the 20th August, Younghusband reports that positive information has reached him to the effect that Dalai Lama left Nagchuka on the 8th August for the North. Tibetans do not regret his departure. In a letter which he has written to National Assembly he said he was going away to look after the interests of the faith, and warned the Assembly to bind the crafty English very tightly in any agreement that might be made.

No. 135.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne, dated Peking, August 28th, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

A telegram from the Amban was received by the Chinese Government on the 24th August, in which the Dalai Lama was denounced to the throne, and his deposition and substitution by the Tashilumpo Lama were proposed. An Imperial Decree was issued on the 26th August that the Dalai Lama should be reduced to the station of a private individual by being "temporarily" deprived of his dignity, and that his place should be taken by the Tashilumpo. By this Decree all spiritual functions and authority are transferred from the one to the other. The Dalai Lama, so I am informed, will be permanently degraded should be remain contumacious, in which case the usual process of drawing lots (effected by the Amban) would become necessary to select a successor.

No. 136.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 28th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 25th August. Inquiry is being made by His Majesty's Minister at Peking whether Amban has made proposal, as stated, and how it is regarded by Chinese Government.

No. 137.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 29th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Telegraphic report, dated the 22nd August, from Younghusband states that the Tibetans are giving the four hostages demanded in consequence of the attack on the two medical officers. Younghusband believes it will be possible to get Trade Regulations through without much delay and difficulty. This question is under our consideration.

No. 138.

Letter from the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 11th August, 1904. *(Received at India Office, 29th August,* 1904.*)*

(Extract.)

We have the honour to forward a copy of the draft Convention with Tibet, as further revised in the light of your telegram of the 3rd August. A copy of this draft has also been sent to Colonel Younghusband, and it is now submitted for information and approval, subject to any further modifications that His Majesty's Government may consider necessary on receipt of news of the course of negotiations at Lhasa.

Enclosure in No. 138.

Whereas doubts and difficulties have arisen as to the meaning and validity of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and the Trade Regulations of 1893, and as to the liabilities of the Tibetan Government under these agreements; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the relations of friendship and good understanding which have existed between the British Government and the Government of Tibet; and whereas it is desirable to restore peace and amicable relations, and to resolve and determine the doubts and difficulties as aforesaid, the said Governments have resolved to conclude a Convention with these objects, and the following articles have been agreed upon by Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., in virtue of full powers vested in him by His Britannic Majesty's Government and on behalf of that said Government, and the Illustrious Dalai Lama, Nag-Wang, Lo-ssang Theedan Gyarso Gyon Rimboochay, on his own behalf and on behalf of the Government of Tibet.

I.

The Government of Tibet engages to respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and to recognise the frontier between Sikkim and Tibet as defined in Article I. of the said Convention, and to erect boundary pillars accordingly.

II.

The Tibetan Government undertakes to open forthwith trade marts to which all British and Tibetan subjects shall have free right of access at Gyangtse and Gartok, as well as at Yatung.

The Regulations applicable to the trade mart at Yatung, under the Anglo-Chinese Agreement of 1893, shall, subject to such amendments as may hereafter be agreed upon by common consent between the British and Tibetan Governments, apply to the marts above mentioned.

In addition to establishing trade marts at the places mentioned, the Tibetan Government undertakes to place no restrictions on the trade by existing routes and to consider the question of establishing fresh trade marts under similar conditions if development of trade requires it.

III.

The question of the amendment of the Regulations of 1893 is reserved for separate consideration, and the Tibetan Government undertakes to appoint fully authorised delegates to negotiate with representatives of the British Government as to the details of the amendments required.

IV.

The Tibetan Government undertakes to levy no dues of any kind other than those provided for in the tariff to be mutually agreed upon.

V.

The Tibetan Government undertakes to keep the road to Gyangtse from the frontier clear of all obstruction and in a state of repair suited to the needs of the trade, and to establish at Yatung, Gyangtse, and Gartok, and at each of the other trade marts that may hereafter be established, a Tibetan Agent who shall receive from the British Agent appointed to watch over British trade at the mart in question any letter which the latter may desire to send to the Tibetan or to the Chinese authorities. The Tibetan Agent shall also be responsible for the due delivery of such communications and for the transmission of replies.

VI.

As an indemnity to the British Government for the expense incurred in the despatch of armed troops to Lhasa to exact reparation for breaches of treaty obligations and for the insults offered to and attacks upon the British Commissioner and his following and escort, the Tibetan Government engages to pay a sum of £   to the British Government.

The indemnity shall be payable at such place as the British Government may from time to time after due notice indicate whether in Tibet or in the British districts of Darjeeling or Jalpiguri, in   annual instalments on the 1st January in each year, beginning from the 1st January, 190   .

VII.

As security for the payment of the above-mentioned indemnity, and for the fulfilment of the provisions relative to trade marts specified in Articles II, III, IV, and V, the British Government shall continue to occupy the Chumbi Valley until the indemnity has been paid and until the trade marts have been effectively opened for three years, whichever date may be the later.

VIII.

The Tibetan Government agrees to raze all forts and fortifications and remove all armaments which might impede the course of free communication between the British frontier and the towns of Gyangtse and Lhasa.

IX.

The Government of Tibet engages that, without the previous consent of the British Government,—

(*a*) no portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation, to any Foreign Power;

(*b*) no such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Tibetan affairs;

(*c*) no Representatives or Agents of any Foreign Power shall be admitted to Tibet;

(*d*) no concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights, shall be granted to any Foreign Power, or the subject of any Foreign Power. In the event of consent to such concessions being granted, similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British Government;

(*e*) no Tibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any Foreign Power, or the subject of any Foreign Power.

X.

In witness whereof the two negotiators have signed the same, and affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done in quintuplicate at Lhasa, this day of in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and four, corresponding with the Tibetan date, the day of .

Signatures.

In proceeding to the signature of the Convention, dated this day, the representatives of Great Britain and Tibet declare that the English text shall be binding.

Signatures.

No. 139.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 30th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram received from Younghusband:—

"Amount of indemnity which I am at present demanding, viz., Rs. 50,000 a day, reckoned from date on which Mission was attacked, is excessive, and I would not press it seriously. But by giving way on this point I might be able to secure trade-mart in Eastern Tibet. I should be glad to learn whether Government would approve of this. Payment of indemnity would make us very unpopular, and I would suggest a policy of concession in regard to it, and securing in place of indemnity additional facilities for trade, and, perhaps, mining rights as well."

Do you consider it desirable to modify in any way the instructions contained in your despatch of the 5th August, paragraph 8, in view of the considerations now advanced by Younghusband?

No. 140.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 31st August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 30th August. Is the mart in return for which reduction of indemnity is proposed by Younghusband the centre of any considerable trade at present?

No. 141.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 31st August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 30th August. His Majesty's Government have throughout aimed at obtaining the maximum of reparation while incurring the minimum of future liability. As regards indemnity, amount suggested seems altogether excessive, but we think that by requiring Tibetans to pay a substantial sum the danger of provoking us will be brought home to them. On the other hand, additional treaty concessions, while costing Tibetans less at present, are likely to involve us in further trouble hereafter, since attempts may be made to evade them in the same way as the 1893 regulations were evaded. Additional marts and mining rights, desirable as they may be in the abstract, can only be made effective by affording protection to miners and traders, and by keeping roads open. Unless in future the Tibetan Government show a disposition very different from that which they hitherto displayed, our apprehension is that every fresh mart and mining enterprise will result in questions being raised between the Tibetan Government and the Government of India, which will require support and pressure from us periodically.

No. 142.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 1st September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Telegraphic report, dated the 26th August, has been received from Younghusband. He states that little progress has been made with negotiations. General position is very satisfactory, and attitude of people friendly. Since the arrival of the Mission, more attention is being paid to Amban by Tibetans. Excellent effect was produced by distribution of Rs. 4,000 as alms to poor of Lhasa and neighbourhood, numbering 12,000, our conduct being favourably contrasted by Tibetan people with that of their own troops. Temples and other institutions have been visited by a party of British officers.

No. 143.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 2nd September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your despatch of the 11th August. Agreement with Tibetan Government. The draft is approved.

No. 144.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 2nd September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 31st August. We had given up intention of pressing Tibetans to agree to a mart in Eastern Tibet; should, however, an opportunity present itself of securing such a mart, we may afterwards regret not having availed ourselves of it. As regards the amount of trade there, we have little information.

No. 145.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 3rd September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Younghusband suggests that officer with survey party could be sent up the Sangpo for the purpose of establishing trade-mart at Gartok; for this duty Younghusband proposes to depute Captain Rawling, an experienced traveller in Tibet, and Lieutenant Bailey, of the 32nd Pioneers, together with geologist; they would be escorted by a few orderlies. Provided that we secure Convention, Younghusband's proposal might, I think, be accepted.

No. 146.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 3rd September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Telegraphing from Lhasa on the 30th August, Younghusband reports that he has been visited by the Amban, accompanied by Acting Regent and Council, who had agreed verbally to Articles 5, 8, and 9 of the Draft Convention, and to a portion of Article 2, viz., the first section and the third section, with the exception of the last sentence, requiring Tibetans to consider question of establishing fresh marts if required by development of trade. Amban anticipates that considerable difficulty will be experienced in securing assent of National Assembly in writing. General situation continues satisfactory, supplies coming in with regularity. Kashmiri and Chinese traders at Lhasa are desirous of opening shops at Gyangtse. It is reported that there are about 500 Mongolians at Reting, but they are not proceeding to Lhasa unless required. Dalai Lama has been seen on Sining border, in company with Dorjieff.

No. 147.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 5th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 2nd September. Tibet. See my telegram of 31st August, which conveyed to you the general views of His Majesty's Government on suggestions made by Younghusband. Should an opportunity of securing a mart in Eastern Tibet on easy terms present itself, His Majesty's Government offer no objection; they are not, however, desirous of adding to the marts already specified, unless this can be done under circumstances which are not likely to entail trouble in future, and with the Tibetan Government's goodwill.

No. 148.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 7th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

On the 1st September Younghusband paid a visit to the Amban. Acting Regent, Shape and most of the members of the Tsong-du (National Assembly) were present at the interview. Draft of Convention was handed to Tibetans by Younghusband. Tibetans have given assurance in writing that they will accept Article IX of Convention, and opposition to all terms has now been practically overcome, except as regards indemnity. Persons well qualified to know the actual facts as to the condition of Tibet believe that indemnity should be payable without undue hardship, and, having regard to the wealth of the monasteries, Younghusband is of the same opinion. He considers that, should terms be subsequently found to be really too onerous, it would be more fitting that reduction, if any, should be made by Viceroy.

No. 149.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 8th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Younghusband telegraphs from Lhasa on the 2nd September as follows, in reply to enquiry which we addressed to him (see my telegram of the 25th August):—

"Chinese deposed sixth Dalai Lama on ground of licentious living. In absence of Dalai Lama, Tashi Lama would be head of the Buddhist Church; it is not intended that he should 'assume the place' of Dalai Lama. Fact that I endeavoured to induce Dalai Lama to come in is well known to Buddhists here, and they are also aware that, after he had definitely fled from the country, it was on the initiative of Amban that he was denounced. I, personally, consider the denunciation a very politic step. It also has approval of Tongsa Penlop and Nepalese."

No. 150.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 10th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 7th September. Convention in full signed to-day in Potala in presence of Amban. Seals affixed were (1) that of Dalai Lama, affixed by Acting Regent: (2) that of Council; (3) those of three great monasteries; (4) that of National Assembly. Amban will sign adhesion agreement when formal sanction arrives from Peking. He says he personally has no objection to terms. Perfect good temper was shown by Tibetans during Durbar, and at conclusion Shapes said treaty would be observed by whole people.

No. 151.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 12th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Agreement with Tibetan Government was signed on the 7th instant in the Potala in the presence of the Amban, as already reported to you direct by Colonel Younghusband. Agreement was as finally approved by His Majesty's Government, with the following modifications:—

Preamble.—Style and title of Dalai Lama were omitted and the following officials named as acting "on behalf of the Government of Tibet," viz., Ti Rimpoche and representatives of the Council of Ministers, of the three great Lhasa monasteries, Sera, Debung, and Gaden, and of the officials, ecclesiastical and lay, of the National Assembly.

Article V.—Words "and Gartok" were inserted after words "road to Gyangtse," in first sentence.

Article VI.—£500,000 was entered as amount of the indemnity, to be paid in 75 annual instalments of Rs. 1,00,000 each; first instalment payable on the 1st January, 1906.

Article X.—Word "two" before "negotiators" is omitted.

Following seals are affixed to the Agreement:—(1) that of Dalai Lama; (2) that of Council; (3) that of the three great monasteries above-named; (4) that of National Assembly. The instalments of indemnity were fixed at one lakh of rupees a year at the special request of the Ti Rimpoche. Younghusband, after considerable demur, was obliged to give way on this point, having regard to the necessity for obtaining early signature of treaty and to the Tibetans' anxiety to conclude settlement. In the circumstances, he asks for confirmation of his action. Agreement should, in my opinion, be accepted as it stands. Tibetans can be allowed to pay more than one lakh a year if, later on, they are able and willing to do so, or amount can, of course, be reduced, if His Majesty's Government so decide, upon good behaviour of Tibetans and due fulfilment of terms, in consideration of further facilities in regard to trade. No immediate action, however, seems necessary. As regards Adhesion Agreement, Amban, who was present at signing of Tibetan Agreement, is prepared to sign on receipt of formal sanction from Peking. If he has not signed before the 20th September (which is date on which Younghusband hopes to leave Lhasa) Amban might go down to Gyangtse with Mission.

No. 152.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 13th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Please convey to Younghusband hearty congratulations on the conclusion of the agreement with the Tibetan Government. The conduct both of the expedition and of the negotiations must be a source of satisfaction both to the Government of India and to those selected as their representatives. Younghusband's action will be generally supported. As regards indemnity a further communication will be made to you.

No. 153.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 13th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 12th September. Difficulty is presented by amount of indemnity, especially when provision for its payment is read in connection with Clause VII. of the Agreement, effect being that our occupation of the Chumbi Valley may have to continue for 75 years. This is inconsistent with the instructions conveyed in my telegram of the 26th July last, and with the declarations of His Majesty's Government as to withdrawal. Amount, moreover, was admitted by Younghusband to be excessive, as reported in your telegram of 30th August. I request that you will consider whether, without prejudice to the signed agreement, it would not be possible to intimate to the Tibetans, in accordance with the suggestion in your telegram of 12th September, that amount of indemnity will be reduced on their duly fulfilling terms agreed to and granting further facilities for trade.

No. 154.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 14th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 13th September. We recognise that any appearance of occupying Chumbi Valley for an indefinite period must be avoided, and we have already considered your suggestions. It has been suggested to the Tibetans by the Tongsa Penlop that indemnity might be paid out of Customs duties levied at marts to be established under the new agreement, and collected by us. To this Tibetans appear to be willing to agree. The proposal has received our very careful consideration. We propose to agree to the imposition, under new Trade Regulations, of duty on imports and exports from and to India, and we hope to be able to substitute, in place of duty and irregular transit fees, one consolidated payment at frontier. Colonel Younghusband has been informed that the Government of India are disposed to regard the suggestion favourably. Pending receipt of your orders, which it is desirable should be communicated at the earliest possible date, Younghusband has been instructed not to commit Government, but to make further inquiry with a view to ascertaining whether the Tibetans would be prepared to agree to establishment of trade mart in Eastern Tibet, to the survey referred to in my telegram of the 3rd September, and to the Customs arrangements indicated above, in consideration of the remission, as an act of grace, of one-third (25 lakhs) of indemnity. Remission might be made by Viceroy, on ratification of agreement, should Tibetans agree to these conditions, and a supplementary note giving effect to them might be annexed to the agreement. This note might also contain a provision giving Tibetans option of paying the balance of indemnity in instalments of more than one lakh annually, the number of which it will not be necessary to specify. The indefinite prolongation of our occupation of the Chumbi Valley under the terms of the agreement would by this means be obviated.

No. 155.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 16th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

You will have observed from my telegram of the 7th September that Colonel Younghusband altered his opinion as to the amount of indemnity being excessive (to which reference is made in your telegram of the 13th September), and expressed his belief that Tibetans could pay the amount fixed.

No. 156.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 16th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 14th September. His Majesty's Government feel it highly undesirable that a term should be fixed for payment of indemnity which would have the effect of throwing burden on future generation and of relieving from any immediate sacrifice the monasteries and those to whom the present troubles are due. Moreover, they do not wish that indemnity should take the form of what would be regarded as a permanent tribute. It is, therefore, essential that indemnity should be fixed at a sum which can be liquidated within a moderate period. Your suggestions for reducing indemnity appear to His Majesty's Government to afford a basis for a more satisfactory settlement in this respect. They accordingly authorise reduction of indemnity from 75 lakhs to 25 lakhs of rupees, which may be charged on security of Customs receipts. Under terms of Convention, our occupation of Chumbi Valley is to continue until indemnity has been paid, and the trade marts opened effectively for a period of three years, whichever is later. Some alteration of these conditions would be required so as to provide that our occupation of Chumbi should cease after three years' effective working of the arrangements in regard to the Customs, as well as of those for the opening of the marts, subject to proviso that a certain proportion of the indemnity (say Rs. 5 lakhs) shall have been paid. In no circumstances is the force to prolong its stay at Lhasa for the purpose of obtaining more favourable terms than those already agreed to. Subject to these orders we leave it to Younghusband to secure from the Tibetans, in consideration of reduction of indemnity, any or all of the concessions specified in your telegram.

No. 157.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 17th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Younghusband was informed by us some time ago that he might stay at Lhasa until the middle of October, but on no account any later. I presume you will not object to his staying behind long enough to carry out your instructions and to get Tibetans to accept Trade Regulations. Present arrangement is that Younghusband, with moderate escort, is to stay at Lhasa, the bulk of the force being withdrawn without delay. There was no time to consult you about arrangement we have made, and I hope you will agree to it. Otherwise it will be impossible for your instructions as to occupation of Chumbi Valley and reduction of indemnity to be carried out.

No. 158.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 17th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Telegraphic report from Younghusband, dated the 7th September, states that exchange of prisoners has been effected, all prisoners of war being released by Macdonald and Shapes producing two men who had been imprisoned for giving assistance to Sarat Chandra Das and two others for helping Kawaguchi, the Japanese traveller. Two former had been in prison for 19 years. Younghusband also released hostages taken and remitted fine imposed in consequence of Monks' assault on British Medical Officers. Rs. 1,000 were, however, retained as compensation for families of the two servants of Mission whom Tibetans tortured to death on the night they attacked Gyangtse post. Younghusband was informed on the 10th September by the Tongsa Penlop, that no further trouble is, in his opinion, to be anticipated, as the Tibetans are well pleased with settlement. Both the Penlop and the Nepalese representative are of opinion that Dalai Lama would be unable to upset the Convention, even if he were to return. They believe that Dalai Lama has been in communication with people throughout negotiations, and that he is at present not far beyond Nagchuka. Younghusband has been authorised, if necessary, to remain at Lhasa for reasonable time after main force has left with an escort not exceeding 500 men or such smaller number as may be necessary for support of negotiations, as it is most desirable that final settlement of matters referred to in my telegram of the 14th September should be secured.

No. 159.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 17th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

I have approved of orders issued Commander-in-Chief, India, for reduction in garrisons of posts, and for withdrawal of as many troops as possible from lines of communication.

No. 160.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 18th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 16th. Tibet. Is the indemnity to be reduced to Rs. 50 lakhs, as proposed by us, or do you wish it reduced to Rs. 25 lakhs?

No. 161.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 18th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 17th. There is no objection to Younghusband remaining behind at Lhasa, to complete negotiations, up to the date named by you, provided that you are satisfied that he can do so in safety, and on the understanding that that date is not exceeded.

No. 162.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 18th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Younghusband telegraphs from Lhasa, on the 14th September, as follows :—

"Wai-wu-pu have telegraphed to Amban, instructing him not to sign the Adhesion Agreement."

No. 163.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 19th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 18th September. We prefer that amount of indemnity should be fixed at Rs. 25 lakhs, with a view to prompt payment.

No. 164.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 23rd September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

We have received the following telegram, dated Lhasa, the 18th September, from Younghusband, in reply to a telegram which we addressed to him on the 14th September:—

"I trust indemnity, as now arranged, is not considered by Government to be excessive. In reality an indemnity of Rs. 75,00,000 payable in instalments spread over 75 years is equivalent to only about half that amount required to be paid in three years. Rs. 36,00,000 is only half the annual revenue of the State of Indore, and Tibet is a country far richer than Indore in everything but cash. It would be unfair on the people of India, who have to pay the balance of expense of the Mission, if any sum less than Rs. 36,00,000 were demanded. But had I insisted on this amount being paid by Tibetans in three years they would have been left with a sense of oppression. A nasty racial feeling would have sprung up, as the Tibetan Government, instead of making the rich monasteries disgorge, would have squeezed the money out of the poor peasantry. The arrangement which I adopted was put forward by Tibetans themselves, who preferred it to the various suggestions indicated in your telegram, all of which were put before them by the Nepalese and Bhutanese. The feeling now prevailing here is altogether better, the Tibetans to all appearance being well contented with the settlement which I have concluded. They have acquiesced in proposal to despatch survey party up to Gartok from Gyangtse, and have agreed to depute Tibetan official to accompany the party, without raising a single protest. It was necessary that psychological moment for clinching matters should be seized, for, had further discussion been permitted, the moderate party, who had shown a disposition to conclude settlement, would have been swamped in a sea of argument. My view, in which Macdonald fully concurs, is that our responsibility is greatly diminished by terms of the Convention. With Chumbi Valley in our occupation and the Tibetans well disposed, our merchants and trade agents at Gyangtse and Gartok marts will be secure; whereas their position might have been precarious, after our withdrawal from Chumbi, had Tibetans' resentment been aroused by their having to pay indemnity in a short time. I have, I think, incurred minimum of responsibility, while securing maximum of reparation, and I would deprecate any alteration of terms at present as likely to unsettle minds of the Tibetans who are content with present arrangement. If any different arrangement is required it could be made more conveniently when revision of Trade Regulations takes place; it would be impossible to carry out this revision, on scale recommended, in the limited time at my disposal, and I would suggest deferring consideration of further amendment. As regards attitude of Chinese Government, it would be unreasonable for them at this stage to raise any objection to the agreement; the final draft had been communicated to Amban before treaty was signed; Amban was present at signature of treaty. I furnished him with a copy and he stated that, personally, he saw no objection to it."

Position has been fully explained to Younghusband in a telegram which I sent to him on the 19th September. His reply is now awaited.

No. 165.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 24th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 23rd. In explaining situation to Younghusband, you have doubtless informed him that provisions respecting indemnity are regarded by His Majesty's Government as contravening the instructions conveyed in my telegram of the 26th July last. Those instructions were subjected to careful consideration by His Majesty's Government, who are not prepared to modify them in regard to any of the more important provisions. As signed, the treaty involves the collection for 75 years of an annual tribute; this might give rise to difficulties, and might also give occasion for interference in the affairs of Tibet, which the orders contained in my telegram of the 26th July were designed to avoid. His Majesty's Government are not prepared to consent to the occupation of Tibetan territory for an indefinite period.

No. 166.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 24th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Telegraphing on the 20th September, Younghusband reports that he paid ceremonial visits to Depung and Sera monasteries, and met with good reception from Abbot, who promised to assist Tibetan Government in carrying out settlement which has been effected. Abbot expressed himself completely satisfied with it. It is believed that Dalai Lama is a few marches beyond Nagchuka, and that he will return to Lhasa after departure of Mission.

No. 167.

From Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne, dated Peking, the 27th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

It is announced in the "Peking Gazette" that T'ang, Customs Taotai at Tien-tsin, is granted the rank of Deputy Lieutenant-General, and is appointed to proceed to Tibet, where he is to investigate and conduct affairs. I will report date of his departure.

No. 168.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 30th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Following news from Lhasa:—On the 21st September Younghusband on paying ceremonial visit to Gokhang Cathedral met with very civil reception from monks who conducted him round the most sacred shrines. Younghusband and the Amban exchanged farewell visits on the 22nd. Younghusband was also visited by Councillors who said they fully intended to carry out the treaty, assured him of their friendly sentiments, and brought presents. They appointed an official to accompany party who are to proceed to Gartok. Before Mission started from Lhasa Younghusband and Macdonald were visited by Ti Rimpoche who promised to pray for their welfare and presented each of them, as well as O'Connor and White, with an image of Buddha. Tent was pitched on road, and Mission received there by whole of Tibetan Council, including Secretary; marked cordiality being displayed. Mission left Lhasa on 23rd September.

No. 169.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 30th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

On the 19th September we telegraphed to Younghusband as follows:—

"You now have authority to remain until the 15th October at Lhasa, if you can do so in safety. His Majesty's Government have authorised indemnity being reduced and our occupation of Chumbi Valley being terminated at an early date. The Government of India consider it most desirable that before you leave Lhasa you should make an effort to secure consent of Tibetans to new Trade Regulations, lien on Customs, survey in Tibet, and additional trade mart in Eastern Tibet. They trust that you will endeavour to meet their wishes on this point."

Following telegram, dated the 24th September, was received from Younghusband in reply:—

"I received your telegram on the evening before Mission left Lhasa. Had it been possible for me to have been informed last month that our stay at Lhasa might be prolonged till the 15th October, that additional trade mart would be acceptable, and that indemnity required was not to be more than Rs. 25 lakhs, Convention could have been arranged on these lines. Present arrangement, however, is distinctly preferred by Tibetans to one involving establishment of a third trade mart in a distant province where control they exercise is but slight, and in regard to which our action would arouse their suspicion. Had I attempted to alter, at this stage, settlement made with such solemnity, we might after all have failed to attain our object, while it is certain that all present good feeling, which is the best basis for our future relations, would have been lost. As regards best method of meeting the views of His Majesty's Government, I hope to give my opinion on arriving in India. Present was not the most suitable moment for arranging the matter, but it can, I think, be arranged when revision of Trade Regulations is eventually taken in hand."

Younghusband hopes to arrive at Simla on the 14th October. Matter must now stand over till then.

No. 170.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 3rd October, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Colonel Younghusband has carried out the instructions of His Majesty's Government as to the treaty in a manner which enables them to give their general approval to the Convention he has negotiated; but in regard to the indemnity his Convention has been framed in defiance of express instructions. These were that the indemnity should be limited to a sum which the Tibetans could pay within three years, and that our occupation of the Chumbi Valley should terminate when the indemnity had been paid and the trade marts opened effectually for three years. But Colonel Younghusband by accepting the proposal made by the Tibetans for the payment of indemnity by instalments spread over a long period, has contravened our instructions in a most important particular. The policy of His Majesty's Government, which since the 6th of November last has been repeatedly impressed upon your Government, is to avoid interference in the internal affairs of Tibet, and to deal with the situation, which the breaches of the old treaty by the Tibetans have created, in the manner best calculated to attain that object. The question of what should be done with regard to the indemnity has been the subject of our most careful consideration. You were authorised by my telegram of the 16th September to reduce the amount from Rs. 75,00,000 to Rs. 25,00,000, five lakhs of which were to be paid before Chumbi Valley should be evacuated. This mode of payment might have been insisted on, had our instructions been carried out, but the opportunity has now unfortunately been lost owing to Colonel Younghusband's departure from Lhasa. His Majesty's Government, however, do not propose on that account to modify the cardinal principles of their policy, and they altogether decline to sanction any stipulations being made which would necessitate our occupation of the Chumbi Valley for a longer period than that which was indicated in my telegram of the 26th July. When the Convention is ratified, it must, therefore, be amended so as to give effect to the decision of His Majesty's Government. In the event of the Tibetans breaking the treaty, at some future date, either by refusing to pay the annual instalments of the indemnity or in any other way, it will be necessary to reconsider the situation; but in the meanwhile we cannot accept the situation created for us by our representative's disobedience to orders.

No. 171.

From Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne, dated Peking, the 5th October, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Viceroy's telegram of the 30th September. At an interview which I had to-day with Prince Ching I explained to him that I thought it practically impossible, now that the British Mission had left Lhasa, for the Adhesion Agreement to be signed by Colonel Younghusband and the Resident. His Highness replied that the official mentioned in my telegram, of the 27th September, would arrive in Peking in a day or two, and, after receiving his instructions, proceed at once to Calcutta to negotiate with the Government of India. The Prince said he would be sent round to see me before starting.

It is evident that the negotiations must now be transferred to Calcutta, Peking, or London, and I would suggest that the first place would be preferable under all the circumstances. An additional advantage would be that the choice of this place would coincide with the wishes of the Chinese Government.

No. 172.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 7th October, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

First Lhasa column arrived at Gyangtse 5th October; second column arrives there to-day, when all posts beyond Gyangtse will have been withdrawn.

No. 173.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 13th October, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Macdonald left Gyangtse 11th October last with remainder of troops, less three companies of infantry for garrison of post.

No. 174.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 14th October, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Please state reason for retention at Gyangtse of the three companies of infantry, as reported in your telegram of the 13th October; state also for what length of time it is proposed that they should remain.

No. 175.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 21st October, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Question of amendment of the Lhasa Convention has been discussed with Colonel Younghusband and in Council here. We propose that Convention should be ratified in the usual manner, and that a declaration should be appended to the effect that, having ratified the Convention (of which a full description would be given) the Viceroy and Governor-General is pleased to direct, as an act of grace, the reduction of the indemnity from 75 to 25 lakhs of rupees, and to declare that after three annual instalments of the said indemnity have been duly paid, the British occupation of the Chumbi Valley shall terminate, provided that the terms of the Convention shall in the meantime have been faithfully carried out by the Tibetans. I would propose to write a friendly letter to the Tibetan Government apprising them of this decision, should our proposal be approved by His Majesty's Government.

No. 176.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 21st October, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 14th. Three weak companies of infantry were left temporarily at Gyangtse pending our final decision as to strength of escort required by Trade Agent there. All but 50 men will be withdrawn to Chumbi at an early date, as we have now come to the conclusion that an escort of 50 rifles will suffice.

No. 177.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 21st October, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Party proceeding to Gartok left Shigatse on the 17th October; all well. Party was accompanied to Shigatse by Captain O'Connor, who visited Tashi Lama and met with a most cordial reception. Reference was made by Tashi Lama to the friendly relations formerly existing between the Indian Government and his predecessor.

No. 178.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 23rd October, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Report received from our Trade Agent at Gyangtse states that most friendly spirit with regard to opening of mart is being shown by Tibetan trade official at that place, who declares that post huts will be erected between Gyangtse and Phari by the Tibetan Government. Small posts on route have fortunately already been constructed by us, and these will serve for the post and traders, as contemplated in the 1893 Regulations, Article II. The establishment of really friendly relations with the Tibetans will, we may hope, prove to be Colonel Younghusband's greatest achievement. So far everything indicates a most satisfactory disposition on the part of the Tibetans.

No. 179.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 24th October, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 21st October. Provided your Military advisers feel no doubt as to the sufficiency of the escort for Trade Agent at Gyangtse, your proposals are approved.

No. 180.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 26th October, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Captain O'Connor left Shigatse on the 23rd for Gyangtse, which he hoped to reach on the 26th. Telegraphic report received from him, dated Shigatse the 22nd October, states that on the 18th he had a private interview with the Tashi Lama. Latter entirely approves of the Convention, but hopes that indemnity may be reduced. He thinks Dalai Lama has certainly gone to Mongolia, but he does not know where he now is. Satisfactory interview took place between O'Connor and Chinese official and traders. Very friendly relations have been established.

No. 181.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 30th October, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Report received from Captain Rawling, in charge of the party proceeding to Gartok, states that on the 22nd October the party reached Poonchaling, a point 70 miles west of Shigatse, all well. They had met with a good reception.

No. 182.

Letter from the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 6th October, 1904. (*Received at India Office*, 31*st October*, 1904.)

(Extract.)

We have the honour to forward, for the information of His Majesty's Government, a copy of the agreement* which was concluded at Lhasa on the 7th September between the Government of India and the Tibetan authorities. The terms are those of the draft forwarded with our despatch, dated the 11th August. In your telegram of the 6th July, you left to our discretion the amount of the indemnity to be demanded under Article VI. of the agreement; and in view of our lack of information as to the resources of the country, we thought it advisable to leave Colonel Younghusband a free hand in this respect, though, as reported in our telegram of the 26th June, we had already suggested that £100,000 per mensem from the date of the attack on the Mission at Gyangtse until one month after the conclusion of the agreement seemed to us a suitable demand. On the 30th August, we informed you by telegraph that our Commissioner was claiming an indemnity of Rs. 50,000 a day, the equivalent of £100,000 per mensem, from the date of the attack on the Mission; but that, as Colonel Younghusband regarded this sum as exorbitant, he proposed to reduce the amount in consideration of the concession of a mart in Eastern Tibet. On the 31st August, we were informed in reply that His Majesty's Government agreed that the amount was excessive, and on the 5th September that they saw no objection to obtaining the additional mart proposed. These views were communicated to Colonel Younghusband, who in the meanwhile, after consulting persons who were well qualified to know the actual facts as to the condition of Tibet and after making personal enquiry at Lhasa, had modified his opinion in the matter, and believed that it was well within the power of the Tibetans to pay the sum named. On the 2nd September, he telegraphed that the Tongsa Penlop had suggested to the Tibetans that they should authorise the Indian Government to collect the Customs at the intended marts, and devote the proceeds to the payment of the indemnity. Colonel Younghusband added, however, that, pending definite proposals from the Tibetans, he was making no move in the matter. On the 4th, the Ti Rimpoche, who the same day had been definitely recognised as Regent by the National Assembly, intimated that the Tibetans were prepared to accept our terms, but begged that the indemnity, amounting on the basis indicated to Rs. 75,00,000, might be paid in annual instalments of one lakh each. Colonel Younghusband, anxious at this critical moment to remove the last remaining obstacle to the signature of the Convention, consented, though reluctantly, to modify the terms of Article VI. in accordance with this request, and on the same day the Regent affixed his private seal to a copy of the draft agreement. It is unfortunate that Colonel Younghusband did not word the alteration to the effect that instalments of "not less than one lakh" should be paid annually, and omit all mention of the total period for repayment, but it is probable that he had reason to fear that any further bargaining might re-open the whole negotiation. The Tibetans were most anxious that the agreement should be concluded on the 7th September, which was, according to their calculations, a most propitious day, and Colonel Younghusband thought it well to meet their wishes, so it was signed in a formal manner at the Potala, on the 7th September, in the presence of the Amban, and attested by the seal of the Dalai Lama, which had been specially entrusted by him to the Ti Rimpoche and by the seals of the Council, of the three great monasteries, and of the National Assembly. It may be noted here that the Nepal-Tibet Treaty of 1856, was sealed by the same authorities, and in that case also the Dalai Lama's seal was attached by a proxy. The conclusion of the agreement was reported to you direct by Colonel Younghusband on the same day, and on the 13th September you telegraphed that the amount of the indemnity raised a difficulty, especially when the provision for payment was read in connection with Clause VII. of the agreement, the effect being that it might be necessary to hold the Chumbi valley for 75 years—a result which would be inconsistent with the declarations of His Majesty's Government as to their intended withdrawal and with the instructions conveyed in your telegram of the 6th July. You desired us accordingly to consider whether it would not be possible, without prejudice to the signed agreement, to intimate that a reduction would be made if the terms were duly fulfilled, and if further trade facilities were given. On the following day we replied that we recognised the necessity of avoiding the appearance of an indefinite occupation of the Chumbi valley, and that we proposed to grant a remission of 25 lakhs in consideration of certain subsidiary concessions which we hoped to obtain, namely, (1) the right of collecting, on behalf of the Tibetan Government, the Customs dues leviable on Indian trade at their frontier, (2) the concession of an additional trade mart in Eastern Tibet, and (3) permission to carry out certain surveys in Tibet. On the same date Colonel Younghusband was informed of your views as to the reduction of the indemnity, and was instructed to enquire whether the Tibetans would be prepared to agree to the arrangements indicated. On the 16th, you approved our recommendation, and authorised us to reduce the indemnity from Rs. 75,00,000 to Rs. 25,00,000, obtaining by way of set off any or all of the concessions named by us. These instructions were at once communicated to our Commissioner on the 17th September, but they cannot have reached him until five days later. In the meantime, however, Colonel Younghusband had already fixed the date of his departure from Lhasa, and actually set out on his return journey on the 23rd, after telegraphing to explain that he was not attempting any readjustment of the Convention already signed, as any such endeavour at that stage would jeopardise the whole settlement. The risks and difficulties of a protracted stay at Lhasa have been recognised from the outset. High passes intervene between the capital and Gyangtse, and, owing to the serious objections raised by the military authorities, which have been so strongly endorsed by yourself, our object throughout has been to avoid in any case the need for retaining troops at Lhasa during the winter, and to withdraw the Mission and its escort at the earliest possible date. Uncertainty as to the period for which he would be able to stay at Lhasa has undoubtedly hampered Colonel Younghusband in no small degree. On the 15th August, you directed that the troops should start back on a day to be named by the military authorities in communication with Colonel Younghusband. On the 21st, Colonel Younghusband urged the importance of being able to remain at Lhasa up to the latest date possible, and on the 25th, telegraphed, enquiring whether he was to receive orders from the military authorities as to the date of his return. On the 31st August, General Macdonald telegraphed, explaining that he considered it inadvisable that the troops should remain at Lhasa after the 15th September, and that, in the absence of orders to the contrary, he would leave on that date. Prior to the receipt of the last message, however, we had telegraphed on the 2nd September, in reply to Colonel Younghusband's message of the 25th August, that the matter was one in which he should receive orders only from the Government of India, and that we wished to receive an expression of his opinion as to the possible duration of the stay at Lhasa after he had consulted General Macdonald. It was added that we saw no reason why the departure should not be postponed until the middle of October, if necessary, but that the 15th October was the latest day; and that, in the absence of any convincing reasons as to the impossibility of doing so, the Mission must remain at Lhasa until the Convention was concluded, or until the date named. On the 16th September, a further message was sent to Colonel Younghusband, informing him that, as it was most desirable to secure a final settlement of the subsidiary points which it was proposed to secure as a set off to the reduction of the indemnity, he was authorised in case of necessity, on the departure of the main force, to retain at Lhasa for a reasonable time an escort of a strength not exceeding 500 men. It will thus be seen that, on the date on which arrangements were actually made for the signature of the Convention, Colonel Younghusband had reason to believe that it might be impossible to protract his stay beyond the 15th September, and we consider, therefore, that he was fully justified in using his discretion as he did and in signing the Convention on the 7th without awaiting approval of the amount of the indemnity and the method of its payment. We need not dwell on the immense difficulties of securing unanimous agreement among the numerous Tibetan negotiators, for they must have been fully evident to you from the reports which we have sent you, but we desire to point out that any alterations in the terms at this critical moment would probably have led to a recommencement of the whole discussion. We regret extremely, however, that the result has been that effect has not been given to the instructions of His Majesty's Government. We are not yet in possession of a complete statement of the reasons which induced Colonel Younghusband eventually to leave Lhasa on the 23rd September without carrying out the subsequent instructions regarding the reduction in the amount of the indemnity, and we prefer to withhold any expression of our opinion as to the wisdom of his action in this respect, until we receive the fuller explanations which he has promised. It remains, therefore, at present only to consider what measures should now be taken to comply with your wishes. Subject to the opinion of Colonel Younghusband, who hopes to reach Simla on the 14th October, and whose arrival we propose to await before arriving at a definite decision, we believe that it may be possible to carry out any modifications of the Convention that may be considered necessary, somewhat in the following way. The Trade Regulations have still to be revised as contemplated by Article III. of the Convention, and we would suggest that the intimation regarding a reduction in the amount of indemnity should be postponed until this matter is taken up, as we propose it should be without delay. The negotiation of the Trade Regulations we propose to entrust to Captain O'Connor, who has held the office of Secretary to the Mission, and who has now remained at Gyangtse as our first Trade Agent. Simultaneously with the conclusion of the main agreement, the Tibetan Government expressed their willingness to permit our Agent at Gyangtse to proceed, in certain circumstances, to Lhasa, and in token of their consent to such an arrangement, handed to Colonel Younghusband the written undertaking, of which we have the honour to enclose a copy. We have instructed our Agent that no use should be made of the permission thus accorded without the express consent of the Government of India. But in the event of another visit to Lhasa becoming necessary in connection with the Trade Regulations, the document may be of use. In your telegram of the 4th August, you informed us that His Majesty's Government had decided not to demand, as a term of our settlement, the grant of right of access for our Agent at Gyangtse to Lhasa. In view, however, of the circumstances explained in Colonel Younghusband's letter of the 9th September, and having regard to the fact that no objection was raised by the Lhasa authorities, we trust that you will permit us to approve our Commissioner's action in this matter, as we are still of opinion that the right may be of the greatest value to us hereafter and, hedged in as it is by the conditions expressed in the written authority, it cannot be held to commit us to any political control over Tibet. As in the case of the indemnity, we consider that Colonel Younghusband used his discretion in very difficult circumstances with great perspicacity and a fearlessness of responsibility which it would be a grave mistake to discourage in any of our Agents. At the same time we desire to express our sincere regret that the instructions of His Majesty's Government were not carried out to the letter, as they would have been, if communication with our Commissioner had not been a matter of twelve days even by telegraph. We take the present opportunity to forward, for your information, further correspondence relating to Tibetan affairs.*

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* For text, *see* page 90.

Enclosure in No. 182.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Lhasa, the 9*th September,* 1904.

As it was desirable, in view of the extremely limited time at my disposal for the purpose of concluding a Convention with Tibet and an Adhesion Agreement with the Amban, to put before the Tibetans a full draft of our terms at as early a date as possible, as the Government of India had already proposed to the Secretary of State that I should ask for permission for the Trade Agent at Gyangtse to proceed to Lhasa, and as it would be most difficult to insert such a clause into the terms after I had once given them out, I inserted this provision in the draft terms which I presented to the Tibetans. Subsequently I received instructions not to ask for permission for the Gyangtse Agent to proceed to Lhasa. I did not, however, at once withdraw the clause from the list of terms, because in the course of negotiations it might prove useful as a point on which I could, if necessary, make concessions to the Tibetans. But when I found the Tibetans raised no special objection to the clause, provided only the Trade Agent came here on commercial, and not political, business, and only after he had found it impossible to get this commercial business disposed of by correspondence or by personal conference with the Tibetan Agent at Gyangtse, I thought there would be no objection to taking an agreement from the Tibetans to this effect, for, under such limitations and provisions, there could be no grounds for assuming that, in coming here, the Trade Agent at Gyangtse would be taking upon himself any political functions, or adopting the character of a Political Resident.

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* *See* Part II., Nos. 226 to end, pp. 195, *et seq.*

2. This agreement being of a less formal character than the rest of the Convention, I had drawn up separately. I have now the honour to forward it for the information of the Government of India. It will at least prove a useful spur to the Tibetans to transact business with the Trade Agent at Gyangtse with despatch.

ANNEXURE.

The Government of Tibet agrees to permit the British Agent, who will reside at Gyangtse, to watch the conditions of the British trade, to visit Lhasa, when it is necessary, to consult with high Chinese and Tibetan officials on such commercial matters of importance as he has found impossible to settle at Gyangtse by correspondence or by personal conference with the Tibetan Agent.

Sealed and signed at Lhasa, the 7th September, 1904, corresponding with the Tibetan date, the twenty-seventh day of the seventh month of the Wood-Dragon Year.

[Seal] F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND, Colonel,
British Commissioner.

[Seal] Seal of Dalai Lama affixed by
the Ti Rimpoche.

[Seal] Seal of the Council.

[Seal] Seal of the Drepung Monastery.

[Seal] Seal of the Sera Monastery.

[Seal] Seal of the Gaden Monastery.

[Seal] Seal of the Tsong du (National Assembly).

No. 183.

From Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne, dated Peking, the 2nd November, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram of the 27th September. I have been informed by Prince Ching that T'ang is proceeding to his post *viâ* India. He requests me to let him know if within the next few days I learn from His Majesty's Government at what place in India T'ang is to meet the British officials appointed to negotiate with him.

No. 184.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 7th November, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your letter of the 6th October and your telegram of the 21st October have been considered by His Majesty's Government. As regards indemnity, the form of the declaration which you propose to make to the Tibetans on ratifying the Convention is approved, but it should be so worded as to maintain the stipulation providing that, as security for fulfilment of provisions as to the trade marts, the Chumbi Valley is to be occupied until the marts have been opened effectively for three years. As regards the Agreement giving the Trade Agent at Gyangtse the right of access to Lhasa, His Majesty's Government have decided to disallow it. I would suggest that you should inform the Tibetans that, while you do not consider it necessary for this provision to be embodied in a formal undertaking, you appreciate the good feeling which they have displayed in accepting it. His Majesty's Government regard the Agreement as unnecessary, and as inconsistent with the principle on which their policy has throughout been based.

No. 185.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 11th November, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 7th November. I have ratified the Convention in accordance with the instructions of His Majesty's Government. I have also, as suggested by you, addressed friendly letter to the authorities at Lhasa.

No. 186.

From the Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow, dated the 11th November, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Tibet Adhesion Agreement. You should inform Chinese Government that His Majesty's Government have decided that the negotiations shall be conducted by the Viceroy of India at Calcutta.

No. 187.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 14th November, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

His Majesty's Government have decided that the negotiations for securing the adhesion of China shall be conducted at Calcutta. This decision was communicated to Sir E. Satow by telegraph on the 11th instant, with an intimation that he may inform the Chinese Government accordingly.

No. 188.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 21st November, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 14th instant. Please see telegram of the 2nd November from Sir E. Satow to Foreign Office. We suggest that Prince Ching should be informed, in reply to his inquiry, that Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department will be happy to meet Tang at Calcutta till March, or at Simla after that date, for the purpose of negotiations. Chinese Government might also be asked to state probable date of Tang's arrival in India.

No. 189.

Letter from the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 27th October, 1904. *(Received 21st November,* 1904.*)*

We have the honour to forward, for the information of His Majesty's Government, a copy of a Memorandum by the Commissioner for Tibetan Frontier Affairs, furnishing explanations as to his conduct of the negotiations, both prior and subsequent to the conclusion of the agreement with Tibet of the 7th September, and also making certain recommendations with a view to carrying out the present wishes of His Majesty's Government in regard to certain points still remaining to be settled with Tibet.

2. There is no need for us to follow Colonel Younghusband in his recommendations as to future action. Our views have already been communicated to His Majesty's Government in His Excellency the Viceroy's telegram of the 21st instant.

3. Moreover, we have already set forth in detail, in our despatch of the 6th instant, the circumstances which, in our opinion, fully justified Colonel Younghusband in using his discretion and signing the Convention of the 7th September, without awaiting approval of the amount of the indemnity and the method of its payment; and it is unnecessary for us to do more than to refer you to that despatch for the expression of our views in the matter. We will, therefore, at once proceed to examine the explanations given by the Commissioner of his action in ordering the departure of the Mission from Lhasa without negotiating or attempting to negotiate the amendments to the Convention desired by His Majesty's Government.

4. We will deal in the first place with the reasons which appear to have prompted Colonel Younghusband's action in the matter. They practically come under the following headings :—

(*a*) the anxiety of the military authorities for the departure of the Mission before the cold weather should have supervened;

(*b*) the danger of exciting Tibetan suspicion by continuing negotiations, especially in view of the Commissioner's promise to depart immediately after signature;

(*c*) the difficulty of changing his plans on the eve of the date fixed for departure;

(*d*) the fruitlessness of attempting further negotiations with the Tibetans at the time;

(*e*) the friendliness displayed by various Tibetan authorities since the departure of the Mission, showing that it was well timed;

(*f*) the general latitude due to an officer placed in his difficult surroundings.

5. These considerations appear to us to have much force, but there are other considerations on which Colonel Younghusband has not touched, but which seem to afford even stronger justification for his action in leaving Lhasa at the earliest possible moment, and to show that the strictures conveyed in your telegram of the 3rd October, in so far as they refer to his leaving Lhasa without attempting to modify the Convention, are unmerited. Not only was the language of the communications which we received from His Majesty's Government prior to the signature of the Convention, such as to impress on us and on Colonel Younghusband alike that His Majesty's Government were strongly averse to any prolongation of the stay at Lhasa, but the telegrams also which were received subsequently gave no indication that His Majesty's Government expected Colonel Younghusband to remain at Lhasa to negotiate alterations in the Convention as signed. We need only refer briefly to a few passages from your telegrams. On the 13th September, you telegraphed your congratulations to Colonel Younghusband, and said that his action would be generally supported. In another telegram of the 13th September, in which you pointed out that under the Convention as signed we might have to hold the Chumbi Valley for 75 years, and intimated that such action would be inconsistent with the declarations and the instructions of His Majesty's Government, you gave the following directions :—" I request that you will consider whether, without prejudice to the signed Agreement, it would not be possible to intimate to the Tibetans, in accordance with the suggestion in your telegram of the 12th September, that amount of indemnity will be reduced on their duly fulfilling terms agreed to and granting further facilities for trade." In pursuance of these directions we telegraphed on the 14th September to the British Commissioner that he might be able to secure the concessions referred to by offering to recommend that the Viceroy should, as an act of grace, remit a portion of the indemnity on certain conditions.

On the 16th September, you telegraphed to us approving of the course which we had adopted in regard to the proposed bargaining for concessions in return for a reduction of the indemnity, and you authorised the Viceroy to reduce the amount of the indemnity in the manner which we had proposed, but in the penultimate sentence of your message you expressly directed that " in no circumstances is the force to prolong its stay at Lhasa for the purpose of obtaining more favourable terms than those already agreed to."

On the 17th September, we asked if there was any objection to Colonel Younghusband staying at Lhasa as long as might be necessary to carry out the instructions of His Majesty's Government and to get the Trade Regulations accepted, and, in replying on the following day, you said that there was no objection provided that the Government of India were satisfied as to Colonel Younghusband's safety, but this was evidently rather a concession to our wishes than an instruction from His Majesty's Government that Colonel Younghusband should remain at Lhasa.

6. In these circumstances it was hardly open to Colonel Younghusband to assume that he was expected by His Majesty's Government to remain at Lhasa in order to attempt a modification of the Convention, and his belief as well as ours was that the required reduction of the indemnity was to be effected by the Viceroy in ratifying the Convention. This belief, we venture to think, is sufficiently countenanced by the telegrams from yourself to which we have just referred. We regret that Colonel Younghusband did not find it possible to stay at Lhasa to negotiate the concessions which we had hoped to secure in return for an immediate promise to reduce the indemnity, but we feel bound to accept his opinion that it would have been impossible to carry such negotiations to a successful conclusion, and that there would have been grave risk of exciting the distrust of the Tibetans and of impairing the friendly relations which had so opportunely been established. It is important to remember that Colonel Younghusband had no instructions to reduce the indemnity without obtaining some compensatory concessions, and it was this latter condition which in his judgment as the man on the spot was impossible of attainment.

7. We trust that His Majesty's Government, while recognising the full merits of Colonel Younghusband's achievement in terminating an affair which began in so unpromising a manner and with such unfortunate incidents, by the establishment of more friendly relations than could possibly have been expected, will not condemn him for the one error of judgment into which he fell. We fully admit that the error of judgment was a serious one, for it involved the occupation of the Chumbi Valley for a period of 75 years, in contravention of the undertaking of His Majesty's Government, but we submit that the circumstances in which it was made afford sufficient reason for generous condonation.

We have, &c.,

(Signed) AMPTHILL.
„ E. F.-G. LAW.
„ E. R. ELLES.
„ A. T. ARUNDEL.
„ H. ERLE RICHARDS.
„ J. P. HEWETT.

Enclosure in No. 189.

Memorandum by the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated the 18th October, 1904.

On my return to India I find that I am held by His Majesty's Government to have acted in defiance of express instructions in accepting the Tibetan proposal regarding the mode of payment of the indemnity; and to have disobeyed orders in leaving Lhasa without making an attempt to alter the Convention I had signed. I desire, therefore, to explain the reasons for my action, and to offer suggestions as to the best method of carrying out the wishes of His Majesty's Government for modifying the terms I settled with the Tibetans.

2. I would, in the first place, remark that the despatch from the Secretary of State, dated 5th August, specifically laying down that the amount of indemnity I was to ask was not to be more than the Tibetans could pay within three years, did not reach me till after I had accepted the Tibetan proposal. The terms of the draft Convention certainly implied that the amount should be paid in three years, but a certain amount of latitude was left to me in the matter of the indemnity; and though I admit that my action was not covered by my instructions, I regret that His Majesty's Government should consider that it was in defiance of them.

3. For what was my position in the early days of September? I had before me the telegram of the Secretary of State, dated 16th August, in which it was definitely laid down that the troops were to start back on a day to be named by the military authorities in communication with me. General Macdonald had consulted his medical officers and his commanding officers of regiments, and had informed me, on 31st August, that 15th September was the latest date he could remain; and that, unless he received orders to the contrary from Government, he intended to leave on that date. I had at the time every reason to suppose that the date named by General Macdonald would be accepted by Government. Throughout the latter part of my Mission very great importance had been attached to military considerations, and I had, indeed, been reprimanded in June for asking for fuller time for my negotiations than General Macdonald had advised could

be given. I could not count, then, upon having any longer period than up to 15th September at my disposal for negotiations.

4. I accordingly arranged that on 1st September the whole of the Council and the principal members of the National Assembly should meet me in the presence of the Amban, and I then presented them with the draft Convention in its final form, which, I said, I expected them to sign within a week. As the amount of the indemnity, I had inserted the sum of £500,000 or 75 lakhs of rupees, this being calculated at the rate suggested by the Government of India to the Secretary of State, *viz.*, £100,000 a month from the date of the attack on the Mission to a month after the Convention should have been signed. The period of payment I placed at three years.

5. On 4th September, the Regent came to me, saying the Tibetans were ready to agree to all our terms except that regarding the indemnity, and he begged me that the amount might be paid in annual instalments of one lakh each for 75 years. I had not then received the telegram from the Government of India, dated 2nd September, saying I could remain till 15th October. I was under the impression I would have to leave on 15th September. Time was exceedingly pressing. It was all important that I should get the Convention through before I left Lhasa. It was in every way desirable, also, that the Convention I should make should be such that it was possible for the Tibetans to keep, and not one which would leave with it the sting of resentment. The country could well afford to pay 75 lakhs, which is not more than a year's revenue of a State like Indore in India. But in Tibet there is almost no cash, and the smallest amount of revenue reaches the Central Government, nearly the whole being paid in kind to local officials and to the monasteries. To pay even a lakh of rupees a year in cash, would cause some difficulty to the Central Government; and if I had insisted on only the 25 lakhs which the Secretary of State now considers sufficient being paid within three years, I should have left behind me a raw in Lhasa. The amount would not have been paid, and we would have been involved in those very complications in the future which it is the object of His Majesty's Government to avoid, and which, in my opinion, have been avoided by the arrangement I made.

6. I had one other consideration in my mind. Under Article VI. of the Convention the indemnity to be fixed was to be for (1) the expense incurred in military operations, and (2) for insults to, and attacks upon, the British Commissioner. However much we might reduce the amount afterwards, it was, I considered, politically desirable to make the Tibetans acknowledge that for the above no small amount of satisfaction was due to us. Twenty-five lakhs of rupees is only £166,000, which is a small amount to enter in a treaty as satisfaction for insults and attacks upon the British Representative.

7. I had then in the end to act upon my own responsibility in the matter of extending the period for the payment of the indemnity, but I trust Government will not consider I acted hastily, for in my telegram of 15th July I referred to the possibility of having to increase the number of years in which payment of the indemnity might have to be made, and suggested that in this respect we might suit the convenience of the Tibetans.

8. I should, of course, have preferred to have been able to carry out the letter of the instructions of His Majesty's Government, but I should have incurred a very heavy responsibility in *refusing* the Tibetan proposal. It was quite possible that, if I had refused, the Regent would have fled from Lhasa rather than sign the Convention, and, in any case, I would have left him there in a very precarious position. Whereas, by accepting the proposal, I satisfied the Tibetans. I also satisfied one at least of the cardinal principles of the policy of His Majesty's Government, *viz.*, the securing of the maximum of reparation with the minimum of future

liability. And I was able to leave Lhasa, feeling that I had effected what I am sure His Majesty's Government must consider of far more importance than the conclusion of a paper Convention, *viz.*, the establishment of our relations with the Tibetans on a footing of mutual good-will.

9. I have now to explain why I refrained from altering the Convention I had made. When it was decided that the Mission could not winter at Lhasa, but must get through its work in a period shorter than I suppose has ever before been allowed for the conclusion of an important treaty, I laid down my course of action, and told the Tibetans time after time that, directly the treaty was signed, we would leave Lhasa. To impress this idea upon them I often made use of the expression:—"If you sign the treaty to-morrow, I will go away the next day." The Tibetans are exceedingly suspicious people. The Dalai Lama had written to them to be especially cautious against the "craftiness" of the English. The mere fact of my remaining would, therefore, have aroused suspicion; and if, in addition, I had asked to alter the Convention only just signed with so much ceremony, I should in an instant have lost all the confidence I had so hardly won. I understood from the telegrams of the Secretary of State that he had no wish to prejudice the Convention already made, and neither I nor a single member of my staff had a doubt that the attempt to alter it would have most seriously prejudiced it. By persuasion I could never have induced them to alter it now it was once arranged; and though I certainly had the power to insist upon the alteration, I hardly had the right to. Nor in the strictly limited time at my disposal could I have expected to negotiate new Trade Regulations. I doubt if Government even yet thoroughly appreciate the extraordinary obtuseness and stubbornness and the lack of business capacity of the Tibetans or the inadequacy of the Government machine for dealing with foreign relations.

10. Then, again, military considerations had here, too, to be taken into account. I was constantly being urged not to keep the troops a day longer in Lhasa than could be helped, so that they might not suffer from the approaching winter. As soon, therefore, as the Convention was signed, I told General Macdonald that he might take 20th September as the date for leaving. This would give the Amban time to get an answer from Peking, authorising him to sign the Adhesion Agreement if the Chinese Government showed any inclination to settle the matter. If they were inclined to be argumentative our leaving Lhasa would have more effect than our remaining, for the Amban certainly felt our presence there extremely useful in checking the Tibetans, and making them more amenable to him. General Macdonald, therefore, made arrangements all the way down the line for the return of the force on or within a few days of 20th September. The convoy, which was ready to start from Gyangtse to stock the posts, if we had to stay, was countermanded, and troops and transport along the line of communications began to return to India. Arrangements of this kind in a country like Tibet cannot be made or altered at the last moment; and as I had been led to expect that my action regarding the indemnity clause was to be supported, I had arranged farewell visits and ceremonies which it would have been very awkward to postpone.

11. Subsequent events have shown that my action has enabled us to leave Tibet with some feeling of confidence that our relations have been placed on a basis rooted in friendly sentiment. We have got the Convention, and we have got it with good-will behind it. And if I have obtained too much, what we do not wish for can at any time be given back.

12. His Majesty's Government, I understand, now wish to reduce the amount of indemnity from 75 lakhs of rupees to 25 lakhs. Now that I have forced the Tibetans to acknowledge that 75 lakhs is due to us for their misdemeanours, the remission may be made with good grace as an act of generosity on our part. As a matter of business, I think we ought to expect from them the opening of a trade mart in Eastern Tibet, which would be

as much to their interest as ours; and my idea had been that an arrangement of this nature might very easily have been made when the revision of the Trade Regulations came to be discussed. But if His Majesty's Government wish the alteration in the amount of the indemnity to be made at once, we must trust to the good feeling of the Tibetans to subsequently make us a concession in regard to the mart. By the Convention they undertake to consider the question of opening new marts, and our generosity in reducing the indemnity may be taken as a ground for asking for the opening of the mart.

13. But while reducing the amount of the indemnity, His Majesty's Government wish also to limit the period of occupation of the Chumbi Valley. This is a very serious sacrifice of the interests of the Government of India. Chumbi is the key to Tibet. It is also the most difficult part of the road to Lhasa. With Chumbi in our possession, we have a clear run into Tibet, for the Tang La Pass across the watershed is an open plain several miles wide. With Chumbi in the possession of the Tibetans the difficulties of an advance into Tibet are trebled. We got through it this time by diplomatic management. Nor do the Tibetans show any resentment whatever at the idea of our prolonged occupation of Chumbi, for the valley is not looked upon as part of Tibet proper, and is on the Indian side of the watershed and inhabited by a separate race. Supposing, however, that His Majesty's Government, with these consideration before them, still desire to limit our occupation of the Chumbi Valley to three years, the Viceroy has merely to state this intention in the ratification of the Convention. There might be advantage in attaching to such a declaration a statement that we reserve to ourselves the right to re-occupy the valley if the indemnity is not paid; but we presumably would always have this right in any case, as every nation has a right to enforce a treaty obligation which is not fulfilled. Any special statement to that effect might not, therefore, greatly strengthen our position, while it might give rise in certain quarters to the idea that we still had designs upon the valley.

14. All that seems necessary, therefore, in order to meet the wishes of His Majesty's Government, is for His Excellency the Viceroy, in ratifying the Convention, to declare that the amount of indemnity will be reduced from 75 to 25 lakhs of rupees, and that the occupation of the Chumbi valley by us would cease when the first three instalments have been punctually paid and when the trade marts at Gyangtse and Gartok have been effectively opened for three years.

15. I would then at once write to the Regent informing him of His Excellency's graciousness, and would invite him to India to receive the ratification. Further discussion regarding Trade Regulations and the opening of a trade mart in Eastern Tibet might then be commenced, and such like negotiations might go on indefinitely with the advantage of keeping us in continued touch with the heads of the Tibetan Government.

16. In this way I hope the wishes of His Majesty's Government will be met and our good relations not be jeopardised as they might have been if I had refused the Regent's proposal regarding the mode of payment of the indemnity; or if I had attempted an alteration of the Convention only a few days after it had been solemnly contracted.

No. 190.

From the Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow, dated the 25th November, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Tibet. Your telegram of the 2nd November. The Indian Foreign Secretary will be glad to negotiate with T'ang at Calcutta till March, or afterwards at Simla. You should inform Chinese Government accordingly, and inquire when T'ang is expected to arrive in India.

No. 191.

From Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne, dated Peking, the 26th November, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 25th November. T'ang proposes to leave Peking in a fortnight for Canton and pass ten days visiting relations there. He will reach Calcutta in eight weeks.

No. 192.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated the 29th November, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 21st instant. It is expected that Chinese Commissioner Tang will arrive Calcutta in about two months' time.

No. 193.

Despatch from the Secretary of State for India to the Government of India, dated 2nd December, 1904.

YOUR Excellency was informed by my telegram of the 7th November of the decision arrived at by His Majesty's Government as to the modification of the provision concerning the indemnity embodied in the Convention signed at Lhasa on the 7th September by Colonel Younghusband, and as to the disallowance of the separate Agreement concluded by him on the same day, giving the British Trade Agent at Gyangtse the right of access to Lhasa in certain contingencies. Your ratification of the Convention in a form to give effect to that decision affords me an opportunity of reviewing the settlement which has been arrived at.

2. The Convention as ratified carries out in full the policy laid down in my telegram of the 26th July and my despatch of the 5th August; and His Majesty's Government cordially congratulate Your Excellency's Government on the successful issue of the labours of the Mission. When Lord Curzon in his despatch of the 8th January, 1903, made his proposal for a Mission to Lhasa, Tibet, though lying on our borders, was practically an unknown country, the rulers of which persistently refused to hold any communications with the British Government even on necessary matters of business; and if the Tibetan Government had become involved in political relations with other Powers, a situation of danger might have been created on the frontier of the Indian Empire. This risk has now been

removed by the conclusion of the Convention, and His Majesty's Government fully recognise that the result is due to the patience and firmness shown by Colonel Younghusband during the long and trying period which elapsed between the despatch of the Mission to Khamba Jong in the spring of 1903 and the signature of the Convention on the 7th September last. His Majesty's Government also fully recognise the services of the officers of the Mission accompanying Colonel Younghusband, and the admirable conduct of the troops under the leadership of General Macdonald. It is most satisfactory, having regard to the obstinacy of the Tibetans in the past, that, besides concluding the Convention, Colonel Younghusband has good reason to believe that the relations which he established with them at Lhasa were generally friendly. This affords a ground for hoping that they will observe in a spirit of good faith the conditions to which they have agreed. In reference to the conduct of the troops and the members of the Mission, I have already informed you of the gracious command of His Majesty the King that a special medal should be granted in recognition of the services which they have rendered.

3. It is with great reluctance that I have to add to these congratulations a reference to your letters of the 6th and 27th October, in which you express your regret that, when the Convention was signed, full effect was not given to the policy of His Majesty's Government in respect of the indemnity and the separate Agreement. The fact that it has been necessary to reverse Colonel Younghusband's action in these two matters is a sufficient indication of the serious nature of his disregard of the instructions he had received.

4. As to the indemnity, it was laid down by my telegrams of 6th and 26th July that it was not to exceed in amount a sum which the Tibetans might be expected to pay in three years, and that the Chumbi Valley was to be held as security till it had been liquidated. It appears from Colonel Younghusband's reports of the 22nd and 28th August, and the 1st September, that the payment of the indemnity by instalments spread over a long period of years had been suggested by him to the Tibetans in reply to their plea that it was impossible for them to provide in cash within three years the sum demanded. These reports, however, were sent by post, and were not received by me till October. No reference was made in your telegrams to the mode of payment adopted by Colonel Younghusband, and it was with complete surprise that His Majesty's Government learnt from your telegram of the 12th September that Colonel Younghusband had inserted in the Convention a stipulation that the indemnity was to be paid in 75 annual instalments, and that he had retained without modification the proviso that the Chumbi Valley was to be occupied as security till the full amount had been paid. The effect of this was to make it appear as if it were our intention to occupy for at least 75 years the Chumbi Valley, which had been recognised in the Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893 as Tibetan territory. This would have been inconsistent with the repeated declarations of His Majesty's Government that the Mission would not lead to occupation, and that we would withdraw from Tibetan territory when reparation had been secured. I therefore, after congratulating Your Excellency and Colonel Younghusband on the conclusion of the Convention, authorised you to reduce the indemnity and to modify the provision for the occupation of the Chumbi Valley as security. It was hoped by His Majesty's Government that it would have been possible to effect this before Colonel Younghusband left Lhasa; but, though it appears from a communication sent by him shortly after the signature of the Convention that he desired liberty to prolong his stay, it is clear that in the circumstances it was not desirable that he should have postponed his departure. There being thus no opportunity for settling the matter on the spot, I directed you, when ratifying the Convention, to modify it in accordance with the instructions of His Majesty's Government.

5. As to the separate Agreement, the question of claiming for the Trade Agent at Gyangtse the right of access to Lhasa was carefully con-

sidered, as you are aware, before His Majesty's Government decided that no such condition was to be included in the terms of the settlement, and a subsequent request made by you for a modification of this decision was negatived by my telegram of the 3rd August. No subsequent reference was made to me on the subject, and it was not till the receipt of your letter of the 6th October that I learned that Colonel Younghusband had taken on himself the responsibility of concluding an Agreement giving the Trade Agent at Gyangtse the right to visit Lhasa to consult with the Chinese and Tibetan officers there, on commercial matters, which it had been found impossible to settle at Gyangtse. In the circumstances His Majesty's Government had no alternative but to disallow the Agreement as inconsistent with the policy which they had laid down.

6. The object of that policy, as stated in Lord George Hamilton's despatch of the 27th February, 1903, was that British influence should be recognised at Lhasa in such a manner as to exclude that of any other Power, and that Tibet should remain in that state of isolation from which till recently she has shown no intention to depart and which has hitherto caused her presence on our frontier to be a matter of indifference to us. We have aimed at effecting this result, not by establishing a Resident at Lhasa, but by obtaining the consent of the Tibetan Government to a Convention by which they undertake neither to receive the Agent of any Foreign Power nor to grant concessions or assignments of revenue to the subject of any Foreign Power, without the previous consent of the British Government. All that we have demanded for ourselves, apart from reparation for injuries in the past, is that the commercial facilities conceded to us in principle by the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893, should be placed on a satisfactory basis, and given such an extension as we are justified in claiming, having regard to the traffic on the existing trade routes, and to the position of India as the limitrophe country with Tibet on that part of her frontiers which is not coterminous with the Chinese Empire. Should the Tibetans fail hereafter to observe the terms of the Convention, the situation will have to be reconsidered. But His Majesty's Government are satisfied that the course which they have adopted is that which in existing circumstances is best calculated to attain the objects which they have in view so far as Tibet is concerned, and most in keeping with the policy which, in the interests of the British Empire as a whole, they have determined to observe.

7. In my despatch of the 5th August, I drew attention to the fact that questions of Indian frontier policy could no longer be regarded from an exclusively Indian point of view, and that the course to be pursued in such cases must be laid down by His Majesty's Government alone. It is essential that this should be borne in mind by those who find themselves entrusted with the conduct of affairs in which the external relations of India are involved, and that they should not allow themselves, under the pressure of the problems which confront them on the spot, to forget the necessity of conforming to the instructions which they have received from His Majesty's Government, who have more immediately before them the interests of the British Empire as a whole.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) ST. JOHN BRODRICK.

No. 194.

Letter from the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 17th November, 1904. (Received 5th December, 1904.)

WE have the honour to transmit, for the information of His Majesty's Government, a copy of a letter from the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, containing his final report on the results attained by the Mission in Tibet, of which he has been the head during part of both last and this year.

2. Colonel Younghusband forwards signed copies of the three versions —English, Chinese and Tibetan—of the agreement which he concluded with the Tibetan Government on 7th September last; and of each of the versions we have the honour to furnish His Majesty's Government with one copy as ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy. We also transmit a signed copy of the declaration which has been appended to the ratified instruments, in obedience to the instructions contained in your telegram of 7th November, as well as a copy of the despatch intimating to the Tibetan Government the decision of His Majesty's Government not to ratify the declaration signed in September last as to the right of the British Agent to visit Lhasa for trade purposes.

3. The Commissioner has in his letter briefly summarised the history of the events which preceded the signature of the agreement; and there is, therefore, no need for us to do more than to endorse his account of what passed and to add that he is fully justified in considering that the feeling of good-will which the Mission has left behind it in Tibet, as well as in Nepal and Bhutan, is of even more importance than the actual conclusion of the agreement, valuable as it is.

4. His Majesty's Government are already in possession of our views as to the merit of Colonel Younghusband's achievement; but we take this further opportunity of stating that, in our opinion, the satisfactory results referred to above are mainly due to the conspicuous tact, ability, and constancy displayed by him during the whole course of his arduous negotiations; negotiations which were rendered all the more difficult by the rigour of the climate and the circumstances of physical discomfort, and not to say danger, in which they had to be carried on. It is true that in one particular the Commissioner has failed to earn the approval of His Majesty's Government, but we feel confident that, when the importance of what he has achieved, taken as a whole, has been more fully realised, His Majesty's Government will not withhold from him a generous measure of approval.

5. We have the honour, before closing this despatch, to draw the attention of His Majesty's Government to the services of the other members of the Mission which are recorded by Colonel Younghusband in his present letter; and we desire to express our special concurrence in his remarks as to the good work done by Mr. White, first as Joint, and later on as Assistant, Commissioner; by Captain O'Connor, who acted as intermediary between the Commissioner and the Tibetan Government, and whom we have now appointed to be the first British Trade Agent at Gyangtse; by Mr. Wilton, who was employed in a similar capacity in respect of the Chinese officials; and by Mr. Walsh, who held the important post of Political Officer in the Chumbi Valley during a large part of the negotiations.

We have, &c.,

(Signed) AMPTHILL.
„ E. F.-G. LAW.
„ E. R. ELLES.
„ H. ERLE RICHARDS.
„ J. P. HEWETT.

Enclosure 1 in No. 194.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Simla, the 28th October, 1904.

Of the five copies of the Convention which I signed at Lhasa on 7th September with the Tibetan Government, one was handed over by me to the Tibetan Government and one to the Chinese Amban. I have now the honour to deliver to you the three remaining copies, and, in doing so, I desire to take the opportunity of recapitulating the main results of the Mission with the charge of which I was honoured, and to bring to the favourable notice of the Government of India the valuable services rendered by the members of my staff.

2. When the Mission entered Tibet at the beginning of July of last year, the Tibetan delegates refused to discuss matters at any other place than Yatung; they returned all written communications addressed to them; they refused to report to their Government anything which I said; they absolutely repudiated the Convention made by the Chinese Government on their behalf in 1890; and they showed a distinct inclination to rely upon a Foreign Power to aid them in defying us. The attitude of the local Chinese officials was hardly more satisfactory. The then Amban, instead of coming himself to the frontier to settle matters, deputed a low grade official to meet me. He ignored my despatches to him, either replying direct to the Viceroy instead of to me, or writing to me in demi-official form, implying that it was beneath his dignity to correspond directly with me. The conduct of our relations with Bhutan was not at first under my control, but at the time of my assuming charge, little was known of the Bhutanese, and their attitude towards us was uncertain. Such was the position of affairs a year ago.

3. As a result of the action of the Government of India during the past year, there has now been signed in the Audience Room of the Dalai Lama's Palace in Lhasa itself, in the presence of the Chinese Amban and of all the chief men of Tibet, a Convention which defines our boundaries, places our trade relations with Tibet upon a satisfactory footing, and gives us the right to exclude any foreign influence if we should so wish, and which contains an acknowledgment from the Tibetans that an indemnity is due for the insults shown us. It is gratifying to be able to record, too, that this Convention has been concluded without leaving any feeling of resentment behind. In spite of the military operations which we were forced to undertake, and in spite of the Tibetans being compelled to pay an indemnity, the disposition of the Tibetans towards us was distinctly more favourable when we left Tibet than when we entered it. British officers were cordially received in the great monasteries of Lhasa and shown round the most sacred Shrines. British soldiers and Indian sepoys were able to wander without let or hindrance round the till now forbidden city. Not only in Lhasa but at every single post down the long line of communications country-produce and local manufactures were brought in readily for sale. Tibetan officials everywhere showed us civility. On the morning the Mission and escort left Lhasa, the Regent visited the Mission, and conferred on Mr. White, Captain O'Connor, and myself, and also upon General Macdonald what was an unprecedented honour in presenting us with images of Buddha, which are very rarely presented by so high a Lama even to Buddhists, and never to Christians. The entire Council assembled in a tent pitched a mile outside Lhasa to bid farewell to the Mission, and expressed their firm intention to conform to the terms of the Convention. And every symptom since the signing seems to show that they mean to. They without any demur furnished a passport for a party to proceed from Gyangtse to Gartok to open a trade mart there, and deputed an official to accompany the party. They also furnished passports for a party to proceed down the Brahmaputra to Assam if the Government of India had desired that piece of exploration to be undertaken; and for Mr. Wilton to return to China by Ta-chien-lu. Captain O'Connor and the Gartok party have been very cordially received at Shigatse, and every facility for preparing for their journey has been afforded them. The Tashi Lama has granted a private interview to Captain O'Connor, and informed him he approved of the terms of the Convention, though he would be glad to see the amount of the indemnity reduced. A Lhasa official has arrived at Gyangtse to arrange for the opening of the trade mart there; and though the maintenance of a postal service with India did not form part of the

terms of the Convention, far from opposing the maintenance of such a line, he has offered to build houses for the dâk-runners employed.

4. I have always regarded the conclusion of a Convention on paper as of minor and the establishment of our relations with the Tibetans on a footing of mutual good-will as of fundamental importance. With the force I had at my back, it was easy to compel the Tibetans to sign any Convention we had liked to impose on them. But there was little advantage in bringing back a Convention which was only extorted from them by force, and which was not framed or negotiated in such a manner as to carry with it a considerable degree of spontaneous assent. And it was especially necessary to secure the good-will of the people in general.

The result of our Mission to Kabul in 1840 was to estrange the Afghans from us from that time to this, and an intense race hatred was engendered. It would be unwise to predict that we shall never have difficulty in seeing that the present Convention is properly carried out. But I may safely say that no feeling of race hatred has been left behind, and that the Tibetans are better disposed towards us than they have ever been before; and this I consider to be incomparably the most important result of the policy of combined firmness and moderation which the Government of India so unswervingly pursued during the past year.

5. A result of minor, though of very considerable, importance is the improvement of our relations with Nepal and Bhutan. Our relations with Nepal were not in my charge. I can therefore only testify to the proofs of good-will afforded by the assistance given me by the Nepalese Representative at Lhasa which enabled me to carry through the Convention with so much good feeling. With the Bhutanese Government I was in more direct contact and was able to procure from them permission for the construction of what will in future be the principal road piercing the Himalayas throughout their entire length. And so interested in our proceedings in Tibet did the Bhutanese become, that the Tongsa Penlop himself, the principal man in Bhutan, accompanied the Mission to Lhasa, put me into communication with leading men, and was highly instrumental in effecting a settlement. A year ago the Bhutanese were strangers. To-day they are our enthusiastic allies, and our surveyors are being assisted in searching for the best route through their country to Tibet.

6. It is needless to state that these results could never have been obtained, if the Government of India had not supported me with an exceptionally able staff, or if the discipline and conduct of the troops escorting the Mission had not been of the highest. It was the gallantry and endurance of the troops which made the negotiations possible in the first instance; but it was the high discipline maintained and the good temper and admirable behaviour displayed by the troops which largely tended to placing our relations with the Tibetan people on so favourable a basis.

7. To my staff I am particularly indebted. Mr. White, whose acquaintance with the Sikkim-Tibet frontier dates back to the Sikkim campaign of 1888, and who was appointed Joint Commissioner with me last year, very effectively exerted his great personal influence in Sikkim towards utilising all the resources of the State for the desptach of the Mission escort. At Lhasa itself, he was mainly instrumental in effecting the important political object of breaking down the Tibetan barrier of exclusion, in gaining access to the monasteries, and bringing us into personal contact with the leading Lamas.

Captain O'Connor was also with the Mission from the first. For years past he has on his own initiative studied the Tibetan people and language. He had compiled a report on Tibet which he is now revising in the light of the fuller knowledge he has acquired. And this intimate acquaintance with the language, geography, and people of Tibet, combined with his sympathetic disposition towards the Tibetans, was of the highest value in negotiating with them and attracting them towards us.

Mr. Wilton, His Majesty's Acting Consul at Chungking, joined the Mission at Khamba Jong in August last year, and from the first rendered me invaluable service, not merely in dealing with the Chinese officials, but also in advising me in dealing with the general political situation, his clearness of judgment, shrewdness and experience in diplomatic work being especially helpful. For two months during my absence from Mission headquarters when summoned to Simla last October, he was in charge of the Mission at Khamba Jong and conducted the difficult operations of withdrawing the Mission from that post. In December he was appointed Assistant Commissioner.

Mr. Walsh joined the Mission in December as an Assistant Commissioner. Like Captain O'Connor he also had studied Tibetan for some years, and while holding political charge in the Chumbi Valley, compiled a valuable report on that district. He received and conducted preliminary negotiations with the Bhutanese Envoys, and proceeded to Lhasa to assist in negotiating new Trade Regulations, if that were possible.

Captain Walton, I.M.S., joined the Mission at Khamba Jong in August, 1903, as Medical Officer and Naturalist. He has made valuable scientific collections, and materially contributed towards the good feeling established with the Tibetans at Lhasa by opening a dispensary, which, by the exercise of his tact and medical skill, became exceedingly popular.

Captain Ryder, R.E., joined the Mission in October, 1903. He is, I consider, a most valuable trans-frontier Survey Officer, for he combines great professional zeal with admirable tact in dealings with strange peoples. He was ably assisted by Captain Cowie, R.E.

Mr. Hayden, of the Geological Survey, also displayed the greatest zeal in pursuing his professional duties under the most trying climatic conditions, and invariably exercised that tact and discretion in dealing with the people which is not only so essential for the furtherance of scientific objects, but which is so helpful politically to the leader of a Mission.

It does not fall within my province to speak of the professional value of the work accomplished by the scientific members of the Mission. But I am anxious that the Government of India should know that their behaviour contributed largely to the success of the Mission when scientific zeal, not combined with tactful behaviour, might have led to direful results politically.

In conclusion, I would desire to take the opportunity of acknowledging the cordial assistance invariably rendered me by my Private Secretary, Mr. Vernon Magniac.

And though their duties were purely military, yet as they were in the initial stages directly connected with the Mission, I should not like to omit mention of the late Captain Bethune, 32nd Pioneers, who commanded the Mission Escort at Khamba Jong, and of Major Bretherton, D.S.O., Chief Supply and Transport Officer. Captain Bethune was an ideal officer to command the escort to a Mission. He never omitted a single military precaution, but was ever ready and eager to meet the enemy if hostilities broke out. He was deeply respected by his men and by all who came in contact with him. Major Bretherton made all arrangements for the advance of the Mission to Khamba Jong and its maintenance there. His energy was boundless, and he possessed just that amount of forcefulness tempered by a sufficiency of tact which was essential for the carrying out of his duties. The loss of these two brave and capable officers is one which the Government of India has real cause to regret.

Annexure.

Convention between Great Britain and Tibet.

Whereas doubts and difficulties have arisen as to the meaning and validity of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and the Trade Regulations of 1893, and as to the liabilities of the Tibetan Government under these agreements; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the relations of friendship and good understanding which have existed between the British Government and the Government of Tibet; and whereas it is desirable to restore peace and amicable relations, and to resolve and determine the doubts and difficulties as aforesaid, the said Governments have resolved to conclude a Convention with these objects, and the following articles have been agreed upon by Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., in virtue of full powers vested in him by His Britannic Majesty's Government and on behalf of that said Government, and Lo-Sang Gyal-Tsen, the Ga-den Ti-Rimpoche, and the representatives of the Council, of the three monasteries Se-ra, Dre-pung, and Ga-den, and of the ecclesiastical and lay officials of the National Assembly on behalf of the Government of Tibet.

I.

The Government of Tibet engages to respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and to recognise the frontier between Sikkim and Tibet, as defined in Article I of the said Convention, and to erect boundary pillars accordingly.

II.

The Tibetan Government undertakes to open forthwith trade marts to which all British and Tibetan subjects shall have free right of access at Gyangtse and Gartok, as well as at Yatung.

The Regulations applicable to the trade mart at Yatung, under the Anglo-Chinese Agreement of 1893, shall, subject to such amendments as may hereafter be agreed upon by common consent between the British and Tibetan Governments, apply to the marts above mentioned.

In addition to establishing trade marts at the places mentioned, the Tibetan Government undertakes to place no restrictions on the trade by existing routes, and to consider the question of establishing fresh trade marts under similar conditions if development of trade requires it.

III.

The question of the amendment of the Regulations of 1893 is reserved for separate consideration, and the Tibetan Government undertakes to appoint fully authorised delegates to negotiate with representatives of the British Government as to the details of the amendments required.

IV.

The Tibetan Government undertakes to levy no dues of any kind other than those provided for in the tariff to be mutually agreed upon.

V.

The Tibetan Government undertakes to keep the roads to Gyangtse and Gartok from the frontier clear of all obstruction and in a state of repair suited to the needs of the trade, and to establish at Yatung, Gyangtse, and Gartok, and at each of the other trade marts that may hereafter be established, a Tibetan Agent who shall receive from the British Agent appointed to watch over British trade at the marts in question any letter which the latter may desire to send to the Tibetan or to the Chinese authorities. The Tibetan Agent shall also be responsible for the due delivery of such communications and for the transmission of replies.

VI.

As an indemnity to the British Government for the expense incurred in the despatch of armed troops to Lhasa, to exact reparation for breaches of treaty obligations, and for the insults offered to and attacks upon the British Commissioner and his following and escort, the Tibetan Government engages to pay a sum of pounds five hundred thousand—equivalent to rupees seventy-five lakhs—to the British Government.

The indemnity shall be payable at such place as the British Government may from time to time, after due notice, indicate, whether in Tibet or in the British districts of Darjeeling or Jalpaiguri, in seventy-five annual instalments of rupees one lakh each on the 1st January in each year, beginning from the 1st January, 1906.

VII.

As security for the payment of the above-mentioned indemnity, and for the fulfilment of the provisions relative to trade marts specified in Articles II, III, IV, and V, the British Government shall continue to occupy the Chumbi valley until the indemnity has been paid and until the trade marts have been effectively opened for three years, whichever date may be the later.

VIII.

The Tibetan Government agrees to raze all forts and fortifications and remove all armaments which might impede the course of free communication between the British frontier and the towns of Gyangtse and Lhasa.

IX.

The Government of Tibet engages that, without the previous consent of the British Government,—

(*a*) no portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation, to any Foreign Power;

(*b*) no such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Tibetan affairs ;

(*c*) no Representatives or Agents of any Foreign Power shall be admitted to Tibet ;

(*d*) no concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights, shall be granted to any Foreign Power, or the subject of any Foreign Power. In the event of consent to such concessions being granted, similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British Government ;

(*e*) no Tibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any Foreign Power, or the subject of any Foreign Power.

X.

In witness whereof the negotiators have signed the same, and affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done in quintuplicate at Lhasa, this 7th day of September in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and four, corresponding with the Tibetan date, the 27th day of the seventh month of the Wood Dragon year.

Tibet Frontier
Commission.

Seal of
British
Commissioner.

(Signed) F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND,
Colonel,
British Commissioner.

Seal of the Dalai Lama
affixed by the Ga-den
Ti-Rimpoche.

Seal of
Council.

Seal of the
Dre-pung Monastery.

Seal of
Sera Monastery.

Seal of
Ga-den Monastery.

Seal of
National
Assembly.

In proceeding to the signature of the Convention, dated this day, the representatives of Great Britain and Tibet declare that the English text shall be binding.

Tibet Frontier
Commission.

Seal of
British
Commissioner.

(Signed) F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND,
Colonel,
British Commissioner.

Seal of Dalai Lama,
affixed by the Ga-den
Ti-Rimpoche.

Seal of
Council.

Seal of
Dre-pung Monastery.

Seal of
Sera Monastery

Seal of
Ga-den Monastery.

Seal of
National
Assembly.

(Signed) AMPTHILL,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

This Convention was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council at Simla on the eleventh day of November, A.D., one thousand nine hundred and four.

(Signed) S. M. FRASER,
Secretary to the Government of India.
Foreign Department

Enclosure 2 in No. 194.

Declaration signed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and appended to the ratified Convention of 7th September, **1904.**

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, having ratified the Convention which was concluded at Lhasa on 7th September, 1904, by Colonel Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, on behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government; and by Lo-Sang Gyal-Tsen, the Ga-den Ti-Rimpoche, and the representatives of the Council, of the three monasteries Sera, Drepung and Ga-den, and of the ecclesiastical and lay officials of the National Assembly, on behalf of the Government of Tibet, is pleased to direct as an act of grace that the sum of money which the Tibetan Government have bound themselves under the terms of Article VI. of the said Convention to pay to His Majesty's Government as an indemnity for the expenses incurred by the latter in connection with the despatch of armed forces to Lhasa, be reduced from Rs. 75,00,000 to Rs. 25,00,000; and to declare that the British occupation of the Chumbi Valley shall cease after the due payment of three annual instalments of the said indemnity as fixed by the said Article, provided, however, that the trade marts as stipulated in Article II. of the Convention shall have been effectively opened for three years as provided in Article VI. of the Convention; and that, in the meantime, the Tibetans shall have faithfully complied with the terms of the said Convention in all other respects.

AMPTHILL,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

This declaration was signed by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council at Simla on the eleventh day of November, A.D. one thousand nine hundred and four.

S. M. FRASER,
Secretary to the Government of India,
Foreign Department.

Enclosure 3 in No. 194.

Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to Lo-Sang Gyal-Tsen, the Gaden Ti-Rimpochi, Lhasa, dated Simla, the 15*th November,* 1904.

I HAVE the honour, by direction of the Government of India, to inform you that His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General has been pleased to ratify the Convention which was concluded on 7th September, 1904, by the Representatives of His Britannic Majesty's Government and of the Tibetan Government, respectively.

2. It is with much pleasure that I also forward a declaration, signed by His Excellency the Viceroy and appended to the English version of the ratified Convention, as well as a Tibetan translation of the same, from which you will perceive that His Excellency has been pleased to direct, as an act of grace, that the indemnity due from the Tibetan Government, under the terms of Article VI. of the said Convention, shall be reduced from Rs. 75,00,000 to Rs. 25,00,000; and to declare that the British occupation of the Chumbi Valley shall cease after the due payment of three annual instalments of the said indemnity, provided that the trade marts as stipulated in Article II. of the Convention shall have been effectively

opened for three years as provided in Article VI. of the Convention; and that, in the meantime, the Tibetans shall have faithfully complied with the terms of the said Convention in all other respects.

I am at the same time to point out to the Tibetan Government that the gracious consideration shown by the Government of India in spontaneously reducing the amount of the compensation due from Tibet to so moderate an amount as Rs. 25,00,000, and in consenting to restore the Chumbi Valley on such easy conditions as those described above, is largely due to the friendly and correct attitude that the Tibetan Government have adopted towards British interests since the signature of the Convention. In making this free concession the Government of India is animated by the hope that the Tibetan Government will recognise the magnanimity of the British Government and their sincere desire that the most friendly relations shall always prevail between the two contiguous countries of India and Tibet, whose interests are really identical. You will remember that this was the aim that Colonel Younghusband, the British Commissioner who negotiated and signed the Convention on behalf of the British Government, had steadily in view, and His Excellency is glad to see that the Tibetans are evincing a real appreciation of his friendly and sympathetic treatment of them and an active desire to carry out the provisions of the Convention.

I am to take this opportunity of referring you to the declaration signed by the British Commissioner and the Tibetan Representatives in September last, by which the British Agent, who is to be stationed at Gyangtse, is accorded by the Government of Tibet the right, under certain circumstances, to visit Lhasa, and of informing you that the Viceroy, while fully appreciating the good-feeling shown by the Tibetan Government in giving such an undertaking, considers it unnecessary to embody its provisions in a formal instrument.

PART II.

Correspondence received from the Government of India.

Enclosures to Letter from the Government of India, dated 30th June, 1904. (No. 97.)

Enclosure No. 1.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 21st March, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Forty-one ekkas arrived here to-day from Gantok and leave to-morrow for Phari. Regret to report accident blasting road between Richingong and Yatung, in which three men were killed and one native officer and two men severely injured, all 23rd Pioneers.

Enclosure No. 2.

Letter from the Under-Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated the 21st March, 1904.

I am directed to forward, for transmission to His Excellency Yu Tai, the Chinese Resident in Tibet, a letter from His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General; a copy of which is enclosed for your information.

Annexure.

Letter from His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to His Excellency Yu Tai, Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhasa, charged with the administration of Tibetan Affairs, Lieutenant-General of the Manchu Brigade, dated Fort William, the 15th March, 1904.

I have received Your Excellency's letter, dated the 12th February, 1904, announcing your appointment as Resident in Tibet, and that you assumed charge of your duties on the 11th February, 1904.

I congratulate Your Excellency on your appointment.

Enclosure No. 3.

From General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 23rd March 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Eighty-seven ekkas have left here for Phari and 150 more follow during next few days. Half the pack transport left for Phari to-day. Remainder, with head-quarters, guns, 2nd Madras Infantry, and balance of column, leave to-morrow. Over six hundred yaks have been collected locally at Phari. Telegraph extension commenced, and should reach Tang La to-day. The Subedar and two men injured in road accident on 21st are doing well: the Subedar was only injured slightly. Commenced snowing about 4 p.m., and still continuing at 4.30 p.m.

Enclosure No. 4.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated Thuna, the 23rd March, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

I am informed by Captain Parr that the new Amban is making a great effort to bring the Dalai Lama to reason. In a letter written by Captain Parr to the Amban, warning him that the situation is extremely serious, the latter has been urged to use every possible coercive measure with the Dalai Lama, and Captain Parr believes there is a chance of his succeeding; he has therefore requested me to defer for ten days our advance from here. In reply to this request I have agreed not to advance for ten days from the 19th March, which is the date of his letter; and I added that I should be glad if he would renew his efforts for a peaceful settlement, as Government were anxious to avoid the necessity of fighting, though we should certainly do so, if opposed. I am regaining hope that we may get the Mission to Gyangtse without fighting, as our own accounts also show that the new Amban is stronger than his predecessor.

Enclosure No. 5.

Political Diary of the Tibet Frontier Commission.

(Extract.)

7th March, 1904.—Minimum temperature plus 14°. Cold, windy day.

Lieutenant-Colonel Hogge, Commanding 23rd Pioneers, returned to-day from leave in Chumbi.

8th March.—Minimum temperature plus 8°. Bright, warm morning.

An informant from the Tibetan Camp states that the Tibetans have sent out detachments of 100 or 200 men each to the villages of Lhe-gu and Hram, to the south-east of Thuna, and to the nulla at the back of the range of hills to our north, the object being partly to watch us and partly with the idea of operating in our rear if we advance. He also says that orders have been received from Lhasa that we are not to be attacked as long as we remain here, but that any advance will certainly be opposed.

Messengers arrived bringing a letter from the Timpuk Jongpen at Phari to say that he regretted he could not have the pleasure of again meeting the British Commissioner, and with other polite messages.

9th March.—Minimum temperature plus 9·5°. Heavy hoar-frost. Clouds on surrounding hills. A small reconnoitring party went out to try and locate the Tibetans said to be camped amongst the hills to our north, but failed to do so.

10th March.—Minimum temperature plus 5·8°. A cold morning with breeze from north-west.

Mr. Lewis, a young employé in the Post Office, whose feet were amputated some little time ago for frost-bite, died at 3 a.m. this morning. A reply and present was sent to the Timpuk Jongpen, and letters were forwarded at the same time by the British Commissioner, addressed to the Bhutan Dharma Raja and the Tongsa Penlop. A copy of Colonel Younghusband's speech to the Tibetan delegates at Khamba Jong was enclosed, with the Dharma Raja's letter.

11th March.—Minimum temperature minus 5°. Bright, still, warm morning.

The funeral of the late Mr. Lewis took place this morning, attended by the officers of the Mission and escort.

12th March.—Minimum temperature plus 6° (?). Fine morning, but cold wind from south-west. A convoy of some 600 animals, escorted by two companies under the command of Major Lye, 23rd Pioneers, arrived with supplies for the Thuna garrison up to the 10th April.

13th March.—Minimum temperature plus 3°. Fine morning; some light snow fell during the night on the hills by the Tong La, and heavy clouds hung over the Chumalhari ranges. The empty convoy returned to Phari.

The Khamba Jongpen is said to have been arrested and sent to Lhasa; it is not known on what charge.

Three of the latest pattern Lhasa-made cannons are said to have reached the camp at Guru.

The village of Guru, where a Tibetan force is encamped, lies between Dochen and Thuna. Messrs. Li and Chao intend to make Dochen their headquarters, but have had a house at Thuna prepared for them to use when they visit Colonel Younghusband.

The present Amban is also reported to have dismissed several Chinese officials in Tibet for incompetency.

From Chinese sources it is reported that the Tibetan officials have issued very stringent orders against the people selling grain, grass, milk,—in a word, anything—to the Mission. No Tibetan is allowed to pass beyond Guru, unless he has a sponsor ready to guarantee his conduct and his return within a fixed number of days.

F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND, Colonel,
British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters.

Camp Thuna, the 15th March, 1904.

Enclosure No. 6.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissoner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Camp Thuna, the 21st March, 1904.

I have the honour to state that, in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram, dated the 19th instant, I have sent to the Chinese Resident at Lhasa a despatch, of which I enclose a copy.

2. I inserted the first sentence as the Resident has given me no notice of his arrival or taken any notice whatever of my presence in Tibet.

Annexure.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to His Excellency Yu Tai, Imperial Chinese Resident at Lhasa, dated Camp Thuna, the 20th March, 1904.

His Excellency the Viceroy has informed me to-day of your safe arrival in Lhasa. This I am glad to hear, and I trust that Your Excellency is ready to settle all matters in dispute in accordance with the orders issued by the Wai Wu Pu in December 1902, and with your own statements to Mr. Townley, His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, in January 1903, when you said that you hoped to enlighten the Tibetans.

I am, therefore, now moving to Gyangtse to commence negotiations. I hope to meet Your Excellency there, and I trust that you will secure the attendance of fully empowered Tibetan representatives of suitable rank.

I would ask Your Excellency to warn the Tibetans that the consequences of resistance to the passage of my Mission will be very serious.

Enclosure No. 7.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated the 24th March, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Following movements to-day: Two companies 8th Gurkhas from near Kamparab to Phari head-quarters, and 4 companies 32nd and 2 companies 23rd with 4 Maxims to Kamparab Brigade head-quarters; 2 Guns Mountain Battery treasure, and Ammunition column to Gyangtse; 2nd M. F. 1½ sects field hospital, field park, and 90 ekka ponies and Supply column to Upper Lingmathang. Sixty-one more ekkas due to arrive Chumbi. March somewhat trying. Four inches snow last night.

Enclosure No. 8.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated Phari Jong, the 25th March, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Thuna, 25th March. Chinese Lieutenant, passing through here from Lhasa, says rather less than 1,000 Tibetans at Guru, about same number between Guru and Kala Tso, and same number at Kala Tso. None between Kala Tso and Gyangtse, and no unusual gathering at Gyangtse or between Gyangtse and Lhasa. Amban having great difficulty with Dalai Lama, but intends to come and meet me. Dalai Lama makes form of consulting new members of Council, who, of course, say what he wishes them to. Old members of Council still confined, and one has committed suicide in fear. Informant may have missed seeing or hearing of some Tibetan camps, but I do not think there is any great gathering between here and Gyangtse, and he says Tibetans could not put more than 10,000 real fighting men in the field altogether. Lhasa would probably keep many of these.

Enclosure No. 9.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Phari Jong, the 26th March, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Four companies 32nd Pioneers, two companies 23rd Pioneers, and four machine guns, and one and a-half companies 8th Gurkhas arrived Phari yesterday. Brigade head-quarters, two guns Mountain Battery, one and a-half sections field hospital, treasure, ammunition, and transport with 70 ekkas, complete with ponies, arrived Phari to-day. Telegraph should reach Thuna to-day. It is reported from Thuna that survey party, escorted by 20 men, were turned back by Tibetan 10 miles east of Thuna.

Enclosure No. 10.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Camp Thuna, the 13th March, 1904.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, copies of correspondence in regard to Bhutan. The Bhutan Envoy has now returned to Bhutan, and as a result of his mission we have obtained permission to construct a road into the Chumbi Valley avoiding the high snowy passes : we have initiated more intimate relations with the Bhutanese, we have actually obtained assistance in the way of supplies from them and promises of more. While we have secured the assistance of the Bhutanese in these two matters of the construction of the road and the furnishing of supplies and any small amount of transport there may be, we can count on their good offices in our present dealings with Tibet. The Envoy, while a guest of the Mission, received the Lhasa delegates in a Mission tent and did his best to pave the way to a settlement between us and the Tibetans. The Tongsa Penlop is most anxious to make a similar effort as soon as somebody with more authority than the delegates at Guru will arrive to negotiate. I have invited the Tongsa Penlop to visit me. It has been the policy of the Government of India to enlist the sympathies of the States on their side of the Himalayas in our favour in our present negotiations. This has now been accomplished in the case of both Nepal and Bhutan, and whether the presence of the principal men in Bhutan in my camp has much effect on the Lhasa Government or not, it ought at any rate to impress the border people. In any case I hope to be able to increase the intimacy of our relations with Bhutan and lay a solid foundation for our future intercourse.

Annexure 1.

Letter from E. H. C. Walsh, Esq., I.C.S., Assistant to the British Commissioner, Tibet Frontier Matters, to Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner, Tibet Frontier Matters, dated Camp Phari Fort, the 6th March, 1904.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to forward, for your information, the results of the interview which the Timpuk Jongpen had with me this morning. The interview lasted an hour and a half, and took place, as on the previous interviews, in a tent which I had pitched for the purpose on the plain. A guard of honour of half a company of the 8th Gurkhas was in attendance, as on the former occasion, and saluted the Timpuk Jongpen on his arrival and departure. The Timpuk Jongpen presented me with the articles noted in the list annexed, and I in return presented him with the mounted infantry saddle and the bandolier which he had asked for, and for which he requested me to thank you. He then presented me with the Permit sealed with the official seal of the Dharma Raja permitting the survey and construction of a road either by the Di-chhu or the Ammo-chhu river and the taking up of the necessary land for the road and for such rest-houses as may be required along it. I informed him that the Survey Officer will start on the work of survey of the route from the Di-chhu river at once and will be accompanied by Mr. Bell, the Deputy Commissioner of Jalpaiguri, and asked if he could depute a Bhutanese official to meet them and accompany them. He said this would not be necessary, as the Permit gave them full authority, which everyone would respect. He then said that he had received a letter from the Tongsa Penlop, who was still anxious to come to see you as soon as he was well enough, as he had been invited to do ; and also wished to negotiate between the English and Tibetans, but was not aware whether he was still wanted to come now that the Timpuk Jongpen had been deputed in his place. I said I was sure you would be very pleased to see the Tongsa Penlop as soon as he was well enough to come. He said that, in that case, Tongsa Penlop would like to have another letter expressing a wish to see him and inviting him to come, as otherwise he would not know that his visit was now desired. He ended by hoping that after the present dispute with Tibet had been satisfactorily settled and in the summer when the weather was warmer, he should have the pleasure of seeing me at Timpuk (Ta-shi su-don).

Annexure 2.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., to the Dharm Raja, dated Thuna, the 9th March, 1904.

It has given me very great pleasure to make the acquaintance of the Timpuk Jongpen and I write to assure you that though he has been unable to make the Tibetan delegates listen to reason, a thing which I have myself been unable to do in eight months, yet he has succeeded in largely increasing the friendly feeling which the British Government entertain towards your country : and also in allaying certain suspicion of hostility on the part of Bhutan towards us which had been caused by certain wide-spread rumours.

I have explained fully to the Timpuk Jongpen the cause of our entry to Tibet. But in order that you may understand our position more clearly, I enclose you the copy of a speech I made to the Tibetans at Khamba Jong eight months ago. I am most anxious to effect a settlement for my Government by peaceful means, and during all this time have restrained the soldiers from fighting. But as the Tibetans have not yet sent any one with authority to negotiate a settlement, I shall have very shortly to advance still further into Tibet, and of course the more trouble they give to the British Government the more strict will have to be the settlement we make with them. I can assure you, however, that I will see that every respect is paid to the Buddhist religion. The holy books in the Phari Fort are being carefully protected from harm and the monasteries in the Chumbi Valley are fully respected. So it will be always.

I shall be very glad if you will write to me from time to time of your welfare and let me know if there is any way in which I can be of help to you.

Annexure 3.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., to Tongsa Penlop, dated Thuna, the 9th March, 1904.

It was a cause of much regret to me that you were unable, owing to ill-health, to come and meet me. I trust, however, that if you are now recovered you will pay me a visit here at an early date, and it will give me much pleasure to make your acquaintance. I fear you will be unable to induce the Tibetan delegates to effect a settlement with us, for they have no power in their hands. I shall be glad, however, to have an opportunity of talking the matter over with you as I am told that you are a friend of the British Government.

Please let me know when I shall have the pleasure of seeing you.

Enclosure No. 11.

Political Diary of the Tibet Frontier Commission.

(Extract.)

16th March, 1904.—Minimum temperature plus 3°. Bright, warm morning.

A small reconnoitring party of mounted infantry under Lieutenant Bailey, 32nd Pioneers, proceeded as far as Guru Camp, where no change could be observed. The soldiers as usual ran out towards the party, which rode quietly away.

20th March, 1904.—Minimum temperature plus 14°. Bright, clear morning. Breeze from north-west. A telegram was received from Foreign authorising the proposed movement. Messrs. Li and Chao arrived at Dochen on the evening of the 15th, but returned to Gyangtse the next morning. It is stated that they received orders from the Amban to return, and it seems probable that the latter was highly displeased at their delay in leaving Gyangtse and then only making for Dochen, which is about 10 miles from Thuna. A report is now to hand that Messrs. Li and Chao have been replaced by Captain Ma, who is said to be on his way to Thuna.

F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND,
British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters.

Thuna, the 21st March, 1904.

Enclosure No. 12.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Phari Jong, the 28th March, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp two miles south of Tang La, 28th March. Arrived here to-day in fine weather. Seven miles' march from Phari, with 3 guns, 4 companies 32nd; 3½ companies 8th Gurkhas, 1½ sections field hospital; Engineer field park; Rs. 60,000 treasure, ammunition column, with pack mule transport, 611 yaks, and 70 ekkas.

Enclosure No. 13.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated Thuna, the 28th March, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Reconnaissance made to-day towards Guru found new observation posts in sangars two miles this side. A number of unarmed Tibetans came out from them, and asked party not to go to Guru. They were perfectly civil. Party subsequently by a detour reached Guru, and found half the camp had left and three large stocks of stores had disappeared. Whether they have retired or gone to flank is uncertain.

Enclosure No. 14.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated Thuna, the 28th March, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Small Chinese official passed here this evening, having left Lhasa on 25th. He says Amban is using utmost pressure on Dalai Lama, who says he is willing to negotiate and send proper representatives if we will go back to frontier; but that, if we do not go, the consequences will be very serious. Wilton asked official if by this was meant fighting, and he replied that the word fighting had not been used. He said there were any number of Tibetans between here and Gyangtse, but on being asked if there were ten thousand, he said there were nothing like that number.

Enclosure No. 15.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Thuna, the 29th March, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Arrived Thuna with the force as detailed yesterday. The 620 yaks and 70 ekkas did well. The whole of transport return to Phari to-morrow for more supplies. I reconnoitred towards Guru this afternoon, and find Tibetans sangaring road six miles from here. The Mission also informs me they are believed to be in some force with guns between Dochen and Kalatso.

Enclosure No. 16.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated Thuna, the 31st March, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

About 200 Tibetans collected in camp, refusing to retire, were surrounded by our troops who advanced to disarm them. While disarming them, commenced a melée which ended in nearly 100 Tibetans killed. Our casualties very slight, but Candler, "Daily Mail" correspondent, severely wounded. Tibetans were given every possible chance before fighting commenced.

Enclosure No. 17.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated Thuna, the 31st March, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Advance was made to-day by our force towards Guru. I was met by Lhasa General, who asked us to retire to Yatung for negotiations. My reply was that for 15 years we had tried to make a settlement at Yatung, and I had waited in Tibet for eight months. I said that the Amban had lately been informed by me that Mission was going to advance to Gyangtse, and that I was going to-day to Guru. General Macdonald would have to clear a passage for Mission if they opposed us. Thereupon Lhasa General retired and force advanced. I asked General Macdonald to issue orders that, unless Tibetans fired, our troops were not to fire. The advance to Guru is now being continued.

Enclosure No. 18.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated Thuna, the 31st March, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Some resistance was offered at Guru, but we have occupied the village, and will establish there an advance supply depôt, the force returning here in the evening. Our casualties consisted of only a few wounded, of whom only Candler, the correspondent of the "Daily Mail," is severely hurt; we have none killed. The losses of the Tibetans amount to 300 or more killed, and many wounded and prisoners. Amongst the killed are the Lhasa General and another General. The scene of the fighting was a post, which had been recently constructed by them actually on the road; they were surrounded to such a degree that our men were pointing their rifles into the camp over the walls. No violence was used by our men, who showed very great self-restraint; O'Connor told the Lhasa General that, if his men would surrender their arms, they would be permitted to retire. This, however, had no effect, and General Macdonald then ordered our men to begin disarming the Tibetans, who resisted and attacked our troops with swords and with firing. We then returned the fire. This result was wholly caused by the complete inability of the Tibetans, even when our troops absolutely surrounded them, to take in the seriousness of the situation.

Enclosure No. 19.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Thuna, the 31st March, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

I moved to Guru this morning to establish a supply depôt at that place, taking the following force with me:—Two guns, No. 7 Mountain Battery; two 7-pounders, 8th Gurkhas; one-and-a-half companies, Mounted Infantry; three companies, 23rd Pioneers; four companies, 32nd Pioneers; two companies, 8th Gurkhas; machine guns, Norfolks, and section field hospital. We moved out of Thuna at 8 a.m., the ground being covered with snow, about two inches of which fell last night. Colonel Younghusband accompanied me. When we had moved about four miles across the plain, we were met by a deputation of Tibetan leaders who demanded our retiring to Yatung, and threatened trouble if we advanced. Colonel Younghusband replied that we would proceed to Guru, and asked if they were prepared to oppose us, to which no definite answer was given. Colonel Younghusband accordingly asked me to refrain from firing till fired at. A large number of armed Tibetans, estimated at about 2,000, were observed on a hill putting out into the plain, some four miles short of Guru, where they occupied sangars and a high wall commanding the road. I advanced in attack formation, shouldering the Tibetans off the hill and outflanking them on the plains without firing, the troops exercising the greatest restraint. The result was that 1,500 Tibetan troops collected behind the high wall blocking the road and refused to budge. They were informed that they would have to lay down their arms, and an attempt was accordingly made to disarm them, a portion of the reserve being moved up for the purpose. The Lhasa leaders then incited an attack upon us, the Lhasa Depon firing the first shot and the Tibetans firing point blank and charging with swords. They were, however, so hemmed in that they could not make use of their numbers, and after a few minutes were in full retreat under a heavy fire of guns, maxims, and rifles, which caused them heavy loss. The 2nd Mounted Infantry were despatched in pursuit, and the balance of the troops, re-forming, pushed on to Guru. The two eastern Guru villages were evacuated, but the western one was held, and after being shelled was taken by the 2nd Mounted Infantry and Gurkhas, the garrison surrendering. This ended the engagement, except that the 1st Mounted Infantry continued the pursuit for some miles further. Our casualties are—Major Wallace Dunlop slightly wounded; Mr. Candler, "Daily Mail" correspondent, severely wounded, and seven sepoys wounded. The enemy's loss is nearly 500 killed and wounded, and 200 prisoners; all their camp and baggage, about 60 yaks and 30 mules, with two jingals and a large number of matchlocks and swords, together with a few breech-loaders, two of which were of Russian make. Amongst the Tibetans killed was the chief Lhasa Depon and the Lama representative of the Gaden Monastery; also one Shigatse Depon; whilst the Phari Depon was captured severely wounded. Two companies, 32nd Pioneers and the 2nd Mounted Infantry are established at Guru as an advanced post, the remaining troops returning to Thuna by 7 p.m. after a long and trying day, having marched 21 miles and fought two engagements. Fuller details follow. Writing report. All Tibetans wounded have been brought in and are being attended to.

Enclosure No. 20.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Thuna, the 1st April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Reference my telegram 31st March. The following is amended list of casualties :—Major Wallace Dunlop severely wounded, lost two fingers of left hand. Mr. Candler dangerously wounded, left hand amputated, besides other serious sword cuts. Two sepoys severely wounded, and eight slightly wounded. All quiet to-day. Convoy despatched to Guru and one company sent to bury dead and assist wounded.

Enclosure No. 21.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Thuna, the 1st April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

It appears from reports of officers who first approached Tibetan post on road that Tibetans were just commencing to stream away when Lhasa General rode through them and made them remain. Troops in clearing sangars on hillside simply made Tibetans move on, but allowed them to retreat without firing. It was when a report was brought to General Macdonald that Tibetans in the post which actually blocks the thoroughfare were refusing to retreat, though surrounded at point blank range, that Macdonald and I agreed they must be disarmed. Lhasa general himself tried to prevent disarmament and shot sepoy with his revolver. This is believed to be the first shot. The Lama representative of the Gaden Monastery was among the killed. He was the most insolent of three Lamas I saw at Guru in January, and a thorough-going obstructionist. I trust the tremendous punishment they have received will prevent further fighting and induce them at last to negotiate. The ordinary soldiers were before this only half-hearted, and I doubt if Lhasa authorities will be able to induce them to face us again. We shall advance from here in two or three days.

Enclosure No. 22.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Thuna, the 3rd April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

From reconnaissance made yesterday by mounted infantry to the east side of Bamtso lake to village of Hram, it appears that another Tibetan Force 2,000 strong was posted at that place, blocking the road in that direction, and had made extensive sangars and walls there. This force has retired hastily to Kala Tso on hearing of defeat of force at Guru. There appears to be no Tibetan force this side of Kala Tso, and report says they have all fled to Gyangtse. Column moves to-morrow to Guru with Mission. Telegraph reached Guru yesterday evening. Wounded all doing well.

Enclosure No. 23.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Thuna, the 3rd April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

I have received despatch from Amban in reply to mine. He says he was most anxious to come and meet me on his first arrival, but Dalai Lama refused him transport. He now intends to come and meet me as soon as possible. In view of Tibetan obstinacy he says there is no help for it, but I must go to Gyangtse, though Dalai Lama has written to him that I should go back to Yatung. I have written to Amban, giving him short account of fight, saying I shall be in Gyangtse in another week's time, and hope to meet him with high Tibetan official there to make a settlement, and prevent further bloodshed.

Enclosure No. 24.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Guru, the 4th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Ma, a delegate from Amban in place of Ho, Chao, and Li, arrived here from Lhasa with request that we should return to Yatung. He says he saw 200 Tibetan troops between here and Gyangtse.

Enclosure No. 25.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Guru, the 4th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Moved forward this morning, 4th April, to Guru east, 9½ miles, with Mission, 4 guns, 4 maxims, 2 companies Mounted Infantry, 3 companies 23rd, 4 companies 32nd Pioneers, 3 and-a-half companies 8th Gurkhas, Engineers, Field park, field hospital, treasure, &c., and camped on plain about 3 miles west of Lake Bamtso. Reconnoitred yesterday with Mounted Infantry, 16 miles to Kala Tso. Tibetans reported to have fled to Gyangtse. The Chinese General Ma arrived in camp this afternoon with message from Amban, requesting us to retire, and reports Tibetans at Lhasa are gathering all the men they can from far and wide to oppose us. He reports Gyangtse quiet with no collection of men there, but had not heard of engagment when he left. Wire arrived here yesterday, and should reach Chalu where we march, 12 miles, to-morrow.

Enclosure No. 26.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Chalu, the 6th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Kala Tso, 6th April.—No signs of serious opposition between here and Gyangtse. Several villages about here, inhabitants all friendly, and considerable quantities of fodder being brought in by them on payment. It is impossible to say whether or no Lhasa monks will continue obstructive, but they will certainly have great difficulty in raising a force to maintain their obstruction.

Enclosure No. 27.

From General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chalu, the 6th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Kalasanga, 6th April.—Moved to Chalu, 2½ miles on 5th, marching along Bamtso lake, most of way. Chalu situated at outlet of Bamtso lake, which is 15 miles by 9 large, and frozen. Snowstorms yesterday afternoon, and about half-an-inch during night. Road from Chalu to Kalasanga, about 5 miles long, follows right bank of stream joining Bamtso with Kala Tso lakes, running through a narrow valley with hills on each side. As this road is impossible for ekkas at present, I have established a post of one company 23rd Pioneers, and eight Mounted Infantry with signallers at Chalu. The ekkas which have worked well up to Chalu are now returning to Phari for more supplies. Marched to-day with column to Kalasanga on shores of lake Kala Tso, 5 miles. A few small villages here, some forage obtainable. Tibetans 1,000 strong, reported to be holding a position at Samoda, 6 miles north of Salu. March to Salu, 11 miles, to-morrow. Telegraph cable reached Chalu yesterday evening, but the wire between Thuna and Guru was reported to have been interrupted. During my absence Lieutenant-Colonel Hogge, 23rd Pioneers, will command communications up to Kala Tso. Stormy weather with snow squalls renders helio communication difficult. Country beyond Salu appears mountainous.

Enclosure No. 28.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Chalu, the 6th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Villagers, including even women, are returning to their homes, and are selling us fodder.

Enclosure No. 29.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Chalu, the 6th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa Major in hospital here says Tibetans had orders not to fire, but were told that, if they retreated or if they did not stop us, they would have their throats cut. This is probably a correct account.

Enclosure No. 30.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Chalu, the 6th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

There will be no communication beyond this for about two weeks. If any very important communication has to be made to me, please telegraph to Officer Commanding, Chalu, to send it on by mounted infantry.

Enclosure No. 31.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Chalu, the 7th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Kala Tso, 7th April.—Amban's delegate, Ma, sent back message from Salu, saying property of Generals and Lama killed at Guru has been confiscated by

Lhasa Government, because of their failure to stop us. He says about 1,000 Tibetans collected 13 miles beyond here, and reinforcements hastening up, but he does not know if their intention to fight is serious.

Enclosure No. 32.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chalu, the 7th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Kalapangi, 6th April.—Second mounted infantry reconnoitring to-day 13 miles beyond this came on Tibetans at a place called Samunda, where they had a wall and two block-houses occupied by 200 or 300 men armed with Lhasa-made Martinis. They opened fire on mounted infantry at 200 or 300 yards, which was returned, mounted infantry retiring slowly; no casualties on our side.

Enclosure No. 33.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chalu, the 8th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp Salu, 5th April.—Marched here yesterday 11½ miles; found enemy had retreated from Samunda, two miles north of this Camp, after encounter with mounted infantry yesterday, leaving six dead behind and three more wounded. They are reported to have retired to a position some six or eight miles north of Kangma where there is a narrow gorge on road leading to Gyangtse. March this morning to Kangma 13 miles along a valley about 1,000 yards wide with stream running towards Bramaputra. No outlet from Kala Tso. Am sending back about 300 yaks from here.

Enclosure No. 34.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Thuna, the 1st April, 1904.

In amplification of my telegrams of yesterday, I have the honour to make the following report on the events which led up to the occupation of Guru :—

2. General Macdonald was anxious to establish an advance supply depôt at Guru to facilitate the movement to Gyangtse. He, therefore, moved out yesterday with the greater part of his force. On the previous day he had sent a party to clear a village on the flank. This had been effected without the necessity for firing, and Captain O'Connor had told the Tibetan soldiers to warn their Generals that we were about to advance. Yesterday morning I accompanied General Macdonald and his force, and just as we left camp, a messenger arrived from the Lhasa General (the Lheding Depon, as he is called), asking me to return to Yatung where representatives would be sent to treat with me.

3. I told the messenger to gallop back at once and tell the Lhasa General that I was on my way to Gyangtse and was going as far as Guru that day; that we did not want to fight and would not unless we were opposed, but that the road must be left clear for us, and the Tibetans must withdraw from their positions on it.

4. We continued to advance across a wide perfectly open plain towards the position on which the Tibetans had during the last week erected sangars. At three miles from the position two Lhasa Majors met us saying the Lhasa General was coming out to meet me and asking us to stop. I replied that we would stop at a thousand yards from their position, and I would there meet the General.

5. Here between the two forces I met the Lhasa General and repeated to him what I had told his messenger. I said that we had repeatedly warned them that we were going to advance, and I had recently written to the Amban saying I was about to move to Gyangtse where I hoped to meet him with a proper Tibetan delegate and commence negotiations. We had no wish to fight and would not if they did not oppose us; but he must remove his soldiers from the road, or General Macdonald would have to clear the way by force.

6. The Lhasa General said that, if we had peaceable intentions, we should go back to Yatung where negotiations could take place. I repeated what I have so many times said before that for years we had tried to make a settlement with them on the frontier; our Political Officers had met Ambans and Tibetan officers there, but without result; I had myself already waited eight months for someone to negotiate with, and now there was nothing else to be done, but carry out my orders and advance to Gyangtse. He said that if I went on matters would be very serious. I replied that serious or not the troops were now about to advance.

7. I then rose and with General Macdonald, who had been present at the conference, rode back to the line of troops behind us. I was still most anxious to avoid a conflict, and asked General Macdonald while advancing the troops to order them not to fire until the Tibetans fired. My idea was just to make the Tibetans "move on" like a body of London Police does a mob in Trafalgar Square.

8. An interval was given to let the Lhasa General return and issue orders; and General Macdonald made his dispositions. The advance then began. The troops moved up the hillsides towards the sangars; and also round the flank of the post erected within the last week on the road in the plain at the foot of the hills. The Tibetans showed great indecision; first, rushing to occupy a sangar, then running out of it again. But slowly our troops crept up in front and round the flanks, and eventually shouldered them out of the sangars, allowing them to retreat without a shot being fired on either side.

9. At this point the two Lhasa Majors rode out again to me, and said that the Tibetans had been ordered not to fire and asked us to stop advancing. I said we must continue the advance and could not allow any Tibetan troops to remain on the road. The Tibetans were now streaming away from every point, and it looked as if no active resistance was going to be offered us. But those Tibetans who had begun to leave the post on the road in the plain under the hill were made to return by the Lhasa General; and an officer reported to General Macdonald that, though completely surrounded by our troops, they refused to retreat. They were not fighting, but they would not leave the wall they had built right across the road.

10. General Macdonald and I agreed that, in these circumstances, the only thing to do was to disarm them and let them go. We rode up together to the spot and found the Tibetans huddled together like a flock of sheep behind the wall; our infantry were in position on the hillside only twenty yards above them on one side; on the other side our maxims and guns were trained on them; our mounted infantry were in readiness in the plain a quarter of a mile away: our sepoys were actually lining the wall with their rifles pointing over at the Tibetans within a few feet of them; and the Lhasa General himself with his staff was outside the wall in among our sepoys.

11. It was an absurd position for him to have brought his men *back* nto. Still more childish was his conduct when he had got them there. I sent ptain O'Connor to announce to him that General Macdonald and I had ecided that his men must be disarmed; but he remained sullen and did

nothing ; and when, after a pause, the disarmament was actually commenced, he threw himself upon a sepoy, drew his revolver, and shot the sepoy in the jaw. Other shots were immediately fired by the Tibetans ; swordsmen made a rush out ; our troops, of course, then commenced firing, and over 200 were killed and many more wounded.

12. Among the killed was the Lhasa General himself—a man of amiable and polite manners for whom personally I felt considerable regard, though quite deficient in military knowledge or capacity and with his will-power atrophied by fear of the Lhasa authorities. He, perhaps, knew that it would be worse to go back than to remain where he was. Another was the Lama representative of the Gaden Monastery at Lhasa. For him I had no regard. He was the most insolent of the three Lamas I met at Guru in January, when at some risk I went to persuade them by all means in my power to desist from their foolish course. He was the moving spirit, an inveterate obstructionist, and no doubt the one to whom the blame chiefly attaches for the trouble the Tibetans fell into.

13. The troops moved on and after a resistance occupied Guru and reconnoitered for some distance ahead. More Tibetans were killed and wounded and captured, and of the whole force, which General Macdonald estimates at 2,000, few can have escaped.

14. It was an occurrence which I personally deeply regret and had laboured incessantly to avoid. It was entirely due to the ignorance and silly childishness of one set of Lhasa men and the stubborn unreasoning hostility of another set. It is all the more regrettable, because the poor peasant soldiers, upon whom the punishment chiefly fell, were in no way ill-disposed towards us. These were, however, as soon as the firing was over treated with the greatest consideration : the prisoners were released : the wounded were collected and cared for by our doctors : and to-day General Macdonald has sent out the whole medical staff to tend them. I trust these men will prevent others of their class from fighting for the clique of priests at Lhasa who are bringing such trouble on their country in their own purely selfish interests.

15. In conclusion, I would desire to bring most emphatically to the notice of Government the splendid discipline, temper, and moderation shown by the troops up to the time that they were compelled to commence firing. It must be remembered that all through this trying winter our troops have had to be ever on the guard against not an open, day-light advance such as General Macdonald made yesterday, but a stealthy attack at night when the thermometer was more frequently below than above zero : when their hands were numbed with cold : and the advantage of long range weapons would probably be of small avail. They have had night after night for months to stand this chance. And yet yesterday they were asked to put aside the advantage they had from long range fire and advance silently towards the sangars. I do not believe the troops of any other nation in the world would have carried out yesterday's operation with such perfect discipline and temper, and though General Macdonald will doubtless report his opinion also I feel that it is only right that I should here place on record my testimony to their behaviour and my appreciation of it.

Enclosure No. 35.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chalu, the 10th April, **1904.**

(Telegraphic.)

Camp Langma, two miles north of Kangma, 9th April.—When five miles south of Kangma yesterday, found Tibetans, 3,000 strong, had occupied a position across the valley, one mile south of Kangma, having built a wall across the valley and sangared hillsides. The position was reconnoitred with a view to attacking it to-day, and some shots were exchanged. Dispositions were made to attack position this morning, but when attack developed, Tibetans were found to have retreated during the night and are now occupying another position, five miles north of Changra, near a narrow defile, from whence they fired with jingalls and matchlocks at advance guard of mounted infantry. March to-morrow to Changra, attacking Tibetans *en route*. Tibetans said to number 3,000 and to be receiving reinforcements from Gyantgse.

Enclosure No. 36.

Political Diary of the Tibet Frontier Commission.

(Extract.)

22nd March, 1904.—Minimum temperature plus 12°, Bright morning. Breeze from west.

Captain Ryder and Mr. Hayden with an escort of 20 sepoys went out and camped near the foot of the Lingshi La leading into Bhutan, intending to ascend the pass the following morning.

23rd March, 1904.—Minimum temperature plus 13°. Fine, bright morning, southerly breeze. Captain Ryder helioed in from camp to say that 100 Tibetans had appeared at their camp early in the morning and had requested them very civilly not to proceed any further but to return to Thuna, which they had accordingly decided to do.

24th March, 1904.—Minimum temperature plus 10·5°. Bright, still morning. Slight haze on the southern horizon.

Captain Ryder and Mr. Hayden returned to Thuna about 5.30 p.m., there was a smart blizzard, bringing a sprinkling of snow and lasting about an hour.

25th March, 1904.—Minimum temperature plus 2°. A bright, still morning. Clear sky. Hills and plain white with light sprinkling of snow, nowhere exceeding half an inch in depth and averaging about a quarter of an inch.

26th March, 1904.—Minimum temperature plus 9°. A bright, clear morning, clouding over about 11 a.m. The telegraph posts for the line about to arrive were completed up to Thuna.

27th March, 1904.—Minimum temperature plus 10·8°. Haze all round horizon and bases of hills. Telegraph line completed to Thuna about noon. Two officers of the 23rd Pioneers from the hill over Thuna observed some 40 Tibetans building one observation post on the spur between Thuna and Guru, some four miles distant.

It is said that some 500 Lhasa regular soldiers are encamped at the spring about one and a-half miles this side of Guru, and a considerable body of the soldiers from Eastern Tibet are said to be encamped in the neighbourhood of Hram, on the far side of the Hram Tso; but this latter information may be regarded as doubtful. There are, however, some 200 soldiers known to be in the neighbourhood of Hram.

A Chinese official on his way from Lhasa to the Chumbi Valley called on Mr. Wilton on the 24th instant. He stated that he had accompanied Yu Tai from Chengtu to Lhasa, and that he had previously been in Tibet, as a lad, when his father was in the suite of the Amban Sheng. The road from Lhasa to Gyangtse, and thence on to Thuna, was good, he said, although in some places it ran between hills closing in on either side. The present time was remarkable for the complete absence of snow which, usually at this season, lay a foot or more deep at places along the route. Yak dung was practically the only fuel used at Lhasa, Gyangtse, and along the road. In the neighbourhood of Kangma, which lies about midway between Kala Tso and Gyangtse, a certain amount of scrub grew. He had not observed any unusual hostile gatherings of Tibetan soldiers between Lhasa, Gyangtse, and Kala Tso, but at this last place, where grass and grain were stowed in the village, there appeared to be about 1,000 Tibetan soldiers. A camp of another thousand men was established one and a-half miles north of Guru, and half-a-mile to the west of the road which appears here to run close to the western shores of Lake Bam. At this place a low wall has been built and a few pickets stationed on the hills adjacent, and it was generally reported that three native made cannon were posted behind the wall. At Guru there appeared to be rather less than a thousand men. A certain number of the Tibetans were reported to be armed with rifles made at Lhasa by natives of India. The cartridges were also of native manufacture and the gunpowder used was generally supposed to be of poor quality.

The Tibetan feeling at Lhasa appeared to be that the Tibetans had no present intention of attacking the British camp at Thuna, but proposed to await the conclusion of the Amban's visit there. Should no settlement be arrived at, or should the British refuse to retire or attempt to advance, the Tibetans would resist in force. The total number of available Tibetan fighting-men was estimated at 10,000.

The new Amban, who was to be allowed to return to China as soon as an arrangement had been come to with the British, had been endeavouring to persuade the Dalai Lama to come to some kind of settlement, but so far without success. The Dalai Lama was putting the Amban off continually by pretending to refer to the Kalons who, however, dared do nothing against the wishes of the Dalai Lama. Of the four ex-Kalons, three were still in prison and one had committed suicide by drowning himself.

The ex-Amban had left for China about February 12th, and about the 20th of the same month the present Amban had received Imperial orders to proceed to meet the British Commissioner. The Amban proposed to leave Lhasa for Thuna not later than April 15th.

The Chinese official concluded by expressing his intense dislike of the Tibetans, who were hopelessly stiff-necked and ignorant. His views on this point were perhaps embittered by his transport and riding animals having slipped back to Gyangtse during the previous night. It should also be remembered that the estimate given by him of the Tibetan forces on the road was probably a low one, as any encampments off the main road would have escaped his notice.

F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND, Lieut.-Col.,
British Commissisoner for Tibet Frontier Matters.

Camp Thuna, the 28th March, 1904.

Enclosure No. 37.

Letter from the Assistant Secretary to the Government of India in the Home Department to Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated Calcutta, the 12th April, 1904.

I am directed to forward a copy of a despatch from the Secretary of State, dated the 12th February last, transmitting a copy of a memorandum by the Librarian on the subject of the collections of the Tibetan books in the India Office Library in which it is represented that advantage should be taken of the present occasion to extend the collections.

2. The Government of India are in full sympathy with the proposal, and I am accordingly to request that, with the assistance of the Lieutenant-Colonel Waddell, I.M.S., and the other experts now under your orders, you will be good enough to cause enquiries to be made for valuable Tibetan books, block-prints, and manuscripts whenever suitable opportunities occur, and will arrange

for the purchase of as many as can be acquired. Each article should be reported on by one of the experts serving under you and despatched to the Imperial Library, Calcutta, to await the orders of the Government of India as to its disposal. For this purpose a sum of Rs. 10,000 is placed at your disposal.

Annexure 1.

Letter from the Secretary of State for India to the Government of India, dated 12th February, 1904.

I forward for the information of Your Excellency's Government, and for such action as may be deemed desirable, a memorandum by the Librarian on the collections of the Tibetan books in the India Office Library.

Annexure 2.

Memorandum by the Librarian, India Office.

(Extract.)

The Librarian ventures to represent for consideration the desirability, if it should be thought expedient and unobjectionable, of profiting by any opportunity that may arise, and in particular by the present occasion, for the extension of the collections of Tibetan books in the India Office Library. At a time when so great a mass of interests, intellectual and material, converges upon Central Asia it is no doubt superfluous to urge the general advantage of accumulating authentic records in a place where they may be accessible to European savants. But we may make known our actual deficiences and desiderata.

Enclosure No. 38.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Chalu, the 13th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 11th, by Chinese couriers. General Macdonald has brought Mission here without loss single man, Tibetans who opposed us highly demoralised. This valley covered with well-built hamlets, cultivation everywhere, and numerous trees, inhabitants mostly fled, but few who remain, say this is on account of heavy demands of their own Government. News just arrived Tibetans are fleeing from fort, two Tibetan Generals have left, and Chinese delegate Ma with Tibetan Jongpen have come in. Ma says Amban will come as soon as he can arrange with Dalai Lama, and that four Tibetan delegates of unknown position are on their way. Jongpen is in great fear, and will doubtless surrender fort to-morrow.

Enclosure No. 39.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chalu, the 13th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

April 11th, Camp, two miles outside Gyangtse. On the morning of 10th, I continued my advance to Gyangtse intending to march to Chengra as marked on the map, but which does not exist, and attack the enemy if met with. My advance guard reported the Tibetans in position at the entrance of a very narrow gorge about five miles from my last camp. The Tibetans were found very shortly posted on ridges and rocks commanding the entrance to the gorge and opened fire on my advanced guard with several jingalls. The position necessitated a long turning movement to the left, and an ascent of over two thousand feet, occupying about three hours. In the meantime, the enemy were shelled, and the jingalls immediately commanding the road silenced. When the heights on the left were crowned, a general advance took place, and after some sharp fighting in the gorge of Jamdan, the enemy were routed, fleeing in various directions, the mounted infantry pursuing for ten miles. The enemy left one hundred and ninety dead, and seventy prisoners were captured, besides many wounded. Our casualties were three wounded. The enemy stood their ground until close quarters were reached, and were estimated at two thousand, including the Shigatse and Gyangtse regular troops. I halted for night at a village called Seogang, four miles beyond end of gorge. Marched to Gyangtse to-day, about fourteen miles, and have camped two miles from the Jong. A Gyangtse Jongpen has visited me in camp, and desires peace. Have postponed further action regarding the Jong till to-morrow, as it is now late. Large numbers of Tibetan troops are reported to be in full flight towards Shigatse.

Enclosure No. 40.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Chalu, the 14th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 12th.—With surrender of the fort this morning, resistance in this part of Tibet is ended. Neither generals nor soldiers nor people have wished to fight. Demeanour of inhabitants is respectful. No scowling looks are seen ; they bring in supplies for sale, and their wish is not to fight us, but to escape being commandeered by Lhasa authorities. Attitude of monks here is, of course, submissive, but I cannot at present say anything regarding their real feelings. The local Chinese are naturally making the most of the situation for their own benefit. The Amban makes no sign of coming to meet me, and I am writing him an urgent letter expressing my surprise at not finding him here. Two Tibetan Members of Council, with two subordinates, are said to be on their way here, but I cannot vouch for the truth of this report. Lhasa authorities are quite silly enough to continue obstruction, but Government may consider Mission absolutely safe in a fertile valley full of supplies, and amidst a population certainly not actively hostile to us, and whom I will guarantee we will in three months' time have thoroughly well disposed. We already have released prisoners of war asking for employment.

Enclosure No. 41.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated the 14th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Viceroy desires to offer to you, to General Macdonald, and to all the officers and men of the Mission and escort, both civil and military, his warmest congratulations upon success of first part of your undertaking, and his grateful recognition of cheerfulness, self-restraint, and endurance exhibited by all ranks in circumstances unexampled in warfare, and calling for no ordinary patience and fortitude.

Enclosure No. 42.

Political Diary of the Tibet Frontier Commission.

(Extract.)

28th March, 1904.—Minimum temperature plus 13·5°. Fine, bright morning.

Lieutenant Bailey took out a small reconnoitring party in the direction of Guru. On approaching the spring about one mile this side of Guru he was met by a party of Tibetans, some mounted and some on foot, who requested him not proceed any further, as the Depon had ordered the road to be closed. A wall about four feet high had been built across the road. Lieutenant Bailey accordingly led his party round to the right and rode across the open plain to within sight of Guru Camp, the tents in which appeared to him to have diminished by about one-half. While he was reconnoitring the camp, the troops from the spring spread out across the maidan and captured a sowar who had been sent back with a message, but he was released on Lieutenant Bailey's return, and the party returned safely to camp. The Tibetans appear to have built three small defence walls at intervals along the summit of the spur above the springs, a mile or so this side of Guru.

29th March.—Minimum temperature plus 9°. A misty morning—mist gradually dissipating as the sun rose. Warm, still day. A messenger rode over from the Guru camp to ask us to return to Yatung, and received the usual answer. About 1 p.m. General Macdonald reached Thuna bringing a force of two 10-pr. guns, one 7-pr. gun, 4 companies, 8th Gurkhas, 4 companies, 32nd Pioneers, 150 mounted infantry and details, and a large convoy, which included 620 yaks and 70 ekkas. Three press correspondents accompanied the force, which camped round Thuna village.

30th March.—Minimum temperature plus 11°. Fine morning. Haze on the horizon. The empty convoy, with the exception of some 200 mules, returned to Phari. Two small parties of mounted infantry went out to reconnoitre the neighbouring country. One party under Captain Peterson, accompanied by Captain O'Connor, proceeded to Lhegu village, where a small Tibetan guard was in a position to threaten the line of communication. This party, numbering some 100 men, was ordered to retire, which they did after some protest, taking their arms (some half dozen match-locks and swords) with them. Captain Ottley's party reconnoitred along the hills above Guru to within sight of the village of Chalu.

31st March.—Minimum temperature plus 23°. There was a light snowfall during the night, which lay on the plain and the hills about Thuna to the depth of about one inch.

At 8.15 a small column of 9 companies of infantry (8th Gurkhas and 23rd Pioneers and 32nd Pioneers), two 10-pr. guns, two 7-pr. guns, and 2 maxims, and about 150 mounted infantry under command of Brigadier-General Macdonald, and accompanied by Colonel Younghusband and the Mission staff, marched for Guru in order to establish there an advanced food depôt and a small garrison. Shortly after leaving camp the Tibetan Sergeant, who has been so frequent a messenger to our camp, met the column, and after delivering his message, which was of no importance, was instructed by the British Commissioner to inform the Depon that we were proceeding at once to Guru, and that the Depon should withdraw his troops and give a free passage to the column in which case the Tibetans would not be molested or attacked. The Sergeant galloped off with this message. The column continued to advance, and when about 3 miles from camp was met by three Majors of the regular Lhasa troops, who protested against the advance which, they said, would lead to trouble, and requested us either to return to Thuna or to halt until the arrival of the Depon, who was now on his way from Guru. Their troops, they said, were collected at the spring, which issues from the foot of a spur about two miles short of Guru. In reply to this request, the British Commissioner and General Macdonald agreed to allow the troops to halt

1,000 yards short of the spring. The column was accordingly halted, and when the Depon was seen approaching, Colonel Younghusband and General Macdonald rode out to meet him, and a short conference was held between the two forces. The Lheding Depon, who was accompanied by the Kyibu Depon and two Tashi Lhumpo officials, and was joined later by the monk representative of the Gaden monastery and by the Nam-se-ling Depon, had no new arguments to offer. He merely urged the British Commissioner to withdraw to Yatung, and promised if he did so to write to Lhasa to hasten the arrival of the Amban and a Shape, and he protested against an advance which, he said, would lead to trouble. He was informed in reply that for 15 years the Indian Government had endeavoured in vain to negotiate at Yatung with Chinese and Tibetan officials, that the British Commissioner had now for eight months awaited the arrival of suitable delegates from Lhasa; that further delay was impossible, and that we would certainly advance to Guru that day. And the Depon was advised to withdraw his troops. The conference then closed, the Lheding Depon rode off, and the advance was resumed. At the request of the British Commissioner, General Macdonald gave orders that the troops were not to open fire unless the Tibetans fired first. The troops deployed and advanced in open order against the Tibetan position on the spur above the springs gradually driving the Tibetans before them, while at the same time the position was outflanked by troops, both to right and left. The troops in the centre in the meanwhile moved slowly up to the wall across the road behind which was massed the greater part of the Tibetan army. While this advance was proceeding, two of the Lhasa Depons again rode out to say that their troops had been ordered not to fire, and the Depon and his officers came out in front of the wall and sat down on the ground in a circle. As the Tibetans showed no further signs of retiring, General Macdonald and the British Commissioner decided to disarm them, and Captain O'Connor was sent to inform the Depon of this decision. The Depon received the news sulkily and made no reply, and issued no orders to his men, so a company of Sikhs with fixed bayonets was ordered up to enforce the order. On the order being given to disarm, a sepoy caught hold of a gun belonging to the nearest Tibetan soldier, and immediately the Depon, the monk, and the other high Tibetan officials jumped to their feet, and began to scuffle and wrestle with the sepoys for the possession of the arms. This lasted for a few minutes, and presently a shot was fired by a Tibetan which was followed by a volley from behind the wall and by a shower of stones, and then the troops opened fire, and the Tibetans retired upon Guru losing heavily on the way. The Lheding Depon was killed, as were also the Nam-se-ling Depon, and the monk representative of Gaden monastery, and several other officers of high rank. The force followed the Tibetans to Guru village which was taken with little difficulty, and a small garrison established. The rest of the force returned to Thuna. The wounded were collected before nightfall, and lodged in tents by the wall near the springs. The majority of them were dressed that evening by the medical officers, and sick attendants were told off from amongst the prisoners. The latter to the number of some 200 were addressed by Captain O'Connor by order of Colonel Younghusband and General Macdonald, and were told that the British Government had no desire to fight against the people of Tibet. That we had entered the country in order to make a satisfactory treaty in the place of the one which the Tibetans had ignored for so many years and with no intention of making war. And, finally, that they were to be released and to return to their homes and to fight no more. They went away exceedingly grateful.

1*st April*.—Minimum temperature plus 21°. A bright, clear morning.

Average minimum temperature during March plus 8·6°.

Lowest recorded temperature minus 5°.

Several medical officers went out to the scene of yesterday's fight, and spent the day dressing and attending the Tibetan wounded. About 40 were brought into Thuna in the evening, and accommodated in one of the Tibetan houses.

A letter was sent by the British Commissioner to the Tongsa Penlop informing him of the result of the conflict with the Tibetans.

2nd April.—Minimum temperature plus 23°. Wind blowing in gusts all day. A very light sprinkle of snow about 11 a.m.

Captain Ottley with some mounted infantry made a reconnaissance to the village of Hram which he found had been vacated by the Tibetans. He found a considerable quantity of stores in the village, and a number of sangars built across the road.

A large convoy bringing stores, &c., for the advance arrived in the afternoon.

3rd April.—Minimum temperature plus 12°. Bright, cloudless morning.

The remainder of the Tibetan wounded were brought into Thuna, and lodged in one of the houses.

F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND,
British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters.

Camp Kala Tso,
The 6th April, 1904.

Enclosure No. 43.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chalu, the 14th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse surrendered to-day, 12th April, and fort was occupied by two companies, 32nd Pioneers, without opposition. It is reported that 1,000 Lhasa troops, armed with rifles, are on their way here.

Enclosure No. 44.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Chalu, the 16th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

I summoned abbot and leading monks of Gyangtse monastery to my camp, and asked them if the hundred monks who fought against us in the last action belonged to this monastery. They replied that they did, but were forced to fight by two Lhasa officials. I said this was most serious offence, as we had hitherto regarded monks as engaged in religious duties, and had respected them and their monasteries accordingly, and I asked them if they had any reason to offer why we should not occupy their monastery with troops like we had occupied the fort. They assured me that the monks, who were forced to go, had no wish to fight; that they had only gone to swell the numbers, and had come away very soon, and they asked to be forgiven. I replied that I was not disposed to forgive them, for I might have been killed by these monks, and they must pay a fine of a quantity of grain to be hereafter fixed; they must allow Captain O'Connor to inspect their monastery from time to time to see that arms were not kept there; and they must from time to time come and pay their respects to me as a guarantee of their future good behaviour. I am anxious not to let this incident pass unnoticed, and I wish at the same time to make use of it for getting into touch with these monks.

Enclosure No. 45.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Muntsa, the 7th April, 1904.

With reference to my telegram of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to submit an English translation of the despatch from the Amban.

Annexure.

Letter from Yu Tai, Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhasa, to Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Affairs, dated the 27th March, 1904.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch on 26th March.

I will not go into these points in your despatch which are already on record.

You state that you trust all matters outstanding may be speedily settled; that you intend on a certain date to proceed to Gyangtse; that you hope to meet me there accompanied by a high Tibetan official of suitable rank; and that you request me to warn the Tibetans against molesting you on the way.

On the eve of my departure last year from Peking, I learnt from the British Chargé d'Affaires that you were a man of steady purpose and broad statesmanlike views, and this filled me with deep respect for you.

As soon as I had arrived at Lhasa, I was most anxious to hasten to the frontier and discuss with you all matters requiring settlement. I had only been there a few days, therefore, when I saw the Dalai Lama and talked over with him this question of my proceeding to the frontier. But difficulties arose over transport which he was unwilling to grant. After minutely sifting my conversation with him and the translations of his letters to me, I gather that Tibetan politics are those of drift, and Chinese officials too engrossed in self-seeking, and hence the Tibetans shirk action. Greatly perplexed, I have repeatedly pondered over these things and conclude that, acting impartially, I must bring the Tibetans over to my way of thinking, or else there will be but profitless talk. A quarrel on my part with the Dalai Lama would only mar matters, and so I shall go on and perform my share of the duties allotted to me. During the month since my arrival, I have made a little headway, and have now decided to forward a succinct report to Peking. As soon as this has been done, I shall at once press for transport, and proceed to meet you for the settlement of all matters. Thus I shall be able to satisfy His Majesty the King-Emperor of India and also to report to my Emperor.

I think you will recognise my perplexities and my effort.

In your despatch under consideration you state that you have fixed a day on which to advance to Gyangtse. I know that you, together with your escort, have been sitting still for a long time without anything having been done. You have excellent reasons for an advance to Gyangtse with your escort. However, notwithstanding the craft and deceit of the Tibetans and their violation of principle, I have compelled them somewhat to understand the meaning of principle. But if you suddenly penetrate into their country, I fear they may lapse into their former temper and thus imperil the conclusion of trade relations.

In the translation of the Dalai Lama's letter to me he says that should you retire to Yatung he will select Tibetan delegates and, also, in that case, requests me to proceed there and discuss matters.

Now, this frontier matter has been hanging fire for over 10 years, because it was perfunctorily drawn up in the beginning, and because, subsequently, it was shirked by the different delegates who did not strive honestly to adjust the difficulties.

Your reluctance to advance precipitately into Tibet with a military force has been a subject of congratulation for the Tibetans. I am ashamed to even mention to you the question of your retirement to Yatung. But, after careful consideration, it seems to me that trade relations are a matter of international importance. The movement of troops is a drain on the public purse and it is very much better to act in accordance with the temporary exigencies of affairs (*i.e.*, by retiring to Yatung) and so ensure the smooth execution of a settlement rather than to delay this for a long time by the display of your Mission and escort (in Tibet).

I am earnestly hoping for a reply from you as to whether you deem a retirement to Yatung feasible or not. Let us correspond in official despatches on any matters hereafter arising for discussion.

I beg you not to listen to either Chinese officials or to the Commissioner of Customs, Mr. Parr. I had written to the latter asking him to convey to you my suggestion as to the possibility or not of retiring to Yatung, but I fear he has misrepresented facts to you, as his reply to me is not at all in accordance with the sense of my letter to him. I am unable, therefore, to repose great confidence in him.

There are those who court popularity and are fair-weather friends.

I beg you to observe for yourself and so confer a benefit not only on myself, but on our respective countries.

Enclosure No. 46.

Letter from E. H. C. Walsh, Esq., Assistant to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner, Tibet Frontier Matters, dated Chumbi, the 8th April, 1904.

(Extract.)

I have been visiting all the villages, both in the valley and those in the hills adjoining, and have now visited every village, 21 in all, and have been into the houses of the headmen of each village, and have been everywhere received in the most friendly manner. I have lately been enquiring to ascertain the feeling of the Dromowas (people of the valley up to Phari Plain) regarding the recent defeat of the Tibetans at Guru, of which they are all aware. The feeling expressed is one of unmixed satisfaction, which I believe to be genuine. The Dromowas consider themselves as distinct from the Tibetans, and openly say that they much prefer our occupation of the valley to the Tibetan rule, and hope that we shall never give it up again. The reason for this, they say, is that the English treat every one with fairness, and pay for all that they buy and for all labour they require, and that since our coming "even a beggar has money in his pocket," whereas the Tibetans pay for nothing they take, and require forced labour without payment. Their only fear was that we might get defeated and have to retire, when the Tibetan troops would have come down to the valley and looted their houses. A fact which confirms this statement is that several of the people of the lower valley, when they heard of our advance, and awaiting the result, had packed up all their valuables, ready to send off at once to Kalimpong, in case the Tibetans were victorious, and would themselves have escaped to British territory or to Bhutan. They say that even in 1888, when the Tibetans had no quarrel with them, the Tibetan troops looted their houses, and now they would certainly loot everything in revenge for the people having supplied us with fodder and labour. There are only a few Tibetans residing in the valley, chiefly at Rinchengong. I have said nothing to them on the subject, and their feelings are naturally with their own nation. The Tibetans have a proverb about themselves, "bod snying rdo" ("the Tibetan's heart is stone"), the meaning of which appears to be that a Tibetan neither forgives nor forgets. Hence, though they may not attempt any further battle, after the severe defeat they have sustained, it would be as well to be on guard against acts of treachery, in revenge.

Enclosure No. 47.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Chalu, the 18th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 16th April. No signs of either Amban or Tibetan delegates appearing, and there is a rumour among the Chinese that Dalai Lama, after resisting to the utmost, intends to flee, and is already preparing for this.

Enclosure No. 48.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Chalu, the 20th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 16th April. I have received letter from the Tongsa Penlop, and Timpuk Jongpen congratulating me on the victory over the Tibetans, who, they say, had sold themselves to us by their bad conduct. They previously had written to the Lhasa Government, urging them to make a settlement, but had received no answer. They ask me to remain at Gyangtse for the present, and the Tongsa Penlop says he will certainly visit me here.

Enclosure No. 49.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Chalu, the 20th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 18th April. Lhasa delegates, who were reported to have been coming, are of low rank, and since receiving news of fighting have halted on their way to receive orders. Headmen here express willingness to sell supplies, which are beginning to come in regularly. There is every sign of this district quietening down.

Enclosure No. 50.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chalu, the 21st April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp Kangma, twentieth. I left Gyangtse yesterday, leaving small movable column and guard to the Mission in strongly entrenched village, 1½ miles from fort, of two 7-pr. guns, 50 mounted infantry, 4 companies 32nd Pioneers, 2 companies 8th Gurkhas, Section Native Field Hospital, Machine, Norfolks, and three troops 7th Mule Corps, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Brander, 32nd Pioneers. All was quiet in the neighbourhood of Gyangtse, and no news from any gathering of Tibetans between that place and Lhasa. Am now returning to Chumbi to arrange posts and communications and convoys, after leaving one company, 23rd Pioneers, as a post here. Expect to arrive Thuna 24th, Phari 25th, Chumbi 27th.

Enclosure No. 51.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, 22nd April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

I have received a despatch from Amban in which he says he will certainly arrive here within the next three weeks; that he has insisted on the Tibetans giving him transport, and that they have agreed; and that he has insisted also on competent and trustworthy Tibetan representatives accompanying him. He does not state specifically what representatives will accompany him, but the official who brought the despatch says that one of the Councillors acting in place of the Councillors imprisoned at Lhasa is coming. This official also says that among the common people at Lhasa there is not much excitement, as they are aware that even if we did go there we would not harm them; but that the Tibetan officials at Lhasa are greatly perturbed, and are begging the Amban to come here and settle the matter. The official saw 700 Tibetan troops about 60 miles from here, and another camp nearer to Lhasa. Excepting these there was no sign of military preparation. The Amban's despatch says that the Lhasa general was the aggressor in the Guru affair, but that my compassion in releasing the prisoners and in caring for the wounded, and my humane motives, have conferred incalculable blessing on Tibet. He says the Dalai Lama is now roused to a sense of our power; but since the former councillors are imprisoned, there are few capable Tibetan officials to negotiate. The Amban adds that he does not speak insincerely. Everything here is very quiet. The general attitude is acceptance of the inevitable, combined with relief at the flight of the oppressive Lhasa officials. Sick and wounded are also coming in to be treated by Wilton. Camp is besieged with Tibetans selling country produce, carpets, and trinkets. A daily bazaar is now established outside the camp. To-day 177 Tibetans, mostly women, were selling their goods there. The scene presented was very remarkable and significant—British officers and soldiers, Sikhs, Gurkhas, and Bhutias bargaining away peaceably with their foes of a fortnight ago, and giving the sharp Tibetan traders exorbitant prices for vegetables, eggs, condiments, watches, cigarettes, carpets, trinkets, cotton goods, cooking utensils—even penny whistles. The Tibetans are evidently born traders, and they are already sending to Phari for more goods from India. Two hundred and twenty-three maunds of bhoosa and 560 lbs. barley were also brought to-day for sale to the commissariat by 16 different villagers.

Enclosure No. 52.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chalu, the 23rd April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp Kala Tso, 22nd.—Gyangtse is provisioned with ghee, gur, &c., up to 1st May, and with barley flour sufficient for three months. The first convoy due Gyangtse, twenty-sixth, with twelve days' supplies. Heliographic communication between this and Gyangtse impracticable. Telegraph line now here and a mail has been passing through to Gyangtse every other day. Daily mail service now being arranged for, and telegraph line will be pushed on. Am leaving additional company 23rd Pioneers at Chalu to-morrow.

Enclosure No. 53.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Thuna, the 24th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Arrived here to-day from Dochen, the ground being covered with four inches snow from heavy snowstorm last night. Communications from Phari to Gyangtse arranged as follows:—Phari to Kala Tso ekka on staging system; Kala Tso to

Kangma yak convoys ; Kangma to Gyangtse convoys of Gyangtse garrison mules supplemented by local hired donkeys. Distances between posts as follows :—Phari to Tangla stage seven miles, Tangla to Thuna 12 miles, Thuna to Dochen 13 miles, Dochen to Kala Tso 14 miles, Kala Tso to Kangma 25 miles, Kangma to Gyangtse 29 miles. From Langram to Phari mules will be mainly employed.

Enclosure No. 54.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Chalu, the 24th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 22nd April.—A collapse of the Lhasa authorities, rather than further determined resistance, seems to be indicated by present circumstances. In the first place, there is the statement of the Amban that the Dalai Lama is now aroused to a sense of our power ; in addition to this there are the several statements made by the Chinese official who brought the dispatch from the Amban, viz., that Tibetan officers are begging the Amban to intercede ; that our appearance is not resented by the common people, even at Lhasa ; and, further, that there are few troops between this place and Lhasa. Further indications of the present impotence of the Lhasa authorities are afforded by the fact that they were unable, after many months, to raise more than some 5,000 men between Thuna and Gyangtse to oppose us ; and by the fact that our presence has been quietly accepted by people here, even including the monks. The game is thus entirely in our own hands. Amban is displaying his usual dilatoriness in the present crisis, and he will, no doubt, show still more while the negotiations are in progress, by trying to delay us through the season best fitted for military movements. Even now, owing to the imprisonment of all the four Councillors, the Amban will be unaccompanied by Tibetan of sufficient authority and position. Against such tactics Government will doubtless be on their guard ; the best way to meet them, in my opinion, is that, at the earliest moment by which military preparations can be completed, the Mission should be moved straight to Lhasa, and that negotiations should take place at the capital instead of at the half-way house. This would be the most effectual and the only permanent way of clinching matters, besides being the cheapest and quickest. By carrying Amban with me I could probably manage this advance without further fighting, or, at any rate, without a serious collision. Our prestige is now at its height ; Nepal and Bhutan are with us ; the people are not against us ; the soldiers do not want to fight ; the Lamas are stunned. By a decisive move now a permanent settlement would be procured, which would be agreeable to the mass of the Tibetan people, which the monks would probably accept, shrugging their shoulders, and which would prevent the Lhasa Lamas from ever again usurping monopoly of power to the detriment of British interests and to the ruin of their own country. In recommending the matter at this early stage for the consideration of Government, my object is that the present favourable season may be utilised to the full, and that we may not allow the psychological moment for action to pass by without taking advantage of it. Meanwhile I will receive the Amban, and will ascertain what power to effect a thorough settlement he and the Tibetan representative really possess.

Enclosure No. 55.

Letter from E. H. C. Walsh, Esq., Assistant to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated Chumbi, the 20th April, 1904.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to submit the following report for your information. Colonel Chao came to see me this morning. He informs me that the Chinese Phegpon at Pim-bi-thang received a letter from Ma-Fhung-ling at Gyangtse that the Amban was expected to arrive at Gyangtse and he consequently started to go to Gyangtse. On arriving at Thuna, however, he met some messengers returning from Gyangtse, who said that there was no news of the Amban's arriving, and he consequently returned and reached here yesterday. Colonel Chao also intended to go to Gyangtse, but is now waiting until he gets information of the Amban's actual coming.

Enclosure No. 56.

Political Diary of the Tibet Frontier Commission.

(Extract.)

4th April.—Minimum temperature + 20°. Bright morning, but heavy storm clouds over mountains to north and east.

The Mission and Escort left Thuna at 8 a.m., and marched to Guru, 8 miles, camping near the village of Guru. Captain O'Connor had an interview in the evening with an aged Major (Rhupon) of the Lhasa troops. The poor old man, who is 73 years of age, had been captured after the fight on the 31st. He is one of the four Lhasa Majors, each of whom commands 250 men. He has suffered from rheumatism in both legs ever since the Gnatong campaign and can scarcely hobble. He did his best, he said, to be excused from coming to Guru, but was ordered to proceed to the front and had to obey. He said that the whole of the Lhasa regular troops, to the number of about 1,000, were employed on the 31st, and that the Shigatse and Gyantse troops who were at Hram have escaped untouched.

5th April.—Minimum temperature + 9°. A cold morning. Heavy clouds to the north and east of the Hram-Tso.

The Mission and Escort marched along the western slope of the lake to near the village of Chalu, 12½ miles. Grass and fuel were supplied by the people at Chalu, a small hamlet of three or four houses. The Mounted Infantry reconnoitred some miles beyond Kala-Tso and on their return met Colonel Ma, who is proceeding towards Gyangtse.

6th April.—Minimum temperature + 21°. There was a light fall of snow during the night.

The Mission and Escort marched to Kala-Tso and camped near the shore of the lake. There are two large villages here—Kala-Sher and Kala-Nub (or East and West Kala)—the inhabitants of which appeared quite friendly though rather frightened, and provided large supplies of fuel and fodder. The Mounted Infantry reconnoitred as far as the village of Sa-ma-da where they were fired on by some Tibetan soldiers and retired without loss.

7th April.—Minimum temperature + 12½°. A clear cold morning.

The Mission and Escort marched across the Kala-Tso plain and entering the valley which runs to Gyangtse camped near the village Mang-tsa, 11 miles. Some villagers from the village of Sa-ma-da reported that the Tibetans intend holding the defile of Dzam-tang, some 20 miles from Gyangtse, and that eight or nine Tibetans were killed and wounded in yesterday's skirmish.

8th April.—Minimum temperature + 14°. A clear bright morning.

The Mission and Escort marched to the hamlet of Be-yul, 12 miles, along a valley enclosed on either side by high bare hills. Several villages and monasteries were passed *en route* and a great number of ruins. The Mounted Infantry reported that the Tibetan troops are in occupation of a position some four miles beyond Be-yul where they had built a wall across the road and some sangars on the hill-sides.

9th April.—Minimum temperature + 26°. Cold wind blowing down valley. Light clouds.

The Mission and Escort marched to the village of Lam-da, 8½ miles. The Tibetans were found to have deserted their defences and no opposition was offered. The large village of Kang-ma was passed at about six miles and just beyond some small hot springs. A Mounted Infantry patrol was fired at by the Tibetans who appear to be holding a position at and near the Dzam-tang defile some three miles lower down the valley.

10th April.—Minimum temperature + 29°. Sleet falling at 7 a.m. Sky cleared by 8 a.m.

The Mission and Escort marched to the village of Sau-gong, 12 miles. The Tibetans were found to be in occupation of a strong position on the heights above and to the left of the road and in the Dzam-tang defile lower down. They were dislodged with little difficulty by a flank attack by the 8th Gurkhas followed by a direct advance down the valley, and they hastily quitted their position and fled down the road followed by the Mounted Infantry. Their losses were considerable, the number of killed being estimated by the military staff at 200. Our casualties were two or three men wounded. Their soldiers consisted of the Shigatse and Gyangtse regular troops to the number of some 1,500, a few militia and 100 of the Gyangtse monks. They were commanded by the Men-Kyi-ling and Rum-pu Depons both of whom escaped on horseback. The Chinese Major Ma has called twice at the camp, but cannot give any definite information of the Amban or the date of his starting from Lhasa. Major Ma also stated that it was reported that there are no signs of Tibetan camps on the road between Gyangtse and Lhasa.

F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND,
British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters.

Camp Gyangtse,
16th April, 1904.

Enclosure No. 57.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Chalu, the 27th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 25th April. Dharm Raja of Bhutan has sent a small present, and written me a letter in which, referring to Guru affair, he says :—"On hearing that my friends had won the victory, I was greatly rejoiced. Now-a-days England and Bhutan have established a firm friendship. Although the small officials at Guru would not hear what we had to say, I have thought that the higher officials might do so, and have, therefore, written a letter to the Dalai Lama, and am in hopes of speedy reply. On its arrival, I will at once send a man to you. May there be faith and friendship between the English and Bhutanese ! Please let me know if there is anything you require from the Bhutan Government."

Enclosure No. 58.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Camp Gyangtse, the 16th April, 1904.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 7th instant, I have the honour to submit a copy of my reply, dated the 3rd, to the despatch from the Chinese Amban.

Annexure.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to His Excellency Yu Tai, Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhasa, dated Camp Thuna, the 3rd April, 1904.

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch, dated 27th March. The idea of returning to Yatung, as your Excellency seems to appreciate, is quite untenable. I regret to have to inform you that the Tibetans have already opposed my progress to Gyangtse. In pursuance with the intimation I had already given you, I moved out from here on 31st March in the direction of Guru on the way to Gyangtse. I warned the Depon who had built a wall across the road and stationed troops on it that I intended to go to Guru, and that he must move his troops. I said that I did not want to fight and would not unless he opposed us, but the troops with me would have to clear the way if he resisted.

The troops advanced without firing, and the Tibetans on the hillside were allowed to retreat without being fired on. But many hundreds of Tibetans under the Lheding Depon collected behind a wall they had built across the road. These were surrounded by our troops; and as they would not retreat, I ordered that they should be disarmed. The Tibetan soldiers began to fire and attack our troops with swords, and then our troops, who up till then had not fired a shot, commenced firing, and about 800 Tibetans (including the Lheding Depon) were killed and wounded.

I much regret this incident, which I had done my best to avoid by frequently warning the Tibetans of the foolishness of their resistance to us. But they would not listen to me. The prisoners we took were allowed to return to their homes, and our doctors are taking care of the wounded.

I shall, to-morrow, move on to Gyangtse, which I expect to reach in about a week, and I hope I shall have the pleasure of meeting Your Excellency and a high Tibetan official with the power to make a settlement which will prevent any further useless bloodshed.

Enclosure No. 59.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Camp Gyangtse, the 16th April, 1904.

With reference to my telegram, dated the 12th April, I have the honour to submit a copy of my letter to the Amban, dated the 15th idem.

Annexure.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to His Excellency Yu Tai, Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhasa, dated Camp Gyangtse, the 15th April, 1904.

I arrived here on the 11th instant, and was surprised to find that Your Excellency had neither not already arrived here nor sent me any intimation of the probable date of your arrival. I am almost bound to assume from this that you have no intention of coming to meet me, and if this is the case, I would be obliged if you would definitely inform me of your intention.

Of the seriousness of the present situation there is no need to remind Your Excellency, but I would request you to inform the Dalai Lama that it is rendered still more serious by the fact that even monks have taken up arms against us. We had hitherto regarded monks

as leading a religious life, and had respected them and their monasteries accordingly. But when monks fight against us in the same way as laymen, I see no reason why they should not be treated as laymen, and why monasteries should not be treated as Jong.

Will you have the goodness to represent this matter to the Dalai Lama, and enquire from him whether the monks were acting with his approval in fighting against us?

I shall await here a reply to this letter, but I would request that the reply be sent without unnecessary delay.

Enclosure No. 60.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Chalu, the 28th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 26th April. I have received a despatch from Amban in reply to one written after my arrival here. He says he has sent to Dalai Lama copy of my despatch, asking if he knew and approved of Monks fighting against us. Amban also urged him to appoint competent and trustworthy official suitably empowered, and at same time pressed him to furnish transport, but he had had no reply yet from Dalai Lama. Amban adds delay is due to Dalai Lama having to consult national assembly, that he has exhausted himself in talking to the Tibetans, and trusts I will see difficult nature of circumstances.

Enclosure No. 61.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 29th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Returned here on 27th from Gyangtse after establishing regular communications with that place, with posts at Kangma, Kala Tso, Dochen, Thuna, and Tang La. And now redistributing and laying out transport so as to accumulate supplies at Phari, Thuna, Kala Tso, Kangma, and Gyangtse. It is reported from Gyangtse that 700 Tibetans are sangared on the Karola, and that their numbers are increasing. A considerable amount of rain is now falling daily in the Chumbi Valley with snow on the passes.

Enclosure No. 62.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Chalu, the 27th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 25th April.—Tashi Lama has sent me an abbot with small present and credentials sealed with Lama's private seal to make representation in behalf of monastery here. Tashi Lama says monks only fought against us under pressure from Lhasa, and that those who did fight have now been well beaten by his orders, and he hopes I will remit the fine on the monastery. I have replied that we had always borne friendly feelings to Tashi Lama on account of hospitality shown to Bogle and Turner. At Khamba Jong I had also done my best to show friendship to his representatives, was all the more disappointed, therefore, when I found not only Shigatse soldiers, but even monks fighting against us. The latter thus forfeited their claims to respect and privileges we had been ready to give them. I was not prepared to let matter pass entirely unnoticed, but out of respect for Tashi Lama's representation would remit half the fine. I would, however, ask Tashi Lama to give me a written engagement that no monks under him would take up arms against us again. Abbot states that, in consequence of friendship which grew up at Khamba Jong between us and abbot then sent, Khamba Jong district has been taken out of jurisdiction of Shigatse and placed under Lhasa. My impression is that monks about here are not of much account for good or evil.

Enclosure No. 63.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kala Tso, the 30th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 23rd April. In replying to-day to Amban's despatch, I have expressed my disappointment at his continued dilatoriness which will keep me a month waiting here, after I have already waited nine months in Tibet, and which will naturally not predispose Government to be lenient in the demand now to be made.

Enclosure No. 64.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kala Tso, the 30th April, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 23rd April. Chinese official from Shigatse says Tibetan officials there are uneasy, but common people quite unmoved. Soldiers engaged in late fighting have got rid of their arms, and are ploughing their fields. There are not the smallest signs of unrest.

Enclosure No. 65.

Political Diary of the Tibet Frontier Commission.

(Extract.)

11*th April.*—Minimum temperature 28°. Bright, clear morning.

The Mission and escort marched to Gyangtse (13½ miles) and camped on the plain about two miles to the east of Gyangtse Jong. Colonel Ma and one of the two Jongpens called on the Camp in the evening and were told that General Macdonald proposed to occupy the Jong on the following morning and would expect to find the Jong vacated by 9 a.m.

12*th April.*—Minimum temperature 25°. Bright, warm morning.

General Macdonald marched out troops at 8 a.m. and was met about one mile from the foot of the hill upon which the Jong stands by Colonel Ma and the Jongpen, who informed him that all troops had been withdrawn from the Jong, which was accordingly occupied without opposition. General Macdonald then rode to the Gyangtse Monastery and informed the Abbot and the head Lamas that he had heard that 100 of their number had been present at the fight in the gorge, and he warned them of the serious consequences likely to ensue if they persisted in attempting to oppose us. In the evening the prisoners captured in the last fight were dismissed to their homes after having been warned not to fight us again, which they gratefully promised not to do.

13*th April.*—Minimum temperature 22°. Bright, cloudless morning.

Camp was shifted about one mile to the south to the neighbourhood of a large house, the property of the Cheng-To family. At 3 p.m. the Abbot of the Pang-Kor-Chi-de (Gyangtse) Monastery and some of the leading Lamas called on Colonel Younghusband. They admitted at once that some of their monks had been present at the last fight, but they said they had gone out with the greatest reluctance, and only at the express orders of two of the Lhasa Government officers who had come to Gyangtse to arrange about troops, supplies, etc. They said that the monks were unused to arms, and had taken no part in the actual fighting. The British Commissioner impressed upon them the serious nature of the course they had adopted, pointing out that if the monks chose to fight, they might reasonably expect to be treated as soldiers, and that their monasteries should be regarded as forts ; that so long as they confined themselves to their religious duties, they and their institutions would be respected, but that we could not allow them to oppose us with impunity ; and the Commissioner asked them if they could give him any reason why their monastery should not be garrisoned with soldiers, as the Jong had been. This alarmed them greatly, and they earnestly begged to be excused. Colonel Younghusband told them he would confer with General Macdonald as to whether it would be necessary to occupy the monastery, or whether a fine for past misconduct and a guarantee for the future would be sufficient notice to take of their ill-advised action. He instructed them to return to-morrow to hear his decision.

14*th April.*—Minimum temperature 31°. Fine, bright morning. Light snow on surrounding hills.

The Commissioner inspected the Jong—a curious old building in a state of almost complete disrepair—built on the sides and top of a rocky hill, some hundreds of feet high, round the base of which is situated the town of Gyangtse. The Abbot and monks came again in the afternoon and were told by the Commissioner that he had decided to punish them by levying from them some supplies, the exact quantity of which he would notify to them the next day by his representative who would visit the monastery for that purpose, and also to see that no arms were collected there ; and he requested them to inform the Tashi Lama of what he had said and to ascertain from him whether the monks of this province propose to adopt a militant or a peaceful attitude. Colonel Younghusband also laid down that Captain O'Connor should visit the monastery from time to time to see that no arms were being collected there, and, further, that the Abbot should periodically pay his respects to the British Commissioner.

15*th April.*—Minimum temperature 18°. Cloudy morning.

Captain O'Connor, as directed by the British Commissioner, proceeded at noon to the monastery where he was received by the Abbot and leading monks. He made a thorough inspection of the monastery as far as possible, and then informed the Abbot of the Commissioner's orders regarding the supply of barley, flour, and butter. The Abbot begged for a fortnight's grace in order to have time to communicate with his outlying monasteries and farms and to accumulate what was required. He was also advised to communicate the whole matter to the Tashi Lama as it was possible that if His Holiness were to intercede, the British Commissioner might be induced to lighten the fine.

16*th April.*—Minimum Temperature 22·5°. Clear morning.

Bhutanese messengers arrived, bringing letters to the British Commissioner from the Tongsa Penlop and Timbuk Jongpen to congratulate him upon the success at Guru and to request him to, if possible, remain for the present at Gyangtse where they propose to visit him.

17*th April.*—Minimum Temperature 24°. Dull, cloudy morning.

The last of the large stores of grain found in the Jong was removed to-day and stored in the house about to be occupied by the Mission and escort at Gyangtse. The total amount is estimated at over 5,000 maunds. In addition to this, supplies in considerable quantities have been collected from the neighbouring villages, the villagers being paid good prices and selling willingly. It is reported that the head of the Pa-lha family—formerly a Po-pon, but recently promoted to the rank of Tung-yig-Chembo—was on his way to meet the British Commissioner, but that on hearing of the fighting he halted at Nagartse Jong, and referred to Lhasa for further orders.

F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND,

British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters.

Camp Gyangtse, the 20th April, 1904.

Enclosure No. 66.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kala Tso, the 3rd May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 1st May. Reconnoitring party located from 1,000 to 1,500 Tibetans in sangared position 43 miles from here on far side of Karo La. Tibetans opened fire, but hit none of our men, who retired, having effected their object. This is force mentioned in my telegram of 22nd April, but recently strengthened from Kham, and by stray soldiers from this district. I have received no further communication from Amban, who presumably, therefore, has not yet had reply from Dalai Lama appointing proper Tibetan representative, and there seems increasing improbability of any intention to negotiate here. Monastery here yesterday completed payment of fine of 500 maunds barley, 250 maunds flour, and 100 maunds butter, goor, and salt.

Enclosure No. 67.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 3rd May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lieutenant-Colonel Brander reports from Gyangtse, 1st May, that reconnoitring party of mounted infantry located Tibetans, 1,500 strong, three miles beyond the Karola Pass, and 13 miles beyond Ralung on the Lhasa road. They were strongly posted behind loop-holed walls and sangars at a narrow gorge, and opened a heavy fire on the mounted infantry, who retired without returning their fire, and with no casualties. The Tibetans also loosed an avalanche of stones on the mounted infantry whilst returning from some well-concealed sangars up the hillside which the men successfully dodged. Colonel Brander further wires that, after consultation with Colonel Younghusband, he proposed moving out with movable column to-day to attack Tibetans.

Enclosure No. 68.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Camp Gyangtse, the 23rd April, 1904.

I have the honour to forward translation of a despatch I have received from the Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhasa, together with my reply.

2. Captain Ma's statement to the Amban that I intended to go to Lhasa, after staying here a fortnight, must be taken as having been made on his own responsibility, as I have never seen him. He merely expressed what was the very natural impression here.

Annexure 1.

Letter from His Excellency Yu Tai, Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhasa, to Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated the 17th April, 1904.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch on 7th April, and to state that I have studied its contents with the greatest attention.

The Lhasa Depon paid no heed to my words of restraint, and was the aggressor in the fighting at Guru. In that not only did his men suffer defeat, but China also suffered loss of prestige ; and although the fault is on the side of the Tibetans, still my advice to them on the situation was disregarded. The minute perusal of your despatch has thus filled me with grief and shame. Happily, however, your compassion in having magnanimously released the foolish and ignorant prisoners and in having cared for the wounded, together with your humane motives of sternness and mercy, have conferred incalculable blessings on Tibet. I am ashamed at my own want of ability, but I now bring the Tibetans before you with prayers of gratitude.

Captain Commandant Ma has petitioned me that you had arrived at Gyangtse, where you intended to stay for a fortnight, and that you wished me to visit you and discuss business. In the event of my non-arrival that you would proceed towards Lhasa. I have replied to Mr. Ma's petition, and would also now beg to inform you that I gave the Dalai Lama the translation of the petition. I also visited him and urged him as to the course to pursue. The Dalai Lama is now aroused to the sense of your power. I further told him that I intended to visit you within the next fortnight, so that we might discuss in a satisfactory manner all the matters requiring settlement.

The former Tibetan officials (Kalons) had been imprisoned, and there are but few capable Tibetan officials to settle the frontier and other important questions which cannot be disposed of in a peremptory manner. I am of the opinion that the discussion of commercial matters demands the services of Chinese and Tibetan officials jointly, and that these latter should be men of courage and experience. Failing this, there would be round-about correspondence on the subject of other appointments. A few days' delay will, therefore, not be out of place in order to definitely settle this point. I have now made the Dalai Lama understand that he must without delay select and send competent and trustworthy Tibetan officials to accompany me. At the same time I have insisted on being provided with transport. I have fixed on a date, and now shall arrive at Gyangtse within the third Chinese month (12th May). If it were possible for you to look into my heart, you would know that I do not speak insincerely. What I have been relating to you is not a mere trumped up story. I would then beg you to stay on at Gyangtse and await my arrival. I would also venture to trouble you for an answer, that I may know how to act. I would further request you, in the event of any necessity arising for correspondence between us, to write to me direct, and not communicate through the medium of any deputies.

Annexure 2.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to His Excellency Yu Tai, Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhasa, dated Gyangtse, the 23rd April, 1904.

I desire to thank Your Excellency for the complimentary acknowledgment you have been good enough to make of the mercy we showed to the prisoners and wounded after the fight at Guru. I had repeatedly told the Tibetans that we had no wish to fight. Once, however, fighting was commenced, then we had to be severe, though even now we are ready to show mercy to the wounded, and in any case will treat peaceful inhabitants who do not take up arms against us as friends, not enemies.

I am disappointed to hear Your Excellency has not already left Lhasa to meet me. I understand that you will not arrive here till a month after my own arrival at Gyangtse, so that I shall have been kept waiting in all ten months, though it is nearly a year-and-a-half since the Wai-wu-pu informed the British Minister at Peking that you had been given orders to proceed to Tibet to settle this matter. This dilatoriness is not likely to predispose my Government to moderate the demands they must now make for the settlement of the matters in dispute.

Your Excellency says that the Dalai Lama is now aroused to the sense of our power : but His Holiness does not appear to be even yet aware of the respect with which a great Government expects its representative to be treated. Since the four Councillors are imprisoned, I understand from you that few capable Tibetan officials are available to conduct negotiations with me. What is even more essential than capacity in the individual is his possession of the fullest authority from the Dalai Lama to make a settlement on behalf of the Tibetan Government in co-operation with Your Excellency.

Enclosure No. 69.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kala Tso, the 5th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 5th May, 7 a.m. Mission attacked at dawn this morning by Tibetan force which marched all night from Shigatse direction. Force was collected by General recently appointed by Lhasa Government in supersession of General who fought against us on way here. It was also accompanied by representatives of Gaden monastery at Lhasa and by two clerks of Dalai Lama besides other Lhasa officials. It numbered about eight hundred. Attack easily repulsed, for we are in house and enclosure strongly fortified. Tibetan loss about two hundred and fifty killed and wounded, our loss two wounded. Attack confirms impression I had formed that Lhasa Government are irreconcilable, and I trust His Majesty's Government, in deciding future attitude towards them, will remember that I have now been ten months in Tibet, that I have met with nothing but insults the whole time in spite of the extreme forbearance I have shown, and that I have now been deliberately attacked. As long as there was chance of peaceful settlement, I spared no effort even at personal risk to effect one. Now that Tibetans have refused every overture and definitely thrown down the gauntlet, I trust that Government will take such action as will prevent the Tibetans ever again treating British representatives as I have been treated. I would note that warning of this attack was given to Walton by sick he was treating in dispensary he has established, but that the Chinese officials here gave no intimation whatever. Mission is absolutely safe, and Government need be under no anxiety in regard to it.

Enclosure No. 70.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated the 6th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Government of India are glad that attack was repulsed so easily and with so little loss. They fully sympathise with the difficulties of your trying position, and your representations are receiving their most careful consideration. Your general attitude should continue to be defensive, so far as is compatible with safety of Mission and its communications, unless and until you receive further orders.

Enclosure No. 71.

From the Officer Commanding, Gyangtse, to the Chief Staff Officer, Kala Tso, dated the 5th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Post at this place was attacked by about 700 Tibetans from direction of Shigatse under General appointed from Lhasa, and accompanied by Lama representatives from Lhasa monastery, at about 4.30 a.m. this morning. Attack continued till about 6.30 a.m., when enemy retired in direction of Shigatse pursued by about half the garrison for two miles. Onr casualties two men, 32nd Pioneers, wounded. Enemy left about 250 dead and wounded in vicinity of post. Post here is perfectly secure.

Enclosure No. 72.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kala Tso, the 5th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 2nd May. Colonel Brander reports that he is of opinion, for reasons given below, that it is advisable to go out and attack Tibetans at Karola before they can attack our communications, and before the gathering can assume more threatening proportions; he accordingly leaves here to-morrow for that purpose. Following are his reasons:—Firstly, force located on the Karola threatens our lines of communication by road leading direct from Karola to Kangma, where we have only one company stationed; secondly, it is reported that Tibetans are also along road from Karola to Kangma; thirdly, Lhasa Government is sending round this district collecting troops, which are being assembled at the Karola position; fourthly, our reconnoitring party was fired on by these troops, although they had received strict injunctions to the contrary from the chief Chinese officials at Gyangtse. I have raised no objections on political grounds to proposed movement, because I do not see the least indication of any intention on the part of the Government at Lhasa to send anyone to open negotiations with me, whereas I do see signs that Tibetan Government are recovering from the shock of the first encounter with us; and I believe that we may have trouble hereafter, unless such gatherings are checked before they come to a head. Colonel Brander is confident that he can defeat the Tibetan forces at Karola without difficulty, and that Mission left at Gyangtse will be safe.

Enclosure No. 73.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kala Tso, the 5th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 3rd May. I have received a despatch from Amban, dated 29th April, saying he sent a translated copy of my despatch of 24th April to Dalai Lama, and also summoned Councillors and representatives of three great monasteries, urged them to at once send fully empowered delegates, stated he had decided to leave on 3rd May, and demanded transport. On 27th, Amban received replies from Dalai Lama and representations of the three great monasteries, denying that they had known of, or encouraged, monks taking up arms against us, but not mentioning a word about transport or other matters. Amban is at loss to understand this, and has written again to Dalai Lama, and on receiving reply will communicate with me. So my fourth despatch to present Amban has produced no more result than previous three, and I have not slightest hope that proper Tibetan delegate will be sent.

Enclosure No. 74.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government to India in the Foreign Department, dated Camp Gyangtse, the 26th April, 1904.

In continuation of my telegram of to-day's date, I have the honour to forward translation of a despatch, dated 23rd April, from the Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhasa.

Annexure.

Letter from His Excellency Yu Tai, Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhasa, to Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated the 23rd April, 1904.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt, on 19th April, of your despatch, and I have carefully gone over the various points therein. I have transmitted a translated copy of your despatch to the Dalai Lama, asking him if he knew and approved of the monks having fought against you. I have also urged him to appoint competent and trustworthy Tibetan officials suitably empowered, and at the same time I pressed him to furnish me speedily with transport, so that I may be able to fix the date of my departure. Three days have now elapsed, but there is as yet no reply. It is an old Tibetan custom that, when there is official business with the Chinese, a meeting of clerical and lay representatives of the three great monasteries must be called to deliberate, and then make an official answer. Hence the delay. On this occasion of my proceeding to visit you, I have exhausted myself in talking with the Tibetans, and trust you may perceive something of the difficult nature of the circumstances. As soon as I receive a reply from the Dalai Lama, I will communicate with you without delay.

Enclosure No. 75.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kala Tso, the 8th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 7th May. Brander has been successful in clearing very important gathering at Karola. Effect of this will be of greatest value in checking recent resuscitation of influence of the Lamas. Enemy's forces, consisting of 2,500 men, armed with numerous Lhasa-made and foreign rifles, and headed by many influential Lamas and officials from Lhasa, occupied very strong position, which they held most stubbornly. Our casualties were :—Killed, 4, including Captain Bethune, who was previously in command of escort of Mission at Khambajong, and whose loss his country has great cause to regret; wounded, 14. Brander has most effectually carried out his object of removing threats to our line of communications; he will return to Gyangtse to-morrow or next day.

Enclosure No. 76.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 8th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

In telegram dated the 6th May, Brander reports that he attacked Tibetans, who were holding entrenched position beyond Karola, and was met with heavy and well-aimed fire from jingals, matchlocks, and numerous breechloaders; this checked his frontal attack until enemy, who numbered 2,000, were dislodged from sangars by wide flanking movement. Four hours' stubborn fighting took place before enemy were dislodged, and retreated, followed by mounted infantry in pursuit. I regret to report following casualties on our side :—Killed, Captain Bethune and three men 32nd Pioneers; wounded, 13 men 32nd Pioneers, 1 man 8th Gurkhas. Captain Bethune was killed while gallantly storming a sangar; he was a most gallant and reliable officer, whom I recently mentioned in despatches, and whose loss I deeply regret. Enemy's loss has not yet been accurately ascertained. Following is believed to have formed Brander's movable column :—Four companies infantry, two 7-pounders, two Maxims, 40 mounted infantry. It is reported that a considerable number of men from Kham were among the force that opposed us at Karola; if this is so, their defeat should produce wholesome effect on Eastern Tibetans. I have received a telegram, dated the 6th May, from Major Murray, 8th Gurkhas, who is in command at Gyangtse, reporting all quiet there.

Enclosure No. 77.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated the 8th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Owing to attack on Gyangtse and serious opposition at Karo La, Government of India consider that preponderance for the present must be given to military considerations, and General Macdonald has been authorised to take all measures necessary to secure safety of Mission and communications short of permanent advance on Lhasa. He will also exercise same control of military operations and press censorship as during advance from Thuna. As soon as active opposition ceases, and you are able to open negotiations with proper Chinese and Tibetan delegates, the former arrangements will be restored.

Enclosure No. 78.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kala Tso, the 8th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 6th May. Proofs of irreconcilability of Lhasa Lamas come in every day now. Last attack was instigated by them, and I now hear representatives from all great monasteries at Lhasa are on their way here to raise troops. Gyangtse monastery was occupied by Tibetan troops to-day, and in future I will raise no objections to military treating it as a fort in accordance with warning I have already given abbot when I heard monks from it had fought against us. Dâk carried by two mounted infantry goes through daily without hindrance, and sepoys say villagers salaam them profusely.

Enclosure No. 79.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kala Tso, the 8th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 7th May. It appears Lamas tried to organise a second attack on Mission, but men refused to turn out.

Enclosure No. 80.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kala Tso, the 9th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 8th May. No further attack during night. Tibetans are still hanging about in town and ruined fort, but Major Murray has strengthened post still more so that it is impregnable against any number Tibetans can bring. Countryfolk are ploughing as usual, even close to camp.

Enclosure No. 81.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kala Tso, the 9th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 8th May. Forty mounted infantry returned here late last night after having on previous day pursued enemy to within sight of Jamdok Tso point half way to Lhasa, keeping them on run and inflicting heavy loss. O'Connor, who also returned, says new monk, Member of Council, who on our arrival here was supposed to be on his way to negotiate, was really seated at Nagartse Jong busily collecting troops. Many monks took part in fight. Position seems to have been an immensely strong one, and enemy well supplied with ammunition for their Lhasa-made rifles, four boxes containing several thousand of rounds were captured. Tibetan force was composed principally of men from districts south and east of Lhasa. Brander will be in here to-morrow. Four of Captain Parr's servants murdered in town and his things looted. Parr himself with Brander.

Enclosure No. 82.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 10th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

News from Gyangtse, dated 8th. Place still loosely invested, and two more men wounded on 6th, one of whom has since died. The ruined fort and big monastery are apparently still held by several hundred Tibetans with jingals and breech-loaders. Neighbouring hamlets are also held. Renewed attack threatened, but Brander's column should reach Gyangtse to-day, 10th Lhasa authority reported to have collected large forces and to be despatching them to Gyangtse in detachments. Between Shigatse and Nangartse, rumour credits Tibetans with seven thousand men. Trust Brander's return will clear neighbourhood of Gyangtse ; if not, shall move up with all the men I can feed. Officer Commanding, Kangma, also reports presence of Tibetan force two days' march to east, who natives say, intend to attack his post, but Brander's victory should alter their plans. Half company, 23rd Pioneers, reinforced Kala Tso to-day, and Colonel Hogge, with one and a half companies Pioneers and two maxims, leaves Phari for Kala Tso to-day, we shall then have four companies and two maxims at Kala Tso.

Enclosure No. 83.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kala Tso, the 10th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 9th May. Garrison harassed enemy all yesterday morning. I had letter from Brander, saying he would arrive to-day.

Enclosure No. 84.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kala Tso, the 10th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 9th May. Chinese official passing this morning was brought into our camp by mounted infantry to give explanation why Chinese had not given warning of recent attack on Mission. He said he was only passing through Gyangtse, but admitted local Chinese officials should have given warning. He says Parr's guard of Chinamen were beaten by Tibetans, and Parr's two Bhutia servants were killed and all his property looted. General Ma and all Chinese officials are practically besieged, and dare not leave their quarters. He has no idea how many Tibetans are in this place, but there are a great many Lamas from the Sera monastery of Lhasa. The newly-appointed Tibetan General and the Lama representative are in the fort. Tibetan soldiers, he says, are looting all towns people.

Enclosure No. 85.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kangma, the 10th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 9th May. Colonel Brander and movable column arrived back to-day. One Russian rifle has been brought in and a large quantity of Russian rifle and revolver ammunition was captured in Tibetan position, though no English weapons or ammunition were seen. Country people were ploughing unconcerned whole way back. Wounded being attended by Walton say if we kill officials, there will be no more fighting. Points established by recent events: first, people have no wish to quarrel with us; second, Lamas control everything and are determined to fight.

Enclosure No. 86.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kangma, the 11th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 10th May. Chinese official says General Ma knew of intended attack on Mission, and could have warned Mission and saved Parr's servants and property, but failed to take any action. Parr's servants were most brutally murdered, limbs being hacked off one by one. Some Mission servants spending night in town were also murdered. Strong feeling against Tibetans has grown up in camp, even amongst those who had hitherto been inclined to pity and be lenient to them.

Enclosure No. 87.

Political Diary of the Tibet Frontier Commission.

(Extract.)

18*th April*.—Minimum temperature 21°.

The Mission moved into the house and compound which they are now to occupy. The house is the property of the "Tap-shi-Pun-Kung" family, one of the "Kung" or noble families of Tibet. It was formerly the property of the

Chang-To family, by which name the property is still known. The present owner is a Tsang-De-pon, and is now at Khamba Jong. During the morning the gates of the Jong were blown up by orders of General Macdonald.

19*th April.*—Minimum temperature 27°.

General Macdonald and part of his force marched at 8 a.m. on their return journey to Chumbi. The remainder of the force moved into the Chang-To house and compounds, which are now being turned into a defensive post. A number of the leading men and head villagers came in this morning, bringing little presents of eggs, &c., to pay their respects to the British Commissioner and to promise supplies.

20*th April.*—Minimum temperature 30°. Bright clear morning.

Captain O'Connor, Captain Ryder, and Mr. Hayden rode down the Shigatse road to Dongtse (about 12 miles) where they visited the Dongtse monastery, the former residence of the Sin-Chin Lama who befriended Sarat Chandra Das. They also visited some other houses and estates of note in the valley and found the people everywhere friendly. The people are ploughing and sowing their fields, and the whole country appears perfectly contented and quiet.

21*st April.*—Minimum temperature 26°. Bright clear morning.

A bazaar was opened near camp this morning by the petty traders and shopkeepers from the town. Some 20 or 30 little booths were opened and trade continued briskly for a couple of hours, the sepoys and followers from the camp buying all manner of small articles, such as goor, spices, Tibetan cloths, caps, tobacco, &c., &c., and country produce. A despatch was received from the Amban. Captain Ryder and Mr. Hayden went out to the Yang-La and to the water-parting between the Nyang and the Rong-Chu.

22*nd April.*—Minimum temperature, 32°. Bright clear morning.

People flocking to the bazaar outside camp in increased numbers.

23*rd April.*—Minimum temperature, 32°. Bright clear morning.

Captain O'Connor rode some miles up the Lhasa road and visited the Sikkim Raja's son at his place at Ta-ring.

24*th April.*—Minimum temperature, 29°. Bright clear morning.

A messenger came into camp this morning from the Tashi Lama. This man is the accredited representative of the Tashi Lama at Gyangtse and holds the rank of Abbot in one of the sections of the Gyangtse monastery. He was selected by the head Abbot and council of the monastery to proceed to Shigatse to request the Tashi Lama to intercede with the British Commissioner regarding the fine which the latter has inflicted on the monastery owing to the presence of its monks at the last fight in the Dzanu-tang gorge. He was received by Captain O'Connor, and said he had just returned from Tashi Lhumpo, where he had seen the Penchen Rinpochu himself, and had been instructed by His Holiness to inform the British Commissioner that the monks of the Gyangtse monastery had only proceeded to join the Tibetan troops with the greatest reluctance and entirely unarmed. That they had had no wish whatever to fight, but had been compelled to go to the front by the stringent orders of the Lhasa Government officials. The British Commissioner decided not to interview the delegate to-day, but requested him to return to-morrow morning. In conversation with Captain O'Connor he informed the latter that the high-handed proceedings of the Lhasa Government had excited the greatest discontent in the province of Tsang. That the Government had even gone so far as to remove from the jurisdiction of the Tashi Lama Khamba Jong and the surrounding district owing to the friendly relations which had existed between the British and the Tashi Lhumpo officials last summer; and he referred to the case of the Sin-Chen Lama when not only was the Lama executed and his property confiscated for having befriended Sarat Chandra Das, but the Tashi Lama Government was heavily fined into the bargain. It would appear that at one time the province of Tsang was entirely controlled by the Tashi Lama, but that ever since the assumption of temporal power by the Dalai Lama Lhasa has been encroaching on the Tashi Lama's prerogatives until now the latter has scarcely any temporal power left; and the last insult of removing from him the jurisdiction of the Khamba District still further curtails his power. When questioned as to the actual dominant power at Lhasa the Abbot said that the ruling spirit was undoubtedly the Dalai Lama, and under him the heads of the three great monasteries. The Tashi Lama, he said, is 21 years of age, and concerns himself but little with worldly affairs. Captain O'Connor, under instructions from Colonel Younghusband, referred to the former friendly relations which existed between India and Tashi Lhumpo, and expressed the regret felt by the Commissioner that the action of the Gyangtse monks should have imperilled those relations, and he explained in some detail the reasons for our coming into Tibet. The Tibetans are said to be building walls across the roads leading to Lhasa at the Karo La and in the Rong Chu valley. The reason of the Amban's delay in coming to meet the British Commissioner is said to be the difficulty in inducing the Dalai Lama to appoint suitable Tibetan delegates to accompany him. The official bearer of a despatch from the Amban to Colonel Younghusband, stated in conversation that he had passed two Tibetan camps on the road from Lhasa to Gyangtse, the latter being about 60 miles from Gyangtse and holding 700 or 800 Tibetans. He had not seen any signs of walls built across the road. The people in the neighbourhood of Lhasa had been alarmed, he said, but were now apparently reassured by the counsels of the Chinese and of Tibetan and other traders to India, as well as by the reports of British treatment of Tibetans along the road to Gyangtse. The Tibetan authorities were, however, excited, and had begged the Chinese to intercede and to do whatever they could to help them. The recently appointed Chinese Commissary in the Chumbi valley called at the camp on his arrival from Shigatse. He reported all quiet there, and that the people were ploughing peacably. He spoke very favourably of the Tashi Lama, a young man of about 20 years of age, pleasant in his manner and amenable to counsel, who busied himself with but little outside his religious devotions. He laid great stress on the contrast between politics at Lhasa and Shigatse, and appeared convinced that the present troubles were entirely due to the Dalai Lama, whom he described as overbearing and truculent in his demeanour, and as harsh and forbidding in his countenance. The Amban would, he thought, leave Lhasa about May 1st, and travelling in a sedan chair, arrive at Gyangtse about May 10th. A rumour appears to be current among Chinese at Gyangtse that the Dalai Lama is endeavouring to gain time to enlist Tibetans from far and wide to resist a British advance to Lhasa, and that the local soldiers from Gyangtse, under orders from him, are quietly leaving this place and proceeding towards Lhasa.

F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND, Colonel,
British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters.

Camp Gyangtse,
27th April, 1904.

Enclosure No. 88.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Camp Gyangtse, the 27th April, 1904.

In continuation of my telegram, dated the 25th instant, I have the honour to forward a translation of the Dharm Raja's letter and of my reply thereto.

Annexure 1.

Translation of a letter received at Gyangtse on the 25th April, 1904, *from the Dharm Raja of Bhutan.*

I am glad to hear that thanks to God you are in good health. When the Timpuk Jongpen returned to Bhutan I learnt from your letter and from the copy of the speech which you had made, the circumstances of the case between England and Tibet, and the Timpuk Jongpen also gave details regarding the causes of disagreement between the two countries. The expressions which you have used in order to secure a friendly understanding are good. The Tibetan delegates who were at Guru said that in order to secure a friendly understanding it would be necessary for you to return to Yatung, and they said that it had been decided that unless you did so the matter could not be arranged. So the Timpuk Jongpen, having no alternative, returned to Bhutan. You were obliged to remain for a long time in a desert place and the Tibetans sent no representatives capable of effecting a settlement. Then after suffering much inconvenience you advanced to Guru from Thuna and had an encounter with the Tibetan soldiers. On hearing that my friends had won the victory I was greatly rejoiced. Now-a-days England and Bhutan have established a firm friendship and the Tibetan frontier is adjacent to them. I trust that at present you are experiencing no great inconvenience and incurring no great expenses and I hope that the Tibetan peasants are not suffering many hardships. Although the small officials at Guru would not hear what we had to say I have thought that the higher officials might do so, and I have therefore written a letter to the Dalai Lama, and am in hopes of a speedy reply. On its arrival I will at once send a man to you, and, meanwhile, I trust that you will suffer no inconvenience. I regret that owing to the distance I can send you no suitable offering, but I send some oranges, fruits, eggs, vegetables, &c. May there be firm faith and friendship between the English and the Bhutanese. I hope you will frequently write to me. Please let me know if there is anything you require from the Bhutan Government. I enclose some scarfs.

Dated the 22nd day of the 2nd month of the Wood Dragon year (7th April, 1904) from Panakha Palace.

Annexure 2.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Dharm Raja of Bhutan, dated Gyangtse, the 27th April, 1904.

I have received your letter and gratefully reciprocate the kind sentiments contained in it. I know that you are as anxious as I am to settle the dispute between us and the Tibetans, and shall always appreciate any assistance you can give me towards that end. But though it is now nearly ten months since I first came to Tibet to negotiate with the Tibetans they have not even yet sent a proper representative to meet me and only to-day I have received a despatch from the Amban saying that he is exhausted with talking to the Tibetans and that they have not yet agreed to his request to send a properly empowered official with him or to furnish transport to enable him to carry out his intention of visiting me. When the Dalai Lama thus defies both the British and Chinese Governments and neglects the advice both of your Government and Nepal, how can he fail to come to trouble ? His action is the foolishness of a child, not the wisdom of a great man. We tried for years to effect a settlement at Yatung, we tried at Khamba Jong, we tried at Thuna, we are trying here, but our patience will not last for ever.

You express the hope that the Tibetan peasants are not suffering many hardships. They have suffered much from their own Government in having to furnish supplies and transport for the soldiers foolishly collected to fight against us ; but they have suffered nothing from us. It is our custom, even during warfare, to pay for everything which is taken from the peasants. So now, every day, of their own accord the villagers bring in large quantities of country produce to our camp for sale, and all the traders in the town come there daily to sell goods to our officers and soldiers. A hospital has also been opened in the camp where the wounded and the sick are treated free of charge.

I am much obliged to you for the very welcome present you send me, and I trust you will accept the vase which accompanies this letter as a small token of the sincere regard I feel towards you.

Enclosure No. 89.

From the General Officer Commanding, Chumbi, to the Adjutant-General in India, dated the 11*th May,* 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Major Murray, Commanding Gyangtse, reports, 8th, Brander's Mounted Infantry returned Gyangtse 7th. Enemy reinforced by large numbers mounted men from Shigatse side morning 8th. Reconnaissance in force to clear surrounding country made on 8th. Our casualties *nil.* Enemy lost eight horsemen ; other casualties unknown. Evening 8th many enemy seen leaving fort by Shigatse road. Brander expected to arrive Gyangtse 9th. Colonel Brander reports from Gyangtse, evening 9th, that he reached Gyangtse that day without opposition on road. Strong force of enemy still holding ruined Jong, which they are repairing and strengthening. Several jingals effective against our post. Our 7-prs. cannot reply effectively, owing to their limited range. Colonel Brander considers assault on Jong without efficient artillery would be a costly measure. He also sends following additional particulars regarding engagement at Karo La on 6th. Enemy completely routed and lost heavily. Exact numbers not known. Their camp and baggage were captured ; 121 large tents, large quantities rations, gunpowder, arms, and hundreds of maunds of blankets, cloaks, and clothing were burnt or destroyed. Seven Lamas were among the prisoners. Mounted infantry pursued very effectively for ten miles, and found and burnt a second Tibetan camp. Telegraphic communication with Kangma opened last night.

Enclosure No. 90.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kangma, the 12th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 11th May. It is reported 3,000 Tibetans have left Khamba Jong for Gyangtse. Number probably exaggerated, but movement not unlikely.

Enclosure No. 91.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kangma, the 12th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 11th May. Wilton hears from a Chinese source that Amban recently received letter from representatives of the three great Lhasa monasteries. They denied that Dalai Lama had power to ratify a treaty, and said it was compulsory on Dalai Lama to work conjointly with the three great monasteries. Amban was notified he might negotiate as much as he pleased with British, but Tibetans would have nothing to do with them, and Amban was warned against making any treaty allowing British proceed beyond Yatung.

Enclosure No. 92.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 10th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

At Karo La Chinese fought against us and some were killed. At Gyangtse General Ma, Chinese delegate, withheld information regarding intended Tibetan attack. Captain Parr, who lived in Gyangtse town, escaped, but his servants were killed.

Enclosure No. 93.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 13th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Colonel Brander reports from Gyangtse morning 12th May. Situation unchanged, except that reinforcements for the Jong from Rong valley reported to have arrived last night. He proceeded with demolition of village about 1,200 yards north of post. All mules from Gyangtse with escort under Major Murray arrived Kangma 12th, and should reach Gyangtse 14th with supplies. Colonel Hogge with two companies 23rd Pioneers and two maxims arrives Kala Tso to-day. Supplies coming into Chumbi valley satisfactorily at rate of about 800 maunds a day in spite of frequent slips due to rain in Teesta valley and on both routes.

Enclosure No. 94.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 13th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Colonel Brander reports, morning 13th, from Gyangtse, one sepoy 32nd Pioneers severely wounded on 12th by jingal ball. Political report that reinforcements of Kham men expected the Tibetans at Gyangtse on 14th. More jingals have been mounted in the Jong. Information received that parties of enemy who were reported on the Relung Kangma road have now retired over the Karo La as result of fight on 9th. The road between Rorotang and Rangpo, reported again breached by heavy rain, will require three days to repair.

Enclosure 95.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Gyangtse, the 3rd May 1904.

In continuation of my telegram of this day's date, I have the honour to forward a translation of the Amban's despatch of the 29th April.

Annexure.

Letter from His Excellency Yu Tai, Chinese Amban at Lhasa, to Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated the 29th April 1904.

On the 19th April I had the honour to receive your official communication, stating that certain monks had fought against you, and asking me for a reply as to whether the Dalai Lama was aware of these circumstances and whether he had encouraged these monks to take up arms. I sent a translated copy of your despatch to the Dalai Lama, but on 26th April, I had received no reply. On that day my messenger to you returned with your despatch of 24th April. After most attentively perusing your communication I sent a translated copy to the Dalai Lama and summoned the Councillors of State (Kalons) and the representatives of the three great monasteries. With great stress I explained the circumstances, and urged them to at once send fully empowered Tibetan delegates. At the same time I stated that I had decided to leave for Gyangtse on 3rd May in order to discuss all outstanding matters with you, and demanded that transport should be got ready for me. On 27th April I received replies from the Dalai Lama and the representatives of the three great monasteries, denying that they had known of or had encouraged the monks taking up arms against you. Not a [word was mentioned about my transport and the other matters. I was at a loss to understand the reason of this, and forthwith wrote again urgently to the Dalai Lama. As soon as I receive a reply I will communicate again with you.

Enclosure No. 96.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kangma, the 14th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 13th May. Information received that Tibetans collected between Karo La and Kangma retreated on hearing result of Karo La engagement.

Enclosure No. 97.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kangma, the 15th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 14th May. Wounded whom Walton had attended had to be sent away for want of accommodation, but they said they dare not go to Jong for fear of being killed by officials for accepting treatment from us. Mission has been fired on continuously for ten days, and number and weight of enemy guns are increasing. Mounted infantry carrying dâk were fired on to-day. Mission is perfectly safe, but is besieged as far as enemy dare besiege us.

Enclosure No. 98.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 15th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Brander wires, Gyangtse, 14th May, 10 p.m. Enemy have mounted 4-pounder cannon this morning which opened fire from the Jong. They have occupied monastery two miles north-west of post. Dâk sowars were fired on on 14th, but drove off enemy and got through. Is sending force to meet convoy expected from Kangma to-morrow.

Enclosure No. 99.

Political Diary of the Tibet Frontier Commission.

(Extract.)

25th April.—Minimum temperature 32°. Bright clear morning.

The British Commissioner received the Tashi Lhumpo delegate, and, in consideration of the request for forgiveness brought by him from the Tashi Lama, he consented to remit half the fine imposed upon the Gyangtse Monastery. Colonel Younghusband, however, informed the Abbot that in return for this concession he should expect a letter from the Tashi Lama definitely stating that for the future he would refuse to permit any of the monks under his control to join the forces of the Lhasa Government. A letter was received from the Dharm Raja of Bhutan congratulating the British Commissioner on the success at Guru, and saying that he had written to the Dalai Lama and on receipt of a reply would send a Bhutanese official to Gyangtse to assist in effecting a settlement.

26th April.—Minimum temperature 31°. Fine clear morning.

The head Abbot and the Bursar of the Gyangtse Monastery came up bringing the first instalment of their fine. A convoy of some 200 mules arrived from Kangma.

27th April.—Minimum temperature 32·5°. Fine bright morning.

In the afternoon a monk of the Dongtse Monastery returned from Tashi Lhumpo. He said he had seen the Treasurer, Ba-du-la, who has now partially recovered his health, and had a long conversation with him, repeating to him what he had heard regarding the arrival of the English here and their friendly sentiments towards the Tashi Lama and his Government. Ba-du-la replied that he was well acquainted with our friendly feelings, having experienced them at Khamba Jong, and that he would take an early opportunity of again addressing the Tashi Lama in the matter. This monk says that the two Tsang Depons, Men-kyi-ling and Ram-po, are at Penam Jong.

28th April.—Minimum temperature 39° (?). Bright clear morning.

A reconnaissance consisting of one company of infantry and some mounted men started this morning for Gubshi *en route* to the Karo La. Captain Ryder, Captain McCowie and Mr. Hayden accompanied the party for scientific purposes.

29th April.—Minimum temperature 29·5°. Bright clear morning.

The Abbot came again to camp, bringing in the greater part of the fine.

30th April.—Minimum temperature 25·5°. Bright clear morning.

Colonel Waddell, Captain O'Connor, and Mr. Wilton rode some ten miles down the Shigatse valley and visited a monastery of recluses of the Nyingina or ancient sect. The country appears everywhere quiet and peaceful, the people quite friendly in their demeanour, and engaged busily in ploughing and sowing. The willows are now in leaf and some fields of peas are showing green sprouts an inch or so high.

1st May.—Minimum temperature 33°. Cloudy morning. Snow fell during the night on the surrounding hills, and there was a smart hailstorm here about noon.

A report was received during the afternoon from Captain Hodgson, 32nd Pioneers, who is in command of the party reconnoitring the Karo La. He reports that on the 30th April he advanced with his mounted infantry across the Karo La, and some three miles beyond in the pass found the Tibetans in occupation of a wall some 600 yards long, built across the valley. The Tibetans, estimated at from 1,000 to 1,500 in number, opened a heavy fire on the mounted infantry skirmishing line at about 300 yards distance. The sepoys then retired steadily, firing only a few shots, and during the retirement the Tibetans on the hills to the left rolled down stones upon them. There were no casualties, and the party returned to Rahung *en route* to Gyangtse. The bulk of the Tibetan soldiers are said to be Kam-pas or men from Eastern Tibet. The Shigatse and Gyangtse troops who were engaged in the fight at the gorge on the 10th April are said to have returned to Shigatse and to have been dispatched thence to the neighbourhood of Ribung Jong in the Rong Valley where they are in a position to reinforce the troops on the Lhasa road when required. There is another report to the effect that there is a large gathering (estimated at 4,000 men) at Shigatse itself, and that a portion of this will move up towards Gyangtse in order to guard the stores of Government grain at Dongtse. It is reported among Chinese officials at Gyangtse that the Amban has definitely decided to start from Lhasa on May 3rd.

F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND,
British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters.

Gyangtse,
3rd May, 1904.

Enclosure No. 100.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 15th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Colonel Brander reports from Gyangtse, 13th May, 10 p.m. Situation unchanged, enemy have mounted more jingals and are expecting large gun from Lhasa shortly. He will do his best to capture gun *en route* and is, meanwhile, harassing enemy with sharpshooters, and endeavouring to cut their water-supply. He presses for two 10-pounders and two companies infantry, with which he says he can easily hold his own and keep up active enterprises against enemy. I am sending him draft 32nd Pioneers, half company Sappers, and 20 mounted infantry,—total 160 rifles and also two 10-pounders, as other guns are *en route* from India. These reinforcements left Chumbi this morning, and should arrive Gyangtse 24th. This force can be escorted to vicinity of Gyangtse by Colonel Hogge, with additional 250 rifles, if necessary. Teesta road closed yesterday, but being repaired. Rungpo-Roratang road repaired and working to-day. Gantok-Rungpo road not yet fit for carts, but 750 maunds a day being passed over by pack and coolies.

Enclosure No. 101.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 12th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

I have received a report, dated Gyangtse, morning of the 11th May, from Colonel Brander, in which he states that on the 10th May the enemy's position was reconnoitred, and a village which threatened our right at 1,500 yards was destroyed, but that the Jong was found to be now too strongly defended by walls and sangars for assault to be made without strong support of artillery. No further casualties have taken place among our force at Gyangtse, but annoying and accurate fire, with jingals and numerous modern rifles, has been maintained by enemy posted on Jong hill, 1,400 yards away, our 7-pounders being unable to reply effectively. Brander, apparently with a view to attacking the jong, asks for following reinforcements: two 10-pounders, two companies infantry, and 50 mounted infantry. Following are being sent up: one company infantry, 20 mounted infantry, half company sappers. But I am not sending the 10-pounders at present, as they have no common shell; and these guns would be of greater use in the field, should it be found necessary for me to clear communications. As everything now points to a concentrated effort being made by enemy at Gyangtse, and as our communications with the place may soon be interrupted, I would strongly urge that the additional guns, troops and transport asked for may be sent without delay. Gyangtse post itself should easily hold out with its present garrison.

Enclosure No. 102.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated the 14th May, 1904.]

(Telegraphic.)

Following from Secretary of State:—" His Majesty's Government have considered your telegram of the 6th May. They agree that recent events make it inevitable that the Mission must advance to Lhasa unless the Tibetans consent to open negotiations at Gyangtse. They, therefore, authorise you to give notice to the Amban that we shall insist on negotiations at Lhasa itself if no competent Tibetan negotiator appears in conjunction with him at Gyangtse within a month, or such further period as may be found necessary for completing preparations for advance. It is, however, the wish of His Majesty's Government that Your Excellency's Government should clearly understand that it is not their intention to depart in any way from the policy which was laid down in my telegram of the 6th November last to the Viceroy." We are asking Macdonald what is the earliest date by which he can advance. You should give notice without delay to the Amban in accordance with the Secretary of State's directions. The day on which Macdonald says he can advance should be specified, in your communication to the Amban, as the date on which you will decline negotiations at Gyangtse. You will, of course, understand that the orders conveyed in my telegram of the 8th May, as to the control of military operations, must hold good, pending commencement of negotiations.

Enclosure No. 103.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 16th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Brander reports, Gyangtse, 15th May, 10 p.m. Situation unchanged. Break on Teesta road reported partly repaired, two-thirds convoy got through. Experiment of using yaks in ekkas promises success.

Enclosure No. 104.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kangma, the 17th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 16th May. Your telegram of 14th May. I have no means of communicating with Amban. We are bombarded from fort all day long, and any messenger sent to town would undoubtedly be murdered as were the servants of even Parr, the Chinese Joint Commissioner.

Enclosure No. 105.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kangma, the 17th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 16th May. Report that 1,000 men are on way from Lhasa with two large guns, and also that force here has been augmented by large number of cavalry. Force dispersed at Karo La are said to have scattered over the country.

Enclosure No. 106.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 17th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Colonel Brander wires, evening 16th, from Gyangtse. Convoy from Kangma arrived here to-day safely, enemy confining themselves to ineffectual fire from Jong. One thousand more Lhasa troops, with two guns, expected Gyangtse shortly. Supplies now in Gyangtse sufficient to last present garrison for three months. All quiet on communications.

Enclosure No. 107.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 19th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Colonel Brander wires, Gyangtse, dated 7 a.m. 19th morning. Eighteenth enemy occupied a building north of post and opened fire with jingals and breech-loaders. This morning at 3.30 a.m. the building stormed by two companies 8th Gurkhas, accompanied by party of Pioneers with explosives, who effected a breach ten feet wide. Enemy were expelled and suffered heavily. Our casualties three wounded.

Enclosure No. 108.

From His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., dated Simla, the 8th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

The attack on the Mission at Gyangtse and serious opposition at Karo La have, for the present, changed the position in Tibet. Until the Tibetans show a willingness to negotiate, military considerations will necessarily preponderate. Under these circumstances the Government of India consider you should resume the same control of military operations as you had on your advance from Thuna to Gyangtse. You will make no permanent advance from Gyangtse towards Lhasa, but you are empowered to break up any forces of the enemy in your vicinity that would, in your opinion, threaten to attack the Mission at Gyangtse, or your line of communications with Chumbi. These orders will hold good until active opposition ceases, and Colonel Younghusband is able to negotiate with proper Chinese and Tibetan delegates.

Enclosure No. 109.

From His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., dated Simla, the 14th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

If all troops, guns, and transport asked for by you are sent can you begin advance towards Lhasa in a month from now ; if not, what is the earliest date ? Reply urgent.

Enclosure No. 110.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, dated Chumbi, the 15th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your wire of to-day. Reply is yes, unless unexpected complications arise.

Enclosure No. 111.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Foreign Secretary Simla, dated Chumbi, the 18th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Brander reports, Gyangtse, evening 17th May. Situation unchanged.

Enclosure No. 112.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated the 20th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of 16th instant. No advance can be commenced until formality of giving notice has been complied with. It is, therefore, essential that you should make every endeavour to despatch your letter to the Amban. If you can send it to the Commander of Tibetan forces, with a covering letter explaining nature of the communication, you will have complied sufficiently with the necessary formality. But you should also send a letter to the Dalai Lama in same terms as that to the Amban, in order that Tibetans may be fully aware of decision of British Government. Could you not use prisoner or friendly peasant as messenger ?

Enclosure No. 113.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Chumbi, the 20th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Colonel Brander wires, Gyangtse, 7 a.m. morning of 20th. Yesterday afternoon dâk patrol of eight mounted infantry, when nearing Gyangtse post, were ambuscaded and surrounded by Tibetans, but were extricated by help from post after losing one killed, two wounded, and one rifle ; also seven ponies killed or wounded. Enemy's loss not known, but considerable. Colonel Brander moves out to-day against village concerned. He has cut off water-supply of Jong and town ; enemy draw water from well at night. He suspects cordon has been drawn round post, but dâk got through to-day.

Enclosure No. 114.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 21st May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

News received from Captain Pearson, Commanding post at Kangma, that his eight mounted infantry had returned at 7 p.m. from Chengra having waited there for the mails from Gyangtse till 4 p.m., up to which time they had not arrived. They report that inhabitants have left villages of Dota and Chengra which are now deserted. Colonel Hogge's column arrives Kangma to-morrow.

Enclosure No. 115.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 22nd May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Colonel Brander reports from Gyangtse, 7 p.m., 21st. Column moved out yesterday against some villages 1½ miles to our rear, held by enemy and which menaced line of communications. A stubborn resistance was made by Tibetan garrison of one of these, and an entry could not be effected till the wall had been blown in, which was done by Lieutenant Gurdon, 32nd Pioneers, the Havildar of the storming party being killed. The village was then captured, our losses in the assault being one Havildar and one sepoy, 32nd Pioneers. killed, Lieutenant Hodgson and three sepoys, 32nd Pioneers, wounded. Lieutenant Hodgson was wounded in the wrist leading an assault on a building. Dâk was not sent off this morning as men were tired. All mules and mails, escorted by 50 rifles and mounted infantry, proceed before dawn to-morrow to Kangma. Unable to push through any more dâks until convoy returns from Kangma.

Enclosure No. 116.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 22nd May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Colonel Hogge wires from Kangma, 5 p.m., 22nd. Spare transport of 300 mules arrived safely at Kangma this afternoon from Gyangtse. Convoy was fired on by jingals from Naini monastery, seven miles from Gyangtse.

Enclosure No. 117.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 23rd May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

The convoy with reinforcements for Gyangtse left Kangma this morning and should arrive to-morrow. Colonel Brander is arranging to co-operate. Two sections, No. 7 British Mounted Battery, arrived Siliguri last night. One section, No. 30 Native Mounted Battery, with 7-pounder guns and two spare 7-pounder guns, arrived Siliguri to-day.

Enclosure No. 118.

Political Diary of the Tibet Frontier Commission.

(Extract.)

2nd May, 1904.—Minimum temperature 33·5°. Cloudy morning. Snow fell on the surrounding hills during the night.

The column returned from reconnoitring the Karo La. Colonel Brander decided to take out another column numbering some 300 rifles on the following day in order to disperse the Tibetan gathering and so safeguard the line of communication. In view of the rumours of the hostile attitude of the Tibetans towards Shigatse and their reinforcement by local levies, it was considered advisable to place the Gyangtse Jongpen in custody in the British Camp. A Chinese official called at the camp on the evening of the 2nd. He explained that he had heard that we were sending a party of soldiers to the Karo La, and he desired us to postpone the matter for a few days when the Amban would positively be on his way to Gyangtse. He said that the unprovoked firing on Lieutenant Hodgson and his few men from the Tibetan position at the Karo La was entirely due to a mistake on the part of Tibetan subordinate officers. The Tibetan officers there had, he added, written acknowledging their mistake and had beheaded two of the Tibetans, who had given orders to fire. He himself had previously written to the Tibetan officers in command of the fortified post at the Karo La warning them not to attack Lieutenant Hodgson's small party which had no hostile purpose, and proposed only to carry out surveying operations. Mr. Ma was informed that his wishes would be laid before Colonel Younghusband, and he left declaring that he would send, without delay, a written communication to the Tibetans at the fortified post at the Karo La on no account to attack the British party.

3rd May, 1904.—Minimum temperature 25°. Bright morning.

A despatch was received from the Amban to say that he had written to the Dalai Lama regarding the presence of the Gyangtse monks at the fight at the gorge, and asking to be supplied with transport for his proposed move to Gyangtse, and to have a *Shape* detailed to accompany him. The Dalai Lama replied that he knew nothing of the action of the monks, and made no reference to the matter of transport or of detailing a *Shape*. The column under Colonel Brander, consisting of three companies 32nd Pioneers, one company 8th Gurkhas, two 7-pr. guns and two Maxims, Mr. Wilton and Captain O'Connor, marched for Gob-shi at 8 a.m., arriving there about 4.30 p.m.

4th May, 1904.—Minimum temperature 28·5°.

The column under Colonel Brander marched from Gob-shi to Ra-lung.

5th May, 1904.—Minimum temperature 31°. Bright morning.

At 4.30 a.m. this morning a force of some 800 Tibetans, supported by 800 more in the fort and town, made a determined attack upon the British camp at Gyangtse, directing their efforts more particularly against the Mission compound. They were beaten off after a fight lasting about three-quarters of an hour and fled north and north-west, pursued by half the garrison. Their casualties are estimated at 250, the loss on the British side being three men wounded, one of whom subsequently died. During the pursuit the Tibetans who had occupied the Jong and monastery fired into the camp for some time. Their leaders are said to be the Te-ling-Kusho (who was so constantly in and out of my camp at Khamba Jong) and a monk official from Lhasa. The men were for the most part recruited under the orders of the Lhasa Government from the neighbourhood of Shigatse and Gyangtse and from the Rong Chu Valley. The column under Colonel Brander marched from Ra-lung and camped about one mile south of the Karo La. Colonel Brander and staff reconnoitred the enemy's position three miles beyond the pass and found them in occupation of a strongly built stone wall running right across the valley, flanked by precipitous and almost inaccessible hills, the slopes of which were moreover protected by sangars and stone booby-traps.

6th May, 1904.—Colonel Brander attacked and dispersed the Tibetan force, pursuing them to within sight of Yam-dok Tso. The Tibetan losses are estimated at 400, our losses were Captain Bethune and 4 men killed and 16 men wounded.

7th May, 1904.—Minimum temperature 29°. Bright morning.

Captain O'Connor interrogated the prisoners who said that the Tibetan force numbered some 1,500 to 2,000 men, mostly drawn from the districts of

Lho-ka, Tak-po, Kong-bu, and other smaller districts lying south-east of Lhasa. They were commanded by a layman called Nga-po (who is a man of good family with large estate in Kong-bu), and a monk official. As to the monks, they said that they had been ordered to fight by the Jongpen of Nangartse Jong acting under the orders of a monk *Shape* (called Cham-pa Ton Lin) and another high ecclesiastical official who, it appears, have been established for some time Nangartse Jong organizing the Tibetan forces. There were representatives of the three great Lhasa monasteries at the fight, but no monks from Lhasa were actually engaged in it. Each monk had been provided by the Lhasa Government with a matchlock and a knife before starting to join the army. Colonel Brander's column marched to Ra-lung, and the Mounted Infantry accompanied by Captain O'Connor rode through to Gyangtse.

8th May, 1904.—Minimum temperature 32°. Bright morning.

At 10 o'clock some cavalry were seen riding out from the Jong and were at once pursued by the Mountry Infantry, who hunted them into a house, and then with the assistance of rifle fire from camp dispersed and put to flight another large body of cavalry from the Jong to cut off the Mounted Infantry. The enemy in the Jong were harassed by rifle-fire from the post and adjoining houses until 2 p.m., and the Tibetans from the Jong fired into the camp. Colonel Brander's column marched to Gob-shi. Three of the Mission servants disappeared on the night of the attack on the Gyangtse post. They are said to have been killed by the Tibetans. Two Gurkha servants of Captain Parr are said to have been lopped to pieces limb by limb before being killed. The officers responsible for this outrage are the Tibetan Commanders, the Te-ling-Kusho and his monk associate. There are said to be numerous monks from the Sera monastery with the troops in the Jong. There is said to be a large gathering in the Rong Valley ready to move on Gyangtse. It is reported from Chinese sources that a body of 3,000 Tibetan soldiers have left the Khamba Jong district for Gyangtse, heedless of the protests of the Chinese officials at Gyangtse.

F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND, *Colonel*,
British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters.

Gyangtse, May 11th, 1904.

Enclosure No. 119.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 21st May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Letter received from Tongsa Penlop, Bhutan, dated 16th May. He says he starts on 28th instant to see me and has many things to tell me in detail, and asks leave to bring with him the Lhasa Lama who brought the Dalai Lama's letter. I shall reply that I shall be glad to see him and that he may bring Lama.

Enclosure No. 120.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the Assistant to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated the 26th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Please refer to General Macdonald's telegram of the 21st May to the Adjutant-General. You should see the Tongsa Penlop, and explain to him that we can only negotiate with the Tibetan Government at the place and in the manner which we have repeatedly indicated. But if the Tongsa Penlop wishes to render his good offices, which we shall appreciate, he should impress on the Dalai Lama the folly and uselessness of resistance. He should tell the Dalai Lama, in reply to his letter, that the British Government have no desire to injure the Tibetans or their country, or to interfere with their religion, but that they insist on a settlement of the differences which have existed for so long. The Dalai Lama has only to send properly accredited representatives to Gyangtse with the Chinese Amban, in order to arrive at an amicable settlement and avoid further disturbance and bloodshed. But the patience of the British Government is now nearly exhausted, and if the Dalai Lama fails to send representatives to Gyangtse before the day which has been notified to him, the British Government will no longer consent to negotiate there, but will send more troops to protect their Mission which will advance and compel negotiations at Lhasa.

Enclosure No. 121.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 27th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Draft of 70 men for 23rd Pioneers proceed to Phari to-morrow. One company, 8th Gurkhas, proceed from Phari to Kala Tso on 30th, which with yak guard will give nine companies infantry between Kangma and Thuna under Colonel Hogge. No news received from Gyangtse up to 9 p.m. to-day. Strength Gyangtse garrison now two 10-pounders, two 7-pounders, two maxims, and 720 effective rifles, excluding sick and casualties.

Enclosure No. 122.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 28th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

News received from Thuna to-day, based on reports from Tibetans wounded who are attending hospital there, that 400 Tibetans are at Hram on east of Lake Bham Tso, who intend to attack communications. The presence of some Tibetans at that place is established by a Tibetan trader who was wounded by them and arrived at Thuna to-day for treatment. Colonel Hogge's mounted infantry are endeavouring to locate this party. Tibetans wounded at Thuna also report that a force of 2,000 Tibetans, with four jingals, are marching from Khamba Jong on Thuna. Mounted infantry from Thuna are on the look-out, but have not located them. Orders issued to discontinue staging system, and to work by guarded convoys between Phari and Kala Tso until situation cleared up. Second mounted infantry left for Phari to-day and arrive to-morrow morning and two companies, 23rd Pioneers, leave this to-morrow, arriving Phari 13th. All posts on the alert, and Colonel Hogge and movable column at Kala Tso warned. Have just heard from Colonel Hogge that Gyangtse does not propose sending any mails before 28th. Colonel Read arrived Chumbi to-day.

Enclosure No. 123.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kangma, the 29th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 28th May. A Chinaman whom Wilton found while accompanying a returning convoy to-day says Amban was unable to obtain transport to come here and sent an official to explain matters to me, but official found things so unsettled he was afraid to come. Chinaman says Tibetans are very truculent now, and talk of first attacking us and cutting all our throats, and then murdering all Chinese. Further reinforcements are said to be coming from Lhasa, but capture Palla village on the 26th was great shock to the Tibetans. Tibetans here were under General recently arrived from Lhasa.

Enclosure No. 124.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 27th May.

(Telegraphic.)

I have received letter from Tongsa Penlop, dated 16th May, saying Dalai Lama has sent him a reply by hand of a Lama to his request for information as to whether or no Tibetans desired friendship with England. Dalai Lama says :—" You, Bhutanese, say you will make a settlement between England and Tibet, but you do not say definitely how you will do it." Tongsa Penlop wishes to come here with the Lama to see me, and I am telling him I shall be glad to see him.

Enclosure No. 125.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 29th May, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Convoy from Gyangtse arrived Kangma to-day unopposed with telegraphic despatches from Colonel Brander, summary of which is as follows :—24th May, convoy and reinforcements arrived at Gyangtse ; they were opposed by enemy estimated at 1,000 strong at village and monastery of Niani, slight engagement followed, enemy did not venture into open. 25th May, without incident. 26th May, as enemy had occupied Palla village, 800 yards east of Jong and 1,100 yards from post, and were connecting village with Jong by a wall, Colonel Brander moved out at 2.30 a.m., with four companies infantry, four guns, and half company sappers, to attack village. Breaches were effected in two places at 4 a.m., but enemy's resistance most obstinate, as village did not fall into our hands till 1.30 p.m., Major Peterson, 32nd Pioneers, greatly distinguishing himself, effecting a lodgment on north of village and sapping from house to house. The enemy lost very heavily and 37 prisoners were taken. Regret to report our casualties were as follows : killed, Lieutenant Garstin, R.E., most gallantly in breach, and three men wounded ; Captain O'Connor, R.A., in shoulder, severe ; Lieutenant Mitchell, 32nd Pioneers, in leg, severe ; Lieutenant Walker, R.E., slight ; and also 9 men wounded, whose degree of injury is not stated. 28th May, convoy left for Kangma with escort of mounted infanty and two companies infantry, accompanied to Mani by guns and sappers. Village and monastery of Mani found unoccupied, enemy having retired on 27th. Monastery, which had been enemy's head-quarters, was rendered useless from military point of view. Sappers and guns returning to Gyangtse. Colonel Brander also reports that by occupation of Palla village the water-supply of the Jong is completely cut, and that he hopes to resume more frequent mail service after a few days. Colonel Hogge reports from Kala Tso this morning that no trace of enemy found on Lhasa road near Hram. His mounted infantry are to-day reconnoitring towards Khamba Jong.

Enclosure No. 126.

Political Diary of the Tibet Frontier Commission.

9th May, 1904.—Minimum temperature 37°. Bright clear morning.

About 8 a.m. a Chinese official was seen riding away from Gyangtse and was brought into camp and interviewed regarding recent events at Gyangtse. About 2 p.m. the column under Colonel Brander returned to camp, and arrangements were at once made to harry the occupants of the Jong by rifle and maxim fire.

10th May.—Minimum temperature 24°. Bright clear morning.

The remains of the late Captain Bethune were buried in a grove of trees near the post at 8 a.m. At 10 a.m. Colonel Brander took out a small column and reconnoitered the further force of the Jong from the hills to the east and north. The Tibetans fired on the column on its return, but there were no casualties.

11th May.—Minimum temperature 31°. Bright clear morning.

Some working parties went out at daybreak and destroyed some houses in the neighbourhood of the post likely to afford cover to the enemy. A convoy of empty animals guarded by 50 rifles was despatched to Kangma to bring in stores. Our snipers continued to fire on the occupants of the Jong during the day and the Tibetans returned the fire-jingals, rifles, and matchlocks.

12th May.—Minimum temperature 33°. Cloudy day.

Day spent in improving the defence of the post and sniping anybody visible in the Jong or monastery. One Sikh wounded by a jingal bullet. A rumour was received that a force of Kambas from Eastern Tibet is expected on the 14th, and will occupy a village about a 1,000 yards from the post on the opposite side of the river. A large cannon is also expected from Shigatse.

13th May.—Minimum temperature 31°. Soft cloudy day.

Colonel Brander took out the mounted infantry and burnt the village which was expected to be occupied by the Kambas.

14th May.—Minimum temperature 37°. Cloudy day. A shower about 5 p.m.

The Tibetans mounted and fired their new gun which carries a 3¾lb. lump of lead. They lined their sangars and cheered as their first shot was fired. Captain Ottley, reconnoitring with the mounted infantry, found a force of Tibetans (mostly monks) in occupation of the big Tse-chen monastery some five miles down the valley. They allowed him to approach to within 400 yards when they opened a heavy fire upon him and he retired without loss. The mounted infantry sepoys bringing in the dâk were also fired at by four men near Na-nying. They returned the fire and the enemy galloped off leaving some of their clothing behind them.

15th May.—Minimum temperature 34°. Cloudy day.

A party of 50 Gurkhas and some mounted infantry were sent out to meet the convoy expected back to-morrow. Mr. Wilton accompanied the party.

F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND, Colonel,
British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters.

Gyangtse,
The 20th May, 1904.

Enclosure No. 127.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 1st June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Mounted infantry reconnaissances in all direction between Phari, Thuna, and Kala Tso show the country clear of any force of enemy. One company, 8th Gurkhas, has arrived Chumbi from Gnatong. The Tongsa Penlop of Bhutan arrives on a visit to me at Phari to-morrow. Mr. Walsh has gone to meet him. Owing to state of road, convoys were unable to proceed between Sivoke and Reang yesterday or to-day.

Enclosure No. 128.

From the Assistant to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 2nd June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Tongsa Penlop arrived this afternoon with retinue of two hundred. Has brought Dalai Lama's envoy, Lama Serkhangtulku, with him. He is staying at the Chatsa monastery where all arrangements have been made. He will have interview with me to-morrow morning. Punakha Jongpen arrives to-morrow.

Enclosure No. 129.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 2nd June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Officer Commanding, Kangma, reports patrolled half-way to Gyangtse and found all quiet. Sevoke-Reang section, Teesta Valley Road, still blocked. Two companies and head-quarters, Royal Fusiliers, arrived Chumbi.

Enclosure No. 130.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kangma, the 3rd June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 3rd June, 3 a.m. Tibetans made another attack at 12.30 a.m.

Enclosure No. 131.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kangma, the 3rd June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 2nd June. Messengers who came from Jong to-day describe soldiers as longing return to their homes. A Lhasa General was killed by our sharp-shooters through window in Jong some days ago. Numbers about here, messenger said, were 9,000, but this is probably double real number. Shigatse itself, they say, is denuded of troops. Villages which Tibetans had occupied to surround us on east have all now been evacuated. All males between 18 and 60 have been enrolled.

Enclosure No. 132.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kangma, the 3rd June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 30th May. Tibetans attacked us again last night, but with no resolution. Their losses were twelve or fifteen killed. We had no losses.

Enclosure No. 133.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kangma, the 3rd June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 2nd June. I yesterday wrote letters to Amban and Dalai Lama, saying that, unless Amban and competent Tibetan negotiators appeared here by 25th June, we would insist upon negotiations being carried on at Lhasa. I sent these letters by prisoner with open covering letter, giving purport of them to Tibetan Commander in fort. Prisoner, before undertaking to deliver letter, asked to be allowed to return to us as prisoner. This morning Tibetan General returned letters, saying it was not their custom to receive communications from us. This afternoon, finding Tibetans were under impression my communication implied an armistice, and were taking advantage of it to loophole walls and build covered ways, I sent message to say that, as they had refused to receive my letters, there was no armistice, and we would continue to fight as before. Tibetan General thereupon sent a messenger to say that he would despatch a Chinese official to me to receive letters, and asked that in meanwhile we should not fight. I replied that we would not fire on a flag of truce, but would continue to fire on every occupied place within vicinity of post.

Enclosure No. 134.

From the Assistant to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 3rd June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Have had interview with Tong-sa Pen-lop and Serkhang Tulku this morning, and have informed Tong-sa Pen-lop as directed in your telegram 26th May. Also informed him of the necessity for the Mission, Tibetans having broken treaty, both as regards boundary and trade, the Dalai Lama having refused to receive letters from the Viceroy, and of the necessity for the advance owing to Tibetan Government having failed to send properly qualified representative. He admits unreasonableness and folly of Tibetan position which was due to bad advice of Tibetan Ministers. He said that the delay in sending qualified representative then to Khamba Jong and since was due to the mismanagement of the Ministers which had led to their dismissal. He said nothing would be gained by Mission going to Lhasa, as Dalai Lama and Government will all leave before their arrival, and they will find no one there to negotiate with. He had written informing Dalai Lama the three points required by the British Government as stated by Colonel Younghusband to the Timpuk Jongpen at Thuna. He had now received reply from Dalai Lama that Sikkim boundary must be as it was; that no English may enter Tibet, that no trade mart may be established, and that no communication from Indian Government can be received by Tibetan Government. He says that Mission will meet with determined resistance if advance Lhasa, and on arrival find Lhasa deserted by the Dalai Lama and Government. He says that Tibetans believe Bhutan to be helping British, and have arrested two messengers that he sent to Colonel Younghusband to Gyangtse and imprisoned them at Shigatse. He says that rumour current in Bhutan that I was killed at Guru, Colonel Younghusband killed at Gyangtse and his clothes and belongings taken to Lhasa, and latest accounts that Russians had landed at Calcutta, defeated English, and set up five banners.

Enclosure No. 135.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 3rd June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Telegrams received this afternoon from Colonel Brander contain following information:—On 27th, party of enemy, retiring towards Shigatse, were attacked by mounted infantry, who inflicted some casualties. 29th, sappers destroyed two houses which enemy had prepared for occupation. 30th, enemy made half-hearted night attacks on Valla and Gurkha outpost. Attacks easily repulsed; no casualties our side. First tower of Ruddenkang village blown down. All available mules bringing in grain to captured villages. Colonel Younghusband despatched ultimatum to Dalai Lama. 2nd June, Colonel Younghusband's letter to Dalai Lama returned by Officer Commanding, Gyangtse Jong. Colonel Brander also reports that two four-pounders were captured at Palla, and that information has been received that Lhasa General was killed in the Jong. Colonel Younghusband reports also by same mail he informed Tibetan Officer Commanding, Gyangtse Jong, that sending these letters did not constitute an armistice; this was done, as Tibetans seized opportunity to fortify points which they could not occupy owing to our fire. Tibetan General then said he would send Chinese official to take over letters, and asked that in meantime should not fight. He was informed we would recognise a flag of truce, but would continue to fire on every place occupied by the enemy in the vicinity of our post. Communications clear. The Tongsa Penlop arrived Phari yesterday, and wishes to go to Gyangtse after seeing me. Two companies, Royal Fusiliers, arrived here to-day.

Enclosure No. 136.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated the 5th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic).

Macdonald will inform you of strength and constitution of force and reserves which apparently fully meet your views. You should after consulting him communicate your views on general situation by telegram, as Government of India wish to have these as soon as possible.

Enclosure No. 137.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kangma, the 6th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 5th June. Wilton has heard from Chinese source; first, that at present no Tibetan troops at Karola or between here and there; second, that 3,000 to 4,000 monks have left Lhasa in direction of Gyangtse; third, body of levies in Gyangtse deserted on 1st June; fourth, that body of Gipsy beggars been enlisted and armed, and had arrived Gyangtse.

Enclosure No. 138.

From the Assistant to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Chumbi, the 6th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Tongsa Penlop had interview with General Macdonald to-day. He is now sending a letter to Dalai Lama by the Puna Jongpen and Lama Serkhangtulku, advising him to send properly qualified representative to Gyangtse within nineteen days, namely, by the 25th June, as otherwise it will be war. He is also sending similar letter by the Dugye Jongpen to the Ta Lama who is head of the four ministers, and who, he says, is at present at Shigatse, having been deputed with power to negotiate. Both messengers start to-morrow.

Enclosure No. 139.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 6th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Mail from Gyangtse arrived all well. Palla village was attacked on 2nd. Attack easily repulsed without loss to us. Colonel Younghusband arrived Kangma *en route* to Phari. The Tongsa Penlop arrived Chumbi this morning and visited me this afternoon. He is very anxious to assist in any way, and privately sends messengers to-morrow to Lhasa and Shigatse, pointing out to

Tibetans that, unless proper delegates are sent to Gyangtse by 24th, the situation for them will be very serious. Two sections, British Mountain Battery, arrived 4th, four 7-pounders 5th ; and section native hospital to-day.

Enclosure No. 140.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 7th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Officer Commanding, Kangma Post, reports that his post was attacked at 5.10 a.m. this morning by strong force, Tibetans. Attack repulsed. Our casualties one Gurkha killed and five men wounded, all seriously. Enemy left one hundred and six bodies round post and sixty more were killed between post and Kangma village. Post quite secure.

Enclosure No. 141.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kangma, the 7th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Post here attacked at dawn. Tibetans repulsed with loss : quite 200 killed. I am proceeding Kala Tso to-day.

Enclosure No. 142.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kala Tso, the 7th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram 5th June. Macdonald has communicated his views to the effect that if Dalai Lama flies it would be practically impossible to occupy Lhàsa in force this winter, and maintain communications. My own view is that effort should be made to quarter troops at Lhasa for winter, for if we retire to Chumbi in November, we risk loss of all result of present efforts. Tibetans would be still more obstructive. From what officers have seen of the Gyangtse valley and from what we heard of Lhasa, I should say that each valley could support one thousand men, and I hope that, while the ample forces now being sent will break down opposition during summer, it will be found possible to keep in Lhasa garrison like that now at Gyangtse capable of holding its own for whole winter. If it is the case that troops cannot be maintained in Lhasa next winter, I had better not go to Lhasa at all, for there is little use in my commencing negotiations with two such obstructive people as the Tibetans and Chinese in any place where I cannot stay for full year if necessary. I have been eleven months trying to even begin negotiations. I should be quite unable to complete them in two or three months, especially if Chinese and Tibetans knew we intended to leave before winter.

Enclosure No. 143.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 8th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Colonel Brander reports, Gyangtse, 3rd :—The enemy made a demonstration against Palla in the early morning, but did nothing. Some buildings were demolished by the Sappers in villages to the south of the post. 4th instant—the post came under effective long range fire at 2,000 yards. Casualties one man slightly wounded. 5th instant—heavy and continuous firing all day from Jong. One man slightly wounded and one mule killed. 6th instant—Colonel Younghusband left Gyangtse for Kangma with escort of Mounted Infantry. General situation at Gyangtse remains unchanged. Further news from Kangma report the enemy who attacked that place had dispersed. One more Gurkha was reported slightly wounded in yesterday's fight at Kangma, and eleven ponies killed or missing. Colonel Younghusband left Kangma during the morning with Mounted Infantry escort, and arrived Kala Tso yesterday afternoon, having seen no Tibetan en route. Kangma reinforced by one company, 23rd Pioneers, from Salu. The Tongsa Penlop leaves Chumbi to-day for Phari, where he will meet Colonel Younghusband.

Enclosure No. 144.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 9th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Brander reports Gyangtse, 8th June, 7 p.m., situation unchanged. Mounted Infantry escort that went with Colonel Younghusband returned safely to Gyangtse. One man, 32nd Pioneers, killed by bullet at Gyangtse whilst on works. Condition of wounded officers as follows :—O'Connor convalescent. Mitchell progressing slowly, wound discharging a good deal. Hodgson fit for duty. Colonel Younghusband arrived Phari to-day. All reinforcements from India have now arrived at Chumbi, except second wing, 40th Pathans, and 3rd company Mounted Infantry and remounts. Outbreak of cholera reported from Sevoke this morning. Arrangements being made for inspection and isolation stations both sides of Sevoke, and all transport on Teesta Valley road stopped up to Teesta Bridge, supplies being moved via Ghoom. Sanitary officer, one medical officer, and one hospital assistant proceeded to Sevoke.

Enclosure No. 145.

Political Diary of the Tibet Frontier Commission.

(Extract.)

16th May, 1904.—Minimum temperature 34°. Bright, sunny morning.

Captain Ottley took out the Mounted Infantry to meet the arriving convoy, which came into camp at 2 p.m. under a heavy fire from the Jong. The Mounted Infantry were also fired on from a village some five miles out, which they destroyed.

17th May.—Minimum temperature 35°. Bright, fine day.

There was very little firing on either side during the day. The Tibetans were found to have much strengthened their sangars in the Jong during the night.

18th May.—Minimum temperature 33°. Fine, bright day.

The enemy were found this morning to have established themselves during the night in a house about 500 yards distance from the post towards the north-west, whence they maintained a galling fire during the day.

19th May.—Minimum temperature 31°. Bright, sunny day.

A party of Gurkhas under Major Murray, with a storming party under Lieutenant Gurdon, 32nd Pioneers, moved out at 3.30 a.m., against the house occupied by the Tibetans. The door was blown in by gun-cotton, and the house taken by assault. The Tibetan losses were 50 killed of a garrison of 60; ours were three men wounded.

About 5 p.m. news was brought into camp that the eight Mounted Infantry dâk riders were being fired on by the Tibetans some three miles out of camp. Captain Ottley accordingly took out the Mounted Infantry, and found the whole country to the south swarming with armed Tibetans, and almost every house occupied. The dâk riders, who were surrounded and under a heavy fire, were rescued and brought in with a loss of one killed and two wounded, and five ponies killed and two wounded out of eight.

20th May.—Minimum temperature 28·5°. Fine, bright day.

Colonel Brander took out a small column and burnt three of the villages which had fired on the Mounted Infantry the day before; one only of these was occupied. It was taken by assault and the garrison destroyed. Our casualties were two men killed, and one officer (Lieutenant Hodgson, 32nd Pioneers) and four men wounded.

21st May.—Minimum temperature 28°. Fine, bright day.

A quiet day with little firing on either side. The Tibetans fired some jingal volleys from the Jong in the evening.

22nd May.—Minimum temperature 27°. Fine, bright day.

A convoy escorted by the Mounted Infantry and 50 rifles started for Kangma at 4 a.m. A quiet day with little firing on either side.

F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND, Colonel,
British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters.

Gyangtse, the 23rd May, 1904.

Enclosure No. 146.

From the Assistant to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated Chumbi, the 8th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Paid return visit to Tongsa Penlop yesterday. He says Tibetan Mongolian(s) and people of Gyarong and eastern kingdoms will probably fight for Tibetans: that Dalai Lama will probably escape either to Kham or Tibetan Mongolia.

Enclosure No. 147.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Phari Jong, the 9th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Have had very satisfactory interview with Tongsa Penlop. He had nothing of importance which he had not already said to Walsh, but he is a straight, reliable man, and gave me an even increased feeling of confidence in the Bhutanese alliance. He urged me to still show patience, but on my asking him admitted that he himself would have no patience left if he had been attacked four times at night.

Enclosure No. 148.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Chumbi, the 10th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

I returned Tongsa Penlop's visit this morning and reached here this afternoon. He renewed his expression of friendliness to British Government. He will wait at Phari till force arrives there and will then return to Bhutan.

Enclosure No. 149.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 10th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Brander reports, Gyangtse, 9th, 7 p.m. Enemy made demonstration against our three posts last night from midnight till 3 a.m., but did not approach to close quarters. They lost five killed, and we captured one Lhasa Martini. No casualties on our side. Colonel Younghusband arrived Chumbi this evening. Some Tibetans reported still in vicinity of Kangma at Niru village about seven miles off post on Kangma-Ralung road. Four deaths from cholera were reported this morning from middle camp between Rungpo and Gangtok. The Rungpo-Gangtok section has been temporarily closed and all precautions taken.

Enclosure No. 150.

From E. C. Wilton, Esq., to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kangma, the 11th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

O'Connor has heard rumours from prisoners recently captured in vicinity that 100 men were told off at Ralung from force which attacked Kangma to occupy Gubsi, 17 miles from here, on Lhasa road. Tibetans made futile attempt to blow up Palla post with gunpowder this morning.

Enclosure No. 151.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 11th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Brander reports, 10th June, 7 p.m. Enemy prowled round posts last night, and exploded two charges of gunpowder against the walls of Palla palace, 40 yards from the post of that name. No damage was done. The usual bombardment took place during the day. One sepoy, 32nd Pioneers, was wounded in the leg whilst working in covered way.

Enclosure No. 152.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Chumbi, the 12th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Brander reports, Gyangtse, 11th June, 7 p.m. Enemy attempted to fill up covered way to Palla last night, but were frustrated by Gurkhas. Royal Fusiliers and two sections, No. 7 Mountain Battery, left Chumbi to-day for Lingmathang and Gantsa.

Enclosure No. 153.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Chumbi, the 13th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Am leaving here to-day with force.

Enclosure No. 154.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Gyangtse, the 3rd June, 1904.

In continuation of my telegram dated the 2nd June, I have the honour to forward copies of the letter addressed by me to His Excellency the Chinese Imperial Resident and His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

Annexure 1.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to His Excellency Yu Tai, Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhasa, dated Gyangtse, the 1st June, 1904.

I am directed by His Excellency the Viceroy to inform you that His Majesty's Government will insist on negotiations being carried on at Lhasa, unless Your Excellency, together with competent Tibetan negotiators, appears at Gyangtse by June 25th.

Annexure 2.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to His Holiness the Dalai Lama, dated Gyangtse, the 1st June, 1904.

I am directed by His Excellency the Viceroy of India to inform Your Holiness that His Majesty the King-Emperor will insist upon negotiations being carried on at Lhasa, unless His Excellency the Amban, together with competent Tibetan negotiators appointed by Your Holiness, appears at Gyangtse by 25th June.

Enclosure No. 155.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, Gyangtse, dated the 14th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 7th June has been considered in Council. The Government of India find it necessary to remind you that any definite proposals which you make for their consideration should be, as far as possible, in conformity with the orders and present policy of His Majesty's Government. Those orders, as defined in the telegrams from Secretary of State, dated 6th November, 1903 and 12th May, 1904, are that the advance to Lhasa should be made for the sole purpose of obtaining satisfaction, and that, as soon as reparation is obtained and a new Convention framed, a withdrawal should be effected. The policy of His Majesty's Government, as recently explained by Lord Lansdowne, contemplates that the advance to Lhasa should not be allowed to lead to annexation or a Protectorate, or to permanent control over internal administration of Tibet. It is possible that circumstances may alter in such a manner as to render a change of plans inevitable, but that contingency has not yet arisen. You must, of course, remember that the policy of His Majesty's Government is based on considerations of international relations wider than the mere relations between India and Tibet, which are not only beyond your purview, but also beyond the purview of the Government of India. The Government of India, therefore, expect you to do your utmost to carry out the present plans until there is unquestionable proof that they are impracticable. It is impossible to argue the political necessity for remaining at Lhasa during the winter until you have arrived there and gauged the situation. The military objections are great and obvious.

Enclosure No. 156.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 28th May, 1904.

With reference to my telegram, dated the 27th instant, I have the honour to enclose translation of letter, dated the 16th instant, from the Tongsa Penlop, and of my reply, dated the 27th idem.

Annexure 1.

Translation of a letter received from the Tongsa Penlop of Bhutan, at Gyangtse, the 24th May, 1904.

After salaams.—By the blessing of God you remain in good health, and we too dwell here in mutual friendship. I came to Punakha in the 12th month in the hope of establishing friendship between England and Tibet. I was obliged to continue living there owing to the non-receipt of any reply from Tibet. We sent the Timpuk Jongpen to Thuna to meet you on the 2nd of the 1st month (18th February) fearing that you would be inconvenienced by a long stay at that place. He met the Lheding-Depon and the Tibetan delegates on the 3rd (19th February) but no hope of friendship was raised by the interview. The Tibetans held out no expectation of effecting a settlement. We therefore sent a letter to the Dalai Lama to which we received no reply. Then after waiting at Thuna, there was an engagement at Guru. And again we thought fit to send a letter to Lhasa regarding the questions outstanding between England and Tibet, and we begged for a reply stating clearly whether or no the Tibetans desired friendship between the two nations. I proceeded from Punakha to Sang-nga-sah-dun with the intention of coming to pay you a visit, but I heard that the Kamba soldiers had stopped the road and would not let me pass, so I sent two men to find out whether this was the case or not. Now the Dalai Lama has appointed and sent with a despatch from Lhasa the incarnate Lama Ser-Kong to negotiate on this matter. In this letter the Dalai Lama says, "You Bhutanese say that you will make a settlement between England and Tibet but you do not say definitely how you will do it." The Tibetans and Bhutanese are of the same religion; and the English and Bhutanese are bound by a sincere friendship. It is on account of this friendship that I speak thus, and I have great hopes that trouble may not arise between England and Tibet. In the hope to establishing friendship I propose to start with a retinue of 200 persons on the 13th of the 4th month (27th May). There is a Monk Sha-pe who is empowered to effect a settlement. I have written so much for your information and on meeting you will communicate with you freely by word of mouth. The Ser-Kong incarnate Lama, who was formerly a Lama in Bhutan, is here with only one servant. He was ordered here from Lhasa with urgent instructions. He cannot now return to Lhasa owing to difficulties on the road, and I wish to learn whether it is your pleasure that I should bring him along with me. If you do not desire him to come I will not bring him. I have sent my steward with this letter with proper instructions as to what he should say to the Sahebs. I enclose a scarf. From the Tongsa Penlop, dated 1st day of the 4th month (16th May).

Annexure 2.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to Tongsa Penlop, dated Gyangtse, the 27th May, 1904.

I have received your letter, dated May 16th, and am glad to hear that you are in good health and have the intention of coming to see me. I shall be glad to see you here and to receive the Lama from Lhasa whom you wish to bring with you.

We have received reinforcements and are daily driving the Tibetans back from the villages they occupied in order to surround us. By the time you arrive all will be quiet here.

Trusting you will continue in good health.

Enclosure No. 157.

Political Diary of the Tibet Frontier Commission.

(Extract.)

May 24th, 1904.—Minimum temperature 35°.

The convoy arrived from Kangma to-day, being greeted by the Jong with a heavy fire. One mule was killed. Reinforcements of two 10-pounder mountain guns, a company of Native sappers, 50 Sikhs and 20 Mounted Infantry arrived at the same time. The convoy and escort were fired upon from the Na Nyng monastery, 7½ miles from camp. The guns fired two shells, killing one man and silencing the enemy's fire. The Tibetans, who had two large jingals and numbered 300, retreated to Gyangtse on the night of the 26th.

May 26th, 1904.—Minimum temperature 34°.

The Palla village, 1,000 yards to the right of the camp, and in the possession of the enemy, was attacked before dawn. The village, which had been strongly entrenched, was not finally taken until noon after an obstinate resistance, it being found necessary to shell a large block of buildings in which the enemy had concentrated. In the heat of the fighting a handful of Tibetan horsemen, with some foot soldiers, about 30 in all, made a desperate but futile attempt to reinforce the defenders in the village. Our losses were Lieutenant Garstin, R.E., killed, Captain O'Connor and Lieutenant Mitchell wounded, three sepoys killed and six wounded. The enemy's losses are variously estimated by themselves at from 150 to 400. They admit that only a score escaped. As the Tibetans in the village had been strongly reinforced the night preceding the attack, it is probable that their casualties include 300 killed and 50 prisoners. The Jong bombarded Palla village vigorously during the afternoon but without effect. A company of Sikhs was left in the village as garrison.

May 27*th*, 1904.—Minimum temperature 41°. Some showers.

The guns in the Jong divided their attention between the camp and the Palla Village, but there were no casualties on our side. A large house in the village we fortified and the remaining buildings demolished.

May 28*th*, 1904.—Minimum temperature 45°. Fine, bright morning.

A convoy escorted by two companies of Sikhs and 40 Mounted Infantry left before dawn for Kangma. The convoy was accompanied as far as Na Nyng Monastery by the two 10-pounder guns, two 7-pounders, a company of Native Sappers and 20 Mounted Infantry. The country from this point as far as Kangma was reported free of Tibetan soldiers. At Na Nyng it was ascertained from a Chinese source of information that the Tibetan forces at Gyangtse probably numbered about 3,000 men, composed of Shigatse, Gyangtse and Khan levies, together with a corps of Lhasa gunners. A Lhasa regiment with a big gun was shortly expected, and an interesting story was told in this connection. It appears that the Tibetan Generals at Gyangtse had applied for one of the big guns said to be at Lhasa. Reply was made that such a valuable gun could not be sent as it might be captured. The Lhasa Lama General at Gyangtse then offered to be personally responsible for the safety of the big gun which was thereupon sent. A large body of Lamas and Monks, estimated at 2,000, has left Lhasa for Gyangtse. It was also stated that a considerable number of Lhasa rifles are now in the possession of the Tibetans at Gyantgse, who have been openly boasting of their intention to destroy the British camp and afterwards to kill all the Chinese they can lay hands on. It would appear that the Tibetans have been proposing, almost daily, to make an attack on the camp, but postponing the date from day-to-day. The Lamas are giving out that we kill even women and children. The villagers, who have not been pressed as soldiers, have fled to the mountains, returning at night by stealth to their homes and fields and fleeing again before daylight. In spite of the evil stories spread by the Lamas, our informant, who has good means of learning local opinion, emphatically declared that the unhappy villagers contrasted the orderly and even kind behaviour of our troops on arrival with that of their own soldiers, who were robbing and ill-treating them at pleasure.

May 29*th*, 1904.—Minimum temperature 41°. Fine, bright morning.

The mail, with an escort of four Mounted Infantry, left for Kangma. Comparatively quiet day, with occasional shots from the Jong.

May 30*th*, 1904.—Minimum temperature 38°. Fine, bright morning; cloudy later.

The garrison in the Palla village and the Gurkha outpost were attacked by the enemy at 1.30 this morning, but they were easily repulsed with some loss and retreated to the Jong at 3.30. We had no casualties. During the attack the houses at the foot of the Jong kept up a heavy fire of jingals and Lhasa rifles on the Palla village, while the Jong opened fire on the camp. It is reported that the Amban, who has not started from Lhasa, sent two Chinese officers to report on the state of affairs at Gyangtse, and that they have returned to Lhasa after a stay of a few hours only. Ma, the Amban's delegate, has, it is said, returned to Gyangtse.

(Signed) F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND,
British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters.

Gyangtse,
The 30th May, 1904.

Enclosure No. 158.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Phari Jong, the 13th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Brander reports, Gyangtse, 12th June, 7 p.m. Heavy rain at Gyangtse. Several sounds of explosions heard on far side of Jong; cause unknown. Officer commanding Kangma reports that the village of Niru, about 20 miles on Kangma-Ralung road, reported still held by enemy by local Tibetans. Marched to Gautsa to-day; also 2 companies 32nd Pioneers, 1 company 8th Gurkhas, and 4 guns, No. 30 Mounted Battery. Colonel Younghusband also proceeds with my head-quarters. March to-morrow to Kamparab.

Enclosure No. 159.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Phari Jong, the 15th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Brander reports, Gyangtse, 14th June, 7 p.m. Gurkha patrol captured one prisoner and inflicted nine casualties on enemy. Sikh patrol was heavily fired on at dawn from hills east of Jong. The enemy have completed a wall connecting the Jong with a burnt house 1,000 yards north-west of post and mounted three fresh jingals on it. Arrived here to-day with Colonel Younghusband, also four 7-pounders, two companies 32nd Pioneers, and one company 8th Gurkhas, ammunition column, and small details. Heavy rain for past three days.

Enclosure No. 160.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Phari Jong, the 16th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Brander wires, Gyangtse, 15th June, 7 p.m. Enemy made a demonstration against working party destroying building of 200 horse and 400 foot, but could not be tempted to come to close quarters. Post fired at half-way between Gyangtse and Chengra; no casualties. Four companies Sappers, 40th Pathans, and Cooly Corps arrived Phari to-day.

Enclosures to Letter from the Government of India, dated the 28th July, 1904. (No. 124.—Part I.)

Enclosure No. 161.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Chumbi, the 13th June, 1904.

(Extract.)

I have the honour, in continuation of previous telegrams, to make the following report on the conversation held between the Tongsa Penlop and myself during his visit to me and my return visit to him on June 9th and 10th. The Tongsa Penlop is a straight, honest-looking, dignified man of about 47 years of age. He bore himself well; both he and his retinue were well dressed. His presents to me were numerous and costly, and altogether he showed himself a man of importance and authority. He said he had been long wishing to visit me in accordance with the desire expressed in the letters he had received last autumn from the Bengal Government, but had been delayed, first, by sickness, and afterwards by the news of fighting. I told him I had been disappointed at not having seen him earlier, but was happy at last to make his acquaintance. He then said he was most anxious to effect a settlement between us and the Tibetans. The latter had been very obstinate and wrong-headed, but the Dalai Lama was a young man who needed good counsellors, and unfortunately there were bad men at Lhasa who acted in his name to the detriment of the country. General Macdonald had told him that we were prepared to receive negotiators up to June 25th, and he (the Tongsa Penlop) had accordingly written urgently to the Tibetans to send a negotiator before that date. Would not I, therefore, show patience up to then? I asked the Tongsa Penlop whether he himself would be inclined to be patient if he had been attacked four times at night after waiting eleven months for negotiators to come. He admitted that, for his part, he would, under those circumstances, like to go about killing people, but I was the representative of a great Government and ought to be more patient. I told him that matters were now out of my hands; that I had reported everything to the Viceroy. Orders were now awaited. It was true I had on June 1st sent letters to the Amban and Dalai Lama, saying I was still ready to receive negotiators by June 25th, but those letters had been returned by the Tibetan Commander at Gyangtse, who had that very night attacked my camp, and a few nights afterwards once more attacked me at Kangma on my way down. I could not answer for it, therefore, that I should still be authorised, after these additional insults, to receive negotiators. No Englishman liked killing villagers who were forced from their houses to fight us. We knew they did not want to fight us, and we had no quarrel with them. But, unfortunately, it seemed impossible to get at the real instigators of the opposition to us except by fighting in which the innocent peasant soldiers, and not the authors of the trouble, suffered most. If these latter would only lead their men I should be better pleased, for then they would appreciate what opposition to the British Government really meant. The Tongsa Penlop was much amused at the suggestion, but said the leaders always remained a march behind when any fighting was likely. I went on to say, that, though I had little hope that any settlement would be arrived at without fighting, yet, fighting or no fighting, I had to make a settlement some time, and one that would last another hundred years. If the Tibetans had only been as sensible as the Bhutanese and come and talked matters over with me as he and the Timpuk Jongpen had, we could easily have arrived at an arrangement long ago. Before leaving I expressed to the Tongsa Penlop the great pleasure this meeting with him had afforded me. He had impressed me with the conviction, which I would report to His Excellency the Viceroy, that the Bhutanese Government sincerely desired the friendship of the British Government. I congratulated him on their wisdom in adopting such a policy, and I assured him, on behalf of the Viceroy, that all we desired was to be on friendly and neighbourly terms with States like Bhutan and Tibet lying on our frontier. War, though it could have but one result, gave us a lot of trouble which we had no wish to unnecessarily incur. We, therefore, much preferred peace. I sent my best respects to Dharma Raja and the Timpuk Jongpen, and I asked the Tongsa Penlop to often write to me and give me advice regarding the settlement with Tibet. The Tongsa Penlop fervently assured me of the goodwill of the Bhutanese Government, and said they would never depart from their friendship with the British Government.

Enclosure No. 162.

Political Diary of the Tibet Frontier Commission.

(Extract.)

31*st May*, 1904.—Minimum temperature 37°. Fine, cloudless morning.

Captain Shepherd, R.E., to-day completed a foot bridge over the stream about one mile south of the post. Two bronze cannons were found in the ruins of the Pa-lha house and were brought over to the camp.

1*st June*, 1904.—Minimum temperature 38°.

A convoy arrived in camp about 2 p.m. having come from Kangma without opposition. It was, however, fired on from the Jong on approaching and entering the post.

2*nd June*, 1904.—Minimum temperature 41°.

3*rd June*, 1904.—Minimum temperature 39°.

At 12.30 a.m. some shots were heard, and the Jong commenced a brisk fire which it maintained for an hour or so. It appeared that some sort of an attack was intended against our post in the Pa-lha village, but it was not pressed home, and resulted in nothing.

4*th June*, 1904.—Minimum temperature 40°.

The Tibetans kept up a brisk bombardment nearly all day from the Jong.

5*th June*, 1904.—Mimimum temperature 45°.

A dâk carried by Mounted Infantry arrived safely from Kangma having encountered no opposition on the road. Information was given by the Tibetan prisoner sent to the Jong with Colonel Younghusband's letters to the Dalai Lama and the Amban that the principal Depon had been recently killed in the Jong by a bullet from the Camp. He also said that the Tibetan forces at Gyangtse numbered 8,000 and were abundantly supplied with ammunition. News has been received from a Chinese source that a detachment of Tibetan levies deserted Gyangtse on June 1st, and that a body of 500 gipsy beggars has been enlisted and armed at Gyangtse. It is also stated that at the present time the Tibetans are not holding their former position at the Karo Pass or any points between there and Gyangtse along the main road to Lhasa. A force of 3,000 to 4,000 monks is also said to have left Lhasa in the direction of Gyangtse.

E. C. Wilton,
For British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters.

Gyangtse,
8th June, 1904.

Enclosure No. 163.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kala Tso, the 21st June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Statement that people are well contented with us on account of our liberal treatment is borne out by statements of officers in posts all along route from Gyangtse to Chumbi. At each post officers spontaneously told me neighbouring villagers were thoroughly friendly, but only afraid of officials and Lamas. Rawling, who travelled in Western Tibet last year, informs me of same. What people are now chiefly afraid of is our withdrawing and leaving them to vengeance of Lamas, in which case people might become permanently estranged from us, while Lamas recovering from effects of blows we are now in position to give, and from loss of influence which our present good treatment of people will cause them, would be doubly antagonistic to us.

Enclosure No. 164.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Phari Jong, the 18th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp Tangla, 17th. Brander wires, Gyangtse, 16th, 7 p.m. Convoy with ammunition arrived from Kangma safely to-day without encountering opposition. Following information received from Chinese sources:—Tibetan force at present in Jong 8,000. Between Kangma and Karò La, including latter place, 7,000. Defeated force which attacked Kangma hovering about section Kangma-Saotang. The Tibet Commander at Gyangtse has issued orders for small bands of 20 or 30 men with three days' rations to infest line towards Saotang and Changra. It was one of these parties that fired on dâk patrol yesterday. Colonel Brander is discontinuing daily dâk to Kangma from to-day. One Sapper killed accidentally by bullet discharged by comrade at Gyangtse on 16th. Marched to Tangla post to-day with 4 guns, 7 Mountain Battery, 4 guns, 30 Mountain Battery, wing Royal Fusiliers, two companies 23rd Pioneers, two companies 8th Gurkhas, section British Field Hospital, and two sections Native Field Hospital, supplies and details wing. Wing, 40th Pathans, and details follow to-morrow.

Enclosure No. 165.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Kala Tso, the 20th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Brander wires, Gyangtse, 18th June, 7 p.m. Party of Pioneers surprised sniping party of Tibetans at 3.30 a.m., killing 20, and wounding several; no casualties our side. There was also a small affair in the afternoon when party of mounted enemy attempted to cut off a foraging party, but were dispersed by shrapnel fire which caused some casualties to them. A party of Gurkhas also surprised a party of enemy in Bur village, inflicting on them some loss. Foraging parties secured 1,156 sheep and goats from a village eight miles south-west of post, and have also brought in a large quantity of grain from Palla village. One sapper was severely wounded at work on covered way. Villages report that a force from Shigatse is marching over the hills to the west to attack Kangma, and is due to arrive there about 21st. Wiring on 19th Brander reports all quiet, and that he proposes sending a convoy to Kangma on 22nd, the day main force due to arrive there. Main force arrived here. All well to-day and proceeds to Menza to-morrow.

Enclosure No. 166.

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel C. W. Ravenshaw, Resident in Nepal, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla dated the 13th June, 1904.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to inform you that at an interview with the Prime Minister on the 9th May, he informed me that he had received a letter from the Dalai Lama at Lhasa and some presents, which were brought by a Tibetan Jongpen, or Captain, who with a few Tibetans accompanied the Chinese Mission from Lhasa. The Prime Minister informed me that the Dalai Lama's letter, though not written by him, bore his signature, was couched in most friendly terms, but made no allusion to the affairs concerning our Mission to Tibet. This the Prime Minister seemed to think indicated that the Dalai Lama was kept in ignorance of what was going on. I enclose a translation of a letter from the Prime Minister in reply to the Dalai Lama's letter which has, under present circumstances, been sent by a special messenger to Lhasa.

Annexure.

From His Highness the Maharaja Chandra Shamsher Jang, Rana Bahadur, Thong Lin Pim Ma Kokong Wang Sian, Prime Minister and Marshal of Nepal, to His Holiness the Potala Lama, Lhasa.

After compliments.—I have the pleasure to inform Your Holiness that the Dheba of Kuti whom you had so kindly sent in the company of the Chinese officers, charged with the conveyance of the warrant and robes of honour and of the order graciously conferred on me by His Majesty the Emperor of China, arrived here safely on Wednesday, the 2nd Baisakh last. The friendly relations that have so long existed between our Governments have added to the pleasure I felt at the receipt of your letter conveying news of your welfare and of the presents from you brought by the said Dheba, who will start on his return journey in a few days carrying with him the reply of your kind letter and the customary presents from me according to former usages, which I hope will be delivered to Your Holiness in due course. Such pleasant exchanges of mutual regards are sure to strengthen the old bonds of friendship that have existed between the two Governments in the past, promote cordial relations between them in the future, and ultimately conduce to the welfare and happiness of their respective peoples. Under such circumstances, the news that the differences regarding the frontier matters between the British and the Tibetan Governments not having been peacefully settled had culminated in open warfare, and thus become the cause of great suffering to a large number of people, has marred the enjoyment of the full measure of happiness derived from such a happy occasion. Words fail to describe my anxiety consequent on this breach of relations brought about by the failure of the Government of Tibet to have the matters in dispute settled by friendly negotiations. That Your Holiness, who is the embodiment of virtue, should be afflicted by the gravest anxiety on this head, goes without saying. It having struck me that the matter in question not having been conducted according to rules of morality and policy might be productive of unpleasant consequences, and the Governments of Nepal and Tibet having long been mutually bound together by ties of brotherly feeling, I wrote without the least reserve and in full detail to the four Kasis of the Kasyal office on the subject on the 20th Bhadra and 18th Falgoon 1960 S. E., all that appeared to me reasonable, moved thereto by the consideration of your welfare, and as the contents of those letters must have been communicated to Your Holiness by the said Kasis, it would be quite superfluous to repeat them here. Wise and far-seeing as you are, the vast resources of the British Government must be well known to you. To rush to extremes with such a big power and to bring calamities upon your poor subjects wantonly without having strong and valid grounds of your own to insist upon, cannot be readily accepted as a virtuous course or wise policy. Hence it may be fairly inferred that the detailed circumstances of the pending questions have not been properly and correctly represented to you, so I strongly hope that it is not yet too late for you even now in your wisdom and out of your great regard for the welfare of your entire people, having fully mastered the details of the subject, to issue proper instructions consonant with morality and policy to your duly authorised Kasis and officers and to direct them to proceed to meet the British officers and cause a settlement to be arrived at, after discussing fully the points at issue, and thus ward off the calamities that have overtaken your people. I believe nothing was further from the views of the English than to go to your country to fight with your Government, and I hear that the present embroglio was precipitated by the Tibetan troops rashly striking the first blow.

Should you be inclined to listen to me, the best advice that I would give you now will be to desist from fighting with the British Government and try your best to bring about a peaceful settlement of the issues in dispute, otherwise I see clearly that great calamities are in store for Tibet. Our present Representative at Lhasa had been there for many years before and has also spent the last few years in his present capacity there, and so he has naturally a great love for your country. If your Kasis and other officers will but openly and sincerely discuss matters with him, he is sure to give the best advice possible for the good of your country. Your Holiness is too sacred to be troubled with mundane affairs, especially when there is the Kasyal office to look after such business. But the present critical situation in Tibet demands the utmost foresight. On you now depends the salvation of your country, and under this belief I have written this to Your Holiness, because I am convinced that the only hope of such deliverance lies in Your Holiness's setting right the affairs of the Government of Tibet by adopting or pointing out the proper course conducive to the well-being of your people and country. More is unnecessary. You yourself are full of wisdom.

Enclosure No. 167.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated the 22nd June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

The Government of India are disposed to think that a proclamation should be issued to the following effect :—

A GENERAL PROCLAMATION.

"The British Government have no desire to be on other than friendly terms with the people of Tibet, but it must be known to all that the present Government of that country have for some time past displayed entire ignorance of, and disregard for, international obligations by repudiating their treaties with the Government of India, and, moreover, have shown gross disrespect to the Government of His Majesty the King-Emperor, firstly by refusing to negotiate in an amicable manner on the points at issue between the two Governments and, secondly, by committing overt acts of war, in attacking with armed forces the British Mission sent for the above purpose.

"It has, therefore, become necessary for the British Government to mark their grave displeasure, and to demand reparation of the Government of Tibet for the insults offered to their representative, and the armed attacks on their peaceful Mission.

"As such reparation and satisfaction can only be obtained from the present rulers of Tibet, at Lhasa, the Mission will proceed to that place, in order to impress upon the Government of Tibet the serious consequences of the course they are pursuing, and to obtain necessary redress for the insults offered.

"The nature of the terms to be exacted will greatly depend on the attitude of the Tibetan Government, to whom a further opportunity of a reasonable settlement of the matters in dispute will then be offered.

"All Tibetans are, therefore, warned by this Proclamation, that any interference with the British Mission, or the armed force escorting it, will meet with condign punishment, and that any such action will only result in making the terms demanded more exacting, and the measures taken to enforce them more severe.

"It is also hereby notified and declared that the British have no desire to fight with the people of Tibet, or to interfere with their liberties, and that the

British Government will, in accordance with their traditional policy, scrupulously respect the religion of the people. At the same time, it is necessary to impress unmistakably upon the Government of Tibet that they cannot with impunity offer insults to the British Government, and must realise the obligations they have entered into, and act up to them in all respects."

If you agree, you should issue the Proclamation in such a manner as may be possible, and report how you have done so.

Enclosure No. 168.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kangma, the 23rd June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

I do not think issue of proclamation will have any immediate result, but may be subsequently useful to refer to, for the purpose of reassuring Lhasa authorities. It would also be useful as declaration of our purpose to surrounding peoples, such as Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, and also to the Chinese. I will try and get proclamation printed at Gyangtse and will post copies in villages, and send some to Bhutan, Sikkim, and Resident, Nepal. I will also take any means of sending them to Lhasa.

Enclosure No. 169.

From the Foreign Secretary to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated Simla, the 24th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of 23rd June. General Proclamation should be issued in manner you propose when advance from Gyangtse takes place. Copies should also be given to General Macdonald for information and further publication by any means at his disposal.

Enclosure No. 170.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Kangma, the 22nd June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Arrived here with first column. Sent on reconnoitring party up the Lhasa road to Nira where enemy were discovered in sangared position near Nira, 13 miles off, about 1,000 strong. Am halting here to-morrow, and sending flying column under Colonel Hogge, 23rd Pioneers, to attack Tibetans, and drive them off. Also reconnoitred to Changra with negative results.

Enclosure No. 171.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Kangma, the 23rd June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Tongsa Penlop informs me that Kallan Lama and Ta Councillor are coming to Gyangtse, and that there has arrived for me from Lhasa a parcel of silk cloth. Penlop also expresses wish to come to see me at Gyangtse. This may indicate anxiety of Tibetans to make terms at last. In the circumstances, I would recommend giving a period of five days' grace, and deferring advance till after the 30th June.

Enclosure No. 172.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated the 24th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of 23rd June. Advance may certainly be deferred until 30th June, if reliable information has reached you that competent Tibetan negotiators may be expected to arrive at an early date.

Enclosure No. 173.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Kangma, the 24th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Colonel Hogge's column reached Niru yesterday, and found the enemy had evacuated it and retired during the night leaving no signs. Hogge returns here to-day. No news from Gyangtse since 20th. Am halting here to-day so as to have my full force available for advance to-morrow. Two companies infantry and half company mounted infantry moved yesterday to exit of Zambang defile where they are entrenched. Telegraphic communication with Chengra should be established this morning. Officer Commanding Communications reports that a gathering of Tibetans, about 1,100 strong, is reported at Khamba Jong, and a party of 50 at Giri; their intentions are unknown. Officer Commanding Communications will reinforce the company now at Lamteng, North Sikkim, with another company, and moving one company to Tangu.

Enclosure No. 174.

Political Diary of the Tibet Frontier Commission.

6th June, 1904.—Minimum temperature 44°.

Colonel Younghusband under orders from Government left this morning with an escort of mounted infantry for Kangma *en route* to Phari.

7th June.—Minimum temperature 37°.

The post at Kangma was attacked at day-break this morning by a force of 1,100 Tibetans who were beaten off with a loss of some 200 killed, the loss to the garrison being one killed and six wounded. After the attack, Colonel Younghusband continued his journey to Phari.

A covered way is under construction to Pa-lha house from the Gyangtse post, the working parties being kept under constant fire from the Jong.

8th June.—Minimum temperature 41½°.

The mounted infantry escort who accompanied Colonel Younghusband to Kangma returned to-day, and reported having seen a body of the enemy up a side valley near the Dzamtang gorge.

9th June.—Minimum temperature 44°.

An attack was made on the Gurkha post beginning at 12.30 a.m., and continuing for about two hours. There was a good deal of firing, but the Tibetans refused to follow their leaders, and never came to close quarters. The Gurkhas reserved their fire, and finally killed five men, who came close to their post. The remainder then bolted to the Jong. Some shots were also fired at Pa-lha house, and one Tibetan was killed.

10th June.—Minimum temperature 39°.

Rain fell during the night, and snow on the neighbouring hill tops. A cloudy day.

The Tibetans made an attempt to blow up Pa-lha house with gunpowder during the night. Two charges were exploded without effect. They also filled in a portion of the covered way leading to Pa-lha house.

11th June.—Minimum temperature 39°.

Rain during the night. Cloudy day.

The Tibetans again attempted to fill in the covered way, but were discovered by Gurkha patrol and dispersed.

12th June.—Minimum temperature 43°.

Rain during the night. Cloudy morning, but cleared towards noon.

During the night the Tibetans built a wall leading from the town to a ruined house some 600 yards beyond the Gurkha post, and they also occupied a small monastery on the hills above Pa-lha house, whence they fired on a Sikh patrol in the morning.

About 11 p.m., a Gurkha patrol surprised a working party of Tibetans near the Gurkha post and drove them back into the Jong under fire. The Jong thereupon opened a heavy fire which lasted for the best part of an hour, evidently under the impression that an attack was threatened.

It is said that the Tibetans, who attacked Kangma are now occupying and fortifying the village of Nyern on the road to Ralung, and that a portion of the force is occupying Gubshi on the Lhasa Road.

The Tsarong Depon (now promoted provisionally Shape) is said to have arrived at Nagartse Jong and to be directing military operations from that place.

E. C. Wilton,

For British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters.

Gyangtse,
The 13th June, 1904.

Enclosure No. 175.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Kangma, the 24th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Colonel Hogge's column returned here at 2 p.m. to-day, reporting the enemy having retreated suddenly during the night of 22nd, leaving behind them some 2,000 rounds breech-loading Lhasa ammunition and other articles. Supposed to have retired towards Ralung. Convoy arrived from Gyangtse 5 p.m. All reported well there. Tibetans still active. Convoy fired on by a few men from Nyan. No casualties. Our 10-pounders fired common shell against the main new building in the Jong with good effect, making a breach in a four and a half feet pucca and well built wall about 20 feet wide. Enemy repairing breach during night with dry stone, which was again demolished by two common shells next day. Enemy reported fortifying approach to Yung La and Lhasa Road near Gobshi. Telegraph completed to Chengra. March to-morrow.

Enclosure No. 176.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 27th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 27th. 10 p.m. 2nd M. I. and one company Fusiliers returned to Niani to cover completion of telegraph. At Niani they learnt from wounded Tibetans that the remnant of the force that had opposed us yesterday fled yesterday night towards their homes in Kham. Two companies proceeded east foraging. Remainder of troops rested after two hard days' work. Resume active operations to-morrow.

Enclosure No. 177.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 27th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegrams sent by post yesterday. Gyangtse, 26th June, 9 p m. Arrived here to-day with my whole force after encountering considerable opposition at the village of Niani, which was held by about 800 of the enemy said to have arrived there from Lhasa four days ago. The fight lasted from 10 a.m. till 2 p.m., the Gyangtse garrison assisting by occupying hills above Niani, and cutting off enemy's retreat that way. At 2 p.m. the village was in our possession, though several of the enemy were left hiding away in buildings. Our casualties were four men killed, and Major Lye, 23rd Pioneers, severely wounded in the hand and slightly head by sword cut, but in no danger, and six men wounded. The enemy lost very heavily, and several Lhasa-made rifles and other arms were captured. The enemy's position was a fortified enclosure with bastions and walls 30 feet high and eight feet thick, enclosing a mass of buildings inside. The force was bombarded on crossing the river, 2,000 yards from the Jong, but without result. I visited Gyangtse post and found everything satisfactory.

Enclosure No. 178.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 28th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Tongsa Penlop will reach here on 30th. I have made a Lama in our employ write letters to the Ta Lama, who is at Shigatse, and to the Shape at Nagartse Jong, saying that Tongsa Penlop had told me they wished to come here to settle matters, but were afraid to; that if they had proper credentials to effect a settlement, I would guarantee their safety, and treat them with respect, but they must come at once, for we were about to move on to Lhasa. These letters I sent on by the hand of prisoners.

Enclosure No. 179.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 29th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Messenger whom I sent yesterday to Nagartse was seized by Tibetans and brought to Jong. On reading my communication Tibetan leaders held Council, and this morning sent messenger with flag of truce asking for armistice till Ta Lama, who is at Penam half way to Shigatse and could be here to-morrow, and Shape who is at Nagartse, could arrive to negotiate with me. Messenger says Ta Lama and Shape have powers from Dalai Lama to treat. I am discussing with Macdonald what military precautions for safety of Mission will have to be taken previous to negotiation.

Enclosure No. 180.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 29th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

After consultation with Macdonald, I have replied to Tibetans that I will grant the armistice they ask for till sunset of 30th June, to enable the Ta Lama to reach Gyangtse; but as I was attacked on 5th May without warning, though I had informed Tibetan Government that I was ready to negotiate here, and as Tibetan armed forces had occupied the Jong and fired into my camp ever since, General Macdonald, who was responsible for safety of Mission, demanded that they should evacuate Jong and withdraw all armed force beyond Karo La, Yang La, and Dongtse. A reasonable time for this would be given.

Enclosure No. 181.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 29th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 28th June, 10 p.m. I strengthened Colonel Brander by two companies 32nd Pioneers, with orders to establish a post in a hamlet a mile to the north, the object of calling the enemy off from the river which is now their main water supply. At the same time I directed him to demonstrate against the Jong and keep the enemy's attention occupied. This he successfully accomplished before daylight with slight opposition. Leaving five companies of infantry and one company mounted infantry to cover the transfer the camp to a new site on the left bank of river, I moved with the remainder of the force to clear the enemy from the left bank, where they had a considerable force occupying a series of villages, and a very strong position on a ridge on which is the Tsechen Monastery and several fortified towers and sangars. Fighting at 10.30 a.m. By 5.30 p.m. the enemy had been cleared out of the villages, and an attack was made on the Tsechen position, which was stormed by the 8th Gurkhas, 40th Pathans, and half No. 3 Company Sappers and Miners, admirably supported by No. 7 Mountain Battery. By 7.30 p.m. the position was in my hands. The enemy lost heavily. I deeply regret to say that Captain Craster, 46th Punjab Infantry, attached 40th Pathans, was killed whilst leading his company. Our other casualties were Captain Bliss, sword cut on shoulder, and Captain Humphreys, contusion, both slightly wounded ; also five sepoys wounded. The Lhasa road was reconnoitred for seven miles with negative results. Heavy rain fell the whole of last night and this morning, which made the day's work exceptionally severe.

Enclosure No. 182.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 30th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 7 a.m., 30th June. Troops rested yesterday. Commenced making new bridge over river and sent out foraging parties, who brought in about 1,200 maunds forage and grain. Shortly after noon the enemy sent in a flag of truce and asked for an armistice to enable the Ta Lama and a Shigatse Shape to come in. This, after consulting Colonel Younghusband, was granted, under certain restrictions, up till midnight to-night. The enemy are evidently much disheartened by our successes at Niani on the 26th, and again against the Techen position 28th, the latter being almost so strong a place as the Jong, and its capture cutting off communication from the Jong to Shigatse and investing the Jong on three sides. A good many men have been seen leaving the Jong during the past two days.

Enclosure No. 183.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 30th June, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Ta Lama marched from Penam to Dongtse to-day, and will reach here early to-morrow.

Enclosure No. 184.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 1st July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Tongsa Penlop has visited me and shown me letter he has received from Dalai Lama, saying he had heard we had appointed date up to which we would negotiate and after which we would fight. Dalai Lama considered fighting bad for men and animals. He, therefore, asked Tongsa Penlop to assist in making a peaceful settlement, and he was also appointing the Shape, Ta Lama, the Grand Secretary and representative of the three great monasteries, to negotiate. Tongsa Penlop also brought parcel of silk which Dalai Lama is said to have sent me, but which I declined to receive until accompanied by a letter, or presented to me by one of Dalai Lama's own officials. I told Tongsa Penlop, though date fixed for negotiation was past, the British Government had been pleased to extend the term, if envoys, now on way, could prove earnestness of Tibetan Government. I expected Ta Lama to arrive to-day, and upon his power and readiness to negotiate, would depend whether we advanced to Lhasa or not. Ta Lama has just arrived in town.

Enclosure No. 185.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 1st July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

The armistice granted yesterday was continued to-day till noon. The enemy continued strengthening and building fresh walls in the Jong, whereupon a few shots were fired this afternoon, when they desisted. The Tongsa Penlop arrived this afternoon and visited Colonel Younghusband. The Ta Lama Shape also arrived from Shigatse about 4 p.m. Hostilities are suspended for the present pending negotiations. The Tsechen ridge and monastery was occupied to-day by two companies 40th Pathans, to prevent it again falling into the hands of the enemy. Wounded all doing well.

Enclosure No. 186.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 2nd July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Shape Ta Lama has arrived in my camp. I am receiving him at eleven with Tongsa Penlop.

Enclosure No. 187.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 2nd July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

I this morning received Shape Ta Lama, the Grand Secretary, and six representatives of the three Lhasa monasteries, accompanied by Tongsa Penlop. Fact of their coming at all is some evidence that they wish make settlement, but impression they gave me was that they have only come to negotiate, because we had expressed our willingness to negotiate with them. Their only credentials are letter from Dalai Lama to Tongsa Penlop, and they display neither eagerness nor hurry for settlement. I have told them to talk matters over with Tongsa Penlop and come and see me again to-morrow, and have asked Tongsa Penlop to impress on them extreme gravity of situation, and need of assuring me of earnestness of their desire to treat and good faith of their Government, if they desired advance to Lhasa be postponed.

Enclosure No. 188.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 2nd July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Tibetan delegates have had conference with Tongsa Penlop who has advised them abandon former attitude, from which they have gained nothing and lost much. He considers they are now really anxious to make settlement.

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*Enclosure No. 189.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 2nd July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Following in continuation of my telegram of to-day's date. I made speech to Tibetan delegates recounting our position from beginning, pointing out especially that, for century and half, we had lived on amicable terms with Tibet, but their wanton invasion of Sikkim in 1886 had forced war on us; that they repudiated treaty then made on their behalf; refused to negotiate new one, first at Khamba Jong, then here; and, instead of negotiations with me, attacked me. Under orders from Viceroy, I had written letters Dalai Lama and Amban, saying we were still ready negotiate up to 25th June. No negotiators had arrived by that date, but on 24th I had heard from Tongsa Penlop that negotiators were on way. British Government had, therefore, allowed few days' grace. We are ready to go to Lhasa to-morrow. If they were really in earnest and had power to make settlement, I was ready to negotiate with them. If they were not prepared to make settlement, we would advance to Lhasa forthwith. Had they any credentials? They said letter from Dalai Lama to Tongsa Penlop was their credentials. Dalai Lama wished Tongsa Penlop to mediate, and they would talk matters over with him, and he would arrange. I said they might talk matters over with him, and he might accompany them, but they must come to me themselves if they wished to negotiate. They said they might have referred matters Lhasa before treaty could be signed, but, when once signed by Dalai Lama, would be scrupulously observed. They tried to avoid coming again to-morrow after having seen Tongsa Penlop this afternoon, but I told them they had not yet satisfied me of their earnestness, and must come.

Enclosure No. 190.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 2nd July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

The Ta Lama, Shape, the Lama Grand Secretary, and representatives of the three Lhasa monasteries had a meeting this morning with Colonel Younghusband, at which the Tongsa Penlop and myself were present. They profess a real desire for peace, and a further meeting is arranged for to-morrow.

Enclosure No. 191.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, Gyangtse, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 3rd July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Though noon had been fixed as hour of reception of Tibetan delegates, they did not appear till 1.30. Tongsa Penlop had arrived at 11 30. I dismissed Durbar at 12.30, but received the delegates at 4, and said presumption I drew from their disrespect was that they were not in earnest in desiring settlement. They assured me they were, but that Grand Secretary had been ill in the morning. Grand Secretary is official who was so discourteous at Khamba Jong. I informed them that, as I had been attacked here without warning and fired on from Jong for nearly two months, they must evacuate it, whether there were negotiations or not. Macdonald would give them till noon on 5th to evacuate after which military operations against Jong would commence. Irrespective of these operations, I would, however, be ready to receive them if they wished to make settlement, and so prevent necessity of our proceeding to Lhasa. I am inclined to think Dalai Lama and Shape Ta Lama sincerely wish settlement, but that Grand Secretary is pursuing his old tactics.

Enclosure No. 192.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, Gyangtse, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 4th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Tibetan delegates had prolonged interview this morning with Tongsa Penlop, asking him whether time for reference to Dalai Lama could not be given them before evacuation of fort was insisted on. Tongsa Penlop said no further time could be given, and advised them evacuate and avoid bloodshed. Tongsa Penlop says they are suspicious we may go on to Lhasa after we have got them to evacuate Jong, and they wanted assurance that we really wished settlement. I have told Tongsa Penlop that fact of my being at head of affairs was sufficient proof. If we wanted war and not settlement, chief control would be in hands of military.

Enclosure No. 193.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 4th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Tibetan delegates came in again yesterday afternoon, and expressed a sincere desire for peace and a settlement. In consultation with Younghusband, they were informed the Jong must be evacuated by noon on Tuesday as a guarantee of good faith, and that during negotiations no Tibetan troops must remain this side of the Karo La, Yang La, and Dongtse.

Enclosure No. 194.

From the Foreign Secretary, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated Simla, the 4th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your attitude towards the delegates, and the conditions which, in order to satisfy yourself of their good faith, you have laid down, are fully approved. The Government of India entertain a strong hope that your efforts to initiate regular negotiations will prove successful. They leave it to your discretion to take the necessary measures if the delegates pursue tactics of a purely dilatory nature.

Enclosure No. 195.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 5th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

I have sent over two messengers in presence of Tongsa Penlop to delegate and Commanders in Jong, saying at 12 signal gun would be fired and at 12.30 firing commence, and warning delegates to leave before then and arrange for women and children leave. I have also warned General Ma who is in town. No notice has been taken, as no Tibetan official will take responsibility of surrendering. I have accordingly informed Macdonald he is free to commence firing.

Enclosure No. 196.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 6th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

As the Tibetan delegate refused to evacuate the Jong as a pledge of good faith, in consultation with Colonel Younghusband, military operations were resumed at 1 p.m. yesterday, after due warning to the Tibetans. A column, consisting of two guns, one company mounted infantry, and six companies infantry moved out at 3.30 p.m. across the river to demonstrate and feint against the north-west side of the Jong and town and monastery. The demonstration succeeded in inducing the enemy to largely reinforce this side of his defences. A considerable amount of firing took place, in which we had one man, 8th Gurkhas, wounded. Enemy's casualties probably slight. The column remained out till after dark, when it was withdrawn. At midnight, 5th/6th, and 1 a.m., a force of 12 guns, ½ company sappers, 1 company mounted infantry, and 12 companies infantry moved out in two columns, and took up a position south-east of Gyangtse by 3.30 a.m., when the sappers and six companies infantry advanced to assault the town. By 7 a.m. were in possession of a portion of the town, against which the assult was launched, and the troops proceeded to make good their position, which was successfully done against a centre attack which lasted from 1 to 2.30 p.m. At 3 p.m. it was decided to assault the Jong, as the enemy appeared somewhat exhausted with their stubborn defence. Four companies of the reserve were accordingly sent forward, and the wall of the Jong breached by the 10-pounders at a range of 1,000 yards. At 4 p.m. column of Gurkhas and a few Fusiliers assaulted the breach which was just practicable, and approached by very precipitous ground. The assault was covered by a concentrated fire of guns and maxims. The enemy offered a most stubborn resistance until our men surmounted the breach, which was carried in the most gallant way by the 8th Gurkhas, who were led by Lieutenant Grant and Captain Humphreys. Once the breach was carried, the enemy's resistance collapsed, and the Jong was in our possession by 6 p.m., after fourteen hours' continuous fighting. The enemy's strength is estimated at 5,000, though prisoners said 7,000. The enemy's losses are not yet known. The full return of our losses is not yet ascertained, but they included Lieutenant Gurdon, 32nd Pioneers, killed —a most gallant officer whose death is deeply deplored by the force—and three men, 8th Gurkhas, killed. Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell and Captain Preston, 40th Pathans, Lieutenant Grant, 8th Gurkhas, and Lieutenant Mitchell, 23rd Pioneers, and three men, Royal Fusiliers, all slightly wounded, and about 20 sepoys wounded. The capture of the Jong involved a very heavy expenditure of shell and ammunition : otherwise, our casualties would have been much more severe. I especially bring to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief the splendid behaviour of the 8th Gurkhas.

Enclosure No. 197.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 7th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Tongsa Penlop has congratulated me on capture of Jong. Directly Jong was captured, I asked him to send messengers to tell Ta Lama and Shape at Nagartse I was still ready negotiate as previously announced, but that they must come in at once, if they wished settlement, otherwise we would proceed Lhasa.

Enclosure No. 198.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, Gyangtse, dated the 8th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 7th July. Your action is fully approved, and your continued patience is appreciated by the Government of India, but they consider that the advance to Lhasa is now inevitable, and that it should not be delayed, as it has become clear that the Ta Lama and Shape have no genuine intention or authority to negotiate.

Enclosure No. 199.

Political Diary of the Tibet Frontier Commission.

13*th June* 1904.—Minimum temperature 44°. Fine day.

A convoy left for Kangma at 4 a.m. Quiet day, with little firing on either side.

14*th June.*—Minimum temperature 45°. Fine morning. It clouded up, and some light rain fell in the afternoon.

A Gurkha patrol surprised a convoy going towards the Jong during the night, and shot five men and captured the remainder. A Sikh patrol shot three of the Tibetan garrison who are occupying the small gunpa in the hills above Palha house. During the afternoon, the Tibetans manned the wall which they have built from the town to the ruined house near Gurkha post, and mounted 3-wheeled cannon behind it, and opened a heavy rifle and cannon fire on the Gurkha post, which lasted all the afternoon.

15*th June.*—Minimum temperature 42½°. Fine day.

A small column crossed the river and destroyed three villages on the other bank. During the operation, the Tibetans sent out a force of some 200 infantry and 150 cavalry from the Jong, apparently with the intention of attacking our column. They, however, confined themselves to shooting at our Mounted Infantry at long range, and afterwards returned to the Jong under heavy fire from the Maxims.

The Mounted Infantry bringing the dâk reported that they had been fired on some miles up the road.

16*th June.*—Minimum temperature 45°. Fine day.

A small force went out to meet the returning convoy, which reached camp safely about 1 p.m. without having been fired on. There was heavy firing from the wall on the Gurkha post all the afternoon.

17*th June.*—Minimum temperature 48°. Fine day.

A Sikh patrol from Palha house surprised a Tibetan patrol on the hills at daybreak, and killed 20 and wounded 9 or 10 of them, without loss to themselves.

A small foraging party crossed the river, and the Tibetans again sent out some cavalry and infantry to try and harass it; but they were fired on by the 10-pounders, and retired after losing a few men.

There was a heavy shower about 4 p.m.

18*th June.*—Minimum temperature 47°. Fine day.

A Gurkha patrol killed eight Tibetans near the wall at daybreak. The 10-pounders fired some 20 common shell at the Jong with excellent effect.

19th June.—Minimum temperature 47°. Fine morning, clouding up in afternoon. Heavy shower fell at 5 p.m., and light rain continued all the evening.

Quiet day, with little firing on either side.

Tibetan prisoners report the number of men in the Jong and monasteries as about 7,000. They say that the 1,000 regular Lhasa troops, who were practically destroyed at Guru, have been replaced by 1,000 levies drawn from various parts of Tibet; of these, 300 left Lhasa some weeks ago, it is believed, for Gyangtse; 400 were in the attack on Kangma; 300 remain in Lhasa as a bodyguard to the Dalai Lama. At the time the prisoners left Lhasa (some three weeks ago), these were the only troops in Lhasa. These 1,000 men are armed only with matchlocks, with the exception of some 10 or 12 Lhasa-made rifles which were served out to them. The Karo La is said to be again occupied.

Information was obtained from a Chinese source on the 16th that it was stated at Gyangtse that the total Tibetan losses since the beginning of the fighting were returned at nearly 1,700 dead. Our informant also reported that parties of about 20 men each were being sent out from Gyangtse to occupy points of vantage and places along our line of communication. The parties were relieved by fresh men every three days. A force of at least 200 men was under orders on the 14th to leave Gyangtse to hold Red Idol Gorge. The Tibetans were also holding the road between Kangma and Ralung, and a large force had gathered at the Karo La. The number of men at these points was given as 7,000, including a very large number of Lamas and monks. The Tibetan army at Gyangtse was estimated at 8,000. The Tibetans are also said to be threatening to murder the Chinese as soon as the British camp is captured.

Our informant also stated that the Tibetans who fired on the dâk escort on the 15th constituted one of the parties of 20 referred to above. Captain Ottley and his Mounted Infantry dispersed a second party on the 16th, killing four of them, about a mile from Nainying Monastery. On the 18th, the Mounted Infantry found and drove off a third party on some hills about four miles south-west of the camp.

E. C. Wilton,

for British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters.

Gyangtse, the 21st June, 1904.

Enclosure No. 200.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Gyangtse, the 29th June, 1904.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a communication I have made to the Tibetan Commanders in the Jong, in reply to their request that an armistice should be granted to enable the Ta Lama to come here for the purpose of negotiating.

Annexure.

English version of a communication made to the Tibetan Commanders in the Jong at Gyangtse.

In reply to their verbal message requesting an armistice pending the arrival of duly empowered negotiators, the Tibetan Commanders in Gyangtse are informed that the British Commissioner is pleased to grant the armistice asked for till sunset on 30th June to enable the Kalon Ta Lama to reach Gyangtse.

But as the British Commissioner was, without warning and after he had informed the Tibetan Government that he was ready to negotiate, attacked on the morning of 5th May, and as Tibetan armed forces have occupied the Jong and fired into his camp every day since then, General Macdonald, who is responsible for the safety of the Mission, will demand that the Jong be evacuated and all armed men withdrawn beyond the Karo La, Yang La, and Dongtse. A reasonable time for this purpose will be allowed.

It is further stipulated that, while this armistice lasts, the Tibetans will confine themselves to their lines, that they will not fire on the British forces, and will not build any further defences. As long as they keep these conditions, the British will not advance beyond the British lines or fire on the Tibetans.

It is also notified that no communications will be allowed along either the Shigatse or Lhasa roads, except by bearers of flag of truce, bearing communications to the British Commissioner or the Commander of the British forces. Such persons will always be given a safe escort.

Enclosure No. 201.

Political Diary of the Tibet Frontier Commission.

20th June, 1904.—Minimum temperature 43°. Cloudy day with a shower of rain in the afternoon.

The 10-pounders effected a large breach in the wall of the "barrack"—the strongest building in the Jong—with common shell.

21st June.—Minimum temperature 46°. A cloudy day. Shower about 3 p.m. Clear night.

The Tibetans repaired the breach in the barrack wall during the night, and it was again opened by the 10-pounders.

Parties of Tibetans were observed during the day building sangars on the hills to north and east.

22nd June.—Minimum temperature 44°. Fine, bright day.

A very quiet day, with little firing on either side.

23rd June.—Minimum temperature 45°. Fine, bright day, clouding up in afternoon.

There was some firing at the Palha post about 3 a.m. During the day streams of Tibetans (200 to 300 in number) were seen passing into the little monastery above Palha house.

24th June.—Minimum temperature 46°. Fine morning, clouding up in afternoon.

There was another attempted attack on Palha about 3 a.m., during which the Tibetans exploded a box of gunpowder in the next house. An empty convoy left for Kangma at 3.30 a.m.

Heavy firing during the afternoon from the wall near Gurkha post from four or five wheeled cannon.

25th June.—Minimum temperature 47°. Fine morning, clouding up in the afternoon.

A patrol of mounted infantry met a mounted infanty patrol from General Macdonald's force at Nainying Monastery. The patrols were fired on from the monastery, and one man was mortally wounded.

26th June.—Minimum temperature 48°. Fine morning, clouding up in the afternoon.

Colonel Brander took out a small column of two companies, guns and Maxim to the hills above Nainying Monastery, and co-operated with General

Macdonald's force in the capture of that place. The troops returned to camp about 5 p.m. Colonel Younghusband and Mr. White accompanied the force. Captain Cowie, R.E., returned to Gyangtse from surveying in the neighbourhood of Kala Tso.

E. F. YOUNGHUSBAND, Colonel,
British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters.

Gyangtse, the 30th June, 1904.

Enclosure No. 202.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 7th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Gyangtse, 7th, 10 p.m. Reports were received that enemy retreated during night towards Shigatse, Yang La, and Karo La. Mounted Infantry were sent out in all three directions on the Shigatse road. They overtook the rearguard of 400 Tibetans, followed them for two miles beyond Dongtse, and inflicted some loss. The other two parties did not get in touch with enemy, but learned they had retreated hastily towards passes. The monastery and balance of town were occupied this morning without resistance, and the demolition of Jong commenced. The enemy's loss was severer than anticipated. From further information obtained to-day from prisoners and Lamas, the total numbers of the enemy opposed to us yesterday are estimated as 6,000. Am moving to Dongtse to-morrow with flying column, partly to disperse enemy reported in neighbourhood, but mainly to get fodder and supplies.

Enclosure No. 203.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 8th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Column reached Dongtse to-day unopposed, and Mounted Infantry reconnoitred some miles further on. Demolition of Jong continued. Regret to report that two men dangerously and six men seriously burnt, all of Royal Fusiliers, in unexpected gunpowder explosion in Jong. All reported quiet in vicinity; villagers returning.

Enclosure No. 204.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated the 9th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Government of India consider advance to Lhasa inevitable. If the Ta Lama and the Shape can be induced to come in and to negotiate *en route*, you should invite them to accompany you, explaining the terms of His Majesty's Government, and warning them that any further resistance will involve a settlement less favourable to Tibet.

Enclosure No. 205.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 9th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

I visited the Tongsa Penlop this morning and informed him that Viceroy considers delegates were not in earnest in discussing settlement and had not sufficient authority. His Excellency could not, therefore, consent to any further delay in the advance to Lhasa, but if they came in I would be glad to discuss settlement with them on the way to Lhasa. Tongsa Penlop thought Dalai Lama would fly on our approach.

Enclosure No. 206.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 9th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Column arrived safely at Dongtse yesterday, and found the place evacuated. Convoy of 700 maunds grain sent in from Dongtse to day, more to follow. Convoy also arrived from Kangma with ammunition and supplies. Reconnoitring parties report all clear in vicinity and six miles beyond Dongtse, the bulk of the Tibetan army being reported to have fled into the Rong valley.

Enclosure No. 207.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 10th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Our mounted infantry reconnoitered as far as Penam Jong and found it unoccupied, and all the Tibetans fled either to Shigatse or into the Rong valley. Rumour also received that they have retired from the Karo La and Negartse, but this is not yet confirmed. All quiet in this vicinity. A plentiful supply of grain and thampa has been found locally, and is being moved into the post.

Enclosure No. 208.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 11th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

We leave here on 14th July, and, provided no opposition is met with and local supplies obtainable, should reach Lhasa about the 5th August.

Enclosure No. 209.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 12th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Column returned yesterday from Dongtse. All quiet. Convoy arrived from Kangma with ammunition and supplies. Preparations for advance nearing completion.

Enclosure No. 210.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 13th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

I propose issuing proclamation to-morrow.

Enclosure No. 211.

From the Foreign Secretary to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated Simla, the 13th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram, 13th June. Please issue proclamation before advancing to Lhasa as proposed.

Enclosure No. 212.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 13th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

I have informed the Amban by letter that I am advancing to Lhasa, as neither properly empowered Tibetan delegates nor he have come to Gyangtse; that my purpose is still to negotiate, but that now negotiations can only be conducted in Lhasa. Tongsa Penlop has at my instance written a further letter to Ta Lama, stating that I shall be prepared to carry on negotiations *en route*, in order that settlement may be ready for signature at an early date at Lhasa. The Penlop has also written at my request to the Dalai Lama, giving an outline of the terms to be demanded, and adding that they will be enhanced if we encounter further opposition. Tongsa Penlop is sending a man with me to act as a means of communication with the Tibetans, he himself will rejoin any time I ask him to; at present he will remain here until he hears from the Tibetans that they still have need of him. A Lama from Lhasa, who has arrived with a letter for the Tongsa Penlop from the Dalai Lama, states that latter is really anxious for a settlement to be effected. In his letter the Dalai Lama says it is a pity that there should be war in a religious country, and asks the Tongsa Penlop to assist the Councillors in their good work. Jongpen of Gyangtse, whom I had confined in post here when we first heard of hostile gathering, just before the Mission was attacked, has now been released and reinstated; he will act as intermediary between the Officer Commanding here and the people. People are selling country produce to the soldiers, and a small bazaar has been started. Proclamation will be posted up everywhere to-morrow.

Enclosure No. 213.

Political Diary of the Tibet Frontier Commission.

27th June, 1904.—Minimum temperature 49°. Cloudy day. Light shower at 2.30 p.m. Rain began again at 4 p.m., and continued all night.

The troops had a day's rest in camp.

28th June.—Minimum temperature 44°. Wet morning, rain continuing till 8 a.m., when it cleared and remained fine till 6 p.m., when rain recommenced and lasted all evening.

General Macdonald began operations by seizing upon houses along the river bank, so as to cut the Tibetans in the fort off from their water-supply and from the Shigatse road. His main force crossed the river, and cleared the country down to the Tse-Chen Monastery which was captured in the evening by the Gurkhas and Pathans, with a loss to ourselves of one officer killed and two officers and four men wounded, and to the Tibetans of 250 killed.

Tibetan prisoners were sent out in the morning to Shigatse and Nang-Kartse with letters to the Shapes, said to be at these places, informing them that Colonel Younghusband had been informed by the Bhutanese that the Shapes had come from Lhasa for the purpose of effecting a settlement, but were afraid to venture into the British Camp, and that, should they come, they would be well received.

29th June.—Minimum temperature 43°. Cloudy day.

The troops were given a day's rest. About 10 a.m. a flag of truce came in from the leaders in the Jong to say that the messenger sent out the day before to Nang-Kar-tse had been captured and taken to the Jong, and the letter read, and that the Tibetans now asked for a temporary armistice to allow for the arrival of the Shape Ta Lama, who was at Penam, and would arrive the following day. An armistice was accordingly granted to them until sunset on the following evening.

30th June.—Minimum temperature 49°. Cloudy day. Shower in afternoon.

A flag of truce came in at 6.30 p.m. to say that the Shape Ta Lama had arrived at Dongtse, and would reach Gyangtse the following morning. The armistice was, therefore, prolonged till noon of the next day.

1st July.—Minimum temperature 48°. Cloudy.

The Tongsa Penlop arrived during the morning, and called upon the British Commissioner at 2.30 p.m. During the interview he showed a letter from the Dalai Lama, in which it was stated that the Shape Ta Lama, a Tung-yig Chempo, and representatives of the three Lhasa monasteries, were being sent to Gyangtse to conduct negotiations. A messenger arrived from the Shape in the evening to say that he had arrived at the Jong, and would call on the next morning on the Tongsa Penlop, and afterwards on the British Commissioner.

2nd July.—Minimum temperature 43°. Cloudy day.

About 9.30 a.m. the Tibetan delegates rode up towards the Mission post under a flag of truce. Captain O'Connor rode out, and informed them that the British Commissioner desired that they should first pay their respects to him, and that they might then proceed to visit the Tongsa Penlop. They replied that they had orders from Lhasa to first visit the Tongsa Penlop, but that they would await his arrival in our camp, and would then pay their respects together to Colonel Younghusband. Accordingly, at 11 o'clock, Colonel Younghusband received the Tongsa Penlop and delegates together, and, after an interview lasting about 1½ hours, they left, promising to call again at noon on the following day.

3rd July.—Minimum temperature 46°. Cloudy day.

The Tongsa Penlop arrived at 11.30, and had a conversation with Colonel Younghusband. General Macdonald and staff arrived at noon ; but at 12.30, as the Tibetan delegates had not arrived, the Durbar was dismissed. The Tibetans did not appear until 1.30, and at 3.30 Colonel Younghusband received them, and gave them an ultimatum to the effect that all Tibetan armed force must evacuate the Jong before noon on the 5th July, failing which hostilities would be resumed. The Tongsa Penlop arrived during the Durbar, and the Tibetans left, saying they would confer with him, and let the British Commissioner have their answer on the following day.

F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND, Colonel,
British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters.

Gyangtse, the 5th July, 1904.

Enclosure No. 214.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 15th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Kotang, 15th July, 7 a.m. We marched here yesterday with continuous rain during night. March to-day to Shelat. Villagers have removed all their grain, and only two and half maunds obtained yesterday. Unless more is obtained to-day, this will considerably increase difficulties.

Enclosure No. 215.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, dated Camp Gyangtse, the 9th July, 1904.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to make the following detailed report of the communications I have recently had with the Tibetan delegates to test their willingness to undertake formal negotiations. Though the Commanders in the Jong had returned the letters I had under your directions written to the Dalai Lama and the Amban, announcing that if they did not send proper negotiators to meet me by June 25th we would advance to Lhasa, yet they knew the contents of these letters from an open letter which I sent with them. They were also informed of the same by the Tongsa Penlop who had come from Bhutan to see General Macdonald and myself and who, after seeing General Macdonald and all our military preparations in Chumbi and been informed that unless the Tibetans sent negotiators by June 25th, an advance to Lhasa would be made, had written to the Dalai Lama warning him of the danger which threatened him and advising him to send negotiators in time. While returning from Chumbi I received at Kangma on June 24th an intimation by telegraph from the Tongsa Penlop to say he had heard from the Shape Ta Lama (the Lama Member of Council) that the Dalai Lama wished a settlement to be made, and he was on his way to Gyangtse for the purpose. The Tongsa Penlop also asked to be allowed to come to Gyangtse. I replied to the Tongsa Penlop asking him to come at once and I asked for and obtained the permission of the Government of India to defer the advance to Lhasa for five days to give the negotiators a chance of coming in. In consequence of the fight at Naini on the way here I arrived here too late on the 26th to send a message to the delegates on that day, but on the following morning I caused a Lama in my employ to write letters to the Shape who was at Nagartse and the Ta Lama who was on his way up from Shigatse, intimating to them that I had heard from the Tongsa Penlop that they were coming here to negotiate, and that if they were sincere in their intentions I would guarantee their security and treat them with respect, but that they must come in quickly as we were about to advance to Lhasa. On June 28th General Macdonald captured the Tibetan position at the Tse Chen monastery, and impressed by this the commanders in the Jong on the following morning sent a flag of truce with a message by the bearer to the effect that my letter to the Shape at Nagartse had been brought into them, a council had been held to consider it and it had been decided to ask us to grant an armistice to enable the Ta Lama to reach here. I consulted with General Macdonald, and replied that I was prepared to grant one for the purpose and I sent the terms upon which it was made in writing to the Ta Lama. The Ta Lama was very deliberate in his movements, and I was willing that military operations against the Jong should be resumed, as the Ta Lama had been specially informed that he could always come in under a flag of truce. But General Macdonald was willing to continue to suspend them, so the armistice was informally prolonged. The Tongsa Penlop, though he had considerably further to travel, came in here at midday on July 1st and immediately came to see me. I thanked him for the efforts which he was making to effect a settlement and asked him if the Tibetans were really earnest in their intentions. We certainly wished to make a settlement I said, but, as he knew, we were perfectly ready to go to Lhasa if necessary. He assured me that the Dalai Lama really wished for a settlement and had written him a letter asking him to assist in making one and naming delegates whom he was sending for that purpose. The Tongsa Penlop also produced a packet of silks which he said the Dalai Lama had sent me. I told him that it was not our custom to receive presents of this nature unless they were either accompanied by a letter or handed by an official of the dignitary who sent them. About 3 in the afternoon the Ta Lama arrived in Gyangtse, and I sent a message to say I should be glad to see him that afternoon. He replied that he proposed to visit the Tongsa Penlop on the following day and would come and see me some time after that. I returned a message to the effect that unless he visited me by 9 on the following morning military operations would be resumed. Undisturbed by this threat he shortly after 9 on the following morning proceeded to visit the Tongsa Penlop, but as he had to pass my camp I sent out Captain O'Connor to say that I insisted on his coming to pay his respects to me unless he wished me to consider he was not anxious to negotiate. He was at perfect liberty to discuss matters with the Tongsa Penlop, but he must no longer delay paying his respects to me and giving me evidence that the Tibetan Government were sincere in their wish to negotiate. At 11 I received the Ta Lama and the Tongsa Penlop in Darbar. There were also present the Tung-yig-Chembo (the Grand Secretary, who was one of the delegates at Khamba Jong last year) and six representatives of the three great Lhasa Monasteries. As all except the Grand Secretary were men who had not met me before and were probably ignorant of our view of the situation, I recounted it at length showing how we had lived on very good terms with Tibet for nearly a century and a half, and it was only after the Tibetans had wantonly invaded Sikkim territory in 1886 that misunderstanding had arisen; that Mr. White had for years tried at Yatung to make them observe the treaty made on their behalf by the Chinese, and that when I came to Khamba Jong, a place of meeting which the Viceroy had been informed was approved of both by the Emperor of China and the Dalai Lama, they still repudiated the old treaty, refused to negotiate a new one, or have any intercourse at all with us, while after my arrival here when I told them I was ready to negotiate, instead of sending me negotiators they sent soldiers and treacherously attacked me at night. I concluded by saying that the Viceroy on hearing this had directed me to write letters to the Dalai Lama and the Amban, announcing that if proper negotiators did not arrive here by June 25th we would advance to Lhasa to compel negotiations there, but these letters had been returned by the Commander in the Jong, no negotiators had arrived here by the 25th and it was only because on the 24th the Tongsa Penlop had informed me that negotiators really were on the way that the British Government in their anxiety for a peaceful settlement had been pleased to grant them a few days' grace. We were ready to go on to Lhasa the next day. If they were really in earnest and had power to make a settlement, I was ready to negotiate with them. If they were not prepared to make a settlement we would advance to Lhasa forthwith. Had they proper credentials? The Grand Secretary replied on behalf of the Ta Lama that we had come by force into the country and occupied Chumbi and Phari, and though the Tibetan soldiers at Guru had strict orders not to fire on us, we had fired on them and had killed all the high officials. He said they did not know I was here when this camp was attacked on May 5th. But they now had orders to negotiate with me. They had no special credentials, but the Dalai Lama in his letter to the Tongsa Penlop had mentioned that they were coming to negotiate and the fact of a man in the Ta Lama's high position being here was evidence of their intentions. I replied that I did not wish to discuss the past except to make clear one point. They were not at the Guru fight, but I was and I saw the first shot fired by the Tibetans after General Macdonald had purposely restrained his men from firing. But what concerned me was the future. If they made a settlement with me now, would it be observed or would it be repudiated like the last one? They at first replied that this would depend upon what was in the settlement; but subsequently explained that though they might have to refer to Lhasa for orders, yet once the Dalai Lama had placed his seal on a Treaty, it would be scrupulously observed. They said they wished to talk matters over with the Tongsa Penlop who would act as mediator and arrange matters with me. I informed them that I would be very glad if they would discuss the situation with him, and I was quite willing that he should accompany them when they came to see me, but they themselves must come to me if they desired that negotiations should take place. They said they would have a talk with him the next day and come and see me the day after. I told them, however, that they must have their talk before noon on the following day and come and see me again at that hour, as I was not yet satisfied of the earnestness of their intentions. The same afternoon they had a prolonged interview with the Tongsa Penlop who asked them what they had gained by their silly attitude of obstruction and advised them to give up fighting and make terms with us. The Tongsa Penlop informed me he thought the delegates, or certainly the Dalai Lama, were really anxious to make a settlement. On July 3rd the Tongsa Penlop arrived half an hour before the time fixed for the reception of the delegates. At noon I took my seat in the Darbar, which was attended by General Macdonald and many military officers, while a strong guard-of-honour lined the approach. I waited for half an hour, but as at the end of that time the Tibetan delegates had not arrived, I rose and dismissed the Darbar. At 1.30 the Tibetan delegates appeared. They were shown to a spare tent and shortly before 4 I received them in Darbar, but to mark my displeasure I did not rise from my seat, and I informed them that the inference I drew from the disrespect they had shown me in arriving an hour and a half late was that they were not in earnest in desiring a settlement. The Ta Lama assured me that they were really in earnest, but that the Grand Secretary was ill. I then informed them that as I had been attacked here without any warning and after I had written repeatedly to the Amban, saying I was waiting here to negotiate and as I had been fired on from the Jong continually for two months since the attack, I must ask them to evacuate the Jong. General Macdonald was prepared to give them till noon of the 5th—that is nearly two days—in which to effect the evacuation, but if after that time the Jong was occupied, he would commence military operations against it. Irrespective of these operations I would, however, be ready to receive them if they wished to make a settlement and prevent the necessity of our proceeding to Lhasa. The Grand Secretary then said that if the Tibetan troops withdrew from the Jong, they would expect that we also would withdraw our troops, otherwise the Tibetans would be suspicious. I replied that the Tibetans did not at all seem to realise that they would have to pay a penalty for the insult they had offered the British representative, and that I could not discuss the matter further: they must either leave the Jong peaceably before noon on the 5th or expect to be then turned out by force. On leaving the Ta Lama very politely and respectfully expressed his regrets for having kept me waiting and begged that I would not be angry. But the Grand Secretary went away without a word of apology. The following morning the delegates had a long interview with the Tongsa Penlop and asked whether time could not be given them to refer to

Lhasa for orders. I sent back a message saying that it was already nearly a week since I had let the Ta Lama know that the evacuation of the Jong would be demanded, that they ought to be grateful for the opportunity that had been given them of withdrawing unmolested, and that no further grace could be allowed. The Tongsa Penlop also informed me that they were very suspicious and wanted an assurance that we really wished a settlement. I told him he might inform them that the best evidence that we desired a settlement was the fact that the control of affairs was in my hands. If we had intended war, the control would have been in the hands of a General. We wanted a settlement, but were ready to make war if a settlement was refused. The delegates and the Commanders in the Jong were still undecided. No one would take the responsibility of evacuating the Jong. On the morning of the 5th the Tongsa Penlop with some Lhasa Lamas came to see me, and I sent one of latter over to the delegate saying that at twelve a signal gun would be fired to warn them that half an hour afterwards firing would commence. I told them that if they came over either before or after with a flag of truce they would be given an asylum in the Tongsa Penlop's camp. I begged that the women and children should be taken out of the town. And I sent a special warning to General Ma. No notice was taken of any of those warnings. At 12 I had a signal gun fired and at 12.30 I heliographed to General Macdonald that he was free to commence firing. At 1.45 he began his military operations, which, planned with great skill and carried out with the utmost gallantry, resulted in the capture of the Jong on the afternoon of the 6th and in the dispersal of the Tibetan forces. Immediately after the capture of the Jong the Tongsa Penlop sent a message of congratulations, and I asked him to try and find the Tibetan delegates and tell them and the Shape at Nagartse that I was still ready to negotiate as previously announced, but that they must come in at once if they wished a settlement, otherwise we would proceed to Lhasa. It was found, however, that the delegates had fled. It is now three days since the Jong was captured and nothing further has been heard of them.

Enclosure No. 216.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Longma, the 15th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

If indemnity increased, I presume number of years in which payment of it be made may be increased. Perhaps, in this respect we might suit convenience of Tibetans.

Enclosure No. 217.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 13th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Preparations for advance now complete. March to Kotang to-morrow, on scale of kit at six per mule. Karo La reported to be occupied by 2,000 Tibetans, with 2,000 Tibetans in support. Rain as usual to-night, with snow on surrounding hills.

Enclosure No. 218.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 17th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Ralung, the 16th July. Marched from Kotang to Lungma yesterday, 14 miles; rainy day; fodder and grain obtainable. Enemy's patrols met by our Mounted Infantry and one prisoner captured. Marched to-day to Ralung, eight miles. Our Mounted Infantry report Karo La strongly held, and that fresh walls and sangars have been built. Captured five prisoners and 118 yaks with their drivers. All villages deserted *en route*.

Enclosure No. 219.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 17th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Ralung, the 16th July. Tongsa Penlop has sent me letters received from the Dalai Lama and the Ta Lama, and Yutok Shape. Dalai Lama asks Tongsa Penlop to use his influence with English and Tibetans, and says that negotiations for establishing friendship should be begun with all speed, as it will then be known which is in the right. Letters from Yutok Shape and Ta Lama were dispatched from Nagartse, and are to the effect that they are on the point of setting out for Gyangtse. They came as far as this place, but left again two days ago without making any communication to me. Before making further diplomatic move, I am awaiting definite advances on their part. They are aware what our terms are, and have been advised by Tongsa Penlop not to fight, but to effect a settlement. In any case, however, the Mission will not postpone its advance.

Enclosure No. 220.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Karo La, the 18th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Delegates told Bhutanese messengers at Zara they meant to come and see me, but they did not appear.

Enclosure No. 221.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated the 19th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp, two miles beyond Zara. Marched from Ralung to the Karo La on 17th, camping just under the summit of the pass at the foot of a large glacier, 16,600 feet. Found the enemy very strongly posted at a narrow gorge, three miles north, flanked by impassable snow mountains. After reconnaissance, dispositions made to attack on 18th. Enemy, however, who had numbered about 1,500 on the 17th, to a great extent retired during the night, 17th, 18th, to Nagartse, leaving only about 700 Kham men to defend the position. These occupied the high hills under the snows. They were turned out by the

Gurkhas and Pathans after a long and difficult climb to 18,000 feet high, but without severe resistance. Our losses—one man killed, two seriously wounded, all of 8th Gurkhas. Mounted Infantry reconnoitred to within two miles of Nagartse, which was found to be occupied. Am marching there to-day. Information received from prisoners that three of their leading men were killed in yesterday's engagement, besides many others: also that further reinforcements of 1,300 Kham men are expected Nagartse to-day.

Enclosure No. 222.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated the 20th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram, 15th July. We must wait and see what indemnity we can claim, and what Tibetans propose as to payment.

Enclosure No. 223.

Political Diary of the Tibet Frontier Commission.

4th July, 1904.—Minimum temperature 46°.

The Tibetan delegates held a long conference with the Tongsa Penlop, and returned to the Jong, saying that they would consult with the military leaders and give a reply on the following morning.

5th July.—Minimum temperature 52°.

The Tongsa Penlop came to visit the British Commissioner informally about 10.30 a.m. He said the Tibetans had as yet given no reply to our ultimatum, but had sent some Lhasa monks with an evasive message, asking for further delay. Colonel Younghusband sent a warning to the Jong that hostilities would commence punctually at 12.30, and urging the removal of all women and children. He sent a similar warning to Colonel Ma. At noon a signal gun was fired, and at 1.45 some shells were fired against the Jong, and a demonstration was made during the afternoon against the north-western side of the monastery.

6th July.—Minimum temperature 52°.

At 3.30 a.m., three storming columns, starting from Palha house, attacked the town, and established themselves in the outskirts. At 4 p.m., after the artillery had succeeded in making a practicable breach in the wall of the Jong, the Gurkhas, with great gallantry, stormed the breach and entered the Jong The Tibetans then fled into the monastery, and the whole Jong was occupied before nightfall.

7th July.—Minimum temperature 50°.

A messenger sent by the Tongsa Penlop to inform the Tibetan delegates that the British Commissioner was still ready to treat with them, found the monastery empty, all the Tibetan troops having fled. Colonel Younghusband, accompanied by the Tongsa Penlop, visited the Jong, and the Tongsa Penlop subsequently went over the monastery.

8th July.—Minimum temperature 49°.

A column marched to Dongtse, where large stores of food-grain were discovered.

9th July.—Minimum temperature 45°.

Colonel Younghusband paid a formal visit to the Tongsa Penlop, and informed him that the Government of India were not convinced of the sincerity of Tibetan delegates, and could no longer delay the advance to Lhasa.

A reconnoitring party proceeded to Penam Jong, some 20 miles below Dongtse. The Jong was found quite deserted, and the country everywhere quiet. The Tibetan soldiers are reported by the country people to have dispersed to their homes. The Tibetan delegates appear to have gone in the direction of Nangkartse.

10th July.—Minimum temperature 46°.

F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND,
British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters.

Camp Gyangtse, the 11th July, 1904.

Enclosure No. 224.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 23rd July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Nagartse, the 20th July. Delegates protested strongly against our going to Lhasa, saying, first, that it would lead to disturbances; then, that we should find no one there. Though at yesterday's interview they vigorously protested against occupation of Jong, at to-day's interview they never mentioned subject. Their tone was that of the aggrieved party, and they evidently do not yet realise seriousness of position, but the two Councillors were perfectly respectful. I told them we must go to Lhasa, though we had no wish to remain there longer than time required for settlement, and we would not fight unless opposed. It rested with them to decide whether our stay should be as peaceful as our first few weeks at Gyangtse, or whether we should have to repeat at Lhasa measures recently taken at Gyangtse and to increase severity of terms. Delegates were acquainted with terms by Tongsa Penlop's letter, but refused to discuss them.

Enclosure No. 225.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 23rd July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Nagartse, the 21st July. Marched here from Zara on 19th. March without incident. Found Tibetan delegates, consisting of Yutok Shape, the Ta Lama, and Grand Secretary, with flag of truce, waiting to see Colonel Younghusband, who received them at 3 p.m. that afternoon. The Nagartse Jong was peacefully occupied by two companies Pathans, and found to contain over 3,000 maunds supplies, chiefly barley meal, and a large number of Tibetan traps, kits. Jong situated at bottom of spur, about a mile from the shore of a narrow arm lake Palti, and is of no great strength. Halted here on 20th to rest and graze animals. Younghusband had further interview with delegates. Am marching to-day to Yasi, and sending back two troops mules under escort one company, 33rd. Am leaving post here of one company, 40th Pathans, and 20 mounted Infantry for dâk purposes.

Enclosures to Letter from Government of India, dated the 6th October, 1904. (No. 182.—Part I.)

Enclosure No. 226.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 26th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Pete Jong, the 23rd July. Marched from Nagartse to Yasi on 21st. Heavy rain most of day turning to snow at night. The delegates left during night, 20th to 21st for Lhasa. Mounted infantry reconnoitred beyond Pete Jong, which was found unoccupied. Pete Jong occupied by mounted infantry for night, but found to contain no supplies of importance. Enemy reported to have all retreated beyond the Brahmaputra two days previous. Made short march on 22nd to Pete Jong, where I am leaving a post of one company 40th Pathans and 20 Mounted Infantry. Mounted Infantry reconnoitred to near Kumbabarji. Khambala found unoccupied, as also Tibetans prepared position with long wall seven miles on. Boats observed crossing the Brahmaputra at two points, and remnants of Kham force reported to be still crossing in disorganised condition, looting country *en route.* Am moving to Demalung to-day, and hope to seize passage of river to-morrow with mounted troops. Elevation of Yamdok Cho, along which we are marching for 25 miles, found to be 15,000 feet.

Enclosure No. 227.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Gyangtse, the 13th July, 1904.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a letter which I have written to the Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhasa, informing him of my intended advance to Lhasa.

Annexure.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to His Excellency Yu Tai, Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhasa, dated Gyangtse, the 12th July, 1904.

I have the honour to inform you that, as neither Your Excellency, nor any Tibetan negotiators possessing proper power or authority to make a settlement have come to negotiate with me here, I am proceeding to Lhasa. My purpose is still to negotiate, but I must ask your Excellency to prevent the Tibetans from further opposing my Mission. I have received the orders of His Majesty's Government as to the terms which I must demand of the Tibetan Government. These terms will be made more severe if I am still further opposed. But if no further opposition is offered to me by the Tibetans, no further fighting will be initiated by us. I must in any case, however, advance to Lhasa to effect the settlement which I have found it impossible to effect either at Khamba Jong or here.

Enclosure No. 228.

Political Diary of the Tibet Frontier Commission.

11*th July,* 1904.—Fine morning. Advance from Gyangtse fixed for 14th, 13*th July.*—Fine morning. Shower in afternoon. Heavy rain all night.

The Tongsa Penlop called on the Commissioner, and said that he thought it would be best for him to remain at Gyangtse for the present, and that, if the Tibetans sent to him later on asking him to come, he would follow us. All Tibetan prisoners, who had not been taken actually fighting, were released to-day, and told to return to their villages and cultivate the farms.

14*th July.*—Wet morning. Rain continuing till noon, when it cleared up till 6 p.m., when rain recommenced and lasted all night.

The Lhasa column, starting at 9.30 a.m., marched to Kotang, 12 miles.

15*th July.*—Cloudy morning. Rain began about 3 p.m., and lasted all the evening.

The force marched to Shetu, 14½ miles.

16*th July.*—Cloudy morning. A letter arrived from the Tongsa Penlop, enclosing letters which he had received from the Dalai Lama and the Ta Lama and Yutok Shape, asking him to use his good offices with us to assist in effecting a settlement. The force marched to Ralung, 8 miles. The Mounted Infantry reconnoitred to the wall beyond the Karo La, which they found occupied by the Tibetans. Rain fell during the night. The Yutok Shape, who had been at Ralung, was found to have returned to the Karo La camp two days before.

17*th July.*—Clear, fine morning. The force marched to camp below Karo La, 9 miles. The Bhutanese messengers, who had carried a letter from the Tongsa Penlop to the Shape's camp, returned, saying that some Tibetan officials would come over presently to see us. The Tibetans, however, fired at our Mounted Infantry from the wall, and no officials appeared.

F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND, Colonel.

British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters.

Camp Nagartse, the 20th July, 1904.

Enclosure No. 229.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 1st August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Chaksam Ferry, the 27th July. July 23rd, marched from Pete Jong to Demolung at foot of Kamba La in pouring rain. July 24th, marched across the Kamba La, 16,000 feet, to Kamba Barji on banks Brahmaputra, sending on the whole of my mounted infantry under Major Iggulden to seize the Chaksam ferry, which was successfully done, and the two large ferry boats taken possession of, whilst Chaksam was occupied by the mounted infantry for the night. Some hundreds of enemy were observed on opposite side of river fleeing towards Lhasa. Messengers with letters from Tibetan National Council arrived in early morning with letter for Colonel Younghusband. July 25th, marched to Chaksam ferry and commenced passage of Brahmaputra, which is here about 150 yards wide with a heavy volume of water and strong current. Succeeded in crossing one company mounted infantry and seven companies infantry by nightfall, using my four Berthon boats and two large local boats. Extremely regret to report that Major G. S. Bretherton, my Chief Supply and Transport Officer, was drowned, together with two Gurkhas, by the capsizing of a boat during the crossing of the river, also one man of the Guides Infantry with 2nd Mounted Infantry was drowned, whilst swimming the river to obtain boats. July 26th, passage of troops across river proceeded with, but owing to river having risen a foot, progress not so fast as yesterday. The Chagyop Kenpo Ta Lama and Dhoongyal Chenpo arrived at the Chaksam monastery during the afternoon from the other side of the river to see Colonel Younghusband.

Enclosure No. 230.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 1st August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Chaksam Ferry, 26th July. National Assembly have written me letter, asking me not proceed Lhasa, and saying Dalai Lama's Chamberlain has been deputed negotiate with us. This letter is first ever written by Tibetan to British official. I have addressed reply to Dalai Lama, stating that I must advance to Lhasa, but no wish to fight unless opposed. I have promised respect religious buildings not occupied by Tibetan soldiers, and have said we have no wish remain Lhasa longer than time required conclude settlement. This letter has been accepted by Chamberlain and forwarded to Lhasa. Chamberlain and Ta Lama visit me to-morrow.

Enclosure No. 231.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp Ralung, the 16th July, 1904.

In continuation of my telegram of this day's date, I have the honour to enclose English translations of the Tongsa Penlop's letter to me and of its enclosures.

Annexure 1.

Letter from the Tongsa Penlop to Colonel Younghusband, received on the 16th July, 1904.

I received to-day (the second day of the 6th month—15th July) a reply from the Dalai Lama to letter which I had written to him after the fight here. In this letter the Dalai Lama tells me that I must certainly effect a settlement between England and Tibet, but I have also received a letter from the two Shapes to say that we must endeavour to arrange a settlement. The Yutok Shape and the Kalon Ta Lama say that they are coming to Gyangtse. I am, therefore, sending to you my servant with the letters of the Dalai Lama and the Shapes for your inspection, and I beg of you to consider carefully the possibilities of making peace. The Yutok Shape and the Kalon Lama have come to Ralung with the object of making a settlement. I have written to the Shapes asking them not to make war but to effect a peaceful settlement.

Annexure 2.

Letter from the Dalai Lama to the Tongsa Penlop.

On the 26th of the 5th month (9th July) I received your letter written on the 23rd (6th July). You tell me that the Kalon Lama and the Tung-Yig-Chempo after negotiations conducted on the 20th and 21st (3rd and 4th July) did not succeed in establishing friendship, that the English said that if the delegates wished for friendship, they must withdraw their soldiers beyond the Karola, and that the delegates could remain in the Jong, and that English soldiers would not occupy the Jong—the clauses of the agreement were well arranged by you. But the delegates said that if the Tibetan soldiers must withdraw, the English soldiers must withdraw with them, and it was on this account that peace could not be arranged and a disagreement arose. You also say that as you are a small nation, neither the English nor the Tibetans will pay any attention to you and you ask where the boundary should be fixed. A letter from the Kalon Lama and the other delegates reached me on the 28th (11th July) in which they announce the capture of the Jong and say they are coming to Nagartse *viâ* Rong. Now you told the delegates that they should come to you, but they did not listen to you and thought that they themselves were clever. We have written to the Yutok Shape enquiring from him whether it will be easy to effect a settlement or not. Will you also request the English privately not to nibble up our country ? Please use your influence well both with the English and the Tibetans. I cannot at present speak with exactness with regard to the frontier, but I have said something on the matter to the Pukong Tulku, so it will be well if the negotiations are begun quickly. Once they have begun we shall hear gradually who is in the right.

Annexure 3.

Letter from the Dalai Lama to the Tongsa Penlop.

On the 28th of the 5th month (11th July) I received your letter written on the 25th (8th July) announcing that the English had captured Gyangtse Jong. I believe that the Kalon Lama and the Tung-Yig-Chempo are about to arrive at Nagartse from Rong. It is well that, owing to your representation, the Pang-Kar-Cho-de Monastery has been left unmolested. But great loss has been occasioned to other monasteries and to the peasants. You say that our delegates ought to reach Gyangtse between the 25th of the 5th month and the 2nd of the 6th month (8th and 15th July), and that you yourself have come to enquire into the making of a Treaty, so we despatched delegates at once. We have also sent a messenger and he should have reached you by now, but if he has not arrived, you should explain matters to the English. Negotiations for establishing friendship should begin quickly. You should regulate your conduct in accordance with the attitude taken up by the English and should do your best in every matter which arises between the English and the Tibetans. Please send me news frequently by letter.

Annexure 4.

Letter from the two Shapes to the Tongsa Penlop.

You have sent letters to each of the two Kalons which have reached us. In this letter you ask whether we really desire friendship with the English, and you say the delegates should come quickly to Gyangtse. We have already sent a letter to you and, after consulting together at Nagartse, we will start on the 30th of the 5th month (13th July), so please send a man to Ralung to assist us against molestation on the road. We are sending herewith letter from the Dalai Lama, dated 30th of the 5th month (13th July).

Enclosure No. 232.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 4th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Chaksam Ferry, the 29th July. Have continued passing troops and animals across the river during the past three days without accident. Weather continues fine, and river has fallen about eight inches. The passage should be completed by noon on 31st. Am leaving post here on south side of river of one company, 40th Pathans, 20 Mounted Infantry, small detachment of sappers, and Attock boatmen, and some medical and supply details.

Enclosure No. 233.

Letter from the Under-Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated Simla, the 5th August, 1904.

I am directed to forward a revised draft Convention, amended in accordance with the instructions contained in the telegram from His Majesty's Secretary of State, dated the 3rd August, 1904, which has been repeated to you. This draft should be regarded as finally settled, unless and until you receive further orders on the subject from the Government of India.

Annexure 1.

Whereas doubts and difficulties have arisen as to the meaning and validity of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and the Trade Regulations of 1893, and as to the liabilities of the Tibetan Government under these agreements; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the relations of friendship and good understanding which have existed between the British Government and the Government of Tibet; and whereas it is desirable to restore peace and amicable relations, and to resolve and determine the doubts and difficulties as aforesaid, the said Governments have resolved to conclude a Convention with these objects, and the following articles have been agreed upon by Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., in virtue of full powers vested in him by His Britannic Majesty's Government and on behalf of that said Government, and the Illustrious Dalai Lama, Nag-Wang, Lo-ssang Theedan Gyarso Gyon Rimboochay, on his own behalf and on behalf of the Government of Tibet.

I.

The Government of Tibet engages to respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and to recognise the frontier between Sikkim and Tibet as defined in Article I. of the said Convention, and to erect boundary pillars accordingly.

II

The Tibetan Government undertakes to open forthwith trade marts to which all British and Tibetan subjects shall have free right of access at Gyantse and Gartok, as well as at Yatung.

The Regulations applicable to the trade mart at Yatung, under the Anglo-Chinese Agreement of 1893, shall, subject to such amendments as may hereafter be agreed upon by common consent between the British and Tibetan Governments, apply to the marts above mentioned.

In addition to establishing trade marts at the places mentioned, the Tibetan Government undertakes to place no restrictions on the trade by existing routes and to consider the question of establishing fresh trade marts under similar conditions if development of trade requires it.

III.

The question of the amendment of the Regulations of 1893 is reserved for separate consideration, and the Tibetan Government undertakes to appoint fully authorised delegates to negotiate with representatives of the British Government as to the details of the amendments required.

IV.

The Tibetan Government undertakes to levy no dues of any kind other than those provided for in the tariff to be mutually agreed upon.

V.

The Tibetan Government undertakes to keep the road to Gyangtse from the frontier clear of all obstruction and in a state of repair suited to the needs of the trade, and to establish at Yatung, Gyangtse, and Gartok, and at each of the other trade marts that may hereafter be established, a Tibetan Agent who shall receive from the British Agent appointed to watch over British trade at the mart in question any letter which the latter may desire to send to the Tibetan or to the Chinese authorities. The Tibetan Agent shall also be responsible for the due delivery of such communications and for the transmission of replies.

VI.

As an indemnity to the British Government for the expense incurred in the despatch of armed troops to Lhasa to exact reparation for breaches of treaty obligations and for the insults offered to and attacks upon the British Commissioner and his following and escort, the Tibetan Government engages to pay a sum of £   to the British Government.

The indemnity shall be payable at such place as the British Government may from time to time after due notice indicate whether in Tibet or in the British districts of Darjeeling or Jalpiguri, in   annual instalments on the 1st January in each year, beginning from the 1st January, 190 .

VII.

As security for the payment of the above-mentioned indemnity, and for the fulfilment of the provisions relative to trade marts specified in Articles II., III., IV., and V., the British Government shall continue to occupy the Chumbi valley until the indemnity has been paid and until the trade marts have been effectively opened for three years, whichever date may be the later.

VIII.

The Tibetan Government agrees to raze all forts and fortifications and remove all armaments which might impede the course of free communication between the British frontier and the towns of Gyantse and Lhasa.

IX.

The Government of Tibet engages that, without the previous consent of the British Government,—

(*a*) no portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation, to any Foreign Power ;

(*b*) no such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Tibetan affairs ;

(*c*) no Representatives or Agents of any Foreign Power shall be admitted to Tibet ;

(*d*) no concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights, shall be granted to any Foreign Power, or the subject of any Foreign Power. In the event of consent to such concessions being granted, similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British Government ;

(*e*) no Tibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any Foreign Power, or the subject of any Foreign Power.

X.

In witness whereof the two negotiators have signed the same, and affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done in quintuplicate at Lhasa, this day of in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and four, corresponding with the Tibetan date, the day of

Signatures.

In proceeding to the signature of the Convention, dated this day, the representatives of Great Britain and Tibet declare that the English text shall be binding.

Signatures.

Enclosure No. 234.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 17th July, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Longma, 15th July. Would it not be well for me to have some document conferring power to sign Convention.

Enclosure No. 235.

Letter from the Under-Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated Simla, the 3rd August, 1904.

In reply to your telegram of the 15th July, 1904, I am directed to inform you that, by virtue of your appointment as British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, which has already been notified to the Chinese Amban in the Viceroy's letter of the 3rd June, 1903,* and in accordance with the instructions conveyed in the telegram, dated 26th July, 1904, from Secretary of State as to the form that the Convention should take, you have full authority to sign the Convention which you have been instructed to conclude for the settlement of the differences which at present exist in regard to Tibet between the British, Chinese and Tibetan Governments. It will be sufficient if you use the seal that is already in your possession.

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* Cd. 2054, p. 200, No. 99, Enclosure 7, Annexure

Enclosure No. 236.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 4th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Chaksam Ferry, the 29th July. Have had two visits from Ta Lama and one from Dalai Lama's Grand Chamberlain, who brought me letter from Dalai Lama, asking me not to go to Lhasa. Chamberlain said he and Councillors ready to negotiate here, but our presence in Lhasa would so spoil religion that Dalai Lama might die. Have told delegates we must proceed to Lhasa, and I have written second letter to Dalai Lama, expressing hope that he will appreciate inconvenience it would be to me to halt this side of Lhasa, now I have left Gyangtse. Chinese merchant arrived with offer to sell us anything we want at Lhasa. He saw no Tibetan troops on way. This valley most fertile, wheat, barley, and peas abundant. Despatch from Amban arrived, answering mine from Gyangtse. He says he has communicated purport to Dalai Lama. Bearer says all in confusion at Lhasa, every one shifting responsibility. Dalai Lama in religious seclusion, and believed to have retired secretly to private monastery, 18 miles from Lhasa; he has ordered monks to attend religious duties. Supplies abundant at Lhasa, and people will sell readily. Amban anxious to make settlement.

Enclosure No. 237.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E, British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to L. W. Dane, Esq., I.C.S., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Camp Nagartse, the 20th July, 1904.

(Extract.)

In continuation of my telegram of to-day's date I have the honour to furnish you with the following full report of the interview which was held yesterday between the Tibetan delegates and myself. When the advance guard arrived near Nagartse they found the delegates had come out from the Jong with a white flag and had pitched a tent a mile outside. They said that a Council had been held at Lhasa and they had been sent to treat. Word to this effect was sent back to me, and I sent forward Captain O'Connor to say that I was willing to treat with them and would receive them in my camp in the afternoon, but that they must understand that we would still advance to Lhasa and that we must occupy the Jong. The Deputation, which consisted of the Yutok Shape, the Ta Lama, the Grand Secretary, and some monks, arrived in my camp shortly before the time appointed. The Yutok Shape took the chief place. He is a genial, gentlemanly official of good family and pleasant manners. But it soon became apparent that both he and the Ta Lama were in the hands of the Grand Secretary, the official who from our first meeting at Khamba Jong has ever been an obstacle in our way. This latter official acting as spokesman said they had heard from the Tongsa Penlop that we wished to negotiate at Gyangtse and they had set out to meet us when they heard that we were advancing and that their messengers whom they had sent on ahead had been fired on by our troops. This made it very difficult for them to come to a peaceful settlement with us, but they were quite willing to negotiate if we returned to Gyangtse, and in that case they would accompany us and make a proper settlement with us there. I repeated for the fiftieth time that I had waited for more than a year to negotiate, that even at Gyangtse I had given them many opportunities, that when I had first arrived there I had announced my desire to negotiate, that after the attack upon me I had still declared my willingness to negotiate up to June 25th, that on the intercession of the Tongsa Penlop the Viceroy had extended that term for some days, that even after the capture of the Jong I had sent messengers over the country to find them and had waited for another week at Gyangtse, but that eventually the patience of the Viceroy had become completely exhausted and His Excellency had ordered me to advance to Lhasa forthwith as he had reluctantly become convinced that only there could a settlement be made. I regretted that their messengers had been fired on, but on enquiring from General Macdonald, who was present, I found that the messengers had no white flag while they bore arms: they were in consequence fired on by our advance guard. In future I would advise them to always send a large white flag with any messengers, and this would be strictly respected. We were now advancing to Lhasa: I would be quite ready to negotiate with them on the way, and if the Tibetan troops did not oppose us we would not fight against them, but as our troops had on the previous day been fired at from the Jong we must send our troops in to occupy it: we would, however, allow the delegates to remain in it unmolested, and would see that their property was not disturbed and that they themselves were accorded proper marks of respect. The delegates replied that if we went on to Lhasa there was no chance of a settlement being arrived at: that they had come here with the sincere intention of making friendship with us and securing peace, but if we sent troops into the Jong they did not see how they could be friends with us: they were the two biggest men in Tibet next to the Dalai Lama, and it was both against their religion and disgusting to them to have soldiers in the same place where they were staying. I said they must after all allow that this could not be half so disgusting to them as having their soldiers firing into my camp at Gyangtse while I was asleep was to me. I asked them to send some responsible man with the soldiers whom General Macdonald was just sending to the Jong to look after their property and point out to the officer in command the quarters which they wished reserved for themselves. But they continued one after another wrangling and protesting against our occupying the Jong and eventually the troops had to start off without any of their men. After listening for an hour to their protests I asked them if they would now care to hear the terms we intended to ask of them. They replied that they could not discuss any terms till we returned to Gyangtse. I said I had no wish to now discuss the terms but merely desired to know if they wanted to be acquainted with them. They continued to protest that they would discuss nothing here, and it was only after considerable fencing that I got them to admit that they had heard the terms from the Tongsa Penlop. I then said that I wished them to understand that if we were further opposed on the way to Lhasa or at Lhasa itself these terms would be made stricter, I said the British Government had no wish to be on any other than friendly terms with Tibet, that we had no intention of remaining in Lhasa any longer than was required to make a settlement, and as soon as a settlement was made we would leave. But I had the Viceroy's orders to go to Lhasa and go there I must. I desired, however, to give them most earnest advice and warning. They were the leading men of Tibet and upon them lay a great responsibility. I was quite prepared on arrival at Lhasa to live on as friendly and peaceable terms with the people as I had at Khamba Jong and when I first arrived at Gyangtse; to pay for everything and to respect their religious buildings. It rested with them now to decide whether our stay at Lhasa should be of this peaceable nature and of short duration and whether the settlement should be of the mild nature we at present contemplated, or whether we should have to resort to force as we had been compelled to at Gyangtse, to impose severer terms and to prolong our stay there. The delegates listened attentively while I made this exhortation to them, but after consulting together replied that even if we did make a settlement at Lhasa it would be of no use for in Tibet everything depended on religion, and by the mere fact of our going to Lhasa we should spoil their religion for no men of other religions were allowed in Lhasa. I asked them if there were no Mahommedans living in Lhasa, and they replied that there were a few, but they were not allowed to practise their religious rites—a sad admission in view of the toleration which the Buddhist religion in reality enjoins.

I added that we would not have gone to Lhasa unless we had been absolutely compelled to by their incivility in not meeting us elsewhere; that personally I had already suffered great inconvenience, and would much prefer not to have the further inconvenience of going to Lhasa, but no other resource was now left to us and my orders from the Viceroy were final. At this stage one of their servants rushed up with the information that their mules had been seized by our Mounted Infantry. He was followed, however, by Captain Souter who commanded the Mounted Infantry, and who said that on the far side of the Jong he had come upon armed Tibetans. In accordance with the instructions he had received he had not fired on them, but after they had twice fired on him he had been compelled to return their fire, and he brought in with him nine prisoners. One of these he indicated as having fired shot after shot at him, and he produced the rifle which the prisoner had used. It was a Russian rifle, and the prisoner the Yutok Shape identified as one of his servants. I informed the delegates that as their own men had been firing on our troops at the very time that they had been talking about peace to me I could no longer permit them to remain in the Jong. They said their men had disobeyed their orders in firing. I replied that that might be so, but it only showed how little control they had over their men, and how impossible it was, therefore, to allow them to remain in the Jong with our troops. They made many earnest requests to me to modify my decision, but as the interview had already lasted for three hours and a quarter I told them I had had a long march that day and asked them if they would kindly excuse me from further prolonging the interview. The Yutok Shape throughout was calm and polite, and at his departure was cordial in his manner. The Ta Lama, though more excited was not ill-mannered. The Grand Secretary was very excited throughout, and argumentative and querulous. The whole tone of the delegates showed that they—or at any rate the Dalai Lama—had not even yet realised the seriousness of the position. The tone they adopted entirely ignored their serious breaches of international courtesy, and was that of people with a grievance against us and quite ignorant of the fact that we had grievances against them. They were too excessively unbusinesslike and impracticable, and I anticipate an infinity of trouble in carrying through a settlement with such men. On the other hand the disposition and manners of the Yutok Shape gave one more confirmation to the impression I had long formed that the lay men of Tibet are by no means inimical, and that but for the opposition of the monks we might be on extremely friendly terms with them. I am glad to be able to report that, under General Macdonald's well thought-out arrangements, the occupation of the Jong was effected without any mishap or loss of life. Captain O'Connor accompanied the delegates back towards the Jong, which, however, they did not again enter, but took up their quarters in the village, while their followers and baggage were sent down to them there. I expressed my regret to the Yutok Shape that at our first meeting I should have had to put him to such inconvenience. But the occupation of the Jong is a military necessity, and it is a matter of congratulation that it should have been effected without the loss of life on either side.

Enclosure No. 238.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Nagartse, the 21st July 1904.

(Extract.)

The Tibetan delegates yesterday held another prolonged interview with me, lasting 3½ hours. They made no further mention of the occupation of the Jong, but were very insistent that we should not advance to Lhasa. The Yutok Shape was the chief spokesman at first; but during the course of the interview, each one repeated separately much the same arguments. They said that in Lhasa there were a great number of monks and many unruly characters; and disturbances might easily arise, to which I replied that I should much regret any such disturbances, and hoped the delegates would do their best to prevent them, for the result could only be the same as the result of the disturbances at Gyangtse. Another argument the delegates used was that, if we went to Lhasa, we should probably find no one there. To this I replied that this would necessitate our waiting until people returned. I reminded them that they lived apart from the rest of the world, and did not understand the customs of international intercourse. To us the fact of their having kept the representative of a Great Power waiting for a year to negotiate was a deep insult which most Powers would resent by making war without giving any further chance for negotiation. But the British Government disliked making war if they could possibly help it. They had, therefore, commanded that the Tibetans should still be given one more chance of negotiating, though that chance could only be given at Lhasa itself. Let them make the most of this chance. The delegates replied that they had intended no insult by keeping me waiting a year; it was merely the custom of their country to keep out strangers. "But anyhow" they said, "let us forget the past. Let us be practical and look only at the present. Here we are, the leading men in Tibet, ready to negotiate at Gyangtse and make a settlement which will last for a century." I replied to the Yutok Shape that I had no doubt that, if a sensible man like him had been sent to me sooner, we might have made up a satisfactory settlement long ago, and there would have been no necessity for us to go through all this inconvenience of advancing through an inhospitable country to Lhasa. But after the many chances which had been given them of negotiating at Gyangtse, they could hardly consider it reasonable that we should give them any more. Moreover, the Viceroy had formed the opinion, from the fact of the Ta Lama having told me at Gyangtse that he had no authority to evacuate the Jong without referring to Lhasa, and from the fact of his running away, that he had not sufficient power to make a settlement. For all these reasons, we were compelled to go to Lhasa, though I was ready to negotiate on the way, and we would return directly a settlement was made. They then made further reference to their religion being spoilt if we went to Lhasa, and I asked them to make more clear to me in what way precisely their religion would be spoilt. I said we were not intolerant of other religions as they themselves were. They had yesterday told me that, though there were some Muhammadans in Lhasa, yet they were not allowed to practise their religious rites. We had no such feelings towards other religions. On the contrary, we allowed the followers of each to practise their religious observances with the utmost freedom. The delegates said that they were not so intolerent to the Muhammadans: they merely forbade building mosques and prevented any new Muhammadans coming into their country. I said that at any rate some were there, and apparently they had not spoilt their religion. They replied that the ancestors of these had come many many years ago, and the Tibetans had become accustomed to them: to which my rejoinder was that, if Muhammadans had lived among them practising their religious rites without hindrance for all these years—apparently for centuries—without spoiling the religion of Tibet, I could not believe that the fact of our going to Lhasa for a few weeks only could have any permanent ill-effect on the religion of Tibet. They then remarked that, if we now went to Lhasa, all the other nations would want to go there, and see the sights and establish Agents there. I told them I had not the smallest wish to see the sights of Lhasa. I had already travelled in many different lands and seen far finer sights than they could show me at Lhasa: and as to stationing an Agent there, we had no such intention. Could they tell me if any other nation wished to? They replied that the Russians would be wanting to send an Agent to Lhasa. I told them they need not be in any fear on that score, for the Russian Government had assured our Government that they had no intention of sending Agents to Tibet. I added that, though we had no intention of establishing a Political Agent at Lhasa, we desired to open a trade mart at Gyangtse on the same conditions as the trade mart at Yatung had been opened, that is, with the right to send a British officer there to superintend the trade. The delegates would not, however, be led into a discussion of the terms. They said they could only discuss the terms at Gyangtse, and the conversation drifted back into the old lines of withdrawing to Gyangtse. Each of the four members of the delegation repeated in turn the same arguments for withdrawing to Gyangtse, and I gave to each in turn my reasons for advancing to Lhasa. I said I feared they must think me extremely obstinate, and I felt sure that, if they had been deputed by their Government earlier in the day, I should have been able to accede to their wishes, and we could have soon come to an agreement. As matters stood at present, I could do nothing but obey the orders of the Viceroy. They asked if I could not stop here, represent to His Excellency what they had said, and await further instructions. I replied that the Viceroy only issued his orders after very careful deliberation, but once they were issued, he never revoked them. I endeavoured throughout the interview to avoid being drawn into petty wrangling, and I am happy to say that, at the close, even the monk, who formed the fourth member of the delegation, went away with a smiling face, while the Yutok Shape, who is a thorough gentleman, was especially genial and polite. Even more important than the securing of a paper Convention which may or may not be of value, is the placing of our personal relations with the officials of Tibet upon a good footing from the start. I had to be severe with them at Gyangtse, because they would not pay proper respect to me. But at each interview here they came well before the appointed time, they were thoroughly respectful throughout, and I was able to treat them with the politeness I prefer to show them when they make this possible. I trust that, after I have suffered two interviews, one of 3¼ hours and another of 3½ hours, they will feel that I am at any rate accessible, and will not have compunction in coming to see me whenever they feel inclined to. Until, however, they receive further orders from Lhasa, there is nothing more to be said on either side.

Enclosure No. 239.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 6th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, the 3rd August. Arrived here without further fighting. Dalai Lama believed to be in private monastery, few miles away; people quiet; and neither alarmed nor hostile. Deputation of two Shapes, Dalai Lama's private Abbot, and Abbots of three great monasteries visited me yesterday to make final appeal not to go to Lhasa, but no active opposition attempted. Whole valley of Lhasa River richly cultivated, and two or three miles broad. River itself here as wide as Thames at Putney. General appearance country remarkably well-to-do, supplies obtainable in ample quantities; and Amban, at my request, already collected two days' supplies, and ready arrange more. He has also made special present of food to troops. Tongsa Penlop has rejoined me. Nepalese representative sent deputy to meet me on road, and will visit me shortly. Amban visited me this afternoon. He expressed willingness to help me, and impress Tibetans with urgent necessity making settlement speedily.

Enclosure No. 240.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 7th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Trilung Bridge, six miles from Lhasa, the 2nd August. Passage of Brahmaputra completed by 8.30 p.m. on 30th. Marched ten miles 31st; seven miles 1st; and 14½ miles to-day. Reach Lhasa to-morrow. No opposition so far. Leading representatives from Lhasa visited Colonel Younghusband this afternoon.

Enclosure No. 241.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 6th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, the 4th August. Arrived at Lhasa yesterday at noon without opposition, and camped on plain a mile west of the Potala. Tibetan troops estimated three to five thousand reported to have withdrawn eastwards. The Amban visited Colonel Younghusband yesterday afternoon. Have left a small post of ten Mounted Infantry and 50 Gurkhas at bridge over the Trilung River six miles back, which is important point. Considering difficulties of march and supplies, health of troops satisfactory and transport in first class condition. Two days' supplies secured from the Amban, but actual resources of the place are not yet known.

Enclosure No. 242.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 10th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, the 6th August. Fourth August was occupied in placing camp in state of defence and in trying to get supplies. The Nepalese Resident paid me a visit in the morning, and promised to do what he could about supplies. Small bazaar opened outside camp to which some Nepalese and a few Tibetans came. Fifth August, Tibetans seem quiet, and a large number of women brought petty supplies to the bazaar. The amount of supplies sent by the Chinese and Tibetan authorities, is, however, not nearly sufficient for requirements, and unless an adequate quantity of grain and tsampa is immediately forthcoming, requisition will have to be resorted to. Am sending back one troop mules and donkey corps from ferry under escort Gurkhas to Nagartse to bring on supplies.

Enclosure No. 243.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 10th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, the 5th August. I yesterday returned Amban's visit, conducted by Amban's body-guard, and escorted by one company, Mounted Infantry, and two companies, Royal Fusiliers. Amban expressed sincere intention to induce the Tibetans to make speedy settlement. On return to camp, I proceeded through heart of city ; large crowds looked on apathetically. I have received visits from Tongsa Penlop, Nepalese representative, and two Shapes. It appears Dalai Lama is at Reteng, and has handed over his seal to a Regent to carry on business. No further opposition seems likely ; and after pressure from Amban, Tongsa Penlop, and Nepalese representative, the Shapes were distinctly more subdued to-day than before, and they presented me with 280 cooly-loads of tea, flour, butter, dried fruits, sugar and peas, besides Rs. 1,500 for the troops, and twenty yaks and fifty sheep. I have asked both Amban and Shapes to have Tibetan delegates for negotiations definitely appointed. Bazaar has been opened outside camp, and 340 Tibetans, Chinese, Nepalese, and Kashmiri traders brought produce there this morning.

Enclosure No. 244.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 10th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, the 5th August. I hear through excellent Chinese source that Dalai Lama would never have opposed us if Dorjieff had not led him to believe that Russian support would be given him. From another source I hear Dorjieff distributed as much as four or five lakhs of rupees amongst monasteries. Chinese think it unlikely that Dalai Lama will fly to either Russia, Mongolia, or China, but will return here.

Enclosure No. 245.

From Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Camp Chaksam Ferry, the 26th July, 1904.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, translation of a letter from the Tibetan National Assembly, together with my reply.

2. This letter is remarkable as the first ever received by a British official from a Tibetan official. I have addressed my reply to the Dalai Lama, as this is the course of procedure adopted by the Chinese Amban. I have received to-day a letter from the Dalai Lama's Chamberlain, saying he has received and forwarded my letter to the Dalai Lama. This, again, is the first letter from a British official which has been accepted by a Tibetan official.

Annexure 1.

Translation of a letter addressed to the all wise Sahib sent by the English Government to settle affairs, from the Tibetan National Assembly.

Recently the Tongsa Penlop sent a letter to the Dalai Lama, and also communicated with the two delegates, but hitherto a treaty has not been effected. The Sahibs say that they intend to come to Lhasa and to see the Dalai Lama and to negotiate there, and that they will there establish friendship. The letter which contains the nine terms of the Convention has arrived here. This is a matter of great importance, and therefore the Chigyab Kenpo (Lord Chamberlain) has been sent to Chusul. Now, our Tibetan religion is very precious, so our Regent, officials, monks, and laymen have consulted together. Formerly we made a National Convention that none was to enter the country. So now, even if the Sahibs should come to Lhasa and meet the Dalai Lama, this will not advantage the cause of friendship. Should a fresh cause of dispute arise, we greatly fear that a disturbance, contrary to the interests of friendship, may follow. So we beg of the Sahibs both now and in the future to give the matter their earnest consideration, and if they will negotiate with the delegates who are now here, all will be well. Please consider well all that has been said, and do not press forward hastily to Lhasa.

Dated the Wood Dragon year. (Received on the 24th July.)

Annexure 2.

From Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to His Holiness the Dalai Lama, dated the 24th July 1904.

I have received a communication from the National Assembly, in which it is stated that, if I come to Lhasa and meet Your Holiness, there will not be advantage to the cause of friendship, and there may be disturbances. The Council beg me, therefore, to negotiate with the delegates deputed for the purpose.

2. More than a year ago, I arrived at Khamba Jong which, according to a communication received by His Excellency the Viceroy from the Chinese Government, Your Holiness had approved of as a place of meeting where matters in dispute between the British Government and the Tibetan Government could be settled. I waited there for several months, but the delegates appointed refused to negotiate. I then advanced to Gyangtse, and wrote several letters to the Amban, informing him that I was prepared to negotiate there. But no negotiators arrived, and I was instead treacherously attacked at night in my camp. I then wrote to both Your Holiness and the Amban, stating that, if negotiators did not arrive by 25th June, I would have to advance to Lhasa. By that date no negotiator had arrived, but, hearing from the Tongsa Penlop that the Ta Lama was on the way, His Excellency the Viceroy authorised me to wait at Gyantse a few days longer. When the Ta Lama arrived, I told him that the Jong must be evacuated, as the Tibetans had been firing at my camp for two months from it, but that I was ready to negotiate. The Jong was not evacuated, and our troops had to turn the Tibetan troops out of it by force, but immediately it was taken, I sent message to the Ta Lama to say I was still ready to negotiate at Gyantse, if he would come at once. I waited there another week, and then His Excellency the Viceroy, considering that I had already been a year in the country awaiting negotiators, and that the negotiators when they did arrive appeared to have neither power nor authority to treat, ordered me to advance to Lhasa to negotiate there.

3. These orders I must obey, but I have no desire to create disturbances in Lhasa, or interfere with the religion of the country, and as soon as I have obtained Your Holiness' seal to the Convention I have been instructed to negotiate, I will retire from Lhasa. No religious places which are not occupied by Tibetan soldiers will be occupied by British soldiers. Our soldiers will not fire, if no opposition is offered to them. And all supplies taken from the peasants will be paid for. But if opposition is offered, our troops will be compelled to commence military operations as they did at Gyangtse, and the terms of the settlement will be increased in severity.

4. I would, however, assure Your Holiness that it is the most sincere wish of His Majesty the King-Emperor and of the Viceroy of India that there should be no further bloodshed, but instead peace and friendship between England and Tibet. For more than a century, the English and Tibetans lived side by side without a quarrel till Sikkim was invaded by the Tibetan troops. The Convention which was negotiated by the Amban at the conclusion of the campaign in Sikkim has been repudiated by Your Holiness' officials. When I have negotiated a new Convention which will be acknowledged by all your officials, I trust that all causes of dispute will have been removed, and that we shall ever after be able to live together in terms of mutual amity.

Enclosure No. 246.

Political Diary of the Tibet Frontier Commission.

18th July, 1904.—Clear, fine morning.

The force marched at 8 a.m., and captured the Karo La position almost without opposition, the Gurkhas turning the enemy's left flank by a wide flanking movement. The only Tibetan troops encountered were some 600 Khambas. The force camped some two miles below Zara.

19th July.—Fine, clear morning.

The force marched to Nagartse, 12 miles. The Yutok Shape, Kalon Ta Lama, and the Tungyig Chembo came out from the Jong to meet the column, and were requested by Colonel Younghusband to call upon him at 3 p.m., and were also warned that, while he was willing to negotiate with them, it would be necessary for us to occupy the Jong and to advance to Lhasa. The delegates called at 3 o'clock; and in the long interview which followed, they protested against the occupation of the Jong and the advance to Lhasa, and requested Colonel Younghusband to return to Gyangtse. During the interview news was brought in that some mounted men had fired on our Mounted Infantry; and as these were men for the most part in the following of the delegates, the latter were told that it would be impossible for them to continue in occupation of the Jong. They removed accordingly into a house in the village, and the Jong was occupied without opposition. Large stores of Tsamba (barley flour), estimated at some 3,500 maunds, were found in the Jong. Hailstorm during the evening.

20th July.—Fine morning. The force halted at Nagartse. The Tibetan delegates called again on the British Commissioner at 3 p.m., and a long interview followed much to the same effect as on the previous day. Heavy hail fell during the afternoon and rain during the night.

21st July.—Light rain fell till about 8.30 a.m. The force marched to Yarsik, 11 miles. The delegates left Nagartse about midnight and proceeded towards Lhasa. Rain fell during the afternoon and evening.

22nd July.—Wet morning, rain continuing until about 8 a.m.

The force marched to Pete Jong, 5 miles. Rain fell during the afternoon.

23rd July.—Wet morning, rain continuing until about 8 a.m.

The force marched to Tramalung, 4 miles.

24th July.—Fine morning.

A messenger arrived in camp about 7 a.m., bearing a letter from the National Assembly at Lhasa, requesting the British Commissioner to consent to negotiate with the delegates now at Chisul, and not to advance to Lhasa. These delegates are the Chikyab Kenpo, or Lord Chamberlain to the Dalai Lama, and a new Tungyig Chembo from Lhasa. A verbal message was sent in reply to say that the Commissioner would be pleased to receive the delegates, but could not consent to defer his advance to Lhasa. The force marched to Kampa Partsi, 7 miles. Colonel Younghusband wrote a letter to the Dalai Lama in reply to the letter received in the morning. Rain fell during the evening and lasted into the night.

F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND, Colonel,
British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters.

Enclosure No. 247.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated the 12th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

As regards the action which should be taken if it becomes necessary to requisition by force for supplies, it is, of course, necessary that you should take what supplies you require, but no destruction of religious property, and nothing in the nature of loot, shall be allowed.

Enclosure No. 248.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 13th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, the 9th August. Paid a visit to the Amban on 7th with escort composed of detachments of units of the force marching through part of Lhasa city on return journey. Large numbers of the populace turned out to see us being quite quiet in their demeanour. As Tibetans had not fulfilled their promises in the matter of supplies, a demonstration was made on 8th, with Colonel Younghusband's consent, against the large Debung monastery, with the result that about 120 maunds supplies were produced after considerable delay with promises of more in three or four days. A great deal of rain has fallen during the past three nights.

Enclosure No. 249.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 13*th August,* 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, the 8th August. Tibetan authorities all in confusion,—Ta Lama disgraced, Yutok Shape gone sick, and of remaining two Shapes one is inimical and other useless. National Assembly sits permanently now, but only criticises, and is afraid to act without reference Dalai Lama who is three days' distant, and will not in his turn act without sanction Assembly. Every one in fear not of us, but of each other, and each is working against the other. No attempt commence negotiations been made. Have given Amban rough outline terms we are asking of Tibetans. Tongsa Penlop and Nepalese representative visit me daily; they express despair at silliness of Tibetans, and say their heads ache with arguing with them; they also say people generally are angry at inaction of authorities, and wish settlement with us rapidly effected. Bazaar outside our camp is daily attended by over three hundred vendors, but authorities have not yet removed prohibition on villagers to sell us grain there, and in spite of my protests and warning, they have sent insufficient quantity of supplies themselves. I authorised Macdonald to take supplies from Depung monastery by force. No fitting residence having been provided for Mission, I informed Shapes I would occupy Summer Palace, but on Tongsa Penlop representing this was considered very sacred owing to its being residence Dalai Lama, I consented to occupy next best residence in Lhasa, but told Shapes I would expect Dalai Lama receive me, and thank Viceroy for consideration His Excellency has ordered me show their religion. General attitude of Tibetans, though exasperating, is probably more futile and inept than intentionally hostile.

Enclosure No. 250.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated the 14*th August,* 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of 8th August. Your action is fully approved.

Enclosure No. 251.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 16*th August,* 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, the 12th August. The Debung Monastery monks commenced bringing in the supplies demanded from them on 9th, and have continued doing so satisfactorily for the past three days. A demand for supplies has also been made on the Sera Monastery, with which they promise compliance. The Lhasa authorities are also bringing in supplies in larger quantities, so that, for the present, the supply question is more satisfactory. There have been heavy rains here with snow low down on surrounding hills. This has brought the Brahmaputra down in flood, and boats are now only got over with great difficulty and some danger, which will probably delay convoys crossing. Younghusband is moving to-morrow into the Lallu Palace, so am moving camp to a new site near Lallu and situated in a plain about half way between the Potala and Sera Monastery. The wet weather, combined with the marshy nature of the ground round Lhasa, is causing a certain amount of diarrhœa and bowel complaints.

Enclosure No. 252.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp, Chaksam Ferry, the 27th July, 1904.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to report that the Dalai Lama's Chamberlain, accompanied by the Ta Lama and one of the Secretaries of the Council, paid me a visit this morning. They brought with them a letter from the Dalai Lama, of which a translation is enclosed, together with my reply. They repeated the old requests that we should not go to Lhasa. The only new argument they used was that our going to Lhasa would so spoil their religion that the Dalai Lama might die. I told them that I should much regret that our arrival in Lhasa should have any such melancholy result, but I had studied their religion and could not believe it was so weak that it could not stand our presence in Lhasa for a few weeks. The delegates repeatedly urged me to realise the personal inconvenience our presence in Lhasa would be to the Dalai Lama. The Ta Lama explained that the Chamberlain was in constant personal attendance on the Dalai Lama and enjoyed his fullest confidence, and for that reason had been specially deputed by the Dalai Lama. I was given to understand that this was a very unusual favour, and I was earnestly begged to accede to the Dalai Lama's personal wishes. The delegates further told me that if I did not accede to them they would themselves be severely punished by the Dalai Lama. I replied that I much regretted my inability to accede to the Dalai Lama's wishes, and trusted they would ask His Holiness to excuse my insistence. They had spoken of the inconvenience our presence in Lhasa would cause the Dalai Lama, but His Holiness would, I felt sure, realise the inconvenience we had already suffered through the delay in the arrival of negotiators. I could assure them that the Viceroy had every desire to consult the feelings of the Dalai Lama, and it was because we knew that His Holiness was averse to the presence of strangers in Lhasa that His Excellency had not sent me there in the first instance, though the capital of a country was the natural and usual place in which to conduct negotiations. It was only after we had found it impossible to effect a settlement anywhere else that I had been ordered to proceed to Lhasa. I added that after an envoy had been kept waiting for a year and had been attacked and shot at for two months most Rulers would have refused to allow their representative to negotiate till the capital had been captured. We were not, however, advancing with that object. They could see that here we were paying for all supplies we took and the Monastery immediately outside the camp was left unmolested. I was prepared to show like consideration on our arrival at Lhasa if we were unopposed, and I trusted His Holiness would appreciate this concession. The delegates assured me again that the Dalai Lama was really anxious to make a settlement, that they had come in a peaceful manner, and had let the army they had with them a few days ago disperse to their homes. I had little difficulty in believing these assertions, for we have received accounts that the Tibetan army has scattered in a panic, the Kham levies looting in all directions. A peaceful settlement is undoubtedly, therefore, the sincere desire of the Dalai Lama, though turbulent monks may yet create a disturbance in Lhasa itself. As to the delegates being punished if we advanced to Lhasa, I said that I myself would be punished if we did not. A discussion afterwards followed on the question of other foreigners coming to Tibet if we were allowed there. I told them it was the usual custom for neighbouring countries to have representatives at each other's capital, and we would probably have avoided all the misunderstandings which led to the present troubles if we had had a representative at Lhasa and they had had one in Calcutta. We knew, however, their aversion to keeping a British Agent in Lhasa, we were not, therefore, pressing the point, and were only insisting upon having trade agents at Gyangtse and other marts. There would, however, in any case have been no reason for other foreigners establishing an Agent at Lhasa. Russia had declared that she had no intention to send an Agent to Tibet. The delegates replied that our establishing an Agent even at Gyangtse would be against their custom and spoil their religion. I said that I understood then that they were not prepared even now to agree to our terms, and they informed me that they were only authorised to discuss them and they would have to be considered in the National Assembly. "You expect me then," I said, "to remain out here in a half desert place discussing terms. I have already remained for months together in desert places in Tibet, and can now negotiate in no other place than Lhasa." I begged the Chamberlain as a practical man to accept this as inevitable, and to now turn his mind to ensuring that there should be no more useless bloodshed on the way, and that we should be enabled by the speedy conclusion of the settlement to leave Lhasa at an early date. Before closing the interview I had some conversation with delegates on the general question of intercourse between Tibet and India. I said that we should be very glad if they would more frequently accept the hospitality we were always ready to offer them in India. They would find that in India they could travel wherever they liked, and would everywhere be protected and welcomed. They would see, too, that though we were Christians we not only tolerated but protected Budhists, Hindus, and Muhammadans. We even spent large sums of money in preserving ancient buildings of other religions. In this camp was an officer, Colonel Waddell, who had spent his life in studying the Budhist religion, and while reading the ancient books had discovered instructions indicating exactly where the birthplace of Buddha could be found. The British Government had spent a considerable amount of money in clearing away forests, and the town in which Buddha was born was actually discovered. We did not believe that every religion except our own was wrong. On the contrary, we believed that the same God whom we all worshipped could be approached by many different roads, and we were ready to respect those who were travelling to the same destination though by a different road to that which we ourselves were following. The delegates expressed their satisfaction that we should have studied their religion, but the conversation soon returned to the more pressing question of our advance to Lhasa. The Chamberlain was the most sensible, practical man we have so far met, and I was specially polite to him, as in the event of the flight or murder of the Dalai Lama he might be a possible Regent. But even he had evidently very little power, and while he was nervous throughout the interview was clearly more nervous of his own people than of us. After the interview had lasted 3½ hours I asked them to report my words to the Dalai Lama, and I told them that I should be very glad to see them again whenever they liked, either to further discuss official business or, putting official matters aside, to pay me a friendly private visit. They took one of my Tibetan Munshis with them and gave him a special present of silk for Captain O'Connor, and also told the Munshi that the man who had brought all this trouble on Tibet was the Tung-yig Chembo (the Grand Secretary) who was at Khamba Jong, Gyangtse, and Nagartse, but who was not present at this interview. It is satisfactory to find that two such influential men as the Chamberlain and the Ta Lama have discovered this, and if the man is now cast aside our chance of getting on terms of friendship with high Tibetan officials will be vastly increased. It is unnecessary to point out to the Government of India the great importance which attaches to the receipt of a letter from the Dalai Lama, and Captain O'Connor tells me that the form in which it is written is that adopted from one equal to another. I have now accepted the silk which he sent me through the Tongsa Penlop but which I have refused to accept unless accompanied by a letter or handed to me by one of the Dalai Lama's own officials. The present was mentioned in the Dalai Lama's letter to me, and the Chamberlain also told me the Dalai Lama begged me to accept it. I could, therefore, accept it without loss of dignity. I have sent him in return a large and very handsome silver-gilt bowl.

Annexure 1.

Translation of a letter from the Dalai Lama, received at Chaksam Ferry on the 27th July, 1904.

To the Saheb sent by the English Government to settle affairs.

In a letter recently received by the Sha-pe from the Tong-sa Pen-lop he says that the establishment of friendship has now become difficult, as the English officers with their escort say that they are about to proceed to Lhasa to make a treaty and to meet the Dalai Lama. With this communication the nine terms of the Convention were also received. The National Assembly has been consulted regarding this matter, and as it has decided for friendship it has sent a separate communication to the British. I too in accordance with the religious customs of Tibet am at present in retreat, and it would be a difficult matter for me to meet the Sahebs. I have sent two representatives on ahead to negotiate regarding friendship, and also the Chikyab Kenpo who lives always near me. It will be well if matters are discussed with my delegates there for the sake of peace. But it is not well for the establishment of an agreement between the two countries if you come to Lhasa contrary to my wishes. Please consider this well. I send a scarf and have already sent some silks separately.

Dated the 8th day of the 6th month, Wood Dragon year (26th July, 1904).

Annexure 2.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to His Holiness the Dalai Lama, dated Camp Chaksam, Ferry, the 27th July, 1904.

I have had the honour to receive Your Holiness' letter, dated July 26th. I have also received a visit from the representatives whom you had sent to meet me. They explained your views at great length and with much politeness and did their best to persuade me from proceeding to Lhasa. I have no doubt that if such able men possessing as they do Your Holiness' entire confidence had been sent earlier to meet me an amicable arrangement could have been made at Gyangtse. But I am sure Your Holiness will realise the inconvenience it would be to me, now that I have left Gyangtse, to negotiate at any other place than Lhasa itself. I trust, however, that as the terms of the settlement which I am prepared to make are so very light an arrangement will be speedily come to and my stay in Lhasa will consequently be very short. In any case, I will disturb Your Holiness as little as possible in your religious seclusion.

I desire to thank Your Holiness for the silks you sent me at Gyangtse. They were not accompanied by any letter from you or handed to me by one of Your Holiness' officials. So I was not certain that you had really sent them. Now I am assured that you did, I have much pleasure in accepting them. I am despatching with this a silver bowl. I trust Your Holiness will accept it as a token of my esteem and will believe me to be, &c.

Enclosure No. 253.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp, Chaksam Ferry, the 29th July, 1904.

(Extract.)

In continuation of my letter, dated July 27th, I have the honour to report that the Ta Lama, accompanied by the same Secretary of Council who was present at the interview of July 27th, came to visit me this morning. He explained that the Chamberlain had returned to Lhasa to report personally to the Dalai Lama the result of his interview with me, and he hoped that I would wait here till the reply of the Dalai Lama should reach me. I informed him that I could not wait here longer than the 31st, that it was not our custom to act in a dilatory manner, and that I was indeed daily expecting a telegram from the Viceroy asking me for an explanation of the delay which had already occurred. During the interview which lasted three hours the conversation was of a discursive nature, as the Ta Lama clearly had no power to even discuss anything else than our advance to Lhasa. I gathered that what he and the other delegates and probably also the Dalai Lama himself fear is the turbulence of the war party among the monks of the three great monasteries, leading to some futile collision with our troops which would not have the slightest effect in stopping us, but which would merely irritate us into sacking Lhasa. Probably what the Dalai Lama's party also fear is that these same turbulent monks may turn upon the Dalai Lama and make away with him. I told the Ta Lama that I considered it a great pity that he and the other able Councillors who had recently met me had not come to Khamba Jong, for the Secretary of Council who had met Mr. White and me there had not comported himself in at all a conciliatory manner; he had in fact irritated us considerably and made a peaceful settlement impossible. This surprised me the more because the Chinese Government had informed His Excellency the Viceroy that the Dalai Lama had agreed to Khamba Jong as the meeting place where negotiations should take place. The Ta Lama replied that what the Dalai Lama meant was the Khamba *boundary*, not Khamba *Jong*. I told him that this was hardly intelligible, as the Khamba boundary was along the top of mountains. We clearly could not sit on the top of a mountain and negotiate: we had to meet on either the one side or the other, and as the Amban and Tibetan officials had come to India on the last occasion it was natural that we should expect to meet in Tibet on this. I added that when the Chinese and Tibetan officials came to India we treated them as our guests, as Mr. White, who was present at Darjeeling, could testify; we provided houses, food, and transport for them, allowed them to have their own soldiers as escort, and took them down to Calcutta to visit His Excellency the Viceroy. On the other hand when Mr. White and I arrived at Khamba Jong last year we were not even allowed to *buy* supplies. The Ta Lama said that what was meant by the Khamba boundary was not the top of the mountains but the wall at Giaogong. He did not deny that Tibetan officials had been treated as guests at Darjeeling, but he said we did not realise the great expense the Tibetan Government had incurred in transporting them to the Indian frontier. I then asked the Ta Lama what reason they had for originally starting this trouble, which after all originated in their invasion of Sikkim in 1886. Why did they send troops into the territory of a British Feudatory State? We had lived for so many years without troubling one another: why did they start a trouble which has lasted up to the present time? He replied that they considered Sikkim to be a feudatory of Tibet and the Dalai Lama was accustomed at that time to send orders to the Sikkim Chief. I said that they must surely have been aware of the Treaty which had been concluded more than twenty years previous to the Tibetan invasion of Sikkim, between Sikkim and the British Government, by which the former acknowledged the suzerainty of the latter. If the Tibetans had had any objection the proper course would have been to make representations at the time, and not twenty years after to send troops into Sikkim. As regards the Treaty we now wish to make with them, how would the negociations be conducted, I asked, and who had the final authority in the State? The Ta Lama said that Councillors and Secretaries and Representatives of the National Assembly would meet me and discuss the terms. The final authority was the National Assembly which was composed of representatives from all over Tibet, but chiefly from the three great monasteries at Lhasa. Both monks and laymen attended it as well as many officials, but the Councillors (Sha-pes) were not included in it, and the Dalai Lama had no representative there. I told the Ta Lama that this seemed rather extraordinary, for the Councillors were presumably the most able men in the State and yet their counsels were liable to be over riden by the decision of a body of irresponsible and less capable men. "Supposing," I said, "that the Dalai Lama and the Councillors wished to agree to the terms I was asking and the National Assembly declined to agree, whose views would be adopted?" The Ta Lama said that the Dalai Lama and the Councillors never disagreed with the National Assembly, for the decision of the latter was final. I said this made matters very difficult for me, for I negotiated with the Councillors as being the leading men in the State and yet they could not even enter the National Assembly to report what I had said to them. The Ta Lama said the custom was for the Councillors to send one of the Secretaries to present their views to the National Assembly. I asked who presided, what was the number of representatives, and whether the decision was arrived at by votes. He said no one presided, that there were about 500 representatives, and that they arrived at a decision by discussing till they were all of one mind. I remarked that under these circumstances the negotiations promised to last a considerable time. Did he think they would be concluded in a year? He said a good deal depended upon how we proposed to set about negociating. If we took each point separately and had it discussed in the National Assembly till agreed to, the settlement might be made fairly quickly, but if we gave the whole Treaty in a lump and said this and nothing less must be agreed to he did not think a settlement would ever be made. I told the Ta Lama that it was a matter of indifference to the British Government how long the negotiations lasted, for we should expect the Tibetan Government to pay for our expenses from the date of the attack on the Mission at Gyangtse. The Ta Lama urged that we should not be hard on the Tibetans by demanding an indemnity, for if we did we could never be friends. I answered that we would not have demanded an indemnity if they had been reasonable and had negotiated at Khamba Jong or Gyangtse, but as they had chosen to fight and had been worsted they must take the consequences of their own actions. The Ta Lama then dwelt upon the habit of the Tibetans to take plenty of time in making decisions. They liked to think well before taking action, and could not stand being hurried. I informed him that we also tried to think well before taking action, but we thought quickly and acted at once, so as to get on without delay from one thing to another. The lives of men were short and we wished to get through as much as possible in the little time we were here. The Ta Lama said that their time was taken up with the study of religion which did not admit of hurry. During this latter part of the discussion the Ta Lama and the Secretary laughed heartily. Then the former, after asking leave to depart, repeated as I was shaking hands with him another appeal to me not to go to Lhasa.

Enclosure No. 254.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Camp Jang, the 31st July, 1904.

I have the honour to enclose, for the information of the Government of India, translation of the Amban's despatch, dated the 27th July, and of my reply thereto.

Annexure No. 1.

Translation of despatch from His Excellency Yu Tai, Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhasa, to Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated Lhasa, the 27th July, 1904.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch yesterday. I have attentively studied its contents. I have the honour to express my sympathy with you in your trials of this long journey exposed to adverse climatic influences. The Tibetans are dull, unlettered men, obstinately adverse to advice, and I am truly ashamed at the state of affairs.

Now that your military forces have reached Chisul, you will be here in a few days in order to discuss matters. I am, therefore, sending Captain Liu, Chief of the Military Secretariat, and Sub-District Deputy Magistrate Wu, Assistant Secretary, as my delegates to bear my despatch to you. I have also instructed them to visit and acquaint you with the present condition of affairs.

I have communicated your despatch to the Dalai Lama, impressing upon him the necessity of seriously warning the Tibetans on no account to treat you unceremoniously. But these Tibetans are cunning and insincere to a degree, and it is necessary to obtain guarantees from them before a settlement of anything can be made.

I intend in a day or two to write again to the Dalai Lama to have you met in a respectful manner.

Should there be any matter requiring my consideration, I would request you to inform my delegates, so that they may report to me.

Annexure No. 2.

English version of a despatch from the British Commissioner, to the Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhasa, dated the 30th July, 1904.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch, dated 27th July. I shall arrive at Lhasa on 3rd August, and hope to have the pleasure of meeting you soon after my arrival.

Enclosure No. 255.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Camp Jang, the 31st July, 1904.

(Extract.)

As I was passing Chisul to-day on the march here from our camp at Chaksam Ferry, the Ta Lama asked me to stay for a short time to talk to him. He said he was much surprised at our advancing, as he had understood from me that we wished to make a settlement and be on friendly terms; and if we advanced there might be disturbances. I reminded him that I had always said we would advance, and remarked that, if there were disturbances, the responsibility would rest upon the Tibetan Government, for I had informed him many times and had written to both the Amban and the Dalai Lama to say that we would not commence fighting—our troops had orders not to fire unless they were fired upon. The Ta Lama then begged me to stay till the Chamberlain returned with the reply from the Dalai Lama. His Holiness would not at all like our advancing without his permission; but if we waited for his reply, we might find that he was willing for us to advance, and he would give orders to the Tibetan soldiers to allow us to pass. I replied that we had already waited nearly a week at Chaksam Ferry; that there had been plenty of time to issue such orders if there was any intention to issue them; and that, in any case, whatever the Dalai Lama's reply was, I should have to advance to Lhasa. The Ta Lama then tried to persuade me to advance with only a small following. He said that my entering Lhasa with a large army would alarm the Tibetans, and make the Dalai Lama think that our intentions were not really friendly. I recalled to his remembrance that only a few minutes before he had spoken of the possibility of disturbances. It was to protect ourselves in case of disturbances and to guard ourselves against such another attack as that which was made upon me at Gyangtse in May that we were taking a sufficient force to Lhasa. The Ta Lama begged me not to be always harping upon what had occurred at Gyangtse. Let all that be forgotten, he said. The Tibetans were now really anxious to make a settlement, and he would give me a promise in writing that no harm would befall us, if I went up to Lhasa with only a small following. I told him the Tibetans already had a promise in writing from me in my letter to the Dalai Lama that we would not fight unless opposed, and if with that in their hands they allowed disturbances to occur, I should presume they were not anxious for a settlement. I required no written promise from them not to harm us, but relied upon their sense of self-interest not to bring on further disturbances. The Ta Lama as a final effort begged me to stay here for a day, and last of all, as he was shaking hands with me—a ceremony which lasted a quarter of an hour—entreated me not to enter Lhasa city. I told him that I had the highest admiration for his eloquence and power of persuasion, and would have great satisfaction in telling the Dalai Lama that he really had done his very best to delay us. I of course realised the position in which he stood, and that it was his business by every means in his power to prevent us reaching Lhasa. At the same time I was sure, I said, that a man of his sense knew in the bottom of his heart that the Tibetans were extremely fortunate in having been able to secure our peaceful entry to Lhasa, and prevented the capture of the city by force of arms. We had promised not to occupy Lhasa if we were not further opposed, and with that promise they must be content. The Ta Lama, though excessively urgent towards the close of the interview, was perfectly polite throughout. But so extraordinarily impracticable are these Tibetans that he evidently thought that, because I had assured him at previous interviews that we wished to make a friendly settlement, we were, therefore, committing a sort of breach of faith in now advancing to Lhasa. I had never ceased to assure him that we did intend to advance, but now we are actually advancing he regards it as a grievance.

Enclosure No. 256.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Camp Tolung, the 2nd August, 1904.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to report that the Ta Lama, the Tsarong Shape a Chinese official deputed by the Amban, the Abbot in private attendance on the Dalai Lama, a Secretary of Council, and the Abbots of the three great Lhasa Monasteries visited me this afternoon, and repeated the usual requests that we should not go to Lhasa. I reiterated my usual statements that we must go there. They said that, if we would remain here, they would supply us with everything—of course on payment. The Dalai Lama's private Abbot made a special appeal on behalf of the religion of Tibet. I told him I was particularly interested in hearing his views on religion, but I trusted he would not object to my reminding him that, while he was an eminent authority on religion, he had little experience of politics. In political life when a country repudiated a treaty, declined to negotiate a new one, and attacked the Envoy who was sent for that purpose, it was considered that that country had committed three very serious offences, any one of which would be justification for the capture of the capital of the offending country. In the present case, out of consideration for the special sanctity of the city we were prepared, if we encountered no opposition, to abstain from capturing Lhasa, and I trusted the Abbot would appreciate the consideration. Perhaps, if he had himself been fired on continually for two months, he would not have been equally moderate. The Abbot laughed, but remarked that they also had had to suffer. I promised the Abbot to respect the monasteries. If they were occupied by soldiers, and we were fired at from them as we were from the monasteries round Gyangtse, we should of course have to attack them. But we did not wish to be obliged to resort to force, and as long as we were not attacked, we would prevent our soldiers from entering the monasteries. I would also see that soldiers and followers did not enter the city of Lhasa unless in attendance on an officer. The Tsarong Shape asked me to give them a written agreement to this effect. I said I would, provided they would give me a written agreement that traders from the city would not be prevented from coming to sell things to the soldiers in camp as the Gyangtse traders had done. The Tsarong Shape said that this would be impossible without the consent of the National Assembly. I told him that I could not in that case give them the written agreement, and I rose at once and closed the Durbar. The Tsarong Shape was the only member of the deputation who introduced a discordant note. He was the second of the two delegates who met Mr. White and me at Khamba Jong last year, and it is significant that these two have been the most inimical men we have yet met. The Ta Lama, the Yutok Shape, and these Abbots, though all exceedingly obstructive, have been good natured and polite. The Tsarong Shape (at Khamba Jong a Depon only) and the Grand Secretary who specially have introduced into the agreement a petty spiteful element. This delegation was composed of all the leading men in Tibet. They, of course, had power to allow traders to come to our camp and the Tsarong Shape's objection was a form of petty objection which it was necessary to put a stop to at once.

Enclosure No. 257.

Political Diary of the Tibet Frontier Commission, dated Lhasa, the 3rd August, 1904.

25th *July*, 1904.—Fine morning.

The British Commissioner despatched by a Tibetan messenger a letter addressed to the Dalai Lama in reply to the letter received from the National Assembly the day before. The force marched to Chaksam Ferry, 6 miles, and camped whilst the ferrying across the river began. Major Bretherton, Chief Supply and Transport Officer, was drowned by an accident whilst crossing the river.

26*th July*.—Fine day. Halt at the ferry.

The Tibetan delegates crossed the river in the evening *en route* to call on the British Commissioner.

27*th July*.—Fine day. Halt at the ferry.

The Tibetan delegates, consisting of the Grand Chamberlain and the Ta Lama called on the British Commissioner at 9 a.m., and had a 3 hours' interview during which they presented a letter from the Dalai Lama. Thunderstorm during the evening.

28*th July*.—Fine day.

A letter from the British Commissioner to the Dalai Lama was sent to the delegates at Chusul for despatch to Lhasa.

29*th July*.—Shower 7 a.m.

The Ta Lama and the Tung-yig Chembo called at 11 a.m. and had a three hours' interview with the British Commissioner, asking him to await a reply from the Dalai Lama before proceeding to Lhasa. In the evening a despatch was received from the Amban.

30*th July*.—Fine day.

Messengers arrived from the Tongsa Penlop to say he has started from Gyangtse and expects to reach the British Commissioner's camp in a day or two. The last of the force crossed the ferry.

31*st July*.—Rain during the night.

The force marched to Tsa-shi-tse, 10 miles. Colonel Younghusband visited the Ta Lama *en route* at Chusul. After a final effort to delay us, he rode off ahead of the column towards Lhasa.

F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND,
British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters.

Enclosure No. 258.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated the 18*th August*, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram, 12th August. Following from Secretary of State:—

"The instructions to Colonel Younghusband, as reported in your telegram of the 13th August, are approved by His Majesty's Government. Date on which return of force from Lhasa is to begin should be fixed by military authorities in communication with Younghusband. In no case must anything in the way of looting by the troops be permitted."

Enclosure No. 259.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 16*th August,* 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 11th August. Dalai Lama now at Nagchuka, eight marches to north. Dorjieff believed to be with him. Supplies requisitioned from Depun Monastery coming in. Further supplies requisitioned from Serai Monastery. Mission has now removed to best house in Lhasa. I yesterday paid Amban visit, and impressed on him responsibility which lay on Chinese Government to make Tibetans conclude settlement. Amban said he had sent message to Dalai Lama to return here, and he himself most anxious work with me. He also said National Assembly had drawn up reply to draft of terms with which I had furnished Amban. Nature of their answer I have not yet ascertained.

Enclosure No. 260.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 16*th August,* 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 11th August. Tibetan reply in writing to our terms sent to Wilton unofficially by Amban. It is highly unsatisfactory. Tibetans refuse each point, saying that indemnity is due from us to them rather than from them to us, and refuse to pay any. They offer Rinchengong as mart, and refuse future opening others and argue about the boundary. In returning document to Amban, I am telling him that I could not officially receive so preposterous a reply.

Enclosure No. 261.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 19*th August,* 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, the 14th August. Amban visited me on 12th, and said Tibetan reply to him regarding our terms was so impertinent that he dare not even mention it to me officially. He had returned it, reminding Tibetans they had come to end of their military resources, and must be more amenable. He incidentally mentioned to me that people generally were well disposed towards us and anxious to trade: opposition came from three Great Monasteries only. Yesterday two Shapes visited me, complaining that Mounted Infantry had captured some Kham levies I replied that such military operations would continue till I saw signs of their agreeing to our terms, and their reply to Amban has made me think they did not intend to. They said reply was not intended for me, but to give their opinions to Amban, and by asking great deal to obtain a little. Amban would have our view and their view and decide between us. I made clear to them our terms did not admit of bargaining, and that I could not accept Amban's decision, unless it was that our terms should be accepted. To-day Ti Rimpoche, who now holds Dalai Lama's seal and presides at National Assembly, visited me. He said he entirely disagreed with reply sent to Amban, and it was only sent for purpose of obtaining good bargain. He was most moderate and reasonable in his talk, and acknowledged Tibetans were beaten, but he has not much influence. He had received letters from Dalai Lama at Nagchuka, and the

National Assembly were sending him letter, begging him to return. Tongsa Penlop and Nepalese representative, who are working zealously with me, are convinced Tibetans intend no further opposition, but say Dalai Lama has fled even beyond Nagchuka much to anger of Assembly. Supplies are being brought us satisfactorily; bazaar at our camp is increasing; and White and Wilton to-day were politely received and conducted over the great cathedral in city, which they saw contained quantities of gold images and vessels. Macdonald has received satisfactory reports from Officers Commanding Posts all down line, stating people and even monks bringing in supplies for sale. Reconnaissance made to Pemba La, north of Lhasa, found richly cultivated: valley four or five miles broad on other side.

Enclosure No. 262.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 19th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, the 15th August. Moved camp two miles on 12th to new site. The Mounted Infantry, reconnoitring up the valley towards Pemba Gong La, came on about 100 armed Kham men eight miles from camp, surprised them, and captured 64 and about 100 matchlocks and swords without opposition. They located their larger camp further north, which was visited on 13th, when it was found the enemy had fled across the Pemba Gong La. A reconnaissance 11 miles up the Ki Chu on 13th showed it clear of any armed force. Convoy of one mule corps, under escort of Mounted Infantry and one company Gurkhas, left for Ferry on 14th. Weather somewhat improved. Supplies coming in satisfactorily. All reported quiet on posts Lhasa-Gyangtse line.

Enclosure No. 263.

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel C. W. Ravenshaw, Resident in Nepal, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated the 8th August, 1904.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to forward translations of letters from the Dalai Lama to the Prime Minister and the latter's reply. I have forwarded a copy of the translations to Colonel Younghusband, and have asked him to have the Minister's letter delivered to the Nepal Representative at Lhasa, who has been instructed in it to personally deliver the reply to the Dalai Lama.

Annexure 1.

Letter from His Holiness the Potala Lama, Lhasa, to His Highness, the Maharaja, Nepal.

May Your Highness enjoy health and peace and may Gorkha (Nepal), and Tibet continue in the best friendly relations. All is well here, and religious rites and secular affairs are going on here as before.

With the insignia of the order conferred upon Your Highness by His Imperial Majesty of China, while passing through this place, certain auspicious presents were also sent by us through the Dheba of Kuti which, we hope, have reached you safely. May the friendly relations of the two Governments be never broken off or disturbed!

The letter anent the strained relations between the British and the Tibetan Governments addressed to the Kasyal was duly received. It ought to have been categorically replied to as a matter of course, but difficulties having arisen there has been some delay in the matter. The delay was not due to any feeling of contumacy for Your Highness.

I was very happy to read the advice given by Your Highness pointing out the consequences, moved thereto by a sincere desire to see the differences between the Tibetan and the British Governments made up, and also for the good of the people of Tibet.

With reference to the matter in dispute between the said two Governments, I believe or am convinced that the British trespassed upon our territory in spite of our officers and soldiers while keeping watch at the frontier. It was an excellent suggestion on your Highness's part made with pious or the best of motives that friendly negotiations should at once be started and an amicable settlement brought about between the two Governments.

Kazis were not despatched to the frontier as this step would have entailed hardships on the subjects. From the negotiations carried on by our officers on the spot, although the representatives of the Bhutanese Government at Lhasa as also Your Highness's representative had urged a friendly settlement, it was evident that any number of officers, though as numerous as ants deputed from here, could not have concluded the business.

In consideration of the fraternal and friendly relations existing between Nepal and Tibet and on account of the said officers having gone wrong and produced unfriendly feelings, I would beg Your Highness to send without fail a well experienced officer after consultation with your councillors for the settlement of the disputes or to assist in the conclusion of a treaty on this occasion.

Those whose frontiers are contiguous should, as a rule, assist one another in bringing about an arrangement.

Your Highness would be the best judge of what would be in conformity with our religious books and conducive to the best interests of the people, as well as of the fact that there should not be any disturbance of the frontier line even by a single span as evidenced by the genuine documents relating to the frontier of which Your Highness has also been apprised by the Kasyal.

Tibet and Nepal are united together like brothers, and have all along acted in harmony with pure and sincere hearts in all matters. As regards the pending dispute, Your Highness will learn everything from the high officer to be deputed by you.

All Your Highness's instructions to your Representative here intended for us have been duly conveyed by him. We shall keep Your Highness informed of all matters together with the advice given by numerous other people consulted.

A large piece of silk cloth (Khata) accompanies this as a token.

Dated Asarh Badi 10th, Friday, Sambat 1961, corresponding with the 8th July, 1904, from the Norbuling Palace.

Annexure 2.

Letter from His Highness Maharaja Chundra Shum Shere Jung Rana Bahadur Thong-Lim-Pimma-Kokang-Wang-Syan, Prime Minister and Marshal, Nepal, to His Holiness the Potala Lama, Lhasa.

After compliments.—The perusal of Your Holiness's letter, dated Ashar Badi, 10th Friday, Sambat 1961, has given me very great pleasure. I was happy to learn therefrom that Your Holiness was in good health. I am deeply obliged to you for the kind enquiry about my health which is, I am glad to say, satisfactory.

2. I owe Your Holiness my hearty acknowledgments for the presents which you so kindly sent to me by the Dheba of Kuti. They arrived here duly and their receipt has also been already notified to you.

3. Your Holiness's remarks as to the lateness in the acknowledgment of and reply to my letter of advice to the Kasayal Kazis, dated the 18th Fagoon 1960, have been duly noted. I fully appreciate the course of the delay, and can assure Your Holiness that where there is harmony of hearts such delays can never be misconstrued. The matter, however, being urgent and the situation grave, an early expression of your views would have been most welcome, as I was distressed at the turn events were taking in Tibet. I am glad to find that the spirit of my advice to the Kasayal Kazis relative to the said Anglo-Tibetan dispute has been properly appreciated by you.

4. I hope that you have, ere this, received also my letter of the 28th Jestha, 1961. Your Holiness must have observed that I have consistently tried to bring home to you and your Kazis the necessity of promptly coming to a decision with regard to the question in hand and the advantages to be derived from acting according to the advice given in my letters.

I cannot sufficiently impress upon Your Holiness's mind that the safety and the continued prosperity of the country was in a great measure dependent upon friendly relations with our powerful neighbour, the British India Government. I find that you now see wisdom of my advice and ask me to intercede on your behalf. It is a matter of deep regret to me that you should have delayed matters till the last moment. It is, however, better late than never. The closeness and cordiality of our relations, and the contiguity of our frontiers urge me to move in this matter as far as may be practicable.

5. If I am not mistaken the British Government has repeatedly declared that all that it wanted from the Tibetan Government was an unequivocal and binding assurance that they would not have any relations, direct or indirect, with any other European foreign power, and that they would honourably respect the terms of the treaty made in 1890 and the convention made in 1893. These assurances and intentions have been pacific from the very beginning, but as their prestige and good name were at stake they were compelled to take the steps they have taken. I sincerely trust that Your Holiness, who is so full of wisdom, would now see the things, eye to eye, and would not by any means allow them to take a course fraught with calamity to your country. Allow me to tell Your Holiness that the solution of all these troubles is easy and lies in your hands. My advice to you now is that you enter into negotiations with the British Commissioners at once, do not molest them, do not insist on untenable points; and I have every reason to hope that if you give them to understand that you mean to honourably abide by the terms of any treaty that is to be made, the English, who mean honestly by you and wish that you would only be true to your word now to be solemnly given, would not impose any severe conditions on you, but would, on the contrary, reciprocate your friendly feelings, and ultimately you will be considerable gainers. I have disburdened my mind to you frankly inspired by such friendly and fraternal feeling as should exist between brothers, confident that you will take it in the spirit in which it is made.

6. As regards the question of sending an experienced and high officer of this Government to assist in the forthcoming negotiations, I am sorry to say that it is already too late. It would require a long time to make the necessary transport arrangements for him, and by the time the officer reached Lhasa all would have been over, as the English Commissioners are now said to be quite close to the place. My Representative at Lhasa has however my full authority and instructions to convey Your Holiness's represention to them, if Your Holiness's Government could give to him an undertaking in writing to the effect that Tibet will have no relations with any foreign European power other than the British Indian Government, and that she will honourably observe and carry out any treaty that might be made with the British Government by you. I can assure you that you will in no way be a loser by adopting such a course.

7. The assurance given by the Kasyal Kazis repeatedly in their letters to me and orally to my Representative at Lhasa that the reports about the exchange of missions and secret intercourse with Russia were unfounded, and that your religion and sacred books forbade any such intercourse, would present no difficulty for Your Holiness's Government to come to a satisfactory understanding with the British Government on this point. And Your Holiness will agree with me that it is anything but politic and moral to disregard a treaty which has been once properly and regularly made. I therefore see no reason that my suggestions would be in any way objectionable to you. Of course I do not forget the friendly relations that have subsisted between the two Governments of Nepal and Tibet for such a long time, but I must have that undertaking in order to convince the British Government that you were in earnest and eagerly desired to end the disputes by a mutual and amicable arrangement before I can have a hand in the matter. I am sure that our friendly relations would continue as before, and that you will continue to regard me as your best friend and well wisher.

8. I would also be plain with Your Holiness in one matter. You ask me to instruct my Representative to be deputed from here at the negotiations to try to fix the boundary at the old line fixed by His Majesty the Chinese Emperor and that not a span of your territory should be taken away from you. I believe that the British Government would not be unreasonable in their demands, and that they would not impose any intolerable conditions on you, if your Government would convince them that you intended to remain in friendly relations with them. They do not covet your country, and therefore have no desire to annex any part of it. All that they want has already been described above. What I should earnestly request Your Holiness to bear in mind is that you should not spoil this opportunity of extricating your country from the critical situation in which she finds herself now, by leaving Lhasa for any other place and producing suicidal complications. Pray now stick to the post where duty, honour, interest and prudence demand your presence. Vague reports have reached me that Your Holiness intends to quit Lhasa in case the British mission proceeds thither. These have deeply mortified me, but I am confident that these are entirely unfounded. It is impossible to conceive that Your Holiness would take such a serious step, leaving capital with all its inhabitants, etc., to their fate like a captain deserting a ship in mid-ocean. The longer a peaceful settlement of these disputes is deferred, the greater would be the mischief and the more difficult would be their solution. Should this letter of mine unfortunately not find you at Lhasa I have instructed my Representative there, through whom this letter has been sent, to deliver it personally into your hands should you be within a few days' journey from Lhasa. As the matter is urgent I have sent this by the British dâk to accelerate despatch or avoid delay in transit. In the event of your having already quitted Lhasa I earnestly hope that Your Holiness following the advice of a sincere friend and well-wisher of yours, will see your way to

hasten back to your capital to bring the critical situation to a speedy end and thereby relieve the troubles or distress of your subjects, by which act you would be gratefully remembered by them and also gain virtue. To one who is so full of wisdom and knowledge as you are, more is quite superfluous as a drop would be to an ocean.

9. I also beg to inform Your Holiness that I considered it advisable to forward Your Holiness's letter to me, dated Ashar Badi 10, to His Excellency the Viceroy of India through the British Resident in Nepal. I have requested the said Resident to lay before His Excellency the fact that Your Holiness was now anxious for a settlement of the pending disputes and that you were now willing to enter into negotiations for that settlement and that you had asked me to intercede on your behalf. I have also requested him to forward a copy of Your Holiness's letter to His Excellency the Viceroy with such recommendations as I have thought best for the good of Tibet. I have full faith in the justice and honesty of the British Government, and I believe that were it not for the manner in which you received their request for a settlement of old existing disputes, none of these misfortunes would have happened.

10. I shall also request Your Holiness to consult at this time of danger and difficulty the Amban, and be guided by his advice and experience. This is a matter peculiarly within his province, and I am sure his presence at the negotiations would be a matter to be much desired.

11. Now I shall impress upon Your Holiness the necessity of promptness of action, caution, and forbearance in the conduct of the ensuing negotiations, a just desire to give and take, foresight and true patriotism would consist in bringing about a settlement consistent with reason and honour as far as possible. The British are already at your gates. Any delay in settlement would mean a serious burden on your people and Government and would be to nobody's advantage. I pray heartily that the author of all good will bless this business and end the sufferings of a brave and patriotic people. Hoping to have the pleasure to hear in reply that peace has been concluded between the British and the Tibetan Governments to the satisfaction of both the parties.

Dated Saravan 23rd, Saturday, Sambat 1961 (=*6th August*, 1904).

Enclosure No. 264.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Camp, Lhasa, the 4th August, 1904.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to report that the Amban called upon me yesterday afternoon, and expressed his desire to work with me in effecting a speedy settlement with the Tibetans. He had hoped to have met me before, and had hastened to Lhasa at unusual speed, but the Tibetans had refused to furnish him with transport, and he had, therefore, been unable to proceed beyond here. I said I quite appreciated the difficulties he must have had with the Tibetans, for I had had some experience of them now, and a more obstructive people I had never come across. He agreed that they were an exceedingly obstinate people. He said, he feared, I must have had a very unpleasant time at Gyangtse, and I told him that we had come there to negotiate, and not to fight, and therefore had very few soldiers with us at the time the attack was made. Later on, General Macdonald arrived with reinforcements, and the Tibetans had to suffer heavily for their misconduct. On the present occasion, however, we had come ready either to negotiate or to fight. We were prepared to negotiate; but if the Tibetans were obstinate, we would not hesitate to fight. I should be glad if he would impress upon the Tibetans with all his power that we were no longer to be trifled with. I added that one of the conditions we intended to impose was an indemnity to partly cover the cost of military operations, and I should be asking them Rs. 50,000 per diem from the date the Mission was attacked up to a month after the date the convention was signed. The Amban thought this would be an effective way of dealing with them, and he promised to urge the Tibetans to be reasonable, and make a settlement without further loss of time. I returned the Amban's visit this morning. He sent his bodyguard to conduct me to the Chinese Residency, and I was escorted by a company of mounted infantry and two companies of the Royal Fusiliers. To reach the Chinese Residency, we had to pass immediately under the Potala Palace, a most imposing and solidly built edifice surmounted by a pagoda-shaped, gilded roof. The Amban spoke of the friendly relations which have so long existed between England and China, and trusted we should be able to work together in an amicable way on the present occasion. I replied that the coming negotiations would afford one more proof of the friendly feeling we entertained towards the Chinese. He again referred to the obstinate and insubordinate attitude assumed by the Tibetans, and said that in Eastern Tibet they had given the Chinese a great deal of trouble. I expressed my opinion that the Tibetans were grossly ungrateful, for they owed much to the Chinese, and certainly, after the Sikkim campaign, they would not have come off so easily in the ensuing settlement if the Chinese had not interceded on their behalf. It was merely on account of the friendly feeling we entertained towards the Chinese that the settlement we then made was so light. Now, however, that they had repudiated the settlement which the Amban had made on their behalf and had otherwise offended us, the new settlement would, of course, be more severe, and I should be greatly obliged if the Amban would make them understand from the start that the terms which I was going to demand from them would have to be accepted. The Amban asked me if I would give him the terms. I replied that, if he would send over one of his Secretaries to Mr. Wilton this afternoon, Mr. Wilton would inform him of them, and explain them to him, and the Amban and I could then talk the matter over at an early opportunity. I then asked the Amban if he would get the Tibetans to depute two or three representatives for the special purpose of negotiating a settlement with me. A variety of delegates had been sent to meet me on the way up, but it was desirable that the same men without change should continue to negotiate with me till the settlement was arrived at. The Amban promised to arrange this. After apologising for introducing business matters into the conversation during my first visit to him, I took leave of the Amban, and returned to camp by a detour through the heart of the city of Lhasa. Considerable crowd came out to see the procession, but they looked on apathetically, and no sort of opposition or protest was on this occasion offered to us on this first entrance of Europeans to Lhasa since the days of Huc and Gabet. The town and the inhabitants were very dirty, but the buildings were of most solid masonry, and we passed a number of the private dwelling-houses of the Lhasa nobility of considerable size surrounded by trees and gardens, and showing evidence that the owners must be men of wealth. This afternoon three of the Amban's Secretaries visited Mr. Wilton and the terms of the Convention were communicated to them verbally. Mr. Wilton explained that I had received as yet only telegraphic instructions, and could not at this stage place a draft Convention in writing in the hands of the Amban, but the main provisions, subject, of course, to enhancement if the Tibetans showed further opposition, were those which I had authorised him to now communicate to them for the information of the Amban.

Enclosure No. 265.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 22nd August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 16th August. The two Lachung men were to-day handed over to me in full Durbar by two Shapes. Their release has been procured at instance of Amban without suggestion from me. I impressed upon Shapes seriousness of offence of seizing subjects of King-Emperor, and they promised in future see British subjects properly respected. Men were medically examined and found to be in good health, and showing no signs of ill-treatment beyond imprisonment. So as we had last year seized over 200 yaks in retaliation for their imprisonment, I informed Shapes I would not press for reparation mentioned in terms, and I congratulated them on having made a start towards settlement.

Enclosure No. 266.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 22nd August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 17th August. I visited Amban to-day, and thanked him for procuring release of Lachung men. He told me he had instructed Regent to send message to Dalai Lama, asking him to come back, or say whether he did not mean to. In latter case, Amban told me he would denounce him to Emperor. I said Dalai Lama should certainly either come back or abdicate; and if he remained away at this important juncture, assumption would be that he renounced functions of Government. Amban said effect of his denouncement of Dalai Lama would be that he would become a common man. Amban would summon Tashi Lama with view to making him head of whole Buddhist Church in Tibet. Amban said there were precedents for Tashi Lama assuming place of Dalai Lama as well as his own. At my request, Amban promised to look up and inform me of these precedents, and said he recognised the Ti Rimpoche who held seal left here by Dalai Lama, as the principal in these negotiations.

Enclosure No. 267.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 22nd August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 17th August. Situation certainly improving. Supplies coming in steadily, people showing growing confidence, and even National Assembly slowly giving way, and party in favour of settlement increasing in influence. Dalai Lama has almost certainly fled beyond Nagchuka, and it is certain Dorjieff is with him. People of all ranks sincerely trust he has gone for good, and we have no reason regret his departure, for perfectly satisfactory settlement can be made without him in manner suggested by Amban, and with seals of National Assembly and three great monasteries affixed to Convention. The Acting Regent is making marked overtures to me; and as Amban is recognising him as principal in these negotiations, I am showing him special attention.

Enclosure No. 268.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 22nd August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 5 a.m., 18th August. On 15th reconnoitred the Kichu River for crossings and ferries. The river here is about 100 yards wide at its narrowest, but is generally split up into several channels 50 to 80 yards wide, and is unfordable anywhere, the people using skin boats show the passage would take as long as for the Sangpo for the whole force. On 16th commenced survey of Lhasa, reconnoitring party sent 16 miles up the Trilung valley. The Tibetans released two Sikkim prisoners in good health, who had been caught at Khamba Jong last year. 17th, troops went for a short march up the main Kichu valley. Colonel Younghusband visited Amban under escort. All quiet in vicinity, and no signs of any armed force within a day's march. Supplies still arriving satisfactorily. Sangpo still in full flood and some 800 yards wide. Snow reported at Nagatse and on the Karo La.

Enclosure No. 269.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Camp, Lhasa, the 6th August, 1904.

(Extract.)

Two Shapes, with two of the Secretaries of Council, called upon me yesterday morning, bringing with them 280 cooly-loads of tea, sugar, dried fruits, flour, peas, butter, 20 yaks, and 50 sheep, and Rs. 1,500 in cash. I asked them if it always rained so much during this season as it had rained during the last day or two. They replied there was a great deal of rain at this season : and I said, in that case, I should have to remove into a house as soon as possible. They offered a house nearly three miles away from Lhasa. I told them that was too far off, and I suggested the Dalai Lama's Summer Palace as being both a more convenient and a fitter residence. They protested that the Summer Palace was a sacred building, and that I had promised not to occupy sacred buildings. I informed them that I had no intention of occupying any chapel there might be in it : they might lock and seal up any such chapel or keep a few Lamas there, and I would promise not to enter it. But it was essential that I should have some proper place to live in, and a fitting reception hall in which to receive the Amban and themselves when they come to visit me, and I had not yet heard of any other building than the Summer Palace which would be suited to the purpose. In the afternoon, while the Nepalese representative was paying me a visit, the Dalai Lama's private Abbot arrived straight from a meeting of the National Assembly which had been hastily convened to consider the question of our occupation of the Summer Palace. Both he and the Nepalese representative said there was a very strong feeling against it, because the residence of the Dalai Lama was looked upon as being sacred as a monastery. A letter also arrived from the Tongsa Penlop saying the same thing. I told the Abbot that I had received the express orders of His Excellency the Viceroy to respect their religion and their religious buildings; but while we were prepared to show them consideration, we expected the consideration thus shown to be recognised and acknowledged, and equal consideration to be shown us in return. The Nepalese representative could tell him that in India a Resident was accustomed to live in large, well-furnished house with proper reception rooms in which to receive visitors of rank. As the Tibetans had sought for peace, the least I had expected was that they would have provided for my residence here the very best building in the place after the Potala. I had also hoped that the Dalai Lama himself would have received me. Instead of any such recognition being accorded, I was left to encamp upon a swamp. Though our soldiers were strictly kept from looting or even entering the Lhasa city and could be seen by the Abbot from my tent purchasing goods at exorbitant prices from Tibetan traders, and though General Macdonald was ready to pay well for all supplies, no attention had been paid to my requests that supplies should be sent to us. This was not the kind of treatment which I had expected, or would accept. I could quite well understand that they would like to receive every consideration from us, and do nothing on their part in return. But I must ask the Abbot to inform the National Assembly that, as they expected and were receiving consideration from us, they must show us consideration in return.

Enclosure No. 270.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 24th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 21st August. Very important in view of recent developments I should be able stay here utmost limit time. Supplies plentiful here, and blankets, cloth for warm clothing and sheep skins can be obtained in large quantities. Temperature at Khamba Jong for September, October, and November can be obtained from Mission diaries.

Enclosure No. 271.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 24th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 21st August. At visit I paid Amban to-day, he handed me paper containing what he called suggestions regarding draft Convention. He raised no objection of importance to any clause, but merely asked in consideration for Tibetans indemnity should be small. He has no objection to proposal regarding marts.

Enclosure No. 272.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 24th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 21st August. Acting Regent, Tongsa Penlop, and Nepalese representative, after dismissing everyone else, had conference with me to-day. Acting Regent expressed himself most anxious for settlement and ready to concede our terms, though indemnity presented difficulty. Tongsa Penlop made speech, saying Tibet, Nepal and Bhutan all bound together by religion, and looked upon English as powerful friends. If any outsider hurt one of them, each of the rest suffered. They ought all to work together therefore for the good of each. Nepalese representative expressed similar sentiments. Acting Regent said, he hoped settlement would result in lasting friendship with England. I replied that England and Tibet been friends for more than century till Sikkim war, and I hoped result of present settlement would be to establish friendship for ever.

Enclosure No. 273.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 24th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 21st August. Telegram purporting to contain denunciation of Dalai Lama has been sent to me by Amban, with the request that it may be forwarded to Peking *viâ* Gyangtse. Amban declares that, if the Emperor of China acts on this telegram result will be to reduce Dalai Lama to common monk. Tashi Lama, of Shigatse, will then be invited to Lhasa by the Amban, who will recommend him as spiritual head of the Tibetan Church. For transaction of secular business a regent will probably then be appointed. Amban believes Dalai Lama is retiring, not to China, but to the north.

Enclosure No. 274.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, Gyangtse, dated the 12th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Notices are appearing in the newspapers that loot from Tibet is reaching India in considerable quantities. The Government of India believe that these insinuations are unfounded, but you ought to know of them in order that nothing may be done which would expose the Mission to misrepresentation. Suitable action is being taken by the military authorities to prevent any loot being sent down, and Viceroy hopes that you will enjoin on all officers under you the necessity for being very careful in this matter. *Bonâ fide* purchases of curios are, of course, not prohibited, but before sending these off, such officers should inform you and obtain your permission.

Enclosure No. 275.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated the 25th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 21st August. Please report whether there are precedents for degradation of Dalai Lama by Chinese Emperor, or for the assumption of his place by Tashi Lama.

Enclosure No. 276.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 25th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 19th August. In second reply to Amban, which Amban has handed to me officially, Tibetans practically agree to clause 9 of draft Convention; they are prepared to pay a small indemnity, if boundary is fixed at Giaogong; they agree to destroy all sangared positions; marts may be established below Phari, but no new ones established in future; if Chumbi is occupied, we should pay for grass, water, and fuel. After conclusion of treaty, no British official shall ever be allowed to enter Tibet beyond trade marts. Numbers of clauses referred to in this and succeeding telegrams are the numbers given in draft Convention sent with your letter of 5th August.

Enclosure No. 277.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated the 24th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram, dated 16th August. Would it not be well that we should pay some compensation to the two Lachung men? Please wire your opinion.

Enclosure No. 278.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 25th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 19th August. Amban visited me to-day; handed me second Tibetan reply to him regarding our terms. He said it fell short of what he would expect them accept, and he would speak to Tibetans again; and, if necessary, act. He raises no objection to form of Adhesion Agreement.

Enclosure No. 279.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 25th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 20th August. Monk ran amok on 18th outside military camp wounding Captains Kelly and Cook-Young, I.M.S. He was armed with sword and wore chain armour under monk's robes. I immediately summoned Members of Council. Informed them severe measures were necessary to prevent spread of such crimes. Man would be hanged, and I demanded fine of five thousand rupees and a hostage from each of three monasteries and from National Assembly. Council demurred, but I asked them to reflect what they would have done if we were in their power and an Englishman had ran amok in a monastery. Tibetans in bazaar, outside camp, and in city had expected instant assault by us; but on being re-assured, traders continued all day at bazaar. White and Wilton, who were visiting Depong Monastery, were received with civility by Abbots; and O'Connor next day visiting a temple in city, was equally well received. Councillors were bringing fine to-day, but were summoned by Amban, and will bring it to-morrow.

Enclosure No. 280.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 25th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 20th August. Certain information received that Dalai Lama left Nagchuka for north twelve days ago. He has written to National Assembly, saying English are very crafty people, and warning them to be very careful in making an agreement with them, and bind them tight. He adds that he himself will go away, and look after the interests of the faith. His departure is not regretted by Tibetans, and it would not prove prejudicial to our interests, if I had time to deal with new situation which has arisen.

Enclosure No. 281.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp, Lhasa, the 9th August, 1904.

(Extract.)

The Nepalese representative came to see me to-day and to inform me that last night he went to see the Ti Rimpoche, the Regent to whom the Dalai Lama has handed over his seal. Captain Jit Bahadur explained to the Regent that matters were getting serious. The Regent replied that he and the Dalai Lama's brother were anxious to make a settlement and were of opinion that the Government terms might well be accepted with two or three modifications. The Regent thought that the amount of indemnity I had named—Rs. 50,000 a day—was excessive. And he would ask that if they released the two Lachung men we should release the yaks and men whom we had seized last year in retaliation. With those modifications he thought the National Assembly might reasonably accept our terms. The Nepalese representative says the Regent is a moderate man, more inclined to make a peaceful settlement than the generality of the National Assembly. Captain Jit Bahadur having hinted that the Regent and the Dalai Lama's brother were anxious to visit me, I told him to let the Regent know that I would be glad to receive him; and I asked him to tell the Regent from me that we had no wish to be other than on friendly terms with the Tibetans. We had no desire to make war upon them or object to gain by it; we did not wish to annex their country; and the Viceroy had given me the very strictest orders to respect their religion, so that when I heard from him (the Nepalese Representative) and the Tong-sa Penlop that the Tibetans considered the Summer Palace a sacred building, I had consented to take up my residence elsewhere, even though at inconvenience to myself. But while we had thus no wish to make war and were prepared to respect their religion the Tibetans were putting me in a very difficult position. They had asked me to stop hostilities, saying they wished to make a settlement, but although they had been acquainted with the terms for three weeks and I had already been here a week, yet not one word of negotiation had yet passed between me and them. Nor had they made proper efforts to furnish the troops with supplies. If they failed to negotiate, what could I do? It seemed to me that the Tibetans were like men in a bog. They were sinking deeper and deeper. Last year they were in up to their knees only. A month ago they were up to their waists. Now they are up to their necks. And in a short time, if they will not accept the hand which is stretched out to them, they will be in over their heads.

Enclosure No. 282.

Political Diary of the Tibet Frontier Commission, dated 10th August, 1904.

1st August, 1904.—Rain fell during the night. Cloudy day. The force marched to Nam, 10 miles. A letter arrived from the Ta Lama, who is lodged a few miles higher up the stream, to say that he had proposed to call on the British Commissioner; but that, owing to the expected arrival of two Shapes from Lhasa, he had deferred his visit, and would see the British Commissioner on the following day.

2nd August.—Cold, windy morning.

The force marched to Tolung Bridge, 13 miles.

At 3.30 p.m., the Ta Lama, Sechung and Tsarong Shapes, an Abbot in the suite of the Dalai Lama, and Abbots from each of the three great monasteries called on the British Commissioner, and had a three hours' interview in which they requested the Commissioner not to advance to Lhasa; or, if he must do so, to advance with only a small escort. The Amban's Secretary was also present at the interview.

3rd August.—Damp, cloudy morning.

The force marched to Lhasa, and camped on an open plain 1½ miles to the west of the Potala. At 4 p.m., the Amban called on the British Commissioner.

4th August.—Heavy rain during the night, lasting up to about 9 a.m.

Colonel Younghusband returned the Amban's call, returning through the town of Lhasa. On arrival in camp, he received the Nepalese representative.

5th August.—At 10 a.m. the Sechung and Tsarong Shapes and the Tungyik Chembo, who was at Khamba Jong, called on the British Commissioner and had a long interview, during which the Tong-sa Penlop also arrived. The Nepalese representative called in the afternoon, and during his visit an Abbot came in from the National Assembly, with a message regarding our proposed occupation of the Norbuling.

6th August.—Rain during the night.

The daily quantity of supplies required by the force not having been sent by the Lhasa Government as promised, a letter was sent to the Council to say that if certain supplies were not produced by 5 p.m. that day, the British Commissioner would sanction the General Officer Commanding taking any military action he considered necessary the next day. The Nepalese representative and the Tong-sa Penlop called during the afternoon. Only a small proportion of the requisite supplies were produced.

7th August.—Rain during the night. The General Officer Commanding called on the Amban.

F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND, Colonel,

British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters.

Camp, Lhasa, the 10th August, 1904.

Enclosure No. 283.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 25th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 21st August, 5 a.m. On the 18th, a Lama savagely attacked two unarmed medical officers, Captains Kelly and Cook-Young, I.M.S., at the entrance to the camp, with a sword, slightly wounding the former on the hand, and severely wounding the latter on the head. The man was captured and hung yesterday. The Lama said he belonged to Amdung in Western Tibet, and had no connection with local monasteries, but came with the intention of killing. He was armed with sword and dagger, and clad in coat of mail under his red monk's garments. Colonel Younghusband sent for the Tibetan officials, and demanded a hostage from each of the three leading monasteries and one from the Government as a guarantee of future good behaviour, and fined them five thousand rupees. Case is thought to be only isolated case of fanaticism. On 19th instant, I reconnoitred to the Penam Gangla. No signs of any gathering. The Nepalese Resident reports further dispersal of Tibetan soldiers. The Ti Rimpoche, now the leading man in Lhasa, called and expressed regret at the occurrence on 18th. On 20th, troops marched out five miles west. The Tibetans reported that an interpreter belonging to the force, who had been alone in Lhasa without leave and contrary to orders, was found badly wounded by sword cuts. The case is being enquired into, but so far looks like drunken brawl. Minimum temperature here at night now 35°. Weather improving and Brahmaputra going down.

Enclosure No. 284.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated the 27th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of 21st August. We await your reply to Secretary of State's orders forwarded with our telegram of 18th August, regarding date on which Mission should leave Lhasa.

Enclosure No. 285.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 28th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 22nd August. The four hostages demanded on account of the assault on British officers were to-day handed over to me.

Enclosure No. 286.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 28th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 23rd August. Amount of indemnity which I am at present demanding, viz., Rs. 50,000 a day, reckoned from date on which Mission was attacked, is excessive, and I would not press it seriously. But by giving way on this point I might be able to secure trade-mart in Eastern Tibet. I should be glad to learn whether Government would approve of this. Payment of indemnity would make us very unpopular, and I would suggest a policy of concession in regard to it, and securing in place of indemnity additional facilities for trade, and, perhaps, mining rights as well.

Enclosure No. 287.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 28th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, August 24th, 5 a.m. Sent a reconnoitring party to the other side of the river on 22nd who visited the arsenal, which was deserted, but a certain amount of hand machinery for boring rifles and manufacturing cartridges with tools for the same are left; also a large number of partially made breech-blocks, bayonets, and cartridges. An accident occurred at Chaksam Ferry in which one driver, three Tibetan boatmen, and ten mules were drowned, due to swamping of one of large boats. Attock boatmen in Berthon boats behaved well, and saved large boat with remainder of passengers. Convoy arrived from Chaksam Ferry on 23rd with about 1,000 maunds supplies. All reported quiet at posts this side of Gyangtse. Two feet of snow reported on Karo La. On 9th weather very unsettled and rainy here with reduced temperature at nights.

Enclosure No. 288.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 28th August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 23rd August. I would suggest to Government that present opportunity be taken to investigate routes to China and India by means of return parties from here. To establish trade mart at Gartok, party with survey officer might be sent up Sangpo. I think O'Connor better stay at Gyangtse, where his services will be very necessary this winter. I would suggest therefore that Captain Rawling, who is now at Phari, and who travelled in Western Tibet last year, should be employed. He is an excellent fellow, who gets on well with Tibetans. Lieutenant Bailey, 32nd Pioneers, who has learnt some Tibetan and understands the people, might accompany him. The party should also be accompanied by geologist. Beyond a few orderlies, no escort need accompany this party. Another party might return to India down the Brahmaputra River or by the Tawang route. White might be in charge of this party; and as it would have to pass through country inhabited by independent tribes, he should have an escort of one hundred men, preferably Gurkhas. Both White and the Assam authorities might work to secure friendly co-operation of tribes. I cannot, of course, say at present that Tibetan Government will acquiesce in these movements, but people of country have never shown themselves ill-disposed, and I think it is worth while making effort to now explore unknown parts of Tibet.

Enclosure No. 289.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp, Lhasa, the 12th August, 1904.

(Extract.)

The Amban called upon me to-day. He said he had received a reply to our terms, but it was so impertinent he could not even mention it to me officially. He had sent it back to the Tibetans censuring them for their stupidity and ordering them to send a more fit reply. He had pointed out to them their folly in not settling with us, and how impossible it was for them to contend against us. He then made a singularly interesting remark. The ordinary people, he said, were not at all ill-disposed towards us. They liked us and were anxious to trade with us. Reports of our treatment of the wounded and of the liberal payment we made for supplies had spread about the country, and the people in general would be glad enough to make a settlement and be on good terms. Where the opposition came from was from the Lamas, more specially those of the three great monasteries. They and they alone were the obstructionists and if they were out of the way there would be no more trouble and the people would speedily be friends with us. I told the Amban this was extremely interesting and gratifying to hear, and what he had said entirely bore out my own conclusions. It made me all the more sorry that so many of these poor peasants with whom we had no quarrel and who only wished to be friendly with us should have been killed, and this was one consideration which was restraining us from fighting now. I had on several occasions during the recent fighting gone round the dead Tibetans, and invariably found that the dead were all peasants. A Lama was never seen. If we could be quite sure that the originators of all this fighting would fight themselves, I was not sure that we would have been so ready to suspend hostilities. Before the close of his visit I asked the Amban if the Nepalese and

Kashmiris kept on good terms with the Tibetans here. He replied that they got on well enough with the ordinary people but avoided the Lamas, as contact with them was liable to lead to trouble. He added that the Nepalese Representative had been ordered by the Prime Minister of Nepal to advise the Tibetans to be reasonable and come to a settlement with us and to tell them that the British respected the religion of others and would not interfere with theirs. I said I had heard of this, and if the Tibetans had only followed this good advice, which was given a year ago, we might have settled up everything at Khamba Jong. What the Prime Minister of Nepal had said about the tolerance of other religions was perfectly true. We had many millions of Buddhists under our rule, about 200 million Hindus and 70 million Mohomedans. The Tibetan fear that we would interfere with their religion was altogether unfounded. The Amban replied that they were so jealous of their religion that they tried to prevent even Chinese Buddhists of other sects from their own from entering Tibet.

Enclosure No. 290.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp, Lhasa, the 13th August, 1904.

(Extract.)

Two Shapes, the Dalai Lama's private Abbot, a Secretary of Council, and the Accountant-General paid me a formal visit this morning. They asked that our Mounted Infantry should not be allowed to go about in bands of 40 or 50, as they had yesterday captured 36 Tibetan soldiers (the real number is 64), and they feared there might be disturbances if this continued. I replied that such military operations would have to continue till I saw signs that they intended to agree to the terms we were demanding. At present I saw no such signs; the Amban had indeed told me that they had drawn up a document which they had presented to him as a reply to our terms, but which was so impertinent that the Amban had said he could not even mention it to me officially. The deputation replied that they were really anxious to make a settlement, and the document they had presented to the Amban merely represented their views, and was not intended as a reply to me. Their idea was to give the Amban their opinion, and he would give orders upon it. I asked them whether they were prepared to obey the orders of the Amban. They said that if the Amban gives orders acceptable to both them and him they would obey. I asked him if by that they meant that they would obey his orders if they liked them, but would pay no attention to them if they were not according to their taste. They replied that their idea was that the Amban should act as a sort of mediator. We would both present our views to him and he would decide between us and make a settlement satisfactory to both. When they had stated their case to him they had no intention to be impertinent; they were a small people and ignorant of the ways of great nations; they thought that if they asked a good deal at first they might not obtain all they asked but would obtain part. I told them I had already warned the Amban that I was not here to act the part of a merchant in the bazaar and haggle over terms. When I had arrived at Khamba Jong last year I had indeed been prepared then to discuss the terms of a settlement and by give and take arrive at a mutually satisfactory agreement. I had, for instance, announced that we were prepared to concede the Giaogong lands to them if they showed themselves reasonable in regard to trade concessions elsewhere. But they had declined to negotiate, and had chosen to fight. They had been beaten and had no further means of continuing the struggle against us. They must, therefore, accept our terms or expect us to take still further action against them. The terms we were now asking were extremely moderate, but if we were compelled to undertake more military operations they would have to be made much more severe. They begged me to be more reasonable and to discuss things more quietly; they said they were accustomed to talk matters over at great length; they hoped that the Amban would be able to persuade me to be more considerate; and they suggested that I should ask the Viceroy to let me demand easier terms from them. I reminded them that they had been aware of the terms for three weeks now and I had been ready on the way up here to explain them to them. I had now been ten days here; they had not yet come to talk to me about them; and I had heard from the Amban that so far from showing any inclination to agree with them they had written about them in very impertinent terms. They must not be surprised, therefore, that my patience was exhausted. The terms which I had shown them were issued by command of the British Government, and no reference to His Excellency the Viceroy would have the slightest effect in modifying them.

Enclosure No. 291.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp, Lhasa, the 14*th August*, 1904.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to report that the Ti Rimpoche, who is at present acting as Regent and presides at the National Assembly, came to visit me to-day, accompanied by the Nepalese Representative, and bringing with him a present of gold dust to the value of about £30 and some silk from the Dalai Lama's brother. He is a cultured, pleasant-mannered, amiable old gentleman. He said he would like to have come and seen me before, but was afraid of the Shapes. He told me how he had been hastily summoned here by the Dalai Lama a few weeks ago, but on his arrival had found the Dalai Lama had fled. He had greatly disliked taking up political business, for he had spent his whole life in religious study, and was altogether ignorant of the methods of public affairs. But the Shapes and people in the palace had given him a message from the Dalai Lama handing over the Dalai Lama's seal to him, and telling him he was to act as Regent during the Dalai Lama's absence. The Ti Rimpoche then stated that what he had come to see me about was to ask me to show consideration towards their religion, and not destroy their monasteries. When he had come to look into affairs he had convinced himself that those responsible for the conduct of affairs had acted very stupidly, and should have made a settlement with us long ago. Now they were beaten and had to accept our terms, but he hoped we would show them consideration. They were sending to the Dalai Lama to return and he thought he ought to be here to make a settlement with us. I told him that I thoroughly sympathised with him in the very unpleasant position in which he was placed. Others had brought trouble upon the country and he had been called in at the last moment to repair the mischief. But while he was in an awkward position, I hoped he would realise the difficulty in which I also was placed. I had received the orders of the Viceroy to show the utmost consideration to their religion. I had also received orders to make a settlement on the terms which had been determined on by the British Government. But the settlement on these terms had to be made with the National Assembly, which was almost entirely composed of ecclesiastics. The Amban had told me yesterday that the reply which they had made to our terms was so impertinent that he dare not even mention it to me officially. If then this assembly of ecclesiastics refused our terms, what was I to do? I had to show consideration to them and their monasteries because of their sacred calling. I had also to get my terms agreed to. Could he suggest any way of doing this except by force? The Ti Rimpoche said he altogether disagreed with the reply which had been sent to the Amban, but the others were determined to send it; not that they really meant what they said, but they thought that if they put their case strongly at the beginning they might get easier terms out of us. He again begged me, however, to show consideration. I said I would be very much obliged to him if he would at the earliest opportunity try to persuade the National Assembly that I was not here to bargain over terms. I was here by direction of the Viceroy to carry out the commands of the British Government in making a settlement. The terms of that settlement were drawn up with an especial regard for their religion. We were annexing no part of Tibet. We were not asking for an Agent here at Lhasa itself. But we had to ask for an indemnity because the military operations which had been forced on us in 1886 and in the present year had cost us a very great deal of money. The Tibetans had caused the trouble. We had, therefore, to ask them to pay at least a part of the expense. We know, however, that Tibet was too poor a country to pay the whole. We were, therefore, asking not even half of the real cost, and we expected that the Tibetans would give us, who had to suffer by having to pay the remainder of the cost, the advantage of being able to come to Tibet to buy wool and other things which were produced more cheaply here than in India, and of selling to the Tibetans the surplus of articles produced more cheaply in India. The Regent said he thought this quite reasonable, and he would explain my view to the National Assembly. As to the Dalai Lama, I said I was quite prepared to give him the most positive assurance that he would be safe from us if he returned here. I did not wish to discuss personally with him the details of the settlement. but wished him to affix his seal in my presence; and it would certainly be more convenient if he were nearer Lhasa for reference during the negotiations. The Regent said he would send two messengers to him to-morrow, advising him to return. The trouble was, though, that he had nobody about him to advise him properly. At the close of the interview I told the Ti Rimpoche that I should be glad to see him again. He was an old man, and was, I know, very busy just now, but whenever he liked to come and talk with me I should be most pleased to receive him.

Enclosure No. 292.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 31st August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 27th August. Nothing particular to report. Reconnaissances as usual, with negative results. Weather colder, with heavy rain nightly. All report quiet at posts between here and Gyangtse.

Enclosure No. 293.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp, Lhasa, the 16th August, 1904.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to report that yesterday the Amban intimated to me that he had pressed the Tibetan Government to make a start towards settlement by releasing the two Lachung men (British subjects) who had been seized last year beyond Khamba Jong, and that the Tibetan Government had agreed. He wished to know when and in what manner they should be handed over. I informed him that they should be handed over to me at ten this morning by two members of Council. This morning I held a full durbar and two members of Council, accompanied by two Lamas, brought the two Lachung men before me. I told the men, who showed the liveliest satisfaction at their impending release, that I had received the commands of the King-Emperor to obtain their release from the Tibetan Government, and they were now free. His Majesty had further commanded that if they had been ill-treated reparation should be demanded from the Tibetan Government. I wished to know, therefore, if they had been ill-treated or not. They said they had been slightly beaten at Shigatse, and their things had been taken from them, but since their arrival in Lhasa they have been well fed and had not been beaten. I told them they would be examined by a medical officer to ascertain if their statements were correct. I then turned to the Tibetan Councillors and said that the King-Emperor considered the seizure, imprisonment and beating of two of his subjects as an exceedingly serious offence. It formed one of the main reasons why the Mission had been moved forward from Khamba Jong to Gyangtse, and one of the principal terms in the settlement, which I had been commanded to make at Lhasa itself, was the release of these men. If the Tibetan Government had not cared to have them in Tibet they should have returned them across the frontier; or, in any case, have handed them over to us at Khamba Jong. Their seizure and imprisonment for a year was altogether unpardonable. I trusted they now understood that the subjects of the King-Emperor could not be ill-treated with impunity, and that we would, in future, as we had now, hold them strictly responsible for the good treatment of British subjects in Tibet. The Lachung men were then taken out and examined by a medical officer in the presence of Mr. White and two Tibetan officials. The medical officer reported that there were no signs on their bodies of their having been beaten, and that they were in good condition. On receiving this report I expressed my satisfaction that the ill-treatment had not been severe. I would, not, therefore, press the matter of reparation, but imprisonment for a year was in itself sufficiently bad treatment to British subjects who had committed no offence, and we expected that no British subjects would ever be so treated again. The Shapes promised to respect the subjects of His Majesty in future. They expressed their pleasure that one of the terms of the settlement had been concluded; and hoped, now a start was made, an agreement would quickly be come to. It was, at any rate, their intention to proceed as rapidly as possible in their discussions. It has subsequently transpired that the two men had been kept separately in dungeons 21 steps below the surface of the ground, and had not seen daylight for nearly a year. But as they were in excellent health and well fed, and as we had while at Khamba Jong seized over two hundred yaks in retaliation, I am not pursuing the matter further. The most satisfactory feature in this affair is the fact that the release has taken place entirely on the initiation of the Amban.

Enclosure No. 294.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 31st August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 25th August. Your telegram, 18th August. Am I to receive orders from military authorities as to the date of my return? Supplies of wheat, barley, fodder, for whole force, can easily be obtained here, warm clothing for force can also be obtained, Tibetan military forces are utterly broken, people are perfectly friendly. If I leave here before completion of my work, Government risk losing all best result of their expensive efforts and of bravery and endurance of their troops.

Enclosure No. 295.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 31st August, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 26th August. Officers arriving from Gyangtse report villages along route very friendly and voluntarily bringing in country produce for sale. O'Connor has visited three of principal temples in Lhasa. At first he was civilly received, at second he was very cordially received, and at third sullenly. White had obtained permission from great Sera Monastery to visit it any day he wishes. I announced to authorities my wish to give one thousand rupees to poor of Lhasa, but as twelve thousand poor from city and whole district round appeared yesterday to receive my gift, I had to give them a tonka each, or four thousand rupees in all. Nepalese Representative reports this morning that gift has immediately increased our popularity, and that people are saying when their own troops come here, they loot everything, while we keep our troops from looting, pay for everything, and even distribute alms to poor. Acting Regent remarked last evening to Nepalese Representative he understood now why we were a great nation. Party of medical officers visited Tibetans' Medical Hall today, and were well received. White and Wilton visited arsenal, which is a very small affair, and scarcely, in their opinion, worth destroying. There are some English-made lathes, but machinery is hand-worked and fly-wheel wooden.

Enclosure No. 296.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated the 2nd September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 31st August. You are the head of the Mission, and you can only take orders from the Government of India. The Government of India wish for your opinion as to possible duration of stay at Lhasa after you have consulted with General Macdonald. The Government of India see no reason whatever why the Mission should not remain at Lhasa until the middle of October, if necessary, but the 15th October is the latest date up to which you can be permitted to remain there. The reason for this decision is that the troops cannot cross the passes without loss of life if the return is made later, and that further transport and supplies from India cannot be provided. In the absence of any convincing reasons as to the impossibility of staying at Lhasa, the Mission must remain there until the Convention is concluded or until the 15th October.

Enclosure No. 297.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated the 2nd September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram will be despatched by Military Department to General Macdonald:—

"The Government of India expect you to make every possible endeavour to enable the Mission to stay at Lhasa as long as may be necessary for the negotiations, but not later than the 15th October, It is of paramount importance that a Convention should be concluded, and the Mission are expected to endure inconvenience and possible hardship to attain this end, and the Government of India see no reason why the Mission should not be able to stay until the middle of October."

Enclosure No. 298.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 3rd September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 30th August. Four or five hundred Mongolians are collected at Reting, three marches to north of Lhasa. They do not intend come here, unless wanted.

Enclosure No. 299.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 3rd September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 30th August. Supplies are coming in regularly. Ninety to one hundred patients a day visit Walton's dispensary, which is highly appreciated. White and Wilton have visited both Sera and Depung monasteries, and been very civilly received. Reception at latter was much more cordial than on first visit. Officers have visited bazaars in city, and experienced no symptoms of ill-feeling. Bazaar outside camp is crowded daily with Tibetan traders and sellers. Valuable curios are now being brought for sale. O'Connor has received advances from Kashmiri merchants anxious to establish branches at Gyangtse when mart opened there, and Chinese merchants are also keen.

Enclosure No. 300.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 3rd September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 30th August. Acting Regent and two Councillors visiting me on 28th said they had handed Amban letter agreeing to all our terms, except that regarding indemnity. I accordingly asked Amban to bring Council with him when he next visited me. He came to-day with Acting Regent and Council. It seems they were only ready agree to other terms, provided we excused them indemnity. After much talk, they, however, agreed to clauses five, eight and nine, one section of clause two and section three of clause two, with exception of last sentence, commencing with words and to. This assent is, however, only verbal, and Amban anticipates much difficulty in obtaining written assent of National Assembly to even these.

Enclosure No. 301.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 3rd September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, August 30th. Dalai Lama has been seen on Tibetan plateau on road to Sining, accompanied by Dorjieff.

Enclosure No. 302.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 3rd September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 30th August. Macdonald tells me that 15th September is the latest date he can remain here. I have told him that it is unlikely that I can satisfactorily conclude the negotiations before beginning of October.

Enclosure No. 303.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 3rd September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 30th August. I gather that Tibetans, in spite of their protest of poverty, can really pay indemnity. Still, I think that trade concessions in lieu of portion of indemnity would be preferable, and I should like also liberty to arrange payment of indemnity by instalments of one lakh of rupees a year for long term of years, if that arrangement is preferred by Tibetans.

Enclosure No. 304.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the Resident in Nepal, Katmandu, dated the 5th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Can you ascertain what official or officials signed on behalf of Tibet the Treaty of 1856 between Nepal and Tibet, and what seal or seals were affixed? Perhaps you could obtain *facsimile* copy of original document from Durbar.

Enclosure No. 305.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 5th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 2nd September. Yesterday I visited Amban, and at my request Acting Regent and Shapes were present. Most of members now sitting in National Assembly were also present. I handed them final draft of

Convention. I believe opposition to all terms except indemnity is practically overcome, and Amban has handed me a written assurance from Tibetans accepting ninth clause. As regards indemnity, I am coming to conclusion that, considering wealth of monasteries, it should be payable without undue hardships. In any case, reduction could be more suitably made by Viceroy if we subsequently find terms really to severe than by myself now.

Enclosure No. 306.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 3rd September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 30th August, 5 a.m. Nothing unusual occurred on 27th and 28th. On 29th survey party sent 13 miles up the main Kichu valley, escorted by one company 32nd and section mounted infantry. Officers' reconnoitring patrol of mounted infantry proceeded to Pemba Jong La reports Kham force about 800 strong said to be in camp about 12 miles beyond Pemba Jong La. Heavy rain every night for the last three nights. Severe snowstorm reported on night of 23rd at Ralung, and low temperature on the Karola. Convoy left for Chaksam Ferry, and some sick for base hospital escorted by one company 8th Gurkhas and section mounted infantry.

Enclosure No. 307.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 5th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 2nd September. Your telegram, 25th August. Chinese deposed sixth Dalai Lama on ground of licentious living. In absence of Dalai Lama, Tashi Lama would be head of the Buddhist Church; it is not intended that he should "assume the place" of Dalai Lama. Fact that I endeavoured to induce Dalai Lama to come in is well known to Buddhists here, and they are also aware that, after he had definitely fled from the country, it was on the initiative of Amban that he was denounced. I, personally, consider the denunciation a very politic step. It also has approval of Tongsa Penlop and Nepalese.

Enclosure No. 308.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 5th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 2nd September. Tongsa Penlop is suggesting to Tibetans that they should let us collect Customs at marts and get amount of indemnity from this source. I am making no move till Tibetans make definite proposals, but I think that it would be advantageous to move, and would like to know views of Government.

Enclosure No. 309.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated the 31*st August,* 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

I to-day consulted Younghusband with regard to fixing a date for our departure from Lhasa. He says he cannot fix any date, but thinks beginning of October earliest, and cannot guarantee that. Medical authorities consider 1st September latest safe date. Officers Commanding units think 12th might be risked. I am prepared to stay 15th September. I would delay departure a few days longer if this would make the difference. There has already been snow on hills round here and at Nagartse, and heavy snow on Karo La and at Ralung, with severe frost on Karo La, and return march to Gyangtse will take nineteen days. I consider 13th September is the latest safe date for our stay in Lhasa, and would be glad of immediate orders, but, in absence of orders to contrary will fix 15th for departure.

Enclosure No. 310.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated the 6*th September,* 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

With reference to the decision of the Government of India that the Mission may remain at Lhasa until the 15th October at latest, you will, of course, bear in mind that your opinion is based on very imperfect information as to climatic conditions. You must take every precaution to avoid being blocked in the passes with consequent loss of life, and, if you are unfortunately detained at Lhasa, you should keep yourself regularly informed as to the practicability of the road for your return journey.

Enclosure No. 311.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, dated the 6*th September,* 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegrams are repeated for your information :—

(1.) From Secretary of State, 31st August :—

" Your telegram of the 30th August. His Majesty's Government have throughout aimed at obtaining the maximum of reparation while incurring the minimum of future liability. As regards indemnity, amount suggested seems altogether excessive, but we think that by requiring Tibetans to pay a substantial sum the danger of provoking us will be brought home to them. On the other hand, additional treaty concessions, while costing Tibetans less at present, are likely to involve us in further trouble hereafter, since attempts may be made to evade them in the same way as the 1893 regulations were evaded. Additional marts and mining rights, desirable as they may be in the abstract, can only be made effective by affording protection to miners and traders, and by keeping roads open. Unless in future the Tibetan Government show a disposition very different from that which they hitherto displayed, our apprehension is that every fresh mart and mining enterprise will result in questions being raised between the Tibetan Government and the Government of India, which will require support and pressure from us periodically."

(2.) To Secretary of State, 2nd September :—

"Your telegram of the 31st August. We had given up intention of pressing Tibetans to agree to a mart in Eastern Tibet; should, however, an opportunity present itself of securing such a mart, we may afterwards regret not having availed ourselves of it. As regards the amount of trade there, we have little information."

(3.) From Secretary of State, 5th September:—

"Your telegram of the 2nd September. Tibet. See my telegram of 31st August, which conveyed to you the general views of His Majesty's Government on suggestions made by Younghusband. Should an opportunity of securing a mart in Eastern Tibet on easy terms present itself, His Majesty's Government offer no objection; they are not, however, desirous of adding to the marts already specified, unless this can be done under circumstances which was not likely to entail trouble in future, and with the Tibetan Government's goodwill."

Enclosure No. 312.

Political Diary of the Tibet Frontier Commission, dated Camp, Lhasa, the 18th August, 1904.

8th August, 1904.—Cloudy morning.

At 8 a.m. General Macdonald, with the approval of the British Commissioner moved out a column to the neighbourhood of the Depung Monastery, and made a requisition upon the monks for supplies of grain, flour and butter, owing to the failure of the Lhasa Government to supply the quantities required by the troops. After some delay, a small quantity was produced, and the monks were given five days to complete the whole amount. During the course of the day, two Shapes and some other officials and the Tongsa Penlop called on the British Commissioner.

9th August.—Cloudy morning.

Mr. White visited the Nechung Oracle, and was well received.

10th August.—Cloudy.

The British Commissioner visited the Nechung Oracle Monastery in the morning, and called upon the Amban during the afternoon.

11th August.—Heavy rain fell all night, lasting till 8 a.m. Proposed move to Lhalu house and new camp postponed. Rain began again at 5 p.m.

12th August.—Rain fell during the night, lasting till 9 a.m. The force moved camp some two miles to the east, and the Mission moved to the Lhalu house, the property of one of the noble families of Tibet. The Nepalese Representative called on the British Commissioner at noon. A reconnoitring party found a camp of Khamba soldiers up a nullah leading to the Pemba La, and captured about 60 of them without resistance.

13th August.—Rain fell during the night.

At 11 o'clock two Shapes and some other officials called on the British Commissioner, bringing presents of silk, &c. The Tongsa Penlop called in the afternoon.

14th August.—Cloudy.

The Ti Rimpoche, the Chief Doctor of Divinity and Metaphysics, of Tibet, called with the Nepalese Representative at 11 a.m. Messrs. White and Wilton visited the Jokang temple in Lhasa, where they were well received.

F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND,

British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters.

Enclosure No. 313.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 6th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 5 a.m., 2nd September. On the 30th the survey party up the Kichu valley reconnoitred as far as the junction of the Pemba Chu with the Kichu opposite the Gaden monastery, about 20 miles from Lhasa. All quiet. Survey party and escort returned to camp. Nothing of note occurred in post. News from communications—all quiet at posts; Sangpo in heavy flood; Karo La under snow; one death pneumonia Ralung; one case Petijong; two cases enteric here; one at Gyangtse.

Enclosure No. 314.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp, Lhasa, the 18th August, 1904.

(Extract.)

I regret to have to report that a monk attacked two officers, Captain Cooke-Young, I.M.S., and Captain Kelly, I.M.S., with a sword this morning immediately outside the Military Camp. He dealt the former officer a severe cut on the head and wounded the latter officer in the hand. When secured it was found that he was wearing under his monk's robes a coat of chain armour reaching to the knees. He also had a number of charms. The assault, of course, was entirely unprovoked, while the fact of the man having chain armour and bearing a sword is sufficient evidence that he had come to the camp with the deliberate intention of killing a British officer. That it was, however, an act of individual fanaticism was equally evident, for it took place in the bazaar immediately outside our camp, which was attended by two or three hundred Tibetans at the time. Messrs. White and Wilton, too, were at the very moment being civilly received in the Depung Monastery. Nevertheless, as the whole place is swarming with monks, there being, according to the Abbot's account, ten thousand in the Depung Monastery alone, and as we had already caught one with a loaded matchlock, I thought it necessary to make an example of the present case. I, therefore, summoned the Acting Regent and the members of Council and informed them that though I did not imagine that the assault was part of any organised scheme, yet I had to mark the serious nature of the offence in order to prevent others like it being committed in future. We had already captured one monk with a loaded matchlock hidden under his robe; and unless marked action was taken of this case others might occur in future and seriously strain the friendly relations we were beginning to re-establish between us. The man would, therefore, be hanged: a fine of Rs. 5,000 would be imposed on Sera, the nearest monastery: and four hostages, one from each of the three great monasteries and one from the Government, would have to be sent to remain with us. The Tibetans demurred to these terms, saying that if the man was handed over to them they would punish him according to Tibetan custom: and that they were a poor people and could not afford this fine in addition to the indemnity we were imposing, and that it would be unfair if another case of this kind occurred that the hostages should suffer. They proposed instead that they should station guards outside our camp to keep Tibetans in order. I said I would be ready to take the fine in kind if they found difficulty in paying it in cash: and that the hostages might be changed every day, if necessary. They would be at liberty, too, to go about anywhere *inside* the Mission enclosure, to attend durbars, and to receive friends. With those modifications my terms must be adhered to, and I asked the Shapes what would have happened if a British officer had in front of one of their monasteries attacked a Lama and cut his head open. Without doubt the whole monastery would have turned out and killed every defenceless Englishman within reach. Fortunately for the Tibetans our soldiers are well under control. As it was our officers went out and reassured the traders, and not a rupee's worth of their goods was looted. But the Tibetan Government must recognise the moderation we were showing. I trusted that the Tibetan Government would see the wisdom of acceding to my moderate demands without further demur. They returned the usual answer that they would lay the matter before the National Assembly.

Enclosure No. 315.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 9th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 4th September. Your telegram, 24th August. I have already given two Lachung men and their families four hundred fifty rupees each, and think they might receive compensation up to total amount of one thousand rupees each.

Enclosure No. 316.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, Gyangtse, to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 9th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, September 4th. Ti Rimpoche, who has to-day been definitely recognised by National Assembly as Regent and with Amban's consent commenced using seal left by Dalai Lama, visited me with Tongsa Penlop and Nepalese representative this morning. He said Tibetan Government were prepared to accept our terms, but begged that the indemnity might be paid in annual instalment of one lakh each. I pointed out that amount in that case ought to be considerably increased; but eventually as time is pressing, and Amban's consent will yet have to be obtained, I agreed in anticipation of sanction from Government. I trust my action will be upheld. Regent then affixed his private seal to a Tibetan translation of Draft Convention worded precisely as forwarded with your letter, dated August 5th, and I have informed Regent that Convention itself will be signed in the Potala.

Enclosure No. 317.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp, Lhasa, the 22nd August, 1904.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to report that yesterday, after handing me over silks to the value of Rs. 5,000, as fine for the assault on two British officers, the Acting Regent (the Ti Rimpoche) asked those Tibetans who had come with him to withdraw, and he, the Tongsa-Penlop and the Nepalese Representative then proceeded to talk over the general situation. The Ti

Rimpoche said that he himself had no objection to our terms except in regard to the indemnity, which he thought was too heavy, as Tibet was a poor country. He pointed out the difficulty which the Tibetans had found in paying up the small fine I had imposed on them, and asked how they could be expected to pay the sum of Rs. 50,000 a day which I was demanding. He said of course we thought ourselves in the right in this quarrel, but it was difficult for him to make the Assembly acquiesce in this view, and it might be well .if I would impress our views upon them. I said that if only a sensible and reasonable man like him had been sent to meet me in the beginning all this trouble would have been saved: there would have been no war, and no indemnity would have been asked. We had not wished for war, and I had gone with Captain O'Connor without any escort into their camp at Guru in January to reason quietly with the leaders there and ask them to report my views to Lhasa. If we had wanted war I would never have done that. That I did it was proof that we wished for peace. But they refused to report my words to Lhasa, and hence this trouble. The Ti Rimpoche here interpolated that they were afraid to report anything to the Dalai Lama. I went on to say that it was not fair to expect India to pay all the cost of a war brought on by the foolishness of the Tibetan rulers, so we had to ask that the Tibetans should pay part of the sum. Yet even now we were not asking for more than half of the whole cost. I was demanding Rs. 50,000 a day from the date of the attack on the Mission till a month after the date on which the Convention is signed. The Ti Rimpoche would note that I was not asking payment from the date of the Guru fight, because that fight might have been due to mere foolishness on the part of the leaders, but from the date when the Tibetans deliberately attacked the Mission at Gyangtse, after I had repeatedly notified that I had come to negotiate, and there could be no doubt that they meant war. From that date, therefore, we expected them to contribute to the cost of military operations. The Ti Rimpoche had said that the Tibetans had very little cash. If that was so I was prepared to consider the question of extending the period in which the payment of the indemnity could be made. I would also consider whether some of it could not be paid in kind to the trade agent in Gyangtse and the Officer Commanding in Chumbi. The Ti Rimpoche said he wished the settlement with us to be fully completed now so that we could have it over and be friends, but if the Tibetans had to go on paying us an indemnity for some years after, the row would be kept up and friendship would be difficult. I replied that if they would now at once pay the indemnity we should be only too glad. But in any case we would not on our side harbour any ill-feelings towards the Tibetans, with whom we had no other desire than to live on terms of friendship. The Tongsa-Penlop then said that Tibet, Nepal and Bhutan were bound together by the same religion, and all bordered on India. They ought, therefore, to look on England as their friend and leader. The English had no wish to interfere with them, but did not like any one else interfering. They ought to stand together therefore, for if one was hurt all were hurt. They could rely, however, on their big neighbour England to help them in time of trouble if they kept on good terms with her. The Nepalese Representative agreed with the Tongsa-Penlop that all four countries should be on terms of friendship with one another and that Tibet, Nepal and Bhutan should always preserve good relations with their neighbour England. The Ti Rimpoche said he trusted that when this settlement was made Tibet and England would always be on terms of friendship. The Tibetans had no wish to have relations with any other Power, and desired now to keep on good terms with England. I replied that we had been on perfectly good terms with Tibet for more than a century, up till the time of the Sikkim war, and I hoped that when the present settlement was made we would be friends for ever.

Enclosure No. 318.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp, Lhasa, the 19th August, **1904.**

(Extract.)

The Amban visited me to-day and handed to me the second reply of the Tibetan Government to his letter forwarding to them the terms of the settlement we now wish to make with them. The first reply he had been unable to forward to me as it was too impudent. This second reply, he said, I would find on perusal, was more satisfactory, though it still fell short of what he would expect the Tibetans to agree to. I told the Amban that I found it difficult to make the Tibetans realise that the main points in the settlement we should expect them to agree to without question. The period in which the indemnity was to be paid might be a matter for discussion, but there was no question as to its having to be paid sometime. Similarly, they must agree to having marts at Gyangtse and Gartok. I remarked that I had all along been of opinion that nothing could be got out of these Tibetans except by pressure, and I was fully prepared to act. At the same time it would be much more satisfactory if the needful pressure could be put on by the Amban as I had no wish to take more action unless absolutely compelled to. I added that a difficulty I experienced in dealing with the Tibetans was in talking with so many representatives at the same time. Half a dozen delegates would come to me and each one insist upon having his say, and no responsible head was recognised. The Amban said that he, too, had had this difficulty, but that he had recognised the Regent as the principal in these negotiations and from now on he intended to negotiate with him alone: he was the best man among the leading Tibetans and came next after the Dalai Lama in the Lhasa Province. I said this seemed to me a wise course, for I had found the Regent a sensible man and he was much respected by the people. As regards the Convention itself, the Amban said he would have to discuss the clause regarding trade-marts with me. I said I was prepared to talk the matter over, but we should have to insist upon establishing trade marts at Gyangtse and Gartok, and I did not understand the Tibetan objections to the establishment of a mart at Gyangtse, for we had the right more than a century ago to have one even at Shigatse. This right had not been exercised for a great number of years, but at one time Indian traders visited Shigatse regularly.

Annexure.

Revised draft of treaty drawn by the National Assembly with greatest care, as ordered by the Amban.

That the draft of treaty containing eight Articles sent recently to the Amban by the British officials which has been forwarded to us under sealed cover on the evening of the 4th of the 7th month in the Wood Dragon year, in the 30th year of the reign of Kwangsu, stating that although we the National Assembly have talked over the matters with due consideration, yet no mention has been made by you Tibetans in assembly in Article I, on an important part of the subject, in which no property can be sold or leased out to any other power. Further, Tibet has been protected by the Chinese Emperor for more than 200 years with great kindness, and an Amban has been appointed for conducting business in Tibet, and as the Chinese Government is not mentioned clearly in the terms of this treaty, you were going to talk it over with the British officials regarding the 1st Article.

That although it is well known to all the powers of the Four Directions that from the beginning the great Emperor of China "appointed by heaven" is the Dispenser of Gifts since the former incarnation of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and that he (the Emperor) is the protector of Tibet, no mention is made about him in the treaty drawn by the British, and we thank you that you are going to talk it over again with the British officials.

We, the Tibetans, have held no friendly intercouse or taken in any other power whose religion is heretical and does not agree with ours, and we have never leased out or sold any property until now. In future, regarding the present treaty, if the British Government will not dishearten the Tibetan Government, and with an earnest desire for peace, will abide by the treaty so that no dispute may arise hereafter and fault be found: and in the same manner, the Tibetan Government will not hold friendly intercourse, lease out or sell to any other heretical power having a different religion from ours, except the great Emperor of China out of gratitude, and will abide by the same.

Article II.—That as regards the two men of Lachung, who are to be given back by the Tibetan Government, the great Amban has given clear instructions to both the Tibetans and the British, and by mutual consent the aforesaid two men have been delivered over to the English officials without any injury to their bodies and organs of sense by the acting Kalon and the representatives of the National Assembly at 10 a.m. on the 5th day of the 7th month.

Article III.—That as regards the payment of war indemnity to the British by the Tibetans and concerning the universal law of paying back military expenses to the victorious power by the vanquished power, the British have picked up a quarrel and entered into Tibetan territory, thus causing war, and if one looks at the loss and damage done to the land of Tibet, it is impossible to pay back the war indemnity to the British, but Tibet being a religious country and having no military drilling it was unable to protect the land; and if any war indemnity is to be paid to the British according to the universal law, it is to be considered that great damage has been done by the destruction of Jongs, monasteries, villages, images, property and harvest; Tibet has no income like other countries, and whatever wealth is obtained, it is spent solely on performing religious ceremony for the great Emperor of China. As it is quite impossible to pay a big amount, be good enough to explain it to the British; but the real state of the case is that in the event of the same boundary remaining in our possession as before, we shall consider the repayment of a small portion of the indemnity if necessary.

Article IV.—That as regards the destruction of the "hill-Jongs" between Gyangtse and the frontier, we agree that all the newly-built fortifications are to be destroyed.

Article V.—That as regards the establishment of trade-marts in three different places, namely, at Yatung, Gyangtse, and Katakhe, Yatung mart is to remain under the existing conditions. It is not necessary to establish new trade-marts at Katakhe, which appear to be the name of Togar, and at Gyangtse. A trade-mart can be established at any convenient place below Phari. The officers are to be established in the marts under the same conditions as at Yatung. Regarding the delivery of the letters, the telegraph wire erected recently inside the frontier is to be taken away, and Tibetan officials will undertake to receive letters and deliver them.

Desirable traders shall have free access by mutual consent between the frontier and the mart.

Although benefit may be derived by both the parties by the establishment of fresh trade-marts in the event of development of trade, but as the establishment of new trade-marts will do harm to Tibet in future, please explain the matter so that it may not be necessary to make any promise.

Article VI.—The boundary between Sikkim and Tomo (Chumbi Valley) should be Jelap, and the boundary between Khamba and Sikkim should be according to the boundary pillars erected by Ngao-po.

Article VII.—That as for not increasing the customs fixed in the treaty of the 16th year of the reign, no alteration will be made accordingly. Regarding the gate-customs, although we have made a request that the same may be given to the Tibetan Government, but the Emperor of China collects it in his treasury and takes the same. If it cannot be given to the Tibetan Government, we will raise no dispute and can remain as it is, but if it is necessary to pay a small war indemnity to the English, please keep it in mind to move the Chinese Emperor in the matter.

Article VIII.—Regarding the occupation of Chumbi Valley by the British troops till the war indemnity is paid and the trade-mart is effectually established, if it is necessary to keep the troops at Chumbi for fear that the Tibetans may change their minds and until the trade-mart is established, there will be an income for the use of the grass, water, and fuel; please take active measures so that the prices may be paid without delay at the current rates.

On the decision of the above terms of the treaty by mutual consent of both the parties, the British traders can only hire houses on due payment of the house rent, but they will not be permitted to purchase houses or to keep Tibetans with them by deceitful means, or to cause their religion to prosper, or to marry Tibetan women, or to take things by force, or on credit—the due prices must be given at once in cash—or to take houses and land on mortgage. Especially after completing the terms of the present treaty, no British

officials, big or small, will ever be allowed to come into Tibet beyond the trade-mart. We therefore beg you, the great and best Amban, to do an act of virtue towards the doctrine of Tibet, and to do your very best to have these points inserted in the terms of the treaty.

This is sent by the National Assembly of Tibet on the day of the month of the Wood-Dragon year in the 30th year of the reign of Kwangsu.

Enclosure No. 319.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp, Lhasa, the 21th August, 1904.

(Extract.)

I visited the Amban this afternoon and told him I had perused the Tibetan reply to him which he handed to me at our last meeting. It was more satisfactory than the first reply and there were some points which the Tibetans would now evidently agree to. I proposed then that we should get these points settled first and out of the way so as to make a start and then work on to the more contentious clauses. I then remarked that I had heard the Dalai Lama had without any doubt whatever fled the country. The Amban said this was true and he was evidently not flying to China but to the north—possibly to join the great Lama at Urga. I said he would hardly be flying to China, for he would surely have obtained the Amban's permission to proceed to Peking or at least have informed him of his intention. The Amban replied that he had gone off without any warning and he had now definitely decided to denounce him to the Emperor and would to-day or to-morrow send me a telegram which he would ask me to have despatched to Peking as quickly as possible. I said I would do this service for him and I considered he was acting with great wisdom in denouncing the Dalai Lama, for it was he who had brought all this trouble upon his country and he deserved to suffer for it. I was not surprised, however, at so young a ruler coming to grief, for our experience in India was that a young chief even when he only had temporal authority in his hands was very liable to get into the power of unscrupulous and designing men and rush off in a head-strong way on a foolish course. For a young Dalai Lama who had not only temporal but also supreme spiritual power the tendency to go wrong must have been almost irresistible and inevitable. The Amban said this certainly had been the case with the present Dalai Lama who had always been head-strong and obstinate and had never followed good advice. Referring then to the formalities which had to be gone through in the present negotiations, I said that, of course, the agreement I entered into with him and the Tibetans would have to be ratified. Soon after my return after the visit the Amban sent me a telegram for despatch by Gyangtse to Peking which he said contained the recommendation to the Emperor to denounce the Dalai Lama.

Enclosure No. 320.

Political Diary of the Tibet Frontier Commission, dated Lhasa, the 26th August, 1904.

15th August, 1904.—Cloudy.

The Nepalese representative called on the British Commissioner during the morning.

16th August.—Cloudy. Rain fell during the night.

Two Shapes and some other officials arrived at 11 a.m., bringing with them the released Lachung men, both of whom appear to be in good health and to have been well treated and fed during their captivity. The Nepalese representative called on the British Commissioner during the course of the day.

17th August.—Cloudy.

The British Commissioner called on the Amban at 3 p.m. and handed to him a draft of the Proposed Adhesion Agreement.

18th August.—Clear morning.

A monk attacked two officers near the British camp and succeeded in inflicting sword-cuts upon Captains Kelly and Cook-Young, I.M.S., before he could be secured. Colonel Younghusband, on receipt of this news, at once sent for the Shapes and the Ti Rimpoche, and, on their arrival informed them of the occurrence, and that he proposed to hang the monk and to inflict a fine of Rs. 5,000 upon the nearest monastery (Sera), and to take hostages from each of the three great monasteries and the Lhasa Government as security for the future good behaviour of the monks. The Tibetan officers demurred at the terms, but went away to discuss the matter amongst themselves. The Tongsa Penlop brought a letter containing the revised answer of the Tibetans to the terms of the treaty.

19th August.—Clear morning.

The Amban called on the British Commissioner at 3 p.m. The monk who committed the outrage yesterday was hanged at 4 p.m.

20th August.—Cloudy.

The Nepalese representative called on the British Commissioner during the morning.

21st August.—Rain fell during the night. Cloudy day.

The Nepalese representative called during the morning, and at noon the Ti-Rimpoche and the Yutok Shape came, bringing silks to the nominal value of Rs. 5,000 in payment of the fine inflicted by the British Commissioner. The Tongsa Penlop also came and was present during the interview which followed. The British Commissioner called on the Amban at 3 p.m.

F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND, Colonel,
British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters.

Lhasa, the 26th August, 1904.

Enclosure No. 321.

Political Diary of the Tibet Frontier Commission.

22nd August, 1904.—Cloudy.

The four hostages demanded by the British Commissioner from the Government and the three great monasteries arrived to-day. Mr. Hayden visited the Tibetan arsenal on the far side of the Kyi Chu.

A proclamation was posted in Lhasa by the Tibetan Government, forbidding the people to interfere with foreigners in any way.

23rd August.—Rain fell during the night.

A convoy arrived at Lhasa carrying foodstuff, &c., from Gyangtse.

24th August.—Rain fell during the night.

Mr. Hayden left Lhasa en route to Gyangtse.

Captain O'Connor visited the Jokang, Muru, and Ramoche monasteries in Lhasa, and was well received in the first two, but sulkily in the third.

25th August.—Rain fell during the night.

By the British Commissioner's orders alms were distributed to the poor of Lhasa, 12,000 in number, at a rate of one tonka per individual.

A race meeting was held during the afternoon which was attended by the Tongsa Penlop, the Nepalese representative, and some Tibetan officials.

There was a heavy thunderstorm at 7 p.m.

26th August.—Rain fell during the night.

The Nepalese representative called on the British Commissioner.

27th August.—Rain fell during the night.

Messrs. White and Wilton visited Sera monastery, and were well received.

Heavy thunderstorm at 8 p.m.

28th August.—Rain fell during the night.

At noon the Yutok and Tsarong Shapes and the Ti-Rimpoche called on the British Commissioner, and an interview followed with reference to the terms of the proposed treaty. The Tongsa Penlop was also present at the interview. Mr. Wilton called on the Amban in the afternoon.

F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND, Colonel,

British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters.

Lhasa, the 31st August, 1904.

Enclosure No. 322.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, Lhasa, dated the 14th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegrams are repeated for information and guidance. You may be able to secure concession contemplated by offering to recommend Viceroy as act of grace to remit portion of indemnity, on condition that consent is given to all the arrangements, and that the surveys are successfully carried out:—

(1) From Secretary of State, 13th September:—

"Your telegram of the 12th September. Difficulty is presented by amount of indemnity, especially when provision for its payment is read in connection with Clause VII. of the Agreement, effect being that our occupation of the Chumbi Valley may have to continue for 75 years. This is inconsistent with the instructions conveyed in my telegram of the 26th July last, and with the declarations of His Majesty's Government as to withdrawal. Amount, moreover, was admitted by Younghusband to be excessive, as reported in your telegram of 30th August. I request that you will consider whether, without prejudice to the signed agreement, it would not be possible to intimate to the Tibetans, in accordance with the suggestion in your telegram of 12th September, that amount of indemnity will be reduced on their duly fulfilling terms agreed to and granting further facilities for trade."

(2) To Secretary of State, 14th September:—

"Your telegram of the 13th September. We recognise that any appearance of occupying Chumbi Valley for a definite period must be avoided, and we have already considered your suggestions. It has been suggested to the Tibetans by the Tongsa Penlop that indemnity might be paid out of Customs duties levied at marts to be established under the new agreement, and collected by us. To this Tibetans appear to be willing to agree. The proposal has received our very careful consideration. We propose to agree to the imposition, under new Trade Regulations, of duty on imports and exports from and to India, and we hope to be able to substitute, in place of duty and irregular transit fees, one consolidated payment at frontier. Colonel Younghusband has been informed that the Government of India are disposed to regard the suggestion favourably. Pending receipt of your orders, which it is desirable should be communicated at the earliest possible date, Younghusband has been instructed not to commit Government, but to make further inquiry with a view to ascertaining whether the Tibetans would be prepared to agree to establishment of trade mart in Eastern Tibet, to the survey referred to in my telegram of the 3rd of September, and to the Customs arrangements indicated above, in consideration of the remission, as an act of grace, of one-third (25 lakhs) of indemnity. Remission might be made by Viceroy, on ratification of agreement, should Tibetans agree to these conditions, and a supplementary note giving effect to them might be annexed to the agreement. This note might also contain a provision giving Tibetans option of paying the balance of indemnity in instalments of more than one lakh annually, the number of which it will not be necessary to specify. The indefinite prolongation of our occupation of the Chumbi Valley under the terms of the agreement would by this means be obviated."

Enclosure No. 323.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 15th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 7th September. Prisoners were exchanged to-day; Macdonald releasing all prisoners of war and two (Shapes) bringing two men who had been imprisoned for nineteen years for assistance given to Sarat Chandra Das and two others for helping Japanese traveller Kawaguchi. In accordance with promise, I returned fine exacted for assault by Monk on British officers, but deducted one thousand rupees for compensation families of two Mission servants caught by Tibetans in Gyangtse town on night of attack on Mission, both of which were barbarously tortured, one to death. I also released hostages. Shapes assured me they now intended keep treaty.

Enclosure No. 324.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 15*th September*, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 10th September. Your telegram, 6th September. Government may rely upon my experience of Himalayan passes, extending over many years, not to involve troops in undue hardships. I hope be able leave here 20th September, but considering complicated situation I have to deal with and extreme importance of satisfactorily settling things before I go, I do not think I ought to be grudged two months' stay here. Snow, which fallen on passes during rains, does not lie at all, clears away at end September, and passes between here and India are never closed even in depth of winter. Few frost-bites is worst that could happen, and general health of troops returning in bright clear dry weather should be excellent. Mission was at 15,000 feet till December 6th last year, and then crossed pass one thousand feet higher than any we have to cross on way back from here.

Enclosure No. 325.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 15*th September*, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 10th September. Tongsa Penlop made formal call to-day to congratulate me on successful issue of negotiations with Tibetans. He says Tibetans are well satisfied with settlement, and he anticipates no further trouble. His own opinion is that Dalai Lama is not far beyond Nagchuka and has been in communication with people here throughout. Tongsa Penlop thinks, however, that he would not be able upset Convention, even if he did return, because his own seal is supported by seal of every official body of authority in the country, and also because there is no resentment at settlement or manner in which it has been made. Nepalese Representative is of same opinion.

Enclosure No. 326.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, Lhasa, dated the 16*th September*, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

As it is most desirable to secure final settlement of matters, mentioned in my telegrams of 14th September, you are authorised, in case of necessity, on departure of main force, to retain an escort of strength not exceeding 500 men with you at Lhasa for reasonable time. You should arrange details of escort and appointment of commanding officer with Macdonald, to whom copy of this message should be given for guidance. Escort should be kept as small as is compatible with suitable conduct of negotiations.

Enclosure No. 327.

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel C. W. Ravenshaw, Resident in Nepal, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated the 10*th September,* 1904.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram, dated the 5th September, 1904, and to forward a list of the Tibetan officials who signed the Treaty of 1856 between Nepal and Tibet, a copy of which has also been sent to Colonel Younghusband.

2. As it seems difficult to obtain a *facsimile* of the seals on the treaty, the Durbar has courteously agreed to allow the original treaty to be sent to you for inspection and return, and this has been despatched separately by parcel post.

The following Tibet officials signed the 1856 Treaty between Nepal and Tibet:—

1. Chhenair-Nawang-Dhanchen, for the Dalai Lama.
2. Khaibo-Na-Wang-Sang-Drook, Lawa of Dhaibung monastery.
3. Thue-Me-Lop-Sang-Rap, disciple of Dhaibung and other monasteries.
4. Khaimdo-Lisan-Tuachen, of Sera monastery.
5. Thue-Me-Lop-Sang Jam-Yang, disciple of Sera and other monasteries.
6. Khaimdo-Lawang-Nima, Lama of Ghalden monastery.
7. Thue-Mirap-Kamina, disciple of Ghalden and other monasteries.
8. Khaimdo-Losang-Jhal-Chen, Lama of Tasilimbo monastery.
9. Thue-Migha-Leta-Kopa, disciple of Tasilimbo monastery.
10. Jam-Yang-Mun-Lam, for Lama Thichen Rimbochi of Sakhya monastery.
11. Ghyal-Chen-Twain-Dup, for Lama Tulbi-ku of Chhecholing monastery.
12. Setha, Kazi, who is working for Lhasa Bhot.
13. Pailing, Kazi.
14. Thaichu-Sun-Druphro-Prang, Kazi.
15. Thaichu-Tasi-Khangsar, Kazi.
16. Nima-Dhundo, Treasurer of Tasilimbo.
17. Kashya-Chan-Nairdumbise, nephew of Sethe Kazi.

Enclosure No. 328.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lhasa, the 28*th August,* 1904.

(Extract.)

The Ti Rimpoche, the Yutok Shape and the Tsarong Shape accompanied by the Tongsa Penlop, called upon me to-day. They announced that they had been deputed by the National Assembly to discuss the settlement direct with me, as they thought there was delay in dealing through the Amban. I remarked that I understood they were fairly well agreed to accede to all our terms except in regard to the indemnity. They said they had written to the Amban, saying definitely that they would agree to all the terms except that regarding the payment of an indemnity and except in regard to opening further marts in future. They expressed a wish to make the settlement directly with me, and when we had agreed upon it then they would communicate the result to the Amban. I said that I would be ready to receive them whenever they wished to discuss matters with me. What I should tell them and what I should tell the Amban would be exactly the same, but if they liked to hear my views from me direct, I would gladly receive them. They then again announced that they were ready to agree to all our terms but one. The indemnity they could not pay. Tibet was a poor country, and the Tibetans had already suffered heavily during the war; many had been killed, their houses had been burnt, jongs and monasteries had been destroyed; and in addition to all this evil it was impossible for them to pay an indemnity as well. The little money they had was spent in religious services in support of the monasteries, in buying vessels for the temples and butter to burn before the gods. The peasants had to supply transport for officials in addition, and there were no means whatever for paying the heavy indemnity we were demanding. I replied that the war in Sikkim had cost us a million sterling, and the present war would cost us another million. After the Sikkim war the Tibetans had repudiated the treaty which the Amban then made, and we might very justifiably now ask for an indemnity for the Sikkim war, as well as for this. We were, however, making no such demand and we were only asking from Tibet half the cost of the present war. I knew, of course, that Tibet had suffered from the present war, but no such suffering need have occurred if they had negotiated with me at Khamba Jong last year. And while they had suffered we also had not escaped without trouble. Captain O'Connor had himself been wounded; and what we looked upon as extremely serious in this matter was that the representative of the British Government should have been attacked. If they attacked the Amban here they knew well how angry the Emperor of China would be. I quite recognised, however, the difficulty they had in paying the indemnity in cash within three years. I would therefore be prepared to receive proposals from them as to modifications in the manner of payment. If for instance they thought it impossible to pay the whole indemnity in three years, and would like the term extended to five, I would submit such a proposal for the orders of the Viceroy. Or, again, if they would prefer to pay the indemnity at the rate of a lakh of rupees a year for a long term of years, I would ask Government if the difficulty might be met in that way. They expressed their disappointment at this answer, as they had hoped that when they had agreed to all our terms except this one I would have given way on it and excused them paying the indemnity, and they trusted I would not send them back to the National Assembly with so disheartening an answer. In most cases of bargaining if one party got half the things he had asked he would be satisfied. I had got all the points except one, and still was not satisfied. If I could not agree to that myself would I not refer it to the Viceroy? If I did this they had great hopes the Viceroy would excuse them the indemnity. I replied that a reference to the Viceroy would be of no use, for it happened that the terms I was now asking were modifications ordered by the British Government. The Ti Rimpoche said that if the British Government had been lenient once they might be lenient again, and asked me to put their petition before them. I replied that the British Government had considered this matter most carefully, before issuing these commands, so if I now dared to suggest that one of them should not be carried out I should be immediately dismissed from my post. I was prepared, as I had said, to submit proposals for alternative methods of payment of the indemnity, and I would be also prepared to submit proposals for privileges of concessions in Tibet which might be taken in lieu of part of the indemnity. But the indemnity in some manner or other would have to be paid. The Tsarong Depon said we were accustomed to fish in the ocean and did not understand that there were not so many fish to be got out of a well as could be caught from the sea. A field could only yield according to its size and the amount put into it. A poor peasant got only just enough from his field to support himself and his family, with a very little over for religious offerings. It was hard, therefore, that we should demand so much from Tibet, and the National Assembly would be very much disheartened at the result of this interview. I replied that what they had agreed to was what cost them nothing, and what was indeed to their advantage. The opening of trade-marts would in reality prove of much more benefit to them than to us. The only thing that really cost them anything they were consistently refusing. Even on that point I was prepared to make it as easy for them in carrying out as possible and I could not acknowledge that they had any cause for complaint. The Tongsa Penlop then said that he hoped I would take into consideration the sufferings the Tibetans had already gone through, and, if I could, lay the matter before His Excellency the Viceroy. I told the Tongsa Penlop that I was always glad to hear suggestions from one who had proved himself so staunch a friend of the British Government and if he could think of some way which would save India from being saddled with the cost of this war and at the same time not weigh too heavily upon the Tibetans he would be doing a service which would be appreciated by both the Government of India and the Tibetans.

Enclosure No. 329.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 15th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 11th September, 5 a.m. All prisoners of war were released on 8th, the Tibetans also releasing certain political prisoners of their own. On 9th survey party, escorted by one company, 32nd Pioneers, and seven mounted infantry, proceeded up the Ramtaguyla valley. Relations with Tibetans friendly, parties of troops under officers are allowed to visit city, and are well received. The Sappers and one company Gurkhas, with a convoy of 500 maunds supplies, left for Chaksam ferry on 9th to prepare for crossing river on return journey. Heavy rain during last three nights with a good deal of snow on surrounding hills low down.

Enclosure No. 330.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, Lhasa, dated the 17th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

The following telegram, dated 16th September, from Secretary of State is repeated for information and guidance:—

"Your telegram of the 14th September. His Majesty's Government feel it highly undesirable that a term should be fixed for payment of indemnity, which would have the effect of throwing burden on future generation and of relieving from any immediate sacrifice the monasteries and those to whom the present troubles are due. Moreover, they do not wish that indemnity should take the form of what would be regarded as a permanent tribute. It is, therefore, essential that indemnity should be fixed at a sum which can be liquidated within a moderate period. Your suggestions for reducing indemnity appear to His Majesty's Government to afford a basis for a more satisfactory settlement in this respect. They accordingly authorise reduction of indemnity from 75 lakhs to 25 lakhs of rupees, which may be charged on security of Customs receipts. Under terms of Convention, our occupation of Chumbi Valley is to continue until indemnity has been paid, and the trade marts opened effectively for a period of three years, whichever is later. Some alteration of these conditions would be required so as to provide that our occupation of Chumbi should cease after three years' effective working of the arrangements in regard to the Customs, as well as of those for the opening of the marts, subject to proviso that a certain proportion of the indemnity (say Rs. 5 lakhs) shall have been paid. In no circumstances is the force to prolong its stay at Lhasa for the purpose of obtaining more favourable terms than those already agreed to. Subject to these orders we leave it to Younghusband to secure from the Tibetans, in consideration of reduction of indemnity, any or all of the concessions specified in your telegram."

The following has been sent to the Secretary of State:—

"Younghusband was informed by us some time ago that he might stay at Lhasa until the middle of October, but on no account any later. I presume you will not object to his staying behind long enough to carry out your instructions and to get Tibetans to accept Trade Regulations. Present arrangement is that Younghusband, with moderate escort, is to stay at Lhasa, the bulk of the force being withdrawn without delay. There was no time to consult you about arrangement we have made, and I hope you will agree to it. Otherwise it will be impossible for your instructions as to occupation of Chumbi Valley and reduction of indemnity to be carried out." It will hardly be possible to send you further instructions, and Government of India rely upon you to do your best to secure complete settlement within authority now given to you.

Enclosure No. 331.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 18th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 12th September. Amban has posted a proclamation denouncing Dalai Lama for leaving his State. Proclamation has been torn down, but I have not heard of any particular excitement, though certain Tibetans say Emperor of China ought not to punish ruler for leaving their capital, for he himself left his capital when we arrived there. Some Mongolians who have arrived here report seeing Dalai Lama eight marches from Nagchuka, on road to Mongolia, not China.

Enclosure No. 332.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 18th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 13th September. People seem to still regard with apathy proclamation denouncing Dalai Lama.

Enclosure No. 333.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 18th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 13th September. I propose waiting here till 22nd for reply to Amban from Wai-wu-pu, and if no reply has been received by then to leave on 23rd. Please telegraph if Government approve of this proposal.

Enclosure No. 334.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 18th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 14th September. Wai-wu-pu have telegraphed to Amban, instructing him not to sign the Adhesion Agreement.

Enclosure No. 335.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, Lhasa, dated the 19th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Following from Secretary of State:—

"Your telegram of the 17th. There is no objection to Younghusband remaining behind at Lhasa, to complete negotiations, up to the date named by you, provided that you are satisfied that he can do so in safety, and on the understanding that that date is not exceeded."

Enclosure No. 336.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 18th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 14th September. Arrangements for return. progressing smoothly. Weather improved but frost at nights. Sangpo falling. All quiet at posts on line.

Enclosure No. 337.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 18th September, 1904.

Telegraphic.

Lhasa, 16th September, 5 a.m. Colonel Younghusband has now definitely fixed the 23rd as date of departure from Lhasa.

Enclosure No. 338.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, Lhasa, dated the 19th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of 13th September. You now have authority to remain until the 15th October at Lhasa, if you can do so in safety. His Majesty's

Government have authorised indemnity being reduced and our occupation of Chumbi Valley being terminated at an early date. The Government of India consider it most desirable that before you leave Lhasa you should make an effort to secure consent of Tibetans to new Trade Regulations, lien on Customs, survey in Tibet, and additional trade mart in Eastern Tibet. They trust that you will endeavour to meet their wishes on this point.

Enclosure No. 339.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lhasa, the 31*st August*, 1904.

(Extract.)

As it was clear that the Tibetans were trying to make dissention between the Amban and myself, I asked the Amban when he next came to see me to bring the Tibetan Members of Council with him. He came to-day accompanied by the acting Regent and three Members of Council. I told the Amban that we had had some misunderstanding with the Tibetans as to what precisely they did and did not agree to. They had informed me on a previous occasion that they had sent the Amban a written agreement to accept all our terms except that regarding the indemnity, I proposed, therefore, on this occasion to ascertain from them precisely what they did agree to point by point. I then addressed the Tibetans in regard to Clause IX. which was the one, I understand, they had least objection to. I explained to them that by it we had not the least desire to supplant China in the suzerainty of Tibet. The Chinese suzerainty was fully recognized in the Adhesion Agreement and China was not included in the term " Foreign Power." We were not placing a British Resident here at Lhasa, and we were not asking for any railway or other concessions. What we asked in this clause was merely what was in accordance with their traditional policy. Did they agree to the clause? They replied that they did not want to have anything to do with Foreign Powers. They would, therefore, agree to the clause. The clause regarding the razing of fortifications was then discussed, and they began to raise objections, but I cut them short by observing that all the fortifications named were in our hands and would be destroyed whether they agree or not. The clause had been drafted by Government before the fortifications were in our possession. Their agreement was, therefore, merely a formality. They said that in that case they would agree. We then discussed at length the clauses relating to the opening of new trade marts. They had an idea we wished them to make a road from Gyangtse to Gartok and to make big roads by blasting as we did. I assured them that all we wanted was that the roads from the frontier to Gyangtse and from the frontier to Gartok should be kept in repair. We did not expect new roads to be constructed by them, but existing roads kept suitable for trade purposes. The sentence regarding the opening of more trade marts in future they very strongly objected to. I pointed out, however, that we were merely asking them to consider this and not to now decide on it. I said we might reasonably have now demanded a mart here at Lhasa itself and in half a dozen other places, and I could not permit them to refuse merely considering the question of future extension. The Amban added that their objections were frivolous and trade marts were to their advantage. To the establishment of marts at Gyangtse and Gartok they agreed and the discussion having now lasted two hours and I having told the Amban that we had done about as much as it was possible to do in one day he dismissed them.

Enclosure No. 340.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lhasa, the 1st September, 1904.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to report that the Acting Regent (the Ti Rimpoche), the Tongsa Penlop, and the Nepalese Representative came to see me yesterday. The Ti Rimpoche said that there was a good deal of opposition to the clause regarding opening other trade marts in future. The Tibetans did not wish to be bound by anything in regard to the future. I said it was really the least important sentence in the whole Convention. It secured nothing definite for us. It did not say, for instance, that after ten years a third trade mart should be opened; but merely that the matter should be considered. Now, however, that the matter had in the last official interview with the Amban been put forward in official discussion by the Tibetan Council, I was bound to maintain the sentence. While I did not expect that they should now *accede* to the future opening of trade marts, I could not accept their *refusal* to open them. The matter must remain, as stated in the draft Convention, one for future consideration. The Ti Rimpoche then again dwelt upon the impossibility of paying what he considered so heavy an indemnity. He said, laughing, that we must remember the losses which not only we but their own troops had inflicted on the country. I repeated my old arguments as to the unfairness of saddling India with whole cost of a war necessitated by the folly and stupidity of Tibetans. It was bad enough to impose on India half the cost, but anything more than that would be a great injustice. The Ti Rimpoche said that we were putting on the donkey a greater load than it could possibly carry. I replied, using an argument suggested by Mr. Mitter, that I was not asking the donkey to carry the whole load in one journey. It could go backwards and forwards many times carrying a light load each journey. The Ti Rimpoche laughed again and asked what would happen if the donkey died. I said I should ask the Amban to see that the donkey was properly treated so that there should be no fear of its dying. Dropping metaphor I told the acting Regent that I was really quite prepared to receive proposals as t oeasier methods of paying the indemnity. If, for instance, they could not pay the full amount in three years, I would receive proposals as to paying in a larger number of years. Or any other reasonable proposal I would be glad to consider. The Ti Rimpoche replied that the Tibetans disliked the idea of prolonging the time during which they would be under obligation to us. They wanted to settle the business up at once and have done with it. I asked him if in that case he had any other suggestions to make. He made none, but the Tongsa Penlop suggested to him that the Tibetans should let us collect the customs duties at the new trade marts and get the amount of the indemnity from that source. The Ti Rimpoche said, while he personally saw the wisdom of agreeing to our terms he could not persuade the National Assembly to be reasonable. I said I quite saw that he was more sensible than the National Assembly, and that he was doing his best to bring them to reason. When, therefore, I used hard words and employed threats he must consider them as directed at the stupid, obstructive people and not at himself personally.

Enclosure No. 341.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lhasa, the 2nd September, 1904.

(Extract.)

Two days ago I intimated to the Amban that I would call on him on September 1st to present the final full draft of the Convention, and I asked him to have the Shapes present on the occasion. The result of the interview which took place I have the honour to now report, for the information of the Government of India. After some general conversation I intimated to the Amban that I would proceed to business. He thereupon summoned the Shapes. They were received by him and seated on stools in the centre of the room. Most of the members of the National Assembly now sitting were also present and were huddled into corners of the room. I then rose and presented the Amban with the full and final draft of the Convention (as forwarded to me in your letter, dated August 5th) in English, Chinese and Tibetan. The Amban handed the Tibetan copy to Shapes, and when all were seated again I asked the Amban's permission to address a few words to the Tibetans in regard to the Convention. The Amban having assented I said that as this was the first opportunity I had had of addressing members of the National Assembly, I wished to take advantage of it to let them know that if they had negotiated with me at Khamba Jong, or even at Gyangtse when I first arrived there, the terms would not have been as severe as these we were now asking. We would merely have arranged trade and boundary questions, and there would have been no demand for an indemnity. By following the advice the Amban had given them they might have been saved all the trouble which had now come on them. They had chosen to fight and had been defeated and had to pay the consequence. Yet even now we were not demanding the whole but only half the cost of the military operations. The other half would have to fall upon India. The sum we were now asking would, if the Convention were signed the next day, be 75 lakhs of rupees, calculated at the rate of Rs. 50,000 a day from the date on which I was attacked at Gyangtse till one month after date of signature of the Convention. If they signed it on September 3rd the amount would be 75½ lakhs. If on September 4th, 76 lakhs, and so on. I was prepared to explain any point in the final draft which they did not understand, but I could not further discuss the terms. They had been especially framed with moderation. They embodied the commands of the British Government and would have to be accepted. I would give them another week within which they might receive explanation and think matters over. But I could not give them any longer time for which they were punishing themselves by adding day by day to the amount of the indemnity; they were also punishing India who had to pay the other half of the cost. They asked to be allowed to take away the final draft and consider it. I said that as long as they did not mind paying Rs. 50,000 a day they might consider it and come to me or my Secretary for explanations. They then made an appeal to the Amban to intercede with me on their behalf. The Amban merely acknowledged their request and then, after asking me if I had anything further to say to them, dismissed them. When they were gone I said to the Amban that I was sorry to have to speak to them as I had done, but my experience had been that soft words and reasoning had no effect on their obstinate natures. I then said that the Tibetans were agreeing to all the terms which did not hurt them in the least and were indeed advantageous, but were refusing the indemnity, the only one of the terms which cost them anything. Excluding foreigners was in accordance with their traditional policy and was therefore no sacrifice. As to opening trade marts that was to their advantage. They were born traders and bargainers as we were finding to our cost, for they were extorting extravagant prices from us for the articles they brought for sale. The Amban and his staff laughed heartily over this and said that trade marts were of course to their advantage. As to the indemnity, I said I had had some experience of Native States and comparing Tibet with them I should say Tibet was quite able to pay the amount we were asking. If, however, the Tibetans could not pay the whole amount within three years, I was quite prepared, as I had informed them, to receive proposals for the extension of the period of payment. The Amban thought this reasonable, but made no further remark. I then observed that the draft Convention which I had received from Government was made out between me and the Dalai Lama. Was there any chance of the Dalai Lama returning in time to conclude the Convention with me? The Amban said there was not. I thereupon asked with whom in that case I should conclude the treaty. He said that the Ti Rimpoche would act as Regent and would use the seal which the Dalai Lama had left with him, and this seal would be supported by the seal of the National Assembly, the Council and the three great monasteries.

Enclosure No. 342.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 21st September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 18th September. I trust indemnity, as now arranged, is not considered by Government to be excessive. In reality an indemnity of Rs. 75,00,000 payable in instalments spread over 75 years is equivalent to only about half that amount required to be paid in three years. Rs. 36,00,000 is only half the annual revenue of the State of Indore, and Tibet is a country far richer than Indore in everything but cash. It would be unfair on the people of India, who have to pay the balance of expense of the Mission, if any sum less than Rs. 36,00,000 were demanded. But had I insisted on this amount being paid by Tibetans in three years they would have been left with a sense of oppression. A nasty racial feeling would have sprung up, as the Tibetan Government, instead of making the rich monasteries disgorge, would have squeezed the money out of the poor peasantry. The arrangement which I adopted was put forward by Tibetans themselves, who preferred it to the various suggestions indicated in your telegram, all of which were put before them by the Nepalese and Bhutanese. The feeling now prevailing here is altogether better, the Tibetans to all appearance being well contented with the settlement which I have concluded. They have acquiesced in proposal to despatch survey party up to Gartok from Gyangtse, and have agreed to depute Tibetan official to accompany the party, without raising a single protest. It was necessary that psychological moment for clinching matters should be seized, for, had further discussion been permitted, the moderate party, who had shown a disposition to conclude settlement, would have been swamped in a sea of argument. My view, in which Macdonald fully concurs, is that our responsibility is greatly diminished by terms of the Convention. With Chumbi Valley in our occupation and the Tibetans well disposed, our merchants and trade agents at Gyangtse and Gartok marts will be secure; whereas their position might have been precarious, after our withdrawal from Chumbi, had Tibetans' resentment been aroused by their having to pay indemnity in a short time. I have, I think, incurred minimum of responsibility, while securing maximum of reparation, and I would deprecate any alteration of terms at present as likely to unsettle minds of the Tibetans who are content with present arrangement. If any different arrangement is required it could be made more conveniently when revision of Trade Regulations takes place; it would be impossible to carry out this revision, on scale recommended, in the limited time at my disposal, and I would suggest deferring consideration of further amendment. As regards attitude of Chinese Government, it would be unreasonable for them at this stage to raise any objection to the Agreement: the final draft had been communicated to Amban before treaty was signed. Amban was present at signature of treaty. I furnished him with a copy and he stated that personally he saw no objection to it.

Enclosure No. 343.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lhasa, the 4th September, 1904.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to report that the Ti Rimpoche and a Secretary of Council accompanied by the Tongsa Penlop and the Nepalese Representative called upon me to-day and announced that the Tibetan Government was ready to conclude the Convention with me. They only asked that the term for the payment of the indemnity might be extended and that it might be paid in seventy-five annual instalments of one lakh of rupees each. I pointed out to them that such a concession was a very great deal more than it appeared to them. Seventy-five lakhs paid in seventy-five years was only equal to a very much smaller sum paid within three years. In view, however, of the representations which had been made to me as to the difficulty of raising the money and in order to show that we wished to be on friendly terms in future, I would make the concession. They must. however, clearly understand that under the terms of the treaty we should retain the right to continue to occupy the Chumbi Valley till the full amount of the indemnity was paid. They said they understood this. I then remarked that the amount due to us was to-day seventy-six lakhs, not seventy-five lakhs, as two more days had elapsed since I gave them the ultimatum, and for each of those days Rs. 50,000 was chargeable. The Tongsa Penlop, however, asked that this extra lakh might be remitted, and to this I assented. The Tibetans then asked that the amount might be paid in kind, in ponies for instance. I replied that as the amount was so small it would be better to pay it in cash, for if it were paid in ponies or other articles there would be constant disputes between us as to the value of the articles proferred and our good relations might be jeopardised. Finally they asked that it might be paid in tangas, the local Tibetan coin. I replied that I had entered rupees in the Convention, and with that they must be content. The Ti Rimpoche eventually affixed his private seal to the draft Convention.

Enclosure No. 344.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Lhasa, the 6th September, 1904.

(Extract.)

I yesterday arranged with the Amban that he should visit me to-day with the principal men of the Tibetan Government to arrange final details and formalities regarding the signing of the Convention. They visited me this morning, and I have now the honour to report the conversation which then took place. I commenced by asking the Amban whose name I should enter in the Convention in the place of the Dalai Lama's name. The whereabouts of the ruler of Tibet were, I understood, not at present known. The Amban replied that I might enter the name of the Ti Rimpoche, with whom the Dalai Lama had left his seal, and representatives of the Council, of the three great monasteries, and of the National Assembly would also affix their seals. To this the Tibetans assented. I then said the next point to settle was the time and place for signature. There could be only one place, namely, the Potala Palace, and I was ready to sign as soon as the final copies of the Convention had been prepared. The Amban said that he had no objection to the Convention being signed in the Potala. He then informed the Tibetans of our decision. The Tibetans objected strongly, but without advancing any reasons except that they did not wish it. I informed them that they had, at Khamba Jong and Gyangtse, grossly insulted the British representative, and I now insisted that I should be shown the fullest respect. I had been prepared to show, and had shown, the utmost consideration for their religion and sacred buildings, but I expected that they on their part should show the fullest respect to the King-Emperor's representative. They suggested that the Convention should be signed in the Amban's Yamen, but I said I would be content with no other place than that in which the Dalai Lama would have received me, if he had himself been here to sign the Convention with me. The utmost respect it was within their capacity to show I expected should on this occasion be accorded. They began murmuring other objections, but the Amban told them the matter was settled, and did not admit of further discussion. The question of the exact room in the Palace was then discussed, and a certain room was suggested. I told the Amban that I would send officers this afternoon to inspect the Palace, and satisfy themselves that the room suggested was the most appropriate one, and I asked him to have Chinese and Tibetan officials deputed to accompany my officers. To this he agreed. The date for the ceremony of signing was then fixed for to-morrow. The Amban said he would himself be present, though he would be unable to agree to the Convention till he had heard from Peking. Messrs. White and Wilton, and Captain O'Connor, and Majors Iggulden and Beyon from General Macdonald's staff, went over the Potala this afternoon, and reported that the hall suggested by the Tibetans was the most suitable one in the Palace.

Enclosure No. 345.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 22nd September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 20th September, 5 a.m. Some Tibetan officials called and paid a farewell visit on 17th, and expressed sentiments of good-will. Sappers and Miners moved to ferry at Mibseka, ten miles above Chaksam, where arrangements are being made to cross the force on its return journey, and where the Tsungpo runs in a narrower stream, and a crossing will be possible even if in full flood, which would not be the case at Chaksam. Weather fine: all quiet, both here and on lines communication. Snowfall reported on night 13th at Gyangtse.

Enclosure No. 346.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, Lhasa, viâ *Gyangtse, dated the 22nd September,* 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Decision not to take up lower Sangpo survey has been confirmed to-day. You can, however, send party back to Gartok. O'Connor will remain at Gyangtse.

Enclosure No. 347.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 24th September, **1904.**

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 20th September. Unless Mission is to stay at Lhasa for some months, it would be impossible to negotiate Trade Regulations on lines proposed, and no alteration of signed Convention could at present moment be made without prejudice to it. Military arrangements were, after signature of Convention, made for return of force on or near about the 20th September. Under these arrangements, Macdonald says too late now to alter, Mission could only stay few days longer; and as in this short time nothing could be effected by me, Macdonald thinks would be unwise to incur risk involved in delaying force this side of Brahmaputra.

Enclosure No. 348.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 24th September, **1904.**

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 20th September. I made ceremonial visit to-day to Sera and Depung monasteries, and was received at each, by the chief abbots, with every civility, in the main temples. I told them we had never wanted war, and were pleased settlement has been made ensuring peace. I exhorted them to support their Government in carrying out the treaty, and trusted they would see from our acts that we meant neither to annex their country nor interfere with their religion. They expressed complete satisfaction at the settlement, which they promised to assist their Government in observing, and the abbots of Sera said, in addition, that they would offer prayers for our welfare.

Enclosure No. 349.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Lhasa, the 9th September, 1904.

As it was desirable, in view of the extremely limited time at my disposal for the purpose of concluding a Convention with Tibet and an Adhesion Agreement with the Amban, to put before the Tibetans a full draft of our terms at as early a date as possible, as the Government of India had already proposed to the Secretary of State that I should ask for permission for the Trade Agent at Gyangtse to proceed to Lhasa, and as it would be most difficult to insert such a clause into the terms after I had once given them out, I inserted this provision in the draft terms which I presented to the Tibetans. Subsequently I received instructions not to ask for permission for the Gyangtse Agent to proceed to Lhasa. I did not, however, at once withdraw the clause from the list of terms, because in the course of negotiations it might prove useful as a point on which I could, if necessary, make concessions to the Tibetans. But when I found the Tibetans raised no special objection to the clause, provided only the Trade Agent came here on commercial, and not political, business, and only after he had found it impossible to get this commercial business disposed of by correspondence or by personal conference with the Tibetan Agent at Gyangtse, I thought there would be no objection to taking an agreement from the Tibetans to this effect, for, under such limitations and provisions, there could be no grounds for assuming that, in coming here, the Trade Agent at Gyangtse would be taking upon himself any political functions, or adopting the character of a Political Resident.

2. This agreement being of a less formal character than the rest of the Convention, I had drawn up separately. I have now the honour to forward it for the information of the Government of India. It will at least prove a useful spur to the Tibetans to transact business with the Trade Agent at Gyangtse with despatch.

The Government of Tibet agrees to permit the British Agent, who will reside at Gyangtse, to watch the conditions of the British trade, to visit Lhasa, when it is necessary, to consult with high Chinese and Tibetan officials on such commercial matters of importance as he has found impossible to settle at Gyangtse by correspondence or by personal conference with the Tibetan Agent.

Sealed and signed at Lhasa, the 7th September, 1904, corresponding with the Tibetan date, the twenty-seventh day of the seventh month of the Wood-Dragon Year.

[Seal] F. E. Younghusband, *Colonel,*
British Commissioner.

[Seal] Seal of Dalai Lama
affixed by the Ti Rimpoche.

[Seal]
Seal of the Council.

[Seal]
Seal of the Drepung Monastery.

[Seal]
Seal of the Sera
Monastery.

[Seal]
Seal of the Gaden Monastery.

[Seal]
Seal of the Tsong du (National Assembly).

Enclosure No. 350.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 27th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 23rd September, 5 a.m. Four Tibetans who were bringing some parcels for the Mission sent under their own private arrangements with five ponies from Gyangtse were found killed at the south entrance to Karola Pass on the 15th, supposed to be done by bandits or disbanded soldiers. Two men have been captured, found in a side nulla with the ponies, and suspected of being concerned in the deed. The force marches this morning for the ferry over the Brahmaputra, where it should arrive on 27th. Several cases of mumps reported from detachment 40th Pathans at Nagartse, otherwise health of force good, and enteric cases here doing well. Chinese Amban and Tibetan officials paid farewell visits on afternoon 22nd.

Enclosure No. 351.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 27th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 21st September. Your telegram, 17th September. I desire to express my sincere regret for the embarrassment my action regarding indemnity has caused His Majesty's Government. I hope, however, they will remember that I always urged ample time being given for these negotiations, and that time could not be granted to me. Secretary of State for India said that date of departure was to be fixed by military authorities. Macdonald had at that time fixed upon 15th September. I had therefore to make the best arrangement I could under circumstances, and I believe that, when I have had opportunity of explaining those circumstances more fully than is possible by telegraph, Government will agree with me no better arrangement could have been made. I am not, therefore, attempting any readjustment of Convention already signed, for any attempt at readjustment now would jeopardise whole settlement.

Enclosure No. 352.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 27th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 21st September. I paid ceremonial visit to-day to Go-khang Cathedral. I was received with great civility and shown over every part of it, and conducted round most sacred shrines, the monks showing perfect good-will, and allowing party far more freedom in admission to shrines than is ever shown in Hindu temples in India.

Enclosure No. 353.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 27th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Lhasa, 22nd September. I visited and received return visit from Amban to-day. I also received a visit from the Council, who, for third time, brought presents and assured me of their friendly sentiment. They begged me never again to entertain suspicions regarding them, and to believe that they fully intend to carry out treaty. They expressed their intention to pitch tent on road and pay one final farewell to-morrow. They have appointed officials to accompany the party going to Gartok.

Enclosure No. 354.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 27th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp Jongther, 24th September. Mission left Lhasa yesterday. Before starting, Ti-Rimpoche visited me, and presented White, O'Connor and self each with an image of Buddha. This is considered unprecedented honour, for high Lamas seldom give such images, even to co-religionists, and never to persons of other religions. In making presentation to me, Ti Rimpoche said Buddhists when looking at image thought only of peace, and he hoped, whenever my eyes rested on it, I would think kindly of Tibet. He added he would offer prayers for our welfare. Ti Rimpoche also visited Macdonald, and gave him image. Amban, with whom I had exchanged farewell visits on previous day, sent his First and Second Secretaries to say farewell on our actually leaving. Whole Tibetan Council with

Secretaries received us in tent pitched mile out on the road, and showed marked cordiality. Officials, to accompany party up Brahmaputra to Gartok, accompany us, and are making all arrangements for supplies.

Enclosure No. 355.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Jangto, viâ *Gyangtse, the 27th September,* 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp Jangto, 24th September.

I received your telegram of 19th September on the evening before Mission left Lhasa. Had it been possible for me to have been informed last month that our stay at Lhasa might be prolonged till the 15th October, that additional trade mart would be acceptable, and that indemnity required was not to be more than Rs. 25 lakhs, Convention could have been arranged on these lines. Present arrangement, however, is distinctly preferred by Tibetans to one involving establishment of a third trade mart in a distant province where control they exercise is but slight, and in regard to which our action would arouse their suspicion. Had I attempted to alter, at this stage, settlement made with such solemnity, we might after all have failed to attain our object, while it is certain that all present good feeling, which is the best basis for our future relations, would have been lost. As regards best method of meeting the views of His Majesty's Government, I hope to give my opinion on arriving in India. Present was not the most suitable moment for arranging the matter, but it can, I think, be arranged when revision of Trade Regulations is eventually taken in hand.

Enclosure No. 356.

Political Diary of the Tibet Frontier Commission.

29th August, 1904.—Rain fell during the night.

30th August, 1904.—Wet night.

At 3 o'clock the Amban arrived, followed shortly by the Ti-Rimpoche and three laymen Shapes. The terms of the Convention were then discussed, one by one, the Tibetans proving very argumentative. They were then dismissed, and after some further conversation with the British Commissioner, the Amban also took his leave.

31st August.—Wet night. Cloudy morning.

With a view to the cold likely to be encountered on our return journey, Mr. White is having some blankets and vests made up from the materials available locally. This material is a stout woollen blanketing obtainable in practically unlimited quantities.

1st September.—Cloudy morning.

During the morning the Tongsa Penlop, the Nepalese representative, and the Ti-Rimpoche called on the British Commissioner. At 3 p.m., the British Commissioner visited the Amban, when the Tibetan officials were also present, and handed to him final drafts of the Convention in English, Chinese and Tibetan.

2nd September.—Rain fell during the night.

The Lemba Tung-yig-chembo (now Acting Shape) and some other officials visited Captain O'Connor, and went through the terms of the draft treaty with him word by word.

3rd September.—Cloudy morning.

4th September.—Rain fell during the night.

About noon the Ti-Rimpoche, with the Acting Kalon Lama, called on the British Commissioner, and announced their willingness to agree to the terms of the treaty *in toto*. The Tongsa Penlop and the Nepalese representative were also present. A final draft of the Convention was then prepared in Tibetan, to which the Ti-Rimpoche affixed his seal. The formal signing of the Convention will take place later.

F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND, Colonel,
British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters.

Lhasa, September 8, 1904.

Enclosure No. 357.

From the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated Gyangtse, the 28th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

White, Wilton, O'Connor and self will arrive Gyangtse 29th, and, if His Excellency approves, White, Wilton and I proceed Simla, arriving there about 14th.

Enclosure No. 358.

From the Foreign Secretary, Simla, to the British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, Gyangtse, dated the 29th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of 28th. Proposal that you, with White and Wilton, should come to Simla is approved. Walsh can return to Bengal, and Bell can, pending settlement of future arrangements, retain charge of Sikkim and Chumbi.

Enclosure No. 359.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 30th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp, Trabonang, 25th September, 5 a.m. Marched on 23rd from Lhasa to Netang, 14 miles, in fine weather. The Regent came out to say good-bye and express his gratitude for the behaviour of the troops. On 24th marched to Jang, 11 miles. On 25th marched to Trabonang, 11 miles. Colonel Younghusband, accompanied by Messrs. White, Wilton, Magniac and Captain O'Connor, proceeded on by double marches in advance of force to Gyangtse, arriving there 29th. All villages in this valley now re-occupied and harvest in full swing. Inhabitants quite friendly.

Enclosure No. 360.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lhasa, the 8th September, **1904.**

(Extract.)

In continuation of my telegram of yesterday's date, I have the honour to make the following report of the circumstances under which the Convention between Great Britain and Tibet was signed. Half an hour before the time fixed for the ceremony the whole of the route leading up to the Potala and the passages as well were lined with troops, and soon after 3 p.m. General Macdonald and I, accompanied by the members of the Mission and the military staff, reached the Potala. We were received in the Durbar hall by the Amban. The hall was one in which the Dalai Lama holds durbars, and was large enough to hold about two hundred of our troops (some of whom were formed up as an escort, while others had been allowed to attend as spectators), about one hundred Chinese, and over a hundred Tibetans. The scene, as we entered, was extremely picturesque. On the left were all the British and Indian officers and men; on the right were the mass of Tibetans, the Councillors in bright yellow silk robes, and many others in brilliant clothing, together with the Bhutanese in bright dresses and quaint head-gear; and in front the Amban and all his staff in their fullest official dress advanced to meet me with the Acting Regent by him in the severely simple garb of a Lama. The pillars and cross-beams of the roof of the hall were richly painted. An immense silk curtain was hung immediately behind the chair to be occupied by the Amban and myself. And the whole scene was rendered curiously soft and hazy by the light entering, not through windows at the sides, but through an immense skylight in the centre of the hall which was covered over with coloured canvas. The Ti Rimpoche (the Acting Regent) sat next to the Amban on his left. As soon as we were seated Tibetan servants brought in tea and handed cups to all the British and Chinese officials. Low tables of dried fruits were then set before the two rows of officials. When these were all cleared away, I said to the Amban that with his permission I would proceed to business. I first had the Convention read in Tibetan and then asked the Tibetan officials if they were prepared to sign it. They answered in the affirmative, and the immense roll of paper, on which the Convention is written in three parallel columns in English, Chinese and Tibetan, according to their custom of having treaties in different languages inscribed on the same sheet of paper, was produced. I asked the Tibetans to affix their seals first, and the long process began. When the seals of the Council, the Monasteries and the National Assembly had been affixed, I rose and with the Ti Rimpoche advanced to the table, the Amban and the whole Durbar rising at the same time. The Ti Rimpoche then affixed the Dalai Lama's seal, and finally I sealed and signed the Convention. Having done this, I handed the document to the Ti Rimpoche and said a peace had now been made which I hoped would never be broken again. The same ceremonial was followed in the case of the copies in the three languages for the Amban which, having been signed and sealed, I handed to him. The three copies each in three languages for the British Government were then signed and sealed, the whole operation lasting nearly an hour and a half. When the whole ceremony was concluded I addressed a speech, of which I have the honour to enclose a copy, to the Tibetans. This was translated sentence by sentence by Captain O'Connor, and the Amban's interpreter translated it sentence by sentence to the Amban. At its conclusion the members of Council said that the treaty had been made by the whole people, and would never be broken. We would see in future that they really intended to observe it. I then turned to the Amban and thanked him for the help he had given me in making the Convention. He said he was glad he and I had been able to work together, and he hoped and thought the Tibetans would keep the treaty. A copy of the Convention, as signed, is appended. The three original copies I will bring back to India with me. The Tibetans throughout showed perfect good temper and the fullest respect. They often laughed over the operations of sealing, and when we left they all came crowding up to shake hands with every British officer they could make their way to. The Amban was very courteous, and showed special pleasure when my words regarding the continued suzerainty being recognised were translated to him. Altogether I should say the ceremonial very deeply impressed the Tibetans who, without being humiliated in a way which cause resentment, have now learned to accord us the respect which is our due. At the conclusion of the Durbar I had the Lamas of the Potala presented with one thousand rupees. In regard to the Convention itself, it is necessary to say that in the Tibetan translation the Chumbi valley is defined as running up to the Tangla pass, for the Tibetans do not regard Phari as being in the Chumbi valley as we do. In deference to the wish of the Amban, I did not insert the words "Regent of Tibet" after Ti-Rimpoche, as he has not yet been officially recognised as such by the Chinese Emperor. He has, however, been so recognised both by the Dalai Lama and the National Assembly, and the seals which were affixed in support of the seal of the Dalai Lama used by the Ti Rimpochi render the Agreement absolutely binding.

Annexure 1.

Speech delivered by Colonel Younghusband on the signing of the Convention, Lhasa, September 7th, 1904.

The Convention has been signed. We are now at peace. The misunderstandings of the past are over, and a basis has been laid for mutual good relations in future. In the Convention the British Government have been careful to avoid interfering in the smallest degree with your religion. They have annexed no part of your country. They have made no attempt to interfere in your internal affairs. They fully recognise the continued suzerainty of the Chinese Government. They have merely sought to ensure that you abide by the treaty made on your behalf by the Amban in 1890; that trade relations between India and Tibet, which are no less advantageous to you than to us, should be established as they have been with every other country in the world, except Tibet; that British representatives should be treated with respect in future; and that you should not depart from your traditional policy in regard to relations with other countries.

The treaty now made I promise, on behalf of the British Government, we will rigidly observe. But I must also warn you we will as rigidly enforce it. Any infringement will surely be punished; any obstruction to trade, any disrespect or injury to British subjects will be noticed and requirement exacted. We treat you well when you come to India. We take not a single rupee in customs duty from your merchants. We allow Tibetans to travel or reside whenever they will. We preserve the ancient buildings of the Buddhist faith. But we expect when we come to Tibet that we should be treated with no less consideration and respect than we show to you in India.

You have found us bad enemies when you have not observed treaty obligations and shown disrespect to the British Representative. You will find us equally good friends if you keep the present treaty and show civility.

I trust that the peace which has this moment been established will last for ever, and that we may never again be forced to treat you as enemies.

As a first token of peace I will ask General Macdonald to release all prisoners of war, and I shall expect that you will set at liberty all those imprisoned on account of dealings with us.

Annexure 2.

Convention between Great Britain and Tibet.

Whereas doubts and difficulties have arisen as to the meaning and validity of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893, and as to the liabilities of the Tibetan Government under these agreements; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the relations of friendship and good understanding which have existed between the British Government and the Government of Tibet; and whereas it is desirable to restore peace and amicable relations, and to resolve and determine the doubts and difficulties as aforesaid, the said Governments have resolved to conclude a Convention with these objects, and the following articles have been agreed upon by Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., in virtue of full powers vested in him by His Britannic Majesty's Government and on behalf of that said Government, and Lo-Sang Gyal-Tsen, the Ga-den Ti-Rimpoche, and the representatives of the Council, of the three monasteries Se-ra, Dre-pung, and Ga-den, and of the ecclesiastical and lay officials of the National Assembly on behalf of the Government of Tibet :—

I.

The Government of Tibet engages to respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and to recognise the frontier between Sikkim and Tibet, as defined in Article I. of the said Convention, and to erect boundary pillars accordingly.

II.

The Tibetan Government undertakes to open forthwith trade marts to which all British and Tibetan subjects shall have free right of access at Gyangtse and Gartok, as well as at Yatung.

The Regulations applicable to the trade mart at Yatung, under the Anglo-Chinese Agreement of 1893, shall, subject to such amendments as may hereafter be agreed upon by common consent between the British and Tibetan Governments, apply to the marts above mentioned.

In addition to establishing trade marts at the places mentioned, the Tibetan Government undertakes to place no restrictions on the trade by existing routes, and to consider the question of establishing fresh trade marts under similar conditions if development of trade requires it.

III.

The question of the amendment of the Regulations of 1893 is reserved for separate consideration, and the Tibetan Government undertakes to appoint fully authorised delegates to negotiate with representatives of the British Government as to the details of the amendments required.

IV.

The Tibetan Government undertakes to levy no dues of any kind other than those provided for in the tariff to be mutually agreed upon.

V.

The Tibetan Government undertakes to keep the roads to Gyangtse and Gartok from the frontier clear of all obstruction and in a state of repair suited to the needs of the trade, and to establish at Yatung, Gyangtse, and Gartok, and at each of the other trade marts that may hereafter be established, a Tibetan Agent who shall receive from the British Agent appointed to watch over British trade at the marts in question any letter which the latter may desire to send to the Tibetan or to the Chinese authorities. The Tibetan Agent shall also be responsible for the due delivery of such communications and for the transmission of replies.

VI.

As an indemnity to the British Government for the expense incurred in the despatch of armed troops to Lhasa, to exact reparation for breaches of treaty obligations, and for the insults offered to and attacks upon the British Commissioner and his following and escort, the Tibetan Government engages to pay a sum of pounds five hundred thousand, equivalent to rupees seventy-five lakhs, to the British Government.

The indemnity shall be payable at such place as the British Government may from time to time, after due notice, indicate whether in Tibet or in the British districts of Darjeeling or Jalpaiguri, in seventy-five annual instalments of rupees one lakh each on the 1st January in each year, beginning from the 1st January, 1906.

VII.

As security for the payment of the above-mentioned indemnity, and for the fulfilment of the provisions relative to trade marts specified in Articles II., III., IV. and V., the British Government shall continue to occupy the Chumbi valley until the indemnity has been paid and until the trade marts have been effectively opened for three years, whichever date may be the later.

VIII.

The Tibetan Government agrees to raze all forts and fortifications and remove all armaments which might impede the course of free communications between the British frontier and the towns of Gyangtse and Lhasa.

IX.

The Government of Tibet engages that, without the previous consent of the British Government—

(*a*) no portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged, or otherwise given for occupation, to any foreign Power ;

(*b*) no such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Tibetan affairs ;

(*c*) no representatives or agents of any foreign Power shall be admitted to Tibet ;

(*d*) no concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights, shall be granted to any foreign Power, or the subject of any foreign Power. In the event of consent to such concessions being granted, similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British Government;

(*e*) no Tibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any foreign Power, or the subject of any foreign Power.

X.

In witness whereof the negotiators have signed the same, and affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done in quintuplicate at Lhasa, this 7th day of September in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and four, corresponding with the Tibetan date, the 27th day of the seventh month of the Wood Dragon year.

Tibet Frontier.
Commission.

Seal of
British
Commissioner.

(Sd.) F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND,
Colonel,
British Commissioner.

(Seal of Dalai Lama.)

Seal of Council.
Seal of Dre-pung Monastery.
Seal of Sera Monastery.
Seal of Ga-den Monastery.
Seal of Tsongdu (National Assembly).

In proceeding to the signature of the Convention, dated this day, the representatives of Great Britain and Tibet declare that the English text shall be binding.

Tibet Frontier.
Commission.

Seal of
British
Commissioner.

(Sd.) F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND,
Colonel,
British Commissioner.

(Seal of Dalai Lama.)

Seal of Council.
Seal of Dre-pung Monastery.
Seal of Sera Monastery.
Seal of Ga-den Monastery.
Seal of Tsongdu (National Assembly).

Enclosure No. 361.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Lhasa, the 8th September, 1904.

Two Shapes arrived at noon to-day, and I informed them that General Macdonald had agreed to my request to release all prisoners of war. These were paraded in front of the house, and General Macdonald sent a Staff officer to order their release and to give each man five rupees for work he had done.

2. The Shapes then produced two men who had been imprisoned owing to assistance they had given to Sarat Chandra Das and two men who had been imprisoned for helping the Japanese traveller, Kawaguchi, one of whom was a trader from Darjeeling. The two first men had been in chains for nineteen years, and showed signs of terrible suffering. All were in abject fear of the Tibetans, bowing double before them. Their cheeks were sunken, and their eyes glazed and staring. Their release is entirely due to the exertions of Captain O'Connor. I thanked the Shapes for their action, which I looked upon as a sign that they really wished to live on friendly terms with us. I trusted they would never again imprison men whose only offence was friendliness to British subjects.

3. I then returned to the Shapes the sum of Rs. 5,000 which I had exacted from them, and released the hostages I had demanded on the occasion of the attack by a fanatical Lama on two British officers last month. But I demanded back the sum of Rs. 1,000 on account of the murder of one and the brutal torture of another servant of the Mission caught in the town of Gyantse on the night of the attack on the Mission. I said we did not mind fair and square fighting between men whose business it was to fight, but the murder and torture of harmless and defenceless servants was pure barbarity. The Shapes acknowledged that what I said was just, but said they were not present, and knew nothing of it. Rupees 1,000 was, therefore, retained to be paid in compensation to the servants' families.

4. I then remarked that we had now had a general settling up of all accounts between us, and could start fair. The Shapes said they hoped now we would always be on friendly terms, and they certainly meant to observe the treaty.

Enclosure No. 362.

Letter from Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Tibet Frontier Matters, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla, dated Lhasa, the 15th September, 1904.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a Notice posted by the Chinese Amban in Lhasa denouncing the Dalai Lama.

Annexure.

Translation of a Notice posted by the Amban in Lhasa, 10th September, 1904.

This notice is posted by Yu Amban (&c., &c.) on receipt of reply to his telegram, dated 25th of the 7th month (5th September). The rank of the Dalai Lama is temporarily confiscated, and in his place is appointed the Tashi Lama. In accordance with instructions received notice to this effect has been sent to the Tashi Lama. For more than 200 years

Tibet has been a feudatory of China, and the Dalai Lama has received much kindness from this great kingdom, but in return for this kindness he did not remain to guard his kingdom. On account of his not regarding the interests of the faith, the gods and guardian spirits became angry, and he also allowed his subjects to act as they pleased. Moreover, he gave no orders to his subjects to settle the question of the Indian Tibetan boundary, which had been outstanding for more than ten years. Although orders were given to him to settle the matter quickly, he paid no attention to them, but collected soldiers from various parts and made war, and then being defeated and great trouble having arisen, he, instead of protecting his subjects and country, ran away to a distant place in an unknown country. In the war thousands and tens of thousands of Tibetans were slain, and those who ran away being unable to fight were reproached by him for not carrying out his orders. The teacher of the Dalai Lama (the late Regent) and Him Amban had desired a peaceful solution of the frontier difficulties, but the present Dalai Lama out of jealousy not considering properly the correct view of the case caused the death of many people, and thus caused much grief to the people of Tibet, and listening to bad advice, he heavily punished the Regent. In the case of the Shape Pal-jar Dorje the Dalai Lama wrote to the Amban requesting him to report the Shape to the Emperor for bad conduct, and the Amban having reported the matter, the Sha-pe was deposed and punished. As to the other Sha-pes, if they had to be punished, it should have been done in accordance with the custom of nations; but the Dalai Lama, although he had sent a representation to the Amban and the Amban had himself enquired minutely into the case and was awaiting a reply from the Emperor, nevertheless became angry one day and of his own accord punished them severely. Again one day his anger being appeased he set them free. From this it appears that he paid no regard to the Emperor nor to law and justice. These various crimes show that he is not a man who should not be punished. So being a man of evil mind and having oppressed all his subjects and robbed them, it appears that his ministers cannot hold him in much regard. As he has transgressed the laws of the Buddhist faith and thus caused disturbance amongst the great powers, he has been denounced and so reaped the fruits of his ill-doing and all men will thus receive satisfaction. In order that you may all thoroughly understand this matter I have posted this notice, and you should all, Chinese and Tibetan officials, soldiers, peasants, laymen and monks, take it to heart. In future Tibet being a feudatory of China the Dalai Lama will be responsible for the Yellow-cap faith and monks, and will only be concerned slightly in the official matters while the Amban will conduct all Tibetan affairs with the Tibetan officials and important matters will be referred to the Emperor. The Dalai Lama will not be permitted of his own free will to intervene in affairs. You must all understand this and act accordingly so that no punishment may befall you, and must not transgress my orders.

Dated 1*st of the* 8*th month of the* 30*th year of the Emperor Kwang Shu* (10*th September*, 1904).

Enclosure No. 363.

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel C. W. Ravenshaw, Resident in Nepal, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated the 26*th September*, 1904.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter addressed by the Prime Minister of Nepal to the four Kazis at Lhasa.

2. The letter has been written in the hope that it may assist in the due observance of the terms of the treaty recently signed between the British Government and Tibet, and the spirit and intention which has prompted it will, I trust, be appreciated by the Government of India.

3. A copy has also been sent to Colonel Younghusband for information.

Annexure.

Letter from His Highness Maharaja Chandra Shamsher Jang, Rana Bahadur, Thong Lin Pim Ma Kokang Wang Sian, Prime Minister and Marshal of Nepal, to the Honourable the Four Kazies of Lhasa, dated Katmandu, the 26*th September*, 1904.

After compliments.—Since the time it came to my knowledge that there has been some misunderstanding between the British Government and your own, and still more since 1901 heard that your Government have been allowing matters to drift regardless of the consequences which it might lead to, it has been a source of continual anxiety to me as to what might be the ultimate result of all this. In the course of events, I have had occasions to send repeated warnings to your Government in a way as benefits the friendly relations subsisting between the two Governments, proferring words of what I considered to be the best advice under the circumstances. You are very well aware how ardently desirous I was all the time to hear of the conclusion of the pending dispute in an amicable manner and the establishment of a friendly understanding with our powerful neighbour, the British Government. Apprehensive as I was for the fate of your country, it was with a sense of no small relief that I heard that you had at last discussed matters in a friendly spirit with the British Commissioner, and having come to an understanding, concluded and signed a treaty with him. Although at the present moment I have not had any official communication on the subject, yet I suppose I can safely say that the terms agreed upon must have been such as were agreeable to both the parties and such as would lead to the maintenance and strengthening of peaceful and friendly relations between the two Governments. I congratulate you all and your country with my whole heart at the successful conclusion of such a difficult business, and the ending of a matter which at one time threatened to be a serious calamity ruinous to the country which you so dearly love. I shall not tell you here how the serious losses and sufferings entailed by the late proceedings on the people and the Government might have been averted by the smallest exercise of forethought and imagination in the beginning. However, all is well that ends well. Now that the political atmosphere has cleared there and things have assumed their normal attitude, now that peace has been restored and the people and the Government have been free to return to their proper avocation, now that the stirring events and the disturbing causes of the past year and a-half have vanished, and saner and wiser counsels have prevailed at last, and would, I hope, continue to be on the ascendant in the future, I may tell you that the news of the satisfactory settlement of the disputes has been most welcome to me, and I trust you will believe me when I say that the conclusion of the matter would not have given greater pleasure to the Government and the people of Tibet than to me and to my countrymen. I should not rake up the past were it not to bring home to you, and to impress upon your mind clearly, the utter futility of your attempts to try conclusions with the British Power. The bitter experience of the past should have on you a salutary and sobering effect. Now I exhort you all with my heart to be true to the words solemnly recorded by you in the open Durbar with the British Government. It is a matter of great moment. A solemn promise is a sacred thing which must be fulfilled at any cost. The national honour of Tibet and her prosperity and peace are involved in the faithful observance of the terms of the treaty. I am glad to see that, as I had predicted in the beginning of this unfortunate controversy, the British have left your country entire, and shall not interfere with the internal administration of your country, and this they have done in spite of all the provocations offered to them and of the fact of their having penetrated into the very heart of your country. Let me tell you here again what I have told you in the past, that a friendly understanding and maintenance of an amicable relation with the British Government would be nothing but beneficial to you.

I shall now end by saying that you must not forget that the very existence of Tibet as a separate nation depends upon your religiously carrying out the terms of the treaty, and scrupulously avoiding any occasion of friction with the British Power, and you should not forget the duties and responsibilities attaching to your position, and the sanctity of a promise and the honour involved in keeping one's plighted troth unbroken. The experience of the past should act as a guide for the future, and I have every hope that the future of Tibet, when undisturbed by extrennous circumstances, will be as bright as ever.

Enclosure No. 364.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 3rd October, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Parte ferry, south bank, 29th September, 5 a.m. 25th September marched to Tsabonang 12 miles, 26th marched to Chaksam bridge 9 miles, 27th to Parte ferry north 10 miles, and commenced crossing by three ferries, and by evening had crossed over 1,300 men, 1,300 animals, and 1,650 maunds baggage. On 28th crossing rapidly continued in fine weather, leaving only 4 companies Infantry, and 1 company Mounted Infantry, and 500 mules to cross on 29th. First column composed of head-quarters, 1st Mounted Infantry, section 30 Mountain Battery, 32nd Pioneers, 8th Gurkhas, hospitals and details march for Gyangtse to-day followed by 2nd column with remainder of troops to-morrow, and should arrive Gyangtse on 5th and 6th.

Enclosure No. 365.

From Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald, C.B., to the Adjutant-General in India, dated Gyangtse, the 3rd October, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Ralung, 3rd October, 5 a.m. First column marched on 29th across the Dokla, 16,800 feet, the Pete Jong, 15 miles, arriving with the loss of four mules only. On 30th marched to Nagartse 17 miles, on 1st march to Zara 12 miles, and on 2nd cross the Karo La and march to Ralung 15 miles. The second column follows at a day's interval, and reports arrival at Nagartse on 1st October. All well. Weather quite fine, though there were 20 degrees of frost at Nagartse and Zara with a cold wind.

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